UK arms exports in 2019

We are disappointed at the continued reluctance of the Government to offer the Foreign and International Trade Secretaries of State to provide us with oral evidence. This risks giving the impression that the Government do not attach the appropriate importance to parliamentary scrutiny of strategic export controls. While we appreciate that other ministers from the relevant departments have agreed to give evidence, we expect the Government to be more accommodating in offering suitable dates for ministerial sessions. The offer of a one-hour session is unacceptable, given the breadth and importance of the issues covered by the Committees.

We acknowledge that the Annual Report contains a substantial amount of information that is helpful for our inquiries and that strategic export controls cover a wide range of areas so it is not always clear which specific topics will arise as our inquiry proceeds. However, it is regrettable that the Government have in recent years only seen fit to submit a one-page letter welcoming our inquiries and giving a very brief general overview of its performance and policy developments during the year. We would, at the very least, expect the Government to submit written evidence addressing the inquiry’s terms of reference. This would potentially save a lot of subsequent enquiries to the Government as our inquiry proceeds. We also expect the Government to be more proactive in notifying us of proposed policy developments. (Paragraph 16) Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports

Whilst we welcome the information contained in the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report, stakeholders argue it is too descriptive of events and does not drill down sufficiently to provide qualitative or quantitative analysis of the data. We share stakeholders’ concerns about the transparency of information available on Open Licences, especially as the Government has previously promised to review what further data it can make publicly available. Industry is already required to record this information, so we are unclear as to why the Government has yet to improve the quality of information available.

We recommend that the Government improve the data that is available on Open Licences. The Government should publish data in the quarterly “pivot reports” on the precise equipment and quantities exported, the companies exporting the equipment and its intended destination, and each Strategic Export Controls Annual Report should include an analysis of this data. The ability to provide this data should be an integral part of the new LITE IT system.

We share our predecessor committees’ concerns over the continued delays in delivering the new LITE IT system. The rollout of the new LITE IT system must be progressed urgently. In response to our report the Government should set out a specific timeline for each stage of the transition and the intended date for LITE to be fully operational. The Government should provide us with six-monthly updates on progress. (Paragraph 27) 44 Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls

A new IT system should not reduce the amount of publicly available information. We seek assurances that the LITE system will enable greater transparency on Open Licences and include a public searchable database as exists under the current SPIRE system. To increase transparency on exports, the Government should enhance the search facilities of its public facing database.

We appreciate the hard and diligent work of ECJU staff during the Covid pandemic. We recognise that this has been a busy time for the ECJU, with COVID related delays causing additional difficulties.

We welcome the decision to launch the ECJU Transformation Programme and the opportunity it provides to improve and reform the work of the ECJU and its relationships with stakeholders. However, given the duty of DIT to inform us of relevant developments, it is disappointing that the Department did not do so on this occasion. Instead, we learned of its existence from the MoD’s Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. We expect the Government to be more proactive in informing us of future policy developments.

It is also disappointing that the Government has not published terms of reference outlining the aims and remit of the ECJU Transformation Programme. The Government should publish the terms of reference for the ECJU Transformation Programme, and provide us with six-monthly updates on the Programme, including progress on its intended outcomes.

We welcome the consultation that has taken place with the unions. This must continue and the Government must ensure that they draw on the expertise of ECJU staff at all levels. We also welcome the customer survey of exporters. However, this engagement should go further We recommend that the Government hold a public consultation with stakeholders as part of the Programme. It is important that their views inform the Programme. The ECJU should look to continue engagement with industry beyond the Programme by establishing a formal mechanism for industry to interact with the ECJU to improve information sharing and to discuss concerns in the licensing process.

We are concerned by evidence regarding insufficient resources within the ECJU, particularly technical and specialist roles and Compliance Officers. The ECJU Transformation Programme should include a review of ECJU resources. Future editions of the Annual Report should include data on ECJU resources including staff levels by grade, post and parent department.

It is important that an independent assessment takes place of whether the Transformation Programme achieves its intended outcomes. Therefore, we recommend that two years after completion of the Programme the NAO undertake a review of the structure, performance and value for money of the ECJU to ensure it is fit-for-purpose. (Paragraph 42) New Strategic Export Licensing Criteria

We are concerned about the lack of consultation on the new Strategic Export Licensing Criteria. While we note that previous changes to the criteria have not Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls 45 been subject to formal consultation, we believe that the unique circumstances of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU mean that a formal consultation would have been beneficial.

We thank the Secretary of State for International Trade for writing to us setting out the background to the new Criteria. However, we would have appreciated prior notification and consultation on the changes. Prior scrutiny of, and consultation on, these changes with Parliament and stakeholders more widely, would have helped secure greater confidence in the new criteria and address concerns regarding their impact prior to implementation.

In response to our report, the Government should set out which countries’ systems, from inside and outside the EU, that it considered when drafting the new Criteria. The Government should also explain the processes it has put in place to ensure continued cooperation with the EU on strategic export controls. We also recommend that an independent review be commissioned by the Government in two years to assess the effectiveness of the new Criteria. This should include a wide-ranging consultation process. We will also continue to monitor the impact of the new Criteria.

We acknowledge that the EU arms control rules (other than the dual-use items) in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP are part of the CFSP, rather than trade policy, and could therefore have been included in an EU/UK foreign policy agreement but that the UK Government rejected such an agreement. However, we are aware of the concerns regarding divergence between the EU and UK’s controls systems and in particular the UK’s loss of access to the EU’s information sharing systems, especially in respect of the denial of licences. The Government should explore options for an agreement that would grant it access to the EU’s information sharing protocols or explain in its response to our report why it does not deem this to be necessary. (Paragraph 53) Compliance and Enforcement

We welcome the increase in trained Compliance Inspectors mentioned in the 2021 Annual Report. In response to our report the Government should give further details of this increase in Inspectors, including the numbers of Inspectors employed, details of the work they are undertaking and how they are measuring the impact of the change in Inspector numbers on the Compliance Team’s work.

We also welcome the internal review carried out by the Compliance Team in 2021 and changes made to the operating model to better assist the prioritisation of site inspections. We recommend that the 2022 Annual Report includes an analysis of the outcomes of this work.

We are concerned by the increase in recent years of the numbers of companies found to be non-compliant after a revisit and the lack of information given in the Annual Reports on specific companies and countries for findings of non-compliance. This raises questions over the effectiveness of compliance visits. (Paragraph 62) 46 Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls

In response to our report, the ECJU should give greater detail and analysis on the reasons identified for companies being found to be non-compliant, especially after a revisit. This analysis should also be included in future editions of the Annual Report as part of efforts to improve transparency.

Providing exporters with training will always improve compliance results and make the compliance visit process run more smoothly, particularly when companies do not export regularly. We recommend that the Government actively encourage more peer-to-peer, trade bodies or ECJU Awareness training opportunities.

We are also troubled by the concerns expressed regarding the level of technical knowledge within ECJU and the reported reduction in technical experts accompanying compliance officers on compliance visits. We recommend that the ECJU ensure that technical experts accompany compliance inspectors on a greater number of visits and that the number of technical experts and level of technical expertise within ECJU be reviewed as part of the ECJU Transformation Programme.

We welcome HMRC’s increase in resources for Customs A/B. In response to our report, HMRC should set out how it will measure the impact and effectiveness of these increased resources.

Given the apparent low level of strategic exports and sanctions prosecutions, especially in recent years, we are disappointed that when we asked if the Government had any plans to review the effectiveness of the relevant legislation, they simply stated that enforcement was a matter for HMRC. HMRC are responsible for enforcing the legislation put forward by the Government and passed by Parliament. It is not HMRC’s role to assess the effectiveness of legislation. This is a matter for the Government and if changes are required it is for Parliament to legislate for them.

We can find no explanation for the lack of published data on convictions for export controls violations, especially as this information has been provided to us in written evidence when requested. We recommend that the data provided to us on individual convictions on export controls/customs violations should be included in future editions of the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report.

We have noted the record compound settlement agreed in early 2022 and understand the issues surrounding the public disclosure of further information relating to such settlements. However, we see no reason why data such as the name of the company, the item being exported and the destination, cannot be provided to us privately to allow us to undertake effective scrutiny. We also recommend and expect that where unlicensed goods have reached their destination the Government inform us, in private if necessary, of the steps taken to recover the items. (Paragraph 76) Post-shipment verification

Despite the Government undertaking to examine the possibility of establishing a system of post-shipment verification for UK exports, no progress appears to have been made. While we fully understand the pressures of, and the need to respond Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls 47 urgently to, the Covid pandemic, the lack of progress on this matter is disappointing given the concerns expressed to us in evidence regarding the inadequacy of some end-user assurance documentation and the risks posed by diversion. We see no reason why the Government should not recommence its discussions with the German authorities and seek to reinstate the aborted talks with US authorities on post-shipment verification.

We do not envisage a UK post-shipment system as replacing the need for stringent checks and robust application of the licensing criteria at the application stage. Rather such a system should be seen as complementary to the pre-licence checks and equally important as even with the best pre-licence systems, there will be cases where diversion occurs and exported items are obtained by illicit end-users after their export.

While recognising that it is not practicable to carry out post-shipment verification for all exports, we recommend that the Government instigate a pilot programme by 2025 of post-shipment verification. This should include on-site inspections to examine the resource implications and potential benefits of post-shipment verification. We agree with our witnesses from SIPRI that a useful starting point for modelling the pilot would be consideration of the Swiss system which uses a country risk matrix and the German system which mostly inspects small arms and light weapons. (Paragraph 86) Countries of concern

We welcome the inclusion of an export controls section in the FCDO’s annual Human Rights and Democracy Report. However, consideration of human rights should also be better mainstreamed into future Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports. We recommend that future Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports demonstrate, by including examples, how the Government takes the list of human rights priority countries into account in licensing decisions and exercising export controls.

We note the high-level of concern that exists regarding exports to Saudi Arabia and her coalition partners of items that may be used in the conflict in Yemen. This conflict is tragic and we call on all sides to give renewed urgency to finding a solution. It is of the utmost concern that exports were made in breach of the Government’s undertakings to the Court of Appeal. Lessons must be learned around the mechanisms for sharing information and intelligence between departments that make up the ECJU. We support the work of the Mills Review. However, we share concerns expressed by witnesses that this could happen again in respect of exports to other nations.

By the end of 2022, the Government should commission an independent examination of whether the Mills Review outcomes have been successfully implemented and have led to the intended outcomes. It is vital lessons are learned so as to not see a repeat of this in respect of other countries of concern. In response to our report the Government must include a full explanation of its reasons for its decision to resume such exports and an explanation for its decision to cease referring all such exports to Ministers for decision. (Paragraph 103) 48 Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls

We are concerned that previous exports to Saudi Arabia may demonstrate an inconsistency in the application of the previous Consolidated Criteria. In response to our report the Government should set out its reasons for deeming that such exports are not in breach of the Criteria. The Government should also set out its assessment of the impact of the new Strategic Export Licensing Criteria on exports to Saudi Arabia.

We commend the UK Government for voting in favour of renewing the mandate of the Group of Experts on Yemen. However, we are alarmed that the majority of international delegates voted to end the mandate. We urge the Government to seek to work with international partners to reverse this decision as soon as possible so that this valuable independent work can continue.

While we fully support the Government prioritising the evacuation of people over the repatriation of equipment, we are concerned about reports of military items that are now in the hands of adversaries following the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan. We support the decision to remove Afghanistan as a permitted destination for five Open General Export Licences. However, we are concerned that this decision was not taken earlier given the warnings and indications that the Afghan Government would collapse. A key test of the export control system is the ability to adapt to changing situations. We support the continuation of licences for humanitarian demining equipment for NGOs and items for the protection of remaining diplomatic missions and the Government’s commitment to keep the situation under review.

While the priority should always be the safety and evacuation of people, we seek assurances that the Government plans for the risk of military items falling into the hands of adversaries when undertaking operations, especially when planning the withdrawal from conflict zones. In response to our Report, the Government should set out the mechanisms in place to do so and what lessons have been learned from the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

We welcome the Government’s swift action on exports to Hong Kong following the Chinese Government’s decision to impose a National Security Law there. This illustrates how an export control system should work; by being adaptive to changing circumstances and the heightened danger of such exports being used for internal repression. The Government should use this as an example of best practice and examine the lessons that can be learned for situations where the response has not worked as effectively and speedily, for example in Afghanistan.

We welcome the Government’s action in October 2019 to not grant further export licences to Turkey for items that might be used in military operations in Syria. However, we are concerned that no information was given on action taken in respect of exports for which licences had already been granted.

In response to our Report, the Government should set out the steps it took in respect of licences already granted prior to the October 2019 announcement. In the interest of transparency, the Government should also provide details of the additional assessments that were made and the factors taken into account in decision making in respect of exports to Turkey following its 2019 announcement. The Government Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls 49 should also set out the rationale for its December 2021 announcement that it is satisfied that decisions on all licence applications to Turkey can be taken, following a careful assessment against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria on a case-by-case basis.

We welcome the sanctions put in place following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, it is unacceptable that the EU sanctions legislation in 2014 included a prior contracts clause permitting licences where the export concerned the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014. In response to our report the Government should set out the lessons learned from this incident and how it will ensure this situation is not repeated. Following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU it will be necessary to coordinate efforts with the EU with regards to Russia and Ukraine and future crises.

We are very concerned about continuing reports of UK components being found in Russian systems. In response to our report, the Government should set out the actions it is taking, in conjunction with allies. to close down Russia’s ability to acquire replacement foreign-made components that are critical to its systems. The Government should also give further details of the recent revision to UK military end use controls that will provide additional scope to control the export of items not on the lists of items subject to an export licence to destinations subject to an arms embargo.

We acknowledge that the decisions regarding the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014, that made the export of specified equipment for use in the oil industry in Russia subject to a licence, were made at an EU level. However now the UK has left the EU, in response to our report, the Government should set out the current UK measures in place in relation to the oil and gas industry in Russia and also provide data on the number of licence applications granted and refused for exports to Russia in relation to oil and gas since the invasion of Ukraine took place.

We accept the Government’s assertion that it keeps all licences under review and that they have the power to suspend, refuse or revoke licences as circumstances require. However, we also accept the considerable and longstanding concerns over arms exports to Israel especially where they might be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In response to our report, the Government should provide us with a detailed breakdown of licences granted for exports to Israel, including any end- use conditions. The Government should also provide details of licences that have been refused, suspended or revoked and the reasons for this action. We also recommend that exports to Israel are included as a case study in the next Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. (Paragraph 130) Future technological developments and the character of conflict

The quickening pace of technology advancements and the expected changes in the character of conflict will require swift and holistic action to ensure that the current international approach to technology governance remains fit-for-purpose. (Paragraph 134) 50 Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls

The Government should review the impact of technological change and the evolution of the character of conflict and in its response to this report outline what changes it believes are necessary to make to current international agreements and arrangements on the control of the military and dual-use items. The Government should also provide us with regular updates on the outcomes of the relevant international, bilateral and national fora that are responsible for these matters.

The rapid advancement of new technologies such as spyware is a major challenge for export control regimes. Given the Government’s assertion that it is inappropriate to move intrusion software and related licensable goods and technology into Category A of the UK’s trade controls system, in response to our report the Government should set out what action it is taking to address human rights concerns associated with surveillance technologies. The Government should also set out what action it is taking to ensure global human rights compliant regulatory frameworks are in place for such technologies. (Paragraph 141) Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls 51