Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 1
1
Accepted
Paragraph: 13
Wagner Network operates globally, undertaking military and non-military operations in many countries since 2014.
Conclusion
The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. The network subsequently expanded to several other countries in Africa and the Middle East. It has undertaken offensive military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. There are 10 further countries where we have medium or high confidence that it has been involved in a non-military capacity since 2014, and many more countries where the network’s presence is rumoured.
Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the committee's description of the Wagner Network, stating it prioritizes intelligence gathering, has sufficient resources to track Wagner, and continually assesses the group and its impact through various sources and international partners. It confirms ongoing monitoring of at-risk countries and efforts to dissuade engagement with Wagner.
Paragraph Reference:
13
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
Agree. 9. We agree with the Committee that intelligence gathering on Wagner’s activities is a priority and have re-examined the extent and scale of our effort. We believe that we have sufficient resources in place to track Wagner. Wagner is multi-layered, complex and dynamic. We regularly assess the group and its impact. We are also in close contact with international partners, academics and think tanks, and access a wide range of open and closed source reporting in order to inform our approach to countering the organisation. Given the fast-moving nature of events surrounding Wagner, that body of work is being continually refreshed, most recently in light of the June mutiny and the demise of Wagner’s senior leaders. We are also working to understand the broader threat from Russian proxy PMSCs. The Government makes use of a variety of tools to aid its understanding of these issues, of which network-mapping capabilities form one important element. 10. We will continue to monitor countries who may be at risk of influence from Russian proxy PMSCs and their networks, including those noted in the Committee’s ‘medium confidence’ list. It is important to note that in certain countries where conditions on the ground are unsafe or volatile, or where we have limited bilateral relationships, we face challenges in gathering verifiable information at a cost proportionate to the threat. We continue to engage widely to highlight the negative effects that Wagner has wherever it operates and seek to dissuade countries from employing them or offering any form of support. 11. We agree with the idea to establish a cross-Government taskforce on Wagner and have already done this – see recommendation 7. SANCTIONS