Themes | Data & Technology | The Accountability Index

Delayed cyberattack detection and response

Significant delays in detecting and responding to cyberattack risks within government agencies, despite high-risk ratings.

Source spread

Where this theme appears

This theme appears across 13 independent accountability sources, so the source mix matters as much as the headline total.

13 PFD reports 94 committee recs 2 HSSIB recs 2 CQC actions 4 HMICFRS recs 1 ICIBI rec 1 PPO rec 3 IOPC recs 4 NAO recs 19 IMB recs 17 LGO/SPSO decisions 2 CJINI reports 1 ISC report

Browse by source

Source-grouped records are useful for tracing where a concern came from. Large sections show the 50 strongest matches for that source; counts still show the full theme total.

13 sources
Prevention of Future Deaths reports(13)
Georgina Swindells
12 Feb 2014 · London Inner (North)
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding an unexplained delay in image transfer, the absence of a robust backup system, and insufficient data to investigate the issue. There was also a lack of clarity on the cause of an apparently erroneous scan report.
Overdue
Leslie Carswell
19 Apr 2016 · Birmingham and Solihull
Concerns: Technical difficulties transmitting CT scans between hospitals led to delays in treatment planning. The coroner noted these issues are ongoing, risking delays in lifesaving treatment for patients with urgent conditions.
Response (Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals): • The Image Exchange Portal (IEP) Standard Operating Procedure was updated to clarify image transmission, including contingencies for out-of-hours and technical faults. • Work is in progress to configure all … (AI summary)
Overdue
Deborah Hopkinson
24 Apr 2019 · Manchester (North)
Concerns: Multiple equipment failures, including CT scanners and computer systems, affected treatment and caused delays. Additionally, there was insufficient specialist expertise in Cushing's disease, leading to delays in seeking advice from specialist centres.
Response (Northern Care Alliance NHS Trust): • The Trust replaced IT equipment, reconfigured software, and installed filtering equipment to address system failures. • Cortisol analysis was added to the test repertoire at Fairfield General and North … (AI summary)
Responded
Glenys Button
10 Jun 2019 · South Wales Central
Concerns: The coroner noted inefficient and archaic neurosurgical referral processes at UHW, handled by a single on-call registrar, leading to delays and miscommunication. Additionally, there is no back-up doctor available for time-critical referrals.
Response (NHS Wales): • The bleep system for urgent neurosurgical referrals was modified to include a question about call urgency, enabling registrars to prioritise. • An interim email arrangement was implemented to enhance … (AI summary)
Overdue
Carol Jennings
02 Aug 2019 · Norfolk
Concerns: The coroner noted inadequate referral processes for the Tissue Viability Nurse, including the use of voicemails and a lack of follow-up on referrals. There was also insufficient and inconsistent record-keeping for the patient's wound, lacking detailed descriptions, measurements, and photographs.
Response (Queen Elizabeth Hospiatl Kings Lynn NHS Trust): • A new electronic referral system for the Tissue Viability Nurse service will be implemented in the first week of next month. • A weekly Documentation Task and Finish Group, … (AI summary)
Responded
Darran Busby
13 Jan 2022 · Cumbria
Concerns: A flaw in the electronic patient record system (EMIS) means double-clicking 'file no comment' can inadvertently file unreviewed radiology results, potentially causing urgent findings to be overlooked. This could lead to lost opportunities for treatment and future deaths.
Response (EMIS): • EMIS will review and update the EMIS Web Hazard Log and Safety Case to reflect the identified concerns. • EMIS will review and update training material related to the … (AI summary)
Response (North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust): • The Trust engaged with EMIS to test a solution and identified services using the affected functionality. • The community ward at Cockermouth Hospital reverted to using the ICE Order … (AI summary)
Response (NHS North Cumbria Integrated Care): • The Neurology team ceased using the 'file no comment' function and now uses 'File and Comment' to ensure direct clinician action. • A task and finish group has been … (AI summary)
Responded
Daniel Tilley
06 Dec 2022 · Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly
Concerns: The coroner identified insufficient funding for the police force to meet increased summer demand, leading to inadequate staffing levels for call handlers, resource deployment officers, and uniformed officers. This resulted in calls not being answered or responded to within adequate timeframes, a problem noted to have persisted for a decade.
Response (Home Office): • The government reported that 15,343 additional officers had been recruited as of 30 September 2022, towards a target of 20,000. • Devon and Cornwall Constabulary had recruited 313 additional … (AI summary)
Response (Devon Cornwall Police): • The force increased staffing levels in Communication and Control Units (CMCUs) and initiated further recruitment campaigns, with the Radio Incident Management Officer role regraded and a salary increase awarded. … (AI summary)
Responded
Ian Darwin
15 Aug 2023 · County Durham and Darlington
Concerns: Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust routinely delays serious incident investigations, which may allow hazards to persist and compromise the quality of these investigations. This practice does not align with the nationally recognised 60-working day timeframe for completion.
Response (TeesEsk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust): • The Trust contracted additional expert capacity and increased internal capacity to address delayed and incoming incident reviews. • The Trust adapted processes for earlier identification of review types, immediate … (AI summary)
Response (Tees Esk & Wear Valley NHS Foundation Trust): • The Trust has contracted additional expert capacity and increased internal capacity to address delayed incident reviews. • Processes have been adapted to facilitate earlier identification of review types and … (AI summary)
Responded
Manoel Santos
03 Oct 2023 · Inner South London
Concerns: The coroner identified concerns regarding the late notification of immigration detention decisions, insufficient signposting of legal advice entitlements for Foreign National Offenders, and communication issues between agencies involved in immigration and sentence planning.
Response (Home Office): • New commissioning and handling processes were implemented for Professional Standards Unit reports. • A new Strategic Improvement Operations team was established within FNORC to log and track recommendations from … (AI summary)
Response (Practice Plus Group): • Practice Plus Group (PPG) implemented weekly Safety Intervention Meetings (SIM) and increased mental health Multi-Disciplinary Team referrals meetings to twice weekly since June 2023. • PPG implemented a form … (AI summary)
Response (HM Prison and Probation Services): • Guidance was provided to all establishments in October 2021 regarding informing immigration detainees about and providing access to legally aided legal advice, with HMP Belmarsh publishing this information and … (AI summary)
Overdue
Linda Banks
19 Dec 2023 · County Durham and Darlington
Concerns: The coroner noted that a thematic review of mental health services identified significant issues, but actions were not effectively implemented. Additionally, Serious Incident Investigations continue to be significantly delayed, compromising evidence and patient safety improvements.
Response (Tees Esk & Wear Valley NHS Foundation Trust): • The Trust stated that actions from the thematic review were incorporated into an overarching improvement plan for the Durham and Darlington Crisis Team, with all points addressed and a … (AI summary)
Responded
Dean Bray
25 Nov 2024 · Hampshire, Portsmouth & Southampton
Concerns: The coroner noted staff could not make direct 999 calls from the seclusion room observation area, and paramedics faced delays accessing the patient due to an unknown immediate access route to the ward.
Overdue
Liam Allan
30 Jan 2025 · West London
Concerns: Concerns were raised regarding inadequate lighting and inconsistent reflective markings on riverside buoyancy aids, hindering their rapid deployment. Additionally, the communication process between the Metropolitan Police Service and the London Fire Brigade relies on a slower telephone system instead of faster electronic transfer, potentially delaying emergency response.
Response (London Fire Brigade): • The London Fire Brigade (LFB) has made significant changes to its radio system and is upgrading systems for electronic incident data sharing with the Metropolitan Police Service. • LFB … (AI summary)
Response (National Fire Chiefs Council): • The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) confirmed that a Multi-Agency Information Transfer (MAIT) system, which facilitates electronic information exchange between agencies, is currently being implemented in all fire control … (AI summary)
Response (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham): • The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham stated it would initiate a borough-wide survey of waterbodies and riverside locations to identify safety infrastructure and assess risks. • The Borough … (AI summary)
Response (London Borough of Havering): • The Council stated it would not take action regarding communications between emergency services, considering it a matter for those services. • Risk assessments for life buoys at inland water … (AI summary)
Response (City of London): • The City of London Corporation has committed to improving the lighting and reflective markings on all riverside buoyancy aids within its jurisdiction. • A project plan is being developed … (AI summary)
Responded
Stephen Page
18 Dec 2025 · Kent and Medway
Concerns: The coroner noted concerns that a visual-only electronic sensor alarm on a CCTV system, lacking an audible component and displaying for only a few seconds, could be easily missed by operators, potentially leading to missed intervention opportunities.
Response (MAPP): • An audible alarm system has been linked to on-site security arrangements in the relevant area. • Instruction has been given to enhance physical perimeter safety measures. • Arrangements have … (AI summary)
Overdue
Select committee recommendations(94)— showing 50 strongest matches
#47 —
Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee
Recommendation: We recommend that the Government consult on proposals for a mandatory malicious cyber incident reporting regime. (Recommendation, paragraph 159)
#46 —
Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee
Recommendation: The UK Government will not be able to confront the threat posed by cyber- attacks without an accurate understanding of the scale of the problem. Currently large British companies are not required to report cyber-attacks. This is detrimental to national …
#15 —
Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee
Recommendation: Cyber threats to the UK’s economy, institutions and infrastructure continue to evolve. A string of high-profile attacks in 2025 have vividly demonstrated the devastating impacts of these attacks on workers, consumers and associated supply chains. The boundary between “state” and …
#69 —
International Relations and Defence Committee
Recommendation: The UK’s Nordic allies are at the front line of Russian sub-threshold operations. Russia regularly engages in a range of disruptive actions to test the Nordic states’ responses and resilience. This includes GPS jamming, military exercises simulating attacks on its …
Response attribution not verified
#12 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: While the Government maintains that UK victims should not pay ransoms, it is the only viable option for many of those directly affected, enabling them to keep their businesses afloat and prevent damaging leaks of personal data. Too many organisational …
Response attribution not verified
#11 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: Victims are currently disincentivised to report ransomware attacks, making it difficult to understand fully the nature and scale of the threat, and how best to tackle it. The Director General of the NCA has suggested that it would be unusual …
Response attribution not verified
#2 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: Past attacks demonstrate that ransomware can cause severe disruption to the delivery of core Government services, including healthcare and child protection, as well as causing ongoing economic losses. Mass data loss from an attack can be irreversible, even when the …
Response attribution not verified
#1 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: A major ransomware attack could have a devastating impact on UK citizens and the economy, and undoubtedly represents a major threat to UK national security. A sophisticated ransomware ecosystem has evolved, with criminals able to purchase advanced forms of malware …
Response attribution not verified
#55 —
Justice Committee
Recommendation: Legal aid providers and clients have been insufficiently compensated for the additional work and data loss caused by the 2025 cyber- attack. The response of the Legal Aid Agency and Ministry of Justice to informing and safeguarding victims has not …
Response status not verified
#21 —
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: Common resilience issues faced by the museums and galleries include the increasing threats they face of cyberattacks and of thefts of items from their collections, as evidenced by the October 2023 cyber-attack at the British Library and the thefts reported …
Response status not verified
#3 —
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: The Department is not doing enough to ensure museums and galleries apply learning from recent threats to the physical security of their collections and their cyber security. Museums and galleries face significant challenges on cyber-security and the physical security of …
Response attribution not verified
#36 — HMRC acknowledges legacy IT systems and poor data management hinder AI adoption and increase cyber risks.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We asked HMRC whether the age of some of its IT systems were going to make it more difficult to adopt AI. HMRC agreed and considers the “critical thing with AI is making sure you really have a handle on …
Response attribution not verified
#31 — HMRC acknowledges security concerns with third-party Making Tax Digital software, setting strict specifications.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We asked HMRC whether there were potential security concerns that could be posed by the third–party MTD software taxpayers use to submit their tax returns, including whether there were risks to HMRC’s own systems.63 In written evidence provided after our …
Response attribution not verified
#24 — HMRC’s legacy IT systems pose security, reliability, and cost risks.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: HMRC explained that there are three key risks that arise from operating legacy systems: lower levels of security; lower reliability and resilience; and higher costs of system changes. HMRC said that its executive team and its digital team track how …
Response attribution not verified
#9 — Organised criminal groups' ransomware attacks severely disrupt public services and incur significant costs.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: Organised criminal groups use ransomware and data extortion to make money.10 They do this by stealing and encrypting victims’ data and then demanding a ransom or threatening to the leak the data. In October 2023, 5 Q 2; C&AG’s Report, …
Response attribution not verified
#30 — Mandate EU transport operators inform travellers of UK personal import rules by January 2027 deadline.
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee
Recommendation: Regardless of SPS negotiation timings, the Government must not delay the implementation of the requirement for EU transport operators to draw travellers’ attention to UK rules on personal imports of products of animal origin beyond 31 January 2027. (Recommendation, Paragraph …
Response attribution not verified
#25 — Legal Aid Agency experienced significant delays in detecting and responding to cyberattack risks
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We asked LAA why it had taken so long to detect the attack and to then take systems offline.48 LAA explained that the risk of a cyberattack on its systems had been rated as extremely high on MoJ’s risk registers …
Response attribution not verified
#24 — Legal Aid Agency cyberattack went undetected for four months before system shutdown
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: MoJ and LAA acknowledged that the cyberattack on LAA’s online digital services began in December 2024, four months before the LAA detected the attack on 23 April 2025.46 LAA explained that in April, it took action to boost the security …
Response attribution not verified
#1 — Committee reviewed HMP Dartmoor lease, legal aid provision, and LAA cyberattack management.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We took evidence from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) to follow up on our recent scrutiny of several topics. This included HMPPS’s management of the lease renewal at …
Response attribution not verified
#20 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: It is possible to infiltrate and disrupt ransomware groups’ infrastructure without arresting the criminals involved, sometimes even preventing attacks after the initial 66 A hostage to fortune: ransomware and UK national security infiltration has taken place. The NCA has some …
Response attribution not verified
#19 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: The National Crime Agency is locked in an uphill struggle against the ransomware threat, which is now so sophisticated that even the most highly-protected organisations expect to experience a ransomware attack. There is clear value in the Government’s resilience work, …
Response attribution not verified
#13 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: The Government has acknowledged that ransomware is the number one cyber security threat to the UK. It is therefore welcome that it has published an ambitious National Cyber Strategy (NCS), with some strong commitments on resilience and the cyber security …
Response attribution not verified
#10 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: Cyber insurance can provide a vital lifeline for ransomware victims, offering the sort of support and technical advice not offered by state agencies, as well as driving up cyber security standards through conditions of coverage. Unfortunately, there remains a woeful …
Response attribution not verified
#4 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: The Government and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)—the public- facing arm of GCHQ—have focused significant efforts on enhancing the UK’s cyber resilience, with particular attention paid to major operators of critical national infrastructure (CNI). Nevertheless, UK CNI remains vulnerable …
Response attribution not verified
#62 —
International Relations and Defence Committee
Recommendation: The reliance of modern economies on space-based technologies makes them a prime target for hybrid attacks. Cyber and electronic tactics deployed in Ukraine by Russia have been used elsewhere, including against the UK and its allies. It is therefore essential …
Response attribution not verified
#21 —
Science and Technology Committee (Commons)
Recommendation: The UK’s research base is operating in an increasingly contested global environment. The risks to research security are growing but the UK’s response is insufficiently developed. Though the recent breach at UK Biobank illustrated how research collaborations can be exploited …
Response status not verified
#22 —
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: The Department assured us that it was now working closely with the organisations on how it can provide central advice on improving cyber-resilience and minimising the threat and impact of cyber-attacks. It highlighted the Government’s cyber action plan, which the …
Response status not verified
#5 —
Defence Committee
Recommendation: There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some …
Response attribution not verified
#20 — GovAssure reveals significant gaps and low maturity in departmental cyber resilience.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: In 2023, the Cabinet Office launched ‘GovAssure’, a cyber security assurance scheme, as part of its strategy to improve government organisations’ cyber resilience. Before GovAssure, departments self–assessed their performance against minimum cyber standards set by the Cabinet Office.43 In the …
Response attribution not verified
#19 — Government Cyber Coordination Centre improves information sharing but remains in early stages.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We asked the Cabinet Office what structures it had in place to share information about cyber security with permanent secretaries and throughout departments.40 The Cabinet Office told us that it had launched the Government Cyber Coordination Centre (GC3) in September …
Response attribution not verified
#18 — Departments remain reluctant to share cyber incident information, hindering collective learning.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We asked the Cabinet Office what the impact was when departments did not share information about their cyber incidents. The Cabinet Office agreed that sharing data is essential to learn lessons, understand vulnerabilities, share best practice and work out what …
Response attribution not verified
#11 — Government's current cyber resilience levels remain inadequate to effectively respond and recover from attacks.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We pressed the Cabinet Office on what assurance it could give us that government was keeping up with the cyber threat.17 The Cabinet Office’s assessment was that there was already a gap in government’s ability to respond and that this …
Response attribution not verified
#8 — Nation states pose increasing risk of espionage and disruptive cyber attacks on essential services.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: The Cabinet Office highlighted concerns about nation states’ intent to conduct espionage and disrupt essential services.8 It described a campaign of espionage by Russian military intelligence that involved stealing and leaking data, and defacing websites. The Cabinet Office considered disruptive …
Response attribution not verified
#7 — Government faces rapidly evolving and increasingly sophisticated cyber threats from capable adversaries.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: The Cabinet Office told us that we should be extremely worried by the rapidly evolving cyber threat, which is the most sophisticated it has ever been. It explained that over the last three years, government’s adversaries, which include nation states …
Response attribution not verified
#26 — Legal Aid Agency acknowledges critical lessons learned from cyberattack response and provider burden
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: LAA acknowledged that contingency measures it put in place to keep the legal aid system going placed additional burdens on providers, and that there are several lessons to be learned from the attack. This included, ensuring senior leaders understand risks …
Response attribution not verified
#6 — Require MoJ and LAA to detail cyberattack lessons and funding for system vulnerabilities.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: Despite lessons learned from the cyberattack on the LAA, funding to address weaknesses across MoJ systems is uncertain. Vulnerabilities in LAA’s systems had been on MoJ’s risk register since 2021. However, MoJ’s investment of over £50 million to transform and …
Response attribution not verified
#25 — Department maintains a prioritised cyber incident response and business continuity framework
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: The Department explained that it had a security incident response framework in place that, in the case of a cyber attack, would enable it to keep its services running as much as possible. It told us that its business continuity …
Response attribution not verified
#41 —
Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee
Recommendation: Economic security cannot be achieved without cyber security. The spate of cyber-attacks in 2025 has underlined their potential to devastate not just targeted companies, but consumers and wider supply chains. We welcome the steps being taken to build the UK’s …
#22 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: The Government and NCSC’s approach to ransomware is often framed through the language of state threats. While we recognise that operators are often facilitated by the Russian harbour state, ransomware is primarily a problem of criminality for profit, rather than …
Response attribution not verified
#3 —
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation: Russian-speaking actors are the source of most attributable ransomware attacks against UK targets. The Russian Government’s tacit (or even explicit) approval of these attacks is consistent with the Kremlin’s disruptive, zero-sum-game approach to the West. It also provides revenue to …
Response attribution not verified
#9 —
Science and Technology Committee (Commons)
Recommendation: It is a fundamental duty of government, public sector bodies and bodies in receipt of public funds to keep safe the data they hold on citizens. This duty has not been consistently upheld in the UK for some time. An …
Response status not verified
#20 —
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: In our 2018 report on the WannaCry Cyber-attack on the NHS, we found that the Department and its arm’s-length bodies were unprepared for the relatively unsophisticated WannaCry attack and had a lot of work to do to improve cyber-security for …
Response attribution not verified
#8 —
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: The risks associated with legacy systems include that they can be difficult and expensive to support, lack operational resilience for key government services, and be vulnerable to cyber-attack. This exposes government to what is likely to be an uncertain but …
Response attribution not verified
#7 — Legacy IT systems pose significant risks to government AI adoption and cybersecurity.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: DSIT told us that it was a matter of urgency that the issue of legacy systems in government is addressed, not only to take advantage of the opportunities offered by AI, but also to address other risks including cyber security …
Response attribution not verified
#31 — Over-reliance on limited strategic IT suppliers creates significant cyber security risks.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: Based on written evidence, we asked the Cabinet Office about the advantages and disadvantages of relying on a few strategic suppliers.67 The Cabinet Office acknowledged that trying to maximise value for money and interoperability while managing the risks was not …
Response attribution not verified
#30 — Government faces complex challenges managing cyber security risk within its supply chain.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: We asked the Cabinet Office how Government managed the cyber security of its supply chain. The Cabinet Office told us that managing supply chain risk was complex and difficult. Government’s supply chain has been the source of incidents with serious …
Response attribution not verified
#16 — Departments demonstrate insufficient ownership of cyber risk and hinder information sharing.
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: Accounting officers in departments are responsible for protecting the security of their organisations and managing their department’s cyber risk, but they have not taken sufficient ownership of this responsibility. Often, membership of departments’ most senior boards does not include a …
Response attribution not verified
#22 — Collaborate with platforms to identify and track disinformation actors and their online spreading techniques.
Science and Technology Committee (Commons)
Recommendation: Foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, with use of technology such as bots and AI, put UK citizens at risk. The possibility that some of the divisive messages and deceptive content spread by users—and amplified by algorithms—last summer were part of …
Response attribution not verified
#120 —
International Relations and Defence Committee
Recommendation: Russian sub-threshold activity in the High North is a significant and growing threat. The UK and its allies should prepare contingency plans to detect, deter and respond to hybrid and ‘grey-zone activities’, and consult on how to best do this …
Response attribution not verified
#21 —
Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation: As HMRC moves towards a fully digital tax system, the capability of its IT systems, including in terms of cyber security, will become increasingly important to HMRC’s ability to operate effectively. HMRC has recognised that, due to the need in …
Response attribution not verified
HSSIB safety recommendations(2)
CQC inspection actions(2)
HMICFRS recommendations(4)
ICIBI immigration recommendations(1)
PPO death in custody recommendations(1)
IOPC learning recommendations(3)
NAO audit recommendations(4)
IMB individual recommendations(19)
High Down (2024)
The Government should tackle the increase in drone activity as a means of ingress of illicit items into prisons.
Ministry of Justice In Progress
Warren Hill (2020)
The Board reiterates its hope that Warren Hill will soon be included in the development of in-cell telephony.
HMPPS Noted
Warren Hill (2020)
The Board understands that planned work to correct this [telephony and data lines] has been delayed but hopes that the work will be completed as soon as possible.
HMPPS In Progress
Wandsworth (2020)
The CCTV system throughout the prison was unreliable and not fit for purpose. The Ministry of Justice has authorised funding for an upgrade. When will work commence?
HMPPS In Progress
Cardiff (2021)
The Board is concerned that the use of body worn cameras (BWC) is being affected by the need to service and replace cameras. We understand that HMP Cardiff will have cameras replaced in February 2022: we hope that will not be delayed further (para 4.5.2).
HMPPS In Progress
Low Newton (2022)
Could the CCTV system be replaced to assist in monitoring incidents around the prison?
HMPPS In Progress
Swaleside (2024)
The incursion of drones needs to be addressed on a national basis, with a viable solution found for the whole estate.
Other In Progress
Norwich (2025)
Will the Prison Service please advise when a complete overhaul of the current perimeter security surveillance equipment will take place?
HMPPS In Progress
Huntercombe (2020)
To investigate the possibility of improved technology across the prison to facilitate meetings and monitoring by the IMB in the event of a further lockdown situation.
Governor / Director
Brinsford (2021)
The information technology (IT) at Brinsford is old and failing, and needs to be updated. Long periods without a working network are potentially dangerous and, even at its best, this makes it difficult for staff to do their jobs well. Investment in a good IT system would improve many outcomes for staff and prisoners.
Ministry of Justice In Progress
Kirkham (2022)
While a number of major projects (i.e. new timbers building, new gym and new concept building) have either been completed or are well advanced, the CCTV is in need of an urgent upgrade.
HMPPS
Brinsford (2022)
The information technology (IT) at Brinsford is old and failing. While improvements were being discussed and due to be implemented in the 2022-23 reporting year, it needs to be noted that improvements are desperately needed. Hopefully the improvements and investments will improve many outcomes for staff and prisoners.
HMPPS Implemented
Winchester (2023)
When will the finance be approved for the modernised CCTV system and when will the necessary cameras, connectivity and software be installed?
HMPPS In Progress
Thameside (2023)
The Board continues to have issues with IT accessibility for new members. The process for setting up new members with IT access is not transparent, involves a number of stages and invariably takes far too long – four to six weeks for some of our recent members.
Governor / Director In Progress
Gartree (2023)
Will the Governor continue to push for improvements to the security systems to help prevent the influx of illicit items through the gate and/or via drones, etc? What additional steps is the Governor taking to reduce the importation of illicit items, including drugs and mobile phones?
Governor / Director
Exeter (2023)
Ensure the project to update CCTV in the prison is progressed as quickly as possible?
HMPPS In Progress
Long Lartin (2024)
Security systems: operation of current electronic security protection falls below expectation of that originally specified for a high security prison. Pending formal approval and installation of a completely new system, what local short term plans exist to improve confidence in the safe operation of the prison?
Governor / Director In Progress
Moorland (2025)
When will inadequate bandwidth, which prevents the consistent deployment of body worn video cameras, be addressed?
HMPPS In Progress
Doncaster (2025)
The Board continues to be frustrated by the lengthy delays faced by staff and IMB members when using the Serco remote IT service, particularly for new members. This issue, common with other third-party providers, could have been resolved more quickly with on-site support. What action will you take to ensure faster, more reliable IT support and prevent these delays, especially …
Governor / Director
LGO / SPSO decisions(17)
21-011-288 — London Borough of Hackney
Summary: Mr C complained that the Council failed to take adequate action to control anti-social behaviour by his neighbours in the block where he lives and wrongly refused his application for the ‘community trigger’. The Council was at fault because its out-of-hours noise reporting system was inoperable after a cyber-attack …
LGO (Local Government & … Environment And Regulation Upheld Aug 2022
22-001-553 — Gloucester City Council
Summary: Mr X complained the Council failed to provide local land charge search results following a cyber attack. He said it caused delay in the sale of his property. The Council failed to provide a service, but its response limited any injustice to Mr X.
LGO (Local Government & … Other Categories Upheld Nov 2022
24-013-245 — London Borough of Hackney
Summary: The complainant, X, complained that a Cyber Attack on the Council’s systems meant they were unable to pay Council Tax at the time. X was billed for Council Tax during the financial year and so the Council’s offer of a payment plan is reasonable. There was fault, as the …
LGO (Local Government & … Benefits And Tax Upheld Apr 2025
21-007-452 — Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council
Summary: Mr G complained about delays in obtaining a taxi licence. We found fault in the time taken for the Council to resume testing of candidates, suspended at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic and in misleading statements it made to Mr G during that suspension. This caused Mr G …
LGO (Local Government & … Environment And Regulation Upheld May 2022
20-003-958 — London Borough of Hillingdon
Summary: The Council’s delay approving a Disabled Facilities Grant is fault. The Council has agreed to apologise, pay £2,300, and take action to improve its services.
LGO (Local Government & … Adult Care Services Upheld Jan 2022
21-011-226 — London Borough of Hackney
Summary: Ms B complained that the Council delayed in processing her change of circumstances and she may have missed out on the opportunity to be rehoused in a suitable property as a result. We found the Council delayed in processing Ms B’s change of circumstances between July and September 2020. …
LGO (Local Government & … Housing Upheld May 2022
24-010-997 — Essex County Council
Summary: We will not investigate Miss X’s complaint about delays in the Education Health and Care Plan process. This is because the Council has agreed to apologise to Miss X and pay her £100 per month for the delay. We consider this an appropriate remedy and further investigation is therefore …
LGO (Local Government & … Education Upheld Oct 2024
24-009-706 — Essex County Council
Summary: We will not investigate Ms X’s complaint about delays in the Education Health and Care Plan process. This is because the Council has agreed to apologise to Ms X and pay her £100 per month for the delay. We consider this an appropriate remedy and further investigation is therefore …
LGO (Local Government & … Education Upheld Oct 2024
21-001-627 — London Borough of Enfield
Summary: Mr X complained the Council failed to remove stacked shipping containers near to his home. The Council was at fault for not taking the enforcement action it said it would. The Council will pay Mr X £300 for the avoidable time and trouble caused by having to complain and …
LGO (Local Government & … Planning Upheld Jan 2022
22-000-086 — Slough Borough Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint that the Council has not properly investigated a potential attempted fraud as criminal matters are for the police. Mrs X’s concerns about data protection are best dealt with by the Information Commissioner’s Office.
LGO (Local Government & … Other Categories Apr 2022
22-000-434 — London Borough of Waltham Forest
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about the Council’s decision to grant prior approval for a telecommunications mast near Mr X’s home. This is because there is insufficient evidence of fault in the way the Council considered an application for prior approval for a telecommunications mast near his home. …
LGO (Local Government & … Planning Apr 2022
23-021-311 — Exeter City Council
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a delay by the Council in responding to a Freedom of Information request. This is because it is a matter for the Information Commissioner.
LGO (Local Government & … Other Categories May 2024
24-002-944 — Dartford Borough Council
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaint about a data breach. This is because it is better dealt with by the Information Commissioner's Office.
LGO (Local Government & … Other Categories Jun 2024
25-005-339 — London Borough of Lambeth
Summary: We will not exercise discretion to investigate this complaint about defects to grant-aided works carried out in 2021. This complaint was received outside the normal 12-month period for investigating complaints. There is no evidence to suggest that Miss X could not have complained to us sooner.
LGO (Local Government & … Adult Care Services Oct 2025
24-004-406 — London Borough of Hackney
Summary: We will not investigate Mr X’s complaints about the Council’s handling of his COVID-19 business grant applications. This is because the complaints are late and I have seen no good reasons to exercise our discretion to investigate them. We cannot investigate Mr X’s complaint that the Council has applied …
LGO (Local Government & … Benefits And Tax Oct 2024
21-017-567 — Transport for London
Summary: We will not investigate this complaint about a congestion charge as Transport for London has cancelled the charge.
LGO (Local Government & … Transport And Highways Mar 2022
21-013-837 — Bristol City Council
Summary: Mr X complained about the actions the Council took to recover an unpaid fixed penalty notice and the lack of response to a complaint he made in 2017. The Council was not at fault for not sending a court summons to Mr X via email.
LGO (Local Government & … Environment And Regulation Not Upheld Mar 2022
CJINI inspection reports(2)
ISC reports(1)
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