Proscribing Wagner Network
Government's failure to proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation despite it appearing to meet legal criteria.
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54 committee recs
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Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.
Select committee recommendations(54)— showing 50 strongest matches
#22 —
Recommendation: As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue …
Response attribution not verified
#5 —
Recommendation: An increasingly assertive and revisionist China has created geo-political friction with a more introspective United States. China and Russia, as leading authoritarian and revisionist powers, have also been more adept than their ideological rivals at realising where their capacity for …
Response attribution not verified
#28 — Proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, meeting legal criteria.
Recommendation: As a ‘stick’, the Government should proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, recognising that—while there are risks of doing so—there are also risks of failing to do so, when the Network appears to meet the legal criteria. (Paragraph …
Response attribution not verified
#1 — Wagner Network operates globally, undertaking military and non-military operations in many countries since 2014.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. …
Response attribution not verified
#31 — Government under-estimated Wagner Network, lacking strategy, leadership, and joined-up working.
Recommendation: For nearly 10 years, the Government has under-played and under-estimated the Wagner Network’s activities, as well as the security implications of its significant expansion. The Government has not told us anything specific that it is doing to challenge the network’s …
Response attribution not verified
#25 — Offer customised packages of military, aid, and trade support to priority countries.
Recommendation: The Government should offer a genuinely compelling alternative to priority countries in need of investment and security partnership, in collaboration with partners. Priority countries are especially likely to be neighbouring countries to those where the Wagner Network is engaged. A …
Response attribution not verified
#21 — Urgently assess compiled Wagner-linked names and impose sanctions if thresholds are met.
Recommendation: We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met.
Response attribution not verified
#17 — Expedite and strengthen sanctions against all Wagner-linked individuals and entities, closing enforcement gaps.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner- linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should: (Paragraph 58) (a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already …
Response attribution not verified
#7 — Explicitly state government opposition to countries cooperating with Wagner Network and impose consequences.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government explicitly states that it opposes the co-operation of any country with the Wagner Network, or future iterations thereof, due to the security threats of the ‘Wagner model’ of business and governance. Where countries can be …
Response attribution not verified
#5 — Wagner Network's continued growth presents serious national security threats to the UK.
Recommendation: There are serious national security threats to the UK and its allies of allowing the network to continue to thrive, not to mention devastating human consequences, including contributing to the refugee crisis for example, Sudan. (Paragraph 30) Guns for gold: …
Response attribution not verified
#4 — Wagner Network functions as an international criminal mafia, committing atrocities and plundering resources.
Recommendation: There is a significant gap between perception and capability when it comes to the Wagner Network. Despite the continued belief by some that inviting them into a country will result in benefits, the reality is that regimes pay a high …
Response attribution not verified
#100 — Unaccompanied children in contingency accommodation highly vulnerable to trafficking and going missing.
Recommendation: Unaccompanied children living in contingency accommodation are particularly vulnerable to being trafficked, or re-trafficked. Between July 2021 and 19 October 2022, there were 391 episodes where children went missing from hotels. This is unacceptable.
Response attribution not verified
#34 — Government remains complacent regarding states' malign use of Private Military Companies.
Recommendation: The Government appears remarkably complacent about the growing practice of states using PMCs for malign purposes. Although the expansion of the Wagner Network and the harm it has caused appears to have led to some re-examination of the Government’s approach …
Response attribution not verified
#32 — Government lacks knowledge and policy on other malign Private Military Companies.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network is merely the best-known and documented example of a PMC acting deniably on behalf of a state to further its interests and enrich its elites, at the expense of local citizens’ safety and stability in the long …
Response attribution not verified
#24 — Declassify and share intelligence on Wagner Network's destabilising effects with engaging countries.
Recommendation: As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States …
Response attribution not verified
#23 — Seize opportunity to deter countries from engaging with Wagner Network using international cooperation.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government seizes this opportunity and works with international partners to deter countries from engaging with the Wagner Network, using a carrot and stick approach.
Response attribution not verified
#20 — Committee compiles public Wagner-linked names to aid government understanding of the network.
Recommendation: In the public interest, we have compiled Wagner-linked names that are already a matter of public record, as identified via our commissioned open-source research (see Appendix 2). In doing so, we hope to challenge the mystique that the Wagner Network …
Response attribution not verified
#19 — Prioritise introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals, collaborating with Turkey.
Recommendation: We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians.
Response attribution not verified
#18 — Establish a regular mechanism for coordinating Wagner-linked sanctions with US and EU partners.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government establishes a specific and regular mechanism for coordinating with the United States and the European Union over Wagner- linked sanctions; it should report back to us on what these mechanisms are, and how frequently and …
Response attribution not verified
#15 — Government's blanket Wagner Group sanctions approach creates enforcement gaps for linked entities.
Recommendation: The Government claimed that its sanctioning of the ‘Wagner Group’ automatically covered all the entities that the Group owns or controls. This approach under- appreciates the complexity of the network. It is also completely unrealistic. It leaves both enforcement agencies …
Response attribution not verified
#14 — UK's Wagner Network sanctioning efforts and allied coordination remain inadequate.
Recommendation: The UK’s efforts to sanction the Wagner Network are underwhelming in the extreme, compared to those of the European Union and the United States. The responses from the Minister leave us with limited confidence that the UK coordinates effectively with …
Response attribution not verified
#13 — Improve intelligence-gathering on Wagner Network activities in more countries and establish a taskforce.
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government improve its intelligence-gathering on the Wagner Network’s activities in a wider range of countries, particularly in the countries where 54 Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed we have medium-confidence of attempts at Wagner involvement. …
Response attribution not verified
#9 — Focusing solely on Europe for Wagner Network activities is a significant failing.
Recommendation: However, it is a significant failing to see the Wagner Network primarily through the prism of Europe, not least given its geographic spread, the impact of its activities on UK interests further abroad, and the fact that its wealth creation …
Response attribution not verified
#6 — Wagner Network's links to the Russian state confirmed, but countries may still engage.
Recommendation: Over the past year and a half, the Russia-Ukraine war eroded the Wagner Network’s deniability and Prigozhin’s public arguments with the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the network’s long-suspected links to the Russian state. The brutality of its fighters in …
Response attribution not verified
#3 — Host governments engage Wagner Network due to perceived security benefits, furthering regime objectives.
Recommendation: Host governments and other non-regime actors must perceive benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network, because they consider it the most effective form of protection and security. There are examples of its fighters furthering a regime’s security objectives, even if …
Response attribution not verified
#102 — Consider every child missing from home or care as a potential victim of trafficking.
Recommendation: Every child who goes missing from home or care should be considered as a potential victim of trafficking, even if they are subsequently found safe.
Response attribution not verified
#14 —
Recommendation: We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on …
Response attribution not verified
#38 — Identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network using support to Ukraine's Prosecutor General.
Recommendation: The UK Government should use its significant support to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Ukraine to identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network. A prosecution in this theatre would serve to help deter the sense of impunity abroad.
Response attribution not verified
#35 — Voluntary model of Private Military Company regulation remains ineffective and detrimental.
Recommendation: The Government continues to rely on a largely voluntary model of PMC regulation. Our predecessor committee conducted a detailed report into the subject of PMCs in 2002. Even then, the risks of a voluntary model were clear, in that it …
Response attribution not verified
#33 — Assign clear responsibility for Wagner Network and establish cross-government lead on PMCs.
Recommendation: The Government should take a more strategic and coherent approach to addressing the challenges of this network and other proxy ‘PMCs’ by: (Paragraph 84) (a) assigning clear responsibility for the Wagner Network and adjacent ‘PMCs’ to a senior official in …
Response attribution not verified
#29 — Wagner Network effectively reconfigures and its activities will continue due to value.
Recommendation: The last decade has shown that the Wagner Network is highly effective at reconfiguring itself. We expect its activities to continue in some form, as they are too valuable, especially financially, to the Russian state to be lost. The question …
Response attribution not verified
#16 — Ministerial knowledge and FCDO-Treasury coordination on Wagner sanctions waivers are insufficient.
Recommendation: The Minister had no specific knowledge of work within his Department to analyse whether Wagner activities undermine the financial impact of UK sanctions on the Russian war machine. Despite finding it “likely”, he could not confirm that the FCDO had …
Response attribution not verified
#11 — Government's delayed and limited focus on Wagner beyond Ukraine is regrettable.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network began its activities in 2014. By early 2022, when the Government began to invest greater resource in understanding the network, Wagner fighters had already undertaken military deployments in at least seven countries. It is deeply regrettable that …
Response attribution not verified
#8 — Government prioritises military support to Ukraine for countering the Wagner Network.
Recommendation: Supporting Ukraine militarily is the Government’s priority when it comes to countering the Wagner Network. We fully support the continued supply of defence assistance and wider support to Ukraine as it fights to liberate itself from Russian illegal occupation. Through …
Response attribution not verified
#2 — Wagner Network is opportunistic but ultimately guided by the Russian state, delivering geopolitical benefits.
Recommendation: The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in …
Response attribution not verified
#10 — Unacceptable 18-month vacancy for Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner breached statutory duty.
Recommendation: We welcome the Home Office’s appointment of a new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner (IASC) and look forward to inviting her to speak to us as soon as possible, to understand how she intends to prioritise the prevention of human trafficking—including tackling …
Response attribution not verified
#8 — Modern Slavery Unit prioritises Illegal Migration Act over preventing human trafficking.
Recommendation: The Modern Slavery Unit’s outputs, including belated information about its new model for stakeholder engagement (Modern Slavery Stakeholder Forums) is opaque to say the least. We deeply regret that a unit comprising 56 staff has prioritised work on the Illegal …
Response attribution not verified
#7 — Home Office stakeholder engagement on modern slavery legislation remains unacceptably poor.
Recommendation: The Home Office’s approach to stakeholder engagement has been lackadaisical. It has taken the Home Office two years to launch a new formation of stakeholder groups (Modern Slavery Stakeholder Forums), during which time key legislation affecting victims of trafficking has …
Response attribution not verified
#6 — Reinstate full modern slavery policy remit to Safeguarding Minister, removing immigration oversight.
Recommendation: In accordance with the recommendation made by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in its 2023 UK country visit report, we urge the Government to withdraw the issue of modern slavery and human trafficking from the Minister …
Response attribution not verified
#5 — Accelerate development of an overhauled Modern Slavery Strategy with child-specific and financial crime actions.
Recommendation: The Home Office, working together with key human trafficking sector partners, criminal justice practitioners and survivors, must accelerate and scale up efforts to develop a new and overhauled Modern Slavery Strategy. This should include actions to address all forms of …
Response attribution not verified
#4 — Treat human trafficking primarily as a protection issue, not an irregular migration concern.
Recommendation: The Home Office and respective public authorities should treat human trafficking as primarily a protection issue and not an irregular migration concern. Future legislation must take account of the legitimate protection and support needs of all victims including UK nationals.
Response attribution not verified
#3 — Home Office policy shift hinders modern slavery strategy and victim protection efforts.
Recommendation: The Home Office’s shift in policy focus to irregular migration is also demonstrated by the Government’s long delay in producing a new Modern Slavery Strategy and by the recent transfer of elements of responsibility for modern slavery and human trafficking …
Response attribution not verified
#2 — Prevent Home Office from conflating immigration with human trafficking and modern slavery.
Recommendation: The Home Office must not conflate immigration with human trafficking and modern slavery at the expense of protection of victims of human trafficking.
Response attribution not verified
#39 — Provide evidence base for effectiveness of voluntary Private Military Company regulation model.
Recommendation: The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation. (Paragraph 90) Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed 59
Response attribution not verified
#37 — Set out steps to strengthen international legal framework governing PMCs and accountability.
Recommendation: In its response, the Government should set out the steps that it will take to strengthen the international legal framework governing PMCs’ activities, drawing on the UK’s deep legal expertise. Its response should address the following aspects: (Paragraph 88) 58 …
Response attribution not verified
#36 — Improve understanding of Private Military Companies and provide information on new state threat approach.
Recommendation: The Government should improve its understanding of other PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSCs) connected in particular to Russia and China, and from all states. This is likely to be a growth industry, with more Governments seeking to create PMCs …
Response attribution not verified
#22 — Significant opportunity exists to disrupt the Wagner Network amid its uncertain future.
Recommendation: There is an opportunity to disrupt the Wagner Network at a time when its future is uncertain.
Response attribution not verified
#12 — No evidence of serious government effort to track Wagner Network activities outside Ukraine.
Recommendation: We have received no evidence of any serious effort by the Government to track the Network’s activities in countries other than Ukraine.
Response attribution not verified
#10 — Government acknowledges increased importance of understanding Wagner Network's activities.
Recommendation: The Government believes that it is becoming more important to consider the network’s activities, although it did not say where it would do so. In February 2023, the FCDO told us there was now “much more activity” in Government to …
Response attribution not verified
#22 — Announce a clear zero-tolerance policy for transnational repression and expel offending foreign diplomats.
Recommendation: The Government should have had a policy of zero tolerance of transnational repression. It is unacceptable that this has not been the position up to now. It should now announce a clear policy of zero tolerance of transnational repression and …
Response attribution not verified