The UK contribution to European Security

The Government should ensure that it accelerates and further deepens defence and security cooperation with the EU and European partners, particularly France, on the threat posed by Russia and the countries that enable it, notably China. As a nuclear power, it is incumbent upon the UK to lead discussions within Europe on forming a coherent response. (Recommendation, Paragraph 7)

Europe is over-reliant on US defence capabilities. Despite indications from successive US Presidents that Europe needs to step up, European NATO members have failed to invest in key strategic enablers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 14)

The US needs to see European investment in defence capabilities for there to be any chance of an orderly transition of responsibilities. The Government should assess where the UK can lead in terms of replacing US capabilities in the event of them being withdrawn and establishing how it can best support EU capability development programmes, particularly those referenced in ‘ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030’, thereby increasing the crossover between NATO and EU capability development. The Government must ensure that it plays a leading role and expends every effort to hold the NATO Alliance together. (Recommendation, Paragraph 15)

The public need to understand not only the necessity of defence but also their role in it. We are therefore very supportive of the concept of a national conversation on defence and recommend that the Government (and MOD in particular) seek to increase public awareness of recent attacks against the UK, including sabotage, and cyber-attacks, through regular public briefings. However, the MOD should not lead the national conversation— the responsibility for this must be personally led by the Prime Minister and held across the most senior levels of Government, recognising that this is a Cabinet-wide endeavour. In its response to this Report, the Government should set out the cross-Government measures it intends to take as part of the national conversation, including expected timeframes and responsibilities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 18) 56

We are producing this Report prior to the publication of the Defence Investment Plan and as a result without the full picture of the future force posture. We timed this inquiry on the understanding that by now there would be an indication of broad prioritisation, if not specific investment decisions—because these hard choices were not in the published SDR and have not been announced since, we cannot examine them yet: we expect to do so as soon as possible. In order for the UK to play the appropriate leading role in European security, it must address its readiness for contemporary war and start adopting new technology at scale and pace. Time is short, given the urgency of the threat and the work required to respond appropriately. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

We recommend that the Government review the Defence Industrial Plan and the forthcoming Defence Investment Plan, in light of our recommendations and conclusions in this chapter. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22) Defending Europe in the near term

It is clear that the nuclear threat has increased in the recent past. The UK already declares its nuclear deterrent to the defence of NATO, the single most significant contribution it can make. Whilst we have not received sufficient evidence to recommend investing in a second sovereign delivery method for nuclear deterrence, we wish to understand why the Government dismissed this option—we recommend it set out its reasoning in detail in response to this Report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 27)

The Government has stated its intention to implement a NATO First approach. For this to be meaningful, it must implement SDR recommendations aimed at ensuring that the UK is a better Ally. Witnesses have highlighted a lack of mass, delays in developing promised capabilities in line with NDPP timelines, and a failure by the UK to meet its Article 3 commitments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 33)

We were concerned to hear that the UK’s lack of mass is denuding its leadership in NATO. In addition, the lack of resourcing dedicated to the UK meeting its Article 3 commitments is a further failure of leadership. We recommend that the Government addresses these criticisms in detail in its response to this report, setting out the actions it is taking to resolve these issues with a timeline for implementation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)

The Government should set out its plan for implementing the SDR. We recommend that the Government publishes an annual update on its implementation of the SDR commitments. In addition, we will continue to 57 seek regular classified updates on its progress against those commitments related to NATO and how it is improving the offer to personnel deployed to NATO. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35)

The lack of clarity about the Government’s approach to Integrated Air and Missile Defence, given the absence of European IAMD capability, is an area of critical importance that requires urgent action. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

The Government should provide the Committee with a briefing on the Strategic Effect Cycle. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)

It is not always clear how the UK’s many minilateral and bilateral defence relationships feed into the Government’s broader strategy or if the Department and Ministers have an assessment of their relative prioritisation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)

If certain relationships are vital to achieving Government goals then the Government should ensure that there is sufficient political attention and resourcing for these relationships. Given the calls on resources, we recommend the Government ensure it assesses the impact and outcomes of current structures and agreements before starting new rounds of negotiations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)

The UK’s role as a framework nation in JEF means that it has to ensure it is leading both politically and militarily including by ensuring that it has the capabilities required for exercises and operations in the High North and Polar regions. The UK must ensure that the JEF is able to respond at pace and protect its member nations (and in particular their critical national infrastructure installations) given the increasing threat posed in the High North and the Baltic Sea. We intend to examine the Defence Investment Plan for the inclusion of capabilities which would facilitate military tasks in northern Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 52)

The UK’s security and defence partnership with the EU is a welcome recognition of the importance of both parties to the defence of Europe. At present, the partnership is somewhat aspirational, awaiting the outcome of negotiations on a Framework Participation Agreement; access to SAFE; and movement on the UK’s Administrative Arrangement to join the PESCO Military Mobility project. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)

It is vital that British defence industry is not sidelined or excluded from working with their European counterparts—that will be the key measure (in relation to defence) of success when assessing the Government’s relationship with the EU. The Government will need to 58 ensure that its ongoing defence relationship with the EU produces benefits which are demonstrable and adequately explained to the UK public. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

The UK Government has endorsed greater EU-NATO working but should now identify specific measures through which it could best support the improvement of the relationship between the EU and NATO. This could include making it a discussion point in engagements with NATO and EU leaders and developing new ways of working (such as the sharing of classified information) with the European Commission that could potentially be adopted by NATO if successful. (Recommendation, Paragraph 66) Reforming the UK defence industrial base

The defence industrial base has been subject to numerous reviews, plans and strategies, all of which have identified recommendations. However, many of those have only been partially implemented. Whilst the Government appears to be committed to solving some of the most intractable issues, it is too early at this point to judge the progress of these measures let alone their effectiveness. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

There is widespread recognition of the need to address the issues facing defence industry. We welcome the expansion of the defence industrial base and the engagement of HM Treasury and the Department for Business and Trade in finding solutions. However, Ministers will need to closely monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the proposed policies, assisted by our scrutiny. This is an area of vital importance—delivery must be judged by outcomes, not simply changes to processes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 85)

The National Armaments Director is a key post for implementation of policy changes in both the SDR and the Defence Industrial Strategy. As such, we believe that the Department ought to prioritise his giving evidence to Parliament. We recommend that the Government ensure that he appears before us as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 86)

The long-standing issues with security vetting must be addressed. In response to this Report we expect the Government to set out how it intends to reduce waiting times. In addition, we recommend that the Government explore having a single clearance process used across all Government departments and agencies. Furthermore, we suggest that the Government considers adapting its regional testing and evaluation ranges into hubs so that cleared individuals without access to suitable certified premises can use these hubs to take part in classified procurement, as well as for testing and evaluation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88) 59

The evidence is that readiness is suffering because of in-year pressures on budgets at a crucial time of preparation to meet potential conflict. It is vital that the additional funds allocated to defence by the Government do not get swallowed by defence inflation. Both we and the Government recognise the importance of public support (and sacrifice) for the difficult choices which must be made to finance the defence posture required by the current threat. Any money wasted due to an inability to increase capacity will have a significant impact on public opinion. (Conclusion, Paragraph 92)

The Government should measure, benchmark and publish the capacity of the defence industrial base, reporting actual numbers and percentage increases to Parliament on an annual basis as part of its resilience reporting. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)

Access to finance for defence industry is a significant issue as evidenced by the numerous publications and policy proposals from this year alone. We are frustrated that, given widespread recognition of the issue, no proposed solutions are likely to emerge before March 2026, with implementation likely to take much longer. The wider issues which face defence financing appear to be both myriad and complex. But Government ought to be able to identify which of these problems are specific to defence industry as opposed to resulting from wider systemic failings. (Conclusion, Paragraph 99)

We recommend that the Government uses the Defence Finance and Investment Strategy to set out the data it holds and the conclusions it has drawn alongside its approach to resolving the issues with each type of funding difficulty. In the strategy the Government will need to set out how much state intervention it is willing to commit to and for how long. It should accompany the strategy with a timetabled implementation plan, detailing which Department is responsible for each action. As a minimum, the Government ought urgently to create a method of payments services provision in areas where no market participants are willing to provide their services. However, we recommend the Government rapidly conclude and publish its assessment of the viability of creating a defence-specific fund within the British Business Bank and also explore the potential to create other mechanisms. Furthermore, the Government should commit to making the Defence Investors’ Advisory Group available to give evidence to Parliament—whether that be to us, to the Treasury Committee, the Business and Trade Committee or a joint session—once the strategy is published. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100)

We welcome cross-Government work on industrial resilience which we view as area of increasing importance. The measures proposed have the potential to strengthen the defence (and wider UK) industrial base if 60 implemented. However, we are disappointed that the Defence Industrial Strategy failed to recognise and address the threat of disruption from protest and sabotage. (Conclusion, Paragraph 104) Defending the homeland

We question the Ministry of Defence’s ability to protect the UK and the Overseas Territories from crisis or conflict. This means the UK is not fulfilling its Article 3 responsibilities—a fact recognised by Government. Despite this recognition from Government (which has pledged to be ‘NATO First’), measures to remediate seem to be moving at a glacial pace—we are deeply concerned by reports that the UK has no Article 3 national plan and that the work on the Home Defence Programme is still ongoing, a year after it was originally due to be complete. (Conclusion, Paragraph 121)

We will ensure that our future examination of the thinking on capability and infrastructure requirements and the resultant force structure within the Defence Investment Plan will include scrutiny of the implications for defence of the UK and Overseas Territories. In addition, we will seek to establish how the decisions taken within the Defence Investment Plan contribute to the Home Defence Programme and the UK meeting its Article 3 commitments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 122)

Cross-government working on homeland defence and resilience is nowhere near where it needs to be. The Government has said repeatedly that we are in an era of new threat, yet decision-making is slow and opaque. (Conclusion, Paragraph 123)

The Cabinet Office’s leadership in this area appears to be inward focused rather than engaging with other Government departments and wider society. What is required is a clear plan and consistent messaging with well-defined leadership responsibilities—resilience and readiness are not an internal government matter; they require whole of society engagement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 124)

We recommend that the Government produce a public timetable on the generation of the Home Defence Programme and that briefings (at whatever classification is required) are offered to the Select Committees scrutinising the Government departments with responsibilities under the plan. (Recommendation, Paragraph 125)

We reiterate our previous recommendation for the creation of a Minister of Homeland Security who should be responsible for delivery of the Home Defence Programme alongside the Resilience Action Plan and a public engagement strategy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126) 61

We welcome the proposal of a Defence Readiness Bill. However, the Government has not yet determined what specific measures it wishes to include in the Bill, let alone written it. This should be agreed within Government and legislation published as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 127)

The Government should set out its timetable with key milestones for the defence readiness legislation in its response to this report, including its approach to pre-legislative scrutiny, and ensure that it has a strategy for engagement with Parliament and the UK public. Prior to the introduction of the legislation, we recommend that the Minister responsible for the Bill (the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry) implement a regular programme of statements in the House with updates on the efforts to improve readiness and resilience and the progress of the legislation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 128) 62