Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 2
2
Accepted
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the...
Recommendation
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms suggested that exploring the risks of a co-ordinated attack on subsea infrastructure was unhelpfully “apocalyptic”. We disagree. Focusing on fishing accidents and low-level sabotage is no longer good enough. The UK faces a strategic vulnerability in the event of hostilities. Publicly signalling tougher defensive preparations is vital, and may reduce the likelihood of adversaries mounting a sabotage effort in the first place. (Conclusion, Paragraph 37)
Government response summary AI-generated
The government agrees to strengthen security, with DSIT writing to operators to request emergency 'good enough' repair plans within 12 months and defining standards. They are also reviewing legislation and will explore similar exercises with European counterparts.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government · verbatim extract
Accepted
The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of ensuring that public and private risk scenarios reflect the evolving threat landscape, including the potential for coordinated sabotage targeting subsea cables, terrestrial infrastructure, and onward connections to Europe. We are currently reviewing and updating our assessments of risks to telecoms and internet infrastructure, as part of the Government’s national risk assessment process. This will include consideration of how best to update the reasonable worst-case scenarios (RWCS) within our national risk assessments to reflect the possibility of coordinated sabotage on subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe.
Read the full response on Parliament ↗