Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 11
11
Acknowledged
Paragraph: 42
Government's delayed and limited focus on Wagner beyond Ukraine is regrettable.
Conclusion
The Wagner Network began its activities in 2014. By early 2022, when the Government began to invest greater resource in understanding the network, Wagner fighters had already undertaken military deployments in at least seven countries. It is deeply regrettable that it took this long, and that the Government continues to give so little focus to countries beyond Ukraine. This leaves us even less prepared to respond to the evolution of this notoriously shape-shifting network.
Government response summary AI-generated
The government partially agrees with the conclusion, accepting the need to tackle Wagner and the value of declassifying intelligence where feasible. It highlights its efforts to expose Wagner's activities and states it has recently enhanced communication channels, particularly in Africa, to address the network's evolution.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Paragraph Reference:
42
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government · verbatim extract
Acknowledged
Agree. 9. We agree with the Committee that intelligence gathering on Wagner’s activities is a priority and have re-examined the extent and scale of our effort. We believe that we have sufficient resources in place to track Wagner. Wagner is multi-layered, complex and dynamic. We regularly assess the group and its impact. We are also in close contact with international partners, academics and think tanks, and access a wide range of open and closed source reporting in order to inform our approach to countering the organisation. Given the fast-moving nature of events surrounding Wagner, that body of work is being continually refreshed, most recently in light of the June mutiny and the demise of Wagner’s senior leaders. We are also working to understand the broader threat from Russian proxy PMSCs. The Government makes use of a variety of tools to aid its understanding of these issues, of which network-mapping capabilities form one important element. 10. We will continue to monitor countries who may be at risk of influence from Russian proxy PMSCs and their networks, including those noted in the Committee’s ‘medium confidence’ list. It is important to note that in certain countries where conditions on the ground are unsafe or volatile, or where we have limited bilateral relationships, we face challenges in gathering verifiable information at a cost proportionate to the threat. We continue to engage widely to highlight the negative effects that Wagner has wherever it operates and seek to dissuade countries from employing them or offering any form of support. 11. We agree with the idea to establish a cross-Government taskforce on Wagner and have already done this – see recommendation 7.
Read the full response on Parliament ↗