Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 13
13
Accepted
Paragraph: 54
Improve intelligence-gathering on Wagner Network activities in more countries and establish a taskforce.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government improve its intelligence-gathering on the Wagner Network’s activities in a wider range of countries, particularly in the countries where 54 Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed we have medium-confidence of attempts at Wagner involvement. This intelligence should make use of network-mapping capabilities. A cross-Government taskforce would be particularly useful as the Wagner Network transforms, following the attempted march on Moscow.
Government Response Summary
The government agrees intelligence gathering on Wagner is a priority and confirms it has sufficient resources, uses network-mapping capabilities, and continually refreshes its understanding through extensive monitoring and international cooperation. It also states that a cross-Government taskforce on Wagner is already established.
Paragraph Reference:
54
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
Agree. 9. We agree with the Committee that intelligence gathering on Wagner’s activities is a priority and have re-examined the extent and scale of our effort. We believe that we have sufficient resources in place to track Wagner. Wagner is multi-layered, complex and dynamic. We regularly assess the group and its impact. We are also in close contact with international partners, academics and think tanks, and access a wide range of open and closed source reporting in order to inform our approach to countering the organisation. Given the fast-moving nature of events surrounding Wagner, that body of work is being continually refreshed, most recently in light of the June mutiny and the demise of Wagner’s senior leaders. We are also working to understand the broader threat from Russian proxy PMSCs. The Government makes use of a variety of tools to aid its understanding of these issues, of which network-mapping capabilities form one important element. 10. We will continue to monitor countries who may be at risk of influence from Russian proxy PMSCs and their networks, including those noted in the Committee’s ‘medium confidence’ list. It is important to note that in certain countries where conditions on the ground are unsafe or volatile, or where we have limited bilateral relationships, we face challenges in gathering verifiable information at a cost proportionate to the threat. We continue to engage widely to highlight the negative effects that Wagner has wherever it operates and seek to dissuade countries from employing them or offering any form of support. 11. We agree with the idea to establish a cross-Government taskforce on Wagner and have already done this – see recommendation 7.