Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Azroy Dawes-Clarke

Ref: 2025-0388 Date: 29 Jul 2025 Coroner: Ian Brownhill Area: Kent and Medway Responses identified: 1 / 2

Communication during a medical emergency in prison was confused, with no clear command structure established between prison staff, healthcare, and paramedics, indicating an ongoing risk for future critical events.

Date 29 Jul 2025
56-day deadline 23 Sep 2025
Responses identified 1 of 2
State Custody related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Communication during a medical emergency in prison was confused, with no clear command structure established between prison staff, healthcare, and paramedics, indicating an ongoing risk for future critical events.
View full coroner's concerns
(1) As the jury noted, communication between attending prison staƯ, healthcare professionals and paramedics was confused. There was confusion as to who had command and control of the medical emergency, which public body took primacy and the diƯerence in roles and responsibilities. Those attending the scene did not establish any sort of communication strategy or command structure. During prevention of future deaths evidence, there remained a lack of clarity and consistency as to how such a situation would be avoided if a critical medical emergency eventuated in a custodial setting again. (2) (3)

Responses

1 respondent
Department of Health and Social Care Central Government
25 Sep 2025 PDF
Noted

The Department of Health and Social Care acknowledges concerns about communication and confusion during medical emergencies in prisons, confirms HM Prison and Probation Service has primacy for command and control, and highlights existing CQC guidance on reducing harm in mental health settings. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Brownhill, Thank you for the Regulation 28 report of 29 July 2025 sent to the Secretary of State about the death of Azroy Dawes-Clarke. I am replying as the Minister with responsibility for mental health and offender health. Firstly, I would like to say how saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Mr Dawes- Clarke’s death, and I offer my sincere condolences to his family and loved ones. The circumstances your report describes are very concerning and I am grateful to you for bringing these matters to my attention. I understand the concerns your report raises about the communication and confusion between prison staff, healthcare professionals and paramedics as to who should have command and control of the medical emergency, and the lack of clarity as to how such a situation could be avoided if a medical emergency happened in a custodial setting again. In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England to ensure we adequately address the issues highlighted in your report. Good communications are vital during a medical emergency, and it is important that all professionals concerned understand their roles and responsibilities. I can confirm that HM Prison and Probation Service is the public body which takes primacy for the leadership, command and control of an emergency situation in prison, including a medical emergency. Healthcare staff within a prison should respond to and provide any emergency medical treatment, such as CPR, until a paramedic arrives on scene. In light of the circumstances surrounding Mr Dawes-Clarke’s death, I would like to add that the Care Quality Commission has issued guidance about reducing harm in mental health

settings which recognises the risk of non-anchored ligatures. This is available here:

I understand that you have issued a separate Regulation 28 report to the Director General Chief Executive of HM Prison and Probation Service; and one to the Governor at HMP Elmley, Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust and the South East Coast Ambulance Service. I would expect the Ambulance Service to provide more detail about the role of paramedics in medical emergencies within the prison estate. More broadly, as signatories to the National Partnership Agreement for Health and Social Care for England, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England are committed to working with partners to reduce health inequalities for people in prison and improving services to ensure that people have access to timely and effective healthcare whilst in prison. I would like to inform you that the Chief Medical Officer for England’s report on health in prisons is due to be published this year and will provide recommendations for further action. I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 26 November 2021 an investigation commenced into the death of Azroy DAWES-CLARKE. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 11 July 2025. The jury returned a narrative conclusion which read: “From hearing all the evidence presented to us, we conclude that Azroy Dawes-Clarke died from a combination of factors beginning with the compression of the neck via self-inflicted ligaturing. This was followed by a disproportionate use of force by prison oƯicers during control and restraint which led to Mr Dawes-Clarke going limp. After restraint, there was insuƯicient action taken by prison staƯ and paramedics upon realising Mr Dawes-Clarke's cardiac and respiratory arrest. From the body-worn footage, it is evident that prison staƯ neglected to consider Mr Dawes-Clarke's head positioning and breathing throughout the restraint. The poor practice of applying handcuƯs while Mr Dawes-Clarke was in a kneeling position more than minimally increased the risk of positional asphyxia.” The medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Hypoxic ischaemic brain injury due to cardio-respiratory arrest in close temporal proximity to a period of third party restraint shortly after apparent seizure like activity following compression of the neck by a ligature 1b 1c 1d II
Circumstances of the death
Azroy Dawes-Clarke died at Medway Maritime Hospital on 10 November 2021. The jury who heard the case, recorded that, “prior to the 10th November and on the day of Mr Dawes-Clarke's passing, there was a lack of communication between all parties involved with regards to Mr Dawes-Clarke's physical and mental health.” Mr Dawes-Clarke had ligatured in both the houseblock, and in the separation and care unit of HMP Elmley, prior to the date of his death. A decision was made to move Mr Dawes-Clarke to the inpatient department of HMP Elmley. Mr Dawes-Clarke was placed in a safer cell with no ligature points. He applied a ligature to his neck, self-strangulating. The jury recorded, “Mr Dawes-Clarke did not intend to end his own life when he used the ligature on the 10th November. Rather, ligaturing was a known coping mechanism of Mr Dawes-Clarke, which he would use in order to be listened to.” A member of healthcare staƯ saw him self-strangulating. OƯicers entered the cell and removed the ligature. A, “code blue” was called, which automatically caused an ambulance to be called to the prison. Prison healthcare staƯ, including two general practitioners working within the prison at the time were able to attend the cell and stabilise Mr Dawes-Clarke. Paramedics attended the inpatient department and made the decision to convey Mr Dawes-Clarke to hospital. The prison healthcare staƯ, including the general practitioners then left the area. The general practitioners provided a handover to the paramedics and left the prison it being the end of their shift and nobody asking them to stay. Mr Dawes-Clarke had been wearing an anti-ligature gown. This left him exposed, a decision was made to clothe him. Whilst eƯorts were made to clothe Mr Dawes-Clarke, it was suggested that he had kicked one of the paramedics, who then left the cell. The jury went on to record: “For Mr Dawes-Clarke's conveyance to hospital, it was appropriate to attempt to clothe him. However, it was inappropriate to persevere with clothing attempts. The decision making model should have been utilised, and attempts to clothe him should have stopped at the point of resistance. Following the initiation of restraint against Mr Dawes-Clarke, the continued restraint escalated unnecessarily. The prolonged restraint of Mr Dawes-Clarke was inappropriate and disproportionate.” During the restraint of Mr Dawes-Clarke, the paramedics were not in the cell. Prison healthcare were not in the cell either. The jury recorded: “The considerable delay in contacting healthcare to attend throughout the restraint, and furthermore the delay in raising the general alarm caused a significant hindrance. Prison oƯicers were not able to receive vital medical advice for carrying out the restraint. This demonstrates that the lack of healthcare throughout the restraint was a failure and not in line with prison guidance. The ability of the paramedics to perform their duty of care to Mr Dawes-Clarke during the restraint was limited by their placement and lack of visibility from outside the cell. Furthermore, it was inappropriate for the paramedics to approve the handcuƯing of Mr Dawes-Clarke having had no training in mechanical restraint to give such advice.” Mr Dawes-Clarke was handcuƯed (something which the jury found to be inappropriate considering his positioning) and he went limp and became unresponsive. Mr Dawes-Clarke had a cardiac and respiratory arrest. The jury went on to record: “There were significant shortcomings from both the paramedics and prison oƯicers in attendance in their responses to Mr Dawes-Clarke going limp and unresponsive. Specifically, the delay in establishing whether he was breathing and the inaction and further delay when starting CPR. Throughout the whole incident, there was a failure on all parts to communicate eƯectively and properly. This includes the way in which emergency calls have to be relayed through the communications systems in prison.” Paramedics did re-enter the cell after a member of prison healthcare (a registered general nurse) attended. Treatment was given and there was a return of spontaneous circulation. Mr Dawes-Clarke was conveyed to Medway Maritime Hospital, having arrested again whilst being taken there. In the emergency department he became asystole and despite eƯorts at treating him, he died there.

The jury found that, “the level of understanding and care from the prison staƯ was grossly insuƯicient.”

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Report details

Reference
2025-0388
Date of report
29 July 2025
Coroner
Ian Brownhill
Coroner area
Kent and Medway

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 2
1 response not yet linked

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 23 Sep 2025.

Sent to

Department of Health and Social Care
Ministry of Justice

Part of a series

3 reports
2025-0389 All responses identified
2025-0391 All responses identified

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