Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 4
4
Accepted
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage...
Recommendation
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities
Government Response Summary
The government agrees to develop more detailed technical plans for managing cable systems, engage with operators, conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments, and use these findings to inform additional contingency plans and the National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables.
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
The Government agrees with the Committee that there should be more detailed technical plans on management of the UK’s cable systems in the event of serious disruption to subsea cables. The Government will regularly engage with operators to understand the current capacity of cables and operators’ ability to reroute traffic in the event of significant disruption. to activate, making real-time reporting difficult to achieve. their infrastructure, particularly when capacity is sold to third parties. Therefore, to understand critical data flows DSIT and Lead Government Departments will work with critical sectors to conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments and understand how they rely on the connectivity provided by subsea telecoms cables. Based on the findings of this work the Government will consider what additional contingency plans may be necessary, including for scenarios where high-concentration terrestrial routes are temporarily disabled. We will also use the findings to inform the Government’s National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables (NEP-S).