Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 36
36
Accepted
Paragraph: 87
Improve understanding of Private Military Companies and provide information on new state threat approach.
Recommendation
The Government should improve its understanding of other PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSCs) connected in particular to Russia and China, and from all states. This is likely to be a growth industry, with more Governments seeking to create PMCs to secure their geopolitical and economic interests. The Government should provide further information on how its new approach to countering state threats, outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, will tackle the challenge of states’ malign use of proxy PMCs.
Government Response Summary
The government partially agrees, providing details on its new four-strand approach to countering state threats, which includes building a deeper understanding of PMSC activity and capability, increasing resilience, deepening cooperation, and using full powers to contest malign operations, specifically agreeing on the importance of tracking Russian and Chinese PMSCs.
Paragraph Reference:
87
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
Partially agree. As outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, our new approach to countering state threats encompasses four strands: a. protecting ourselves, allies, and partners from the impact of this activity; b. engaging domestically and internationally to raise awareness of state threat activity and to deepen cooperation on countering it; c. building a deeper understanding of states’ activities and capabilities, as well as routes to respond effectively; and, d. where appropriate, competing directly with state threat actors by contesting their attempts to undermine the rules-based international order and erode our security, prosperity, and values. This approach provides a framework for responding to emerging threats as well as traditional ones. As part of this new approach, we will take a whole of government view, using our full range of powers available to tackle the threats faced from organisations such as the Wagner Group. On PMSCs specifically, lines of effort include: building a deeper understanding of activity and capability of PMSCs and their links to states; increasing our resilience and protecting the UK from the threat of PMSC activity; deepening cooperation with our partners and allies to increase international effort against malign use of PMSCs, as well as working in international fora to prevent the use of proxy PMSCs from being normalised; and, contesting the ability of PMSCs to operate in malign ways by using the full range of powers available, such as sanctions and proscription. China has not followed the Russian example in its use of PMSCs and we are unaware of China using PMSCs to support military operations. While it has used private security contractors to protect its overseas infrastructure and the assets of Chinese companies around the world, this is distinct to the activities of Russian proxy PMSCs such as Wagner. We agree with the Committee that it is important to track the development of both Russian and Chinese PMSCs.