Recommendations & Conclusions
24 items
1
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, the power to negotiate and enter into international agreements is a prerogative power; as such, the power still sits notionally with the sovereign, but in practice is exercised exclusively by the executive (i.e Ministers of the Crown). Prerogative powers are legitimately exercised by Ministers owing …
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Under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, the power to negotiate and enter into international agreements is a prerogative power; as such, the power still sits notionally with the sovereign, but in practice is exercised exclusively by the executive (i.e Ministers of the Crown). Prerogative powers are legitimately exercised by Ministers owing to the fact that they are understood to have the confidence of the House of Commons and are ultimately accountable to Parliament for any such exercise.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed that Parliament has an essential role in treaty scrutiny and accountability, but explicitly rejected the notion that the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is insufficient or requires changes.
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2
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
While we believe that the prerogative should continue to be the source of the power for the Government to negotiate and enter into international agreements, it is clear that the manner and way in which that prerogative power is exercised needs to be more clearly and widely understood. The current …
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While we believe that the prerogative should continue to be the source of the power for the Government to negotiate and enter into international agreements, it is clear that the manner and way in which that prerogative power is exercised needs to be more clearly and widely understood. The current arrangements grant the Government considerable power as well as flexibility in how they are used. We favour maintaining this flexibility but are alive to concerns about the potential for abuse of this power. As such, it must be understood that there are clear constitutional limits on the use of this power by ministers. The authority for a Minister, and the Government in general, to exercise the prerogative power is derived from the Government having the confidence of the democractially elected House of Commons. Each and every exercise of prerogative power by a Minister should have the confidence of, and conform to the will of, the House of Commons. It is the responsibility of all Ministers, in their exercise of these powers, to assure themselves that they are acting in accordance with the will and confidence of the House of Commons.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees with the Committee's recognition of the Royal Prerogative and Parliament's scrutiny role, but explicitly states it does not accept that the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is insufficient.
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3
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The UK is a dualist state, meaning that, in order for obligations entered into through treaties to have effect in UK law, domestic implementation is required. This is an important feature of the UK’s constitutional system, ensuring that any changes to domestic law needed to implement treaties must be considered …
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The UK is a dualist state, meaning that, in order for obligations entered into through treaties to have effect in UK law, domestic implementation is required. This is an important feature of the UK’s constitutional system, ensuring that any changes to domestic law needed to implement treaties must be considered by Parliament. While treaties bind the UK as a matter of international law, they do not automatically have effect as a matter of domestic law. Often, provisions do not require new primary legislation to have effect in domestic law; delegated powers to make secondary legislation may be used, or only parts of agreements are presented to Parliament to consider as the remaining obligations can be met without legislating. Furthermore, the current process tends towards presenting Parliament with a treaty whose terms have already been finalised, leaving it with no meaningful scope to amend or even influence the terms of the treaty.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed on Parliament's dual role in treaty scrutiny and implementing legislation, but asserted that the existing framework is appropriate and provides sufficient flexibility, implicitly rejecting the need for changes to Parliament's scope to influence treaty terms.
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5
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Over the last century, there have been significant quantitative and qualitative changes to the nature of international agreements; they now reach into people’s everyday lives in the UK and around the world. They seek not only to deal with relations between states, but increasingly to address problems which one state …
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Over the last century, there have been significant quantitative and qualitative changes to the nature of international agreements; they now reach into people’s everyday lives in the UK and around the world. They seek not only to deal with relations between states, but increasingly to address problems which one state cannot solve alone. In many instances, treaties have, as a consequence, become more akin to domestic legislation. International agreements are now concerned with domestic as well as international affairs, and accordingly this makes them a fundamental concern for Parliament.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed there has been growth in multilateral treaty making, but rejected the assertion that treaties have fundamentally changed or become more akin to domestic legislation, maintaining that the UK's dualist system ensures treaties remain distinct.
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6
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Parliament is not sufficiently engaged with international agreements. The UK’s parliamentary democracy operates on the basis of the dual constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. As such it must be understood that scrutiny of international agreements is a core constitutional function of the UK Parliament.
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Parliament is not sufficiently engaged with international agreements. The UK’s parliamentary democracy operates on the basis of the dual constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. As such it must be understood that scrutiny of international agreements is a core constitutional function of the UK Parliament.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed that treaty scrutiny is a core constitutional function of Parliament but explicitly rejected the Committee's overarching position that parliamentary engagement with international agreements is insufficient.
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7
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Currently, there is no requirement for Parliament to approve treaties. We find this situation untenable. Parliament’s approval must be sought when the Government seeks to bind or change in any material way the UK’s obligations under international law. We therefore recommend that, as a matter of constitutional principle, all treaties …
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Currently, there is no requirement for Parliament to approve treaties. We find this situation untenable. Parliament’s approval must be sought when the Government seeks to bind or change in any material way the UK’s obligations under international law. We therefore recommend that, as a matter of constitutional principle, all treaties should require the explicit approval of the democratically elected House of Commons before they enter into force. To be clear, this would not change the fact that treaties are negotiated and entered into under prerogative power; instead it would make the exercise of that prerogative to enter into an agreement that places, alters or removes a legal obligation on the UK, or to withdraw from such an agreement, conditional on the explicit, active approval of the House of Commons.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation for explicit House of Commons approval of all treaties, stating that Part 2 of the CRaG Act strikes the appropriate balance and that further powers would fundamentally undermine the Royal Prerogative of treaty making.
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8
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The UK Government carries out negotiations and enters into treaties for the whole of the UK. However, under the UK’s devolution arrangements, day to day responsibility for areas of domestic policy which could be impacted by treaties often lies with the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In …
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The UK Government carries out negotiations and enters into treaties for the whole of the UK. However, under the UK’s devolution arrangements, day to day responsibility for areas of domestic policy which could be impacted by treaties often lies with the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In these areas, consultation and coordination between the UK Government and devolved governments is done under the auspices of the Concordat on International Relations. This Concordat has not been updated since 2013. Since this time there have been significant developments in the field of intergovernmental relations; the devolution statutes themselves have changed, the UK has left the EU, and a new intergovernmental relations system has been established.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agreed that devolved governments have a strong interest in international policy making, but rejected the recommendation to update the Concordat on International Relations, arguing that newer structures from the 2022 Review of Intergovernmental Relations and existing engagement practices are sufficient.
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9
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
While many of the principles in the Concordat on International Relations appear to us to continue to be the right ones, the Concordat itself clearly needs to be updated, and the cooperation that it facilitates must take place in earnest. We recommend that the Concordat on International Relations be replaced …
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While many of the principles in the Concordat on International Relations appear to us to continue to be the right ones, the Concordat itself clearly needs to be updated, and the cooperation that it facilitates must take place in earnest. We recommend that the Concordat on International Relations be replaced or updated. This new or revised document should set out clear arrangements for timely and meaningful consultation with devolved institutions on the issue of treaties and clarify how the processes for reaching treaties interact with the recently revised IGR structures. The production of or update to this document should be prioritised, and the agreed arrangements published within six months of the publication of this report. (Paragraph 39) Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century 61 Concluding Treaties
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation to update or replace the Concordat on International Relations, stating that its principles remain valid and that new intergovernmental relations structures (IGRR) published in January 2022 provide updated engagement frameworks. It describes existing close working relationships and engagement mechanisms with …
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10
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
It is clear from the evidence we received that the arrangements set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are unsatisfactory in a modern democratic society. We identified three main areas of concern. First, the legislation provides a passive role for Parliament which need only be notified of …
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It is clear from the evidence we received that the arrangements set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are unsatisfactory in a modern democratic society. We identified three main areas of concern. First, the legislation provides a passive role for Parliament which need only be notified of a new treaty and has only a limited power (in practice) to delay ratification. These arrangements do not provide Parliament with the opportunity to approve a treaty or not, and do not create the space for the level of scrutiny necessary for genuine democratic oversight and authorisation. Second, while many treaties are captured by the current legislation, there are several categories of treaty that are not. We firmly believe that all treaties need express parliamentary approval. Third, while we understand the historic origin of the 21-sitting day period, and accept that for some treaties it may be sufficient time for scrutiny, we are of the view that it is an arbitrary and, in many cases, insufficient period of time for the scrutiny of treaties, given their increasing complexity, and should therefore not be the default scrutiny period. In light of these findings, it is clear to us that, in order for the arrangements for entering into treaties to respect the core constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty, and to bring them into line with international comparators, Parliament must give its express approval to all treaties before they can be ratified or enter into force.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the committee's conclusion, stating it does not accept that Parliament requires further powers to scrutinise treaty-making. It argues that Part 2 of CRaG strikes the appropriate balance, aligns with other dualist states, and maintains the Royal Prerogative, concluding that Parliament already has …
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11
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The explicit, active approval of the House of Commons should be a requirement for all treaties (legally binding international agreements) to be allowed to proceed to ratification or for it to be otherwise indicated that the UK gives consent to be bound by an international instrument. This means that the …
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The explicit, active approval of the House of Commons should be a requirement for all treaties (legally binding international agreements) to be allowed to proceed to ratification or for it to be otherwise indicated that the UK gives consent to be bound by an international instrument. This means that the Government should not be able to proceed to ratify or otherwise indicate consent to be bound by a treaty until approval has been signified by a vote in the House of Commons.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation for explicit House of Commons approval for all treaties, arguing that Part 2 of CRaG already strikes an appropriate balance and that giving Parliament binding votes would undermine the Royal Prerogative and treaty-making flexibility. It asserts Parliament already possesses sufficient …
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12
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
To achieve this end, we recommend that the mechanisms contained in Sections 20 to 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are amended to implement the following arrangements in line with this principle of active approval: The legislation should set out that a Minister of the Crown is …
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To achieve this end, we recommend that the mechanisms contained in Sections 20 to 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are amended to implement the following arrangements in line with this principle of active approval: The legislation should set out that a Minister of the Crown is required to send all treaties to a parliamentary sifting committee, the composition of which will be determined by the House. This sifting committee will have 21-sitting days to recommend either: i that the treaty can proceed to the floor of the House of Commons for debate and that a vote to approve the treaty or otherwise should take place no less than 21-sitting days after this recommendation is made (standard scrutiny period); or ii that the treaty is of such a nature that it requires enhanced scrutiny, and that an appropriate period should be set for that enhanced scrutiny (to be determined by the sifting committee) before which the treaty cannot be brought to the floor of the House of Commons for a debate and a vote (extended scrutiny period). In a situation where, following the expiry of the 21-sitting day sifting period, the sifting committee does not make a recommendation in accordance with either points (i) or (ii) above, the Government may bring a treaty forward to the floor of the House of Commons for a vote to approve the treaty or otherwise as soon as parliamentary time allows. (Paragraph 65) 62 Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation to amend CRaG and introduce a parliamentary sifting committee for treaties. It reiterates that Part 2 of CRaG already provides appropriate scrutiny, defends the Royal Prerogative, and states that Parliament currently has sufficient mechanisms without further legislative changes.
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13
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The exact criteria on which this decision should be made will be for the sifting committee to determine and to set out. The purpose of this longer scrutiny period would be to allow for the relevant parliamentary committees and other interested stakeholders, including but not limited to devolved legislatures and …
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The exact criteria on which this decision should be made will be for the sifting committee to determine and to set out. The purpose of this longer scrutiny period would be to allow for the relevant parliamentary committees and other interested stakeholders, including but not limited to devolved legislatures and administrations, to carry out inquiries and set out their findings ahead of the parliamentary debate and vote to approve the treaty, so that the full implications of a treaty can be fully understood ahead of that vote. Where a treaty would enter into force on signature alone, a draft of the treaty should be provided in the same way as for other treaties, as Parliamentary approval would still be required to sign such a treaty.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation for a longer parliamentary scrutiny period and explicit approval of all treaties, including those entering into force on signature, arguing that the existing 21-sitting-day period under CRaG Part 2 is sufficient and provides necessary flexibility.
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14
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
If the Government does not wish to accept the longer period of scrutiny set out by the sifting committee, a Minister of the Crown must make a statement to the House setting out the reasons why they believe the period is not appropriate and schedule a vote in the House …
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If the Government does not wish to accept the longer period of scrutiny set out by the sifting committee, a Minister of the Crown must make a statement to the House setting out the reasons why they believe the period is not appropriate and schedule a vote in the House of Commons to override the recommendation of the sifting committee. If that vote approves the Government’s motion to override the sifting committee’s recommendation, the Government can then schedule a debate and vote to approve the ratification of the treaty no less than 21-sitting days after the override vote.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation for ministers to justify overriding a sifting committee's extended scrutiny period, stating that CRaG Part 2 already provides an appropriate balance and no legislative changes are needed. It considers the existing 21-day scrutiny period sufficient in most cases and views …
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15
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We recognise that, while rare, there may be circumstances where a treaty needs to enter into force as a matter of urgency. To account for such circumstances, the amended legislation should set out the criteria under which the Government should be able to bypass the sifting committee and proceed straight …
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We recognise that, while rare, there may be circumstances where a treaty needs to enter into force as a matter of urgency. To account for such circumstances, the amended legislation should set out the criteria under which the Government should be able to bypass the sifting committee and proceed straight to the approval debate and vote, but it must nevertheless require the Minister to make a statement to the House setting out the reasons why the urgent procedure is being used in that particular case. This provision should not be able to be used once the process set out in Paragraphs 65–67 above has started - that is once the treaty has been provided to the sifting committee.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation for amended legislation to set out criteria for urgent treaty ratification bypassing a sifting committee, stating that Part 2 of CRaG provides the appropriate balance and no legislative changes are required. It argues the existing framework offers sufficient flexibility for …
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19
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
There is clearly potential for significant changes to be made following the conclusion of a treaty, and for those changes - for various reasons - not to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the current arrangements. All treaties, including any subsequent amendments or decisions of bodies made under those treaties …
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There is clearly potential for significant changes to be made following the conclusion of a treaty, and for those changes - for various reasons - not to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the current arrangements. All treaties, including any subsequent amendments or decisions of bodies made under those treaties that either modify the treaty itself or modify the UK’s obligations under the treaty - regardless of whether those amendments or decisions have an impact on the domestic level - must be subject to parliamentary approval. Under the new arrangement for approval of treaties we have recommended in paragraphs 65–68 above, many amendments to treaties would be subject to a parliamentary vote. It is our view however that, moving forward, it would be impractical for Parliament to be required to debate and vote on every treaty amendment. It is our view however that, moving forward, it would be impractical for Parliament to be required to debate and vote on every treaty amendment. When the Constitutional Reform and Government Act 2010 is amended in line with our recommendations in paragraphs 65–68 above, it should include a mechanism to ensure that all amendments to treaties, or decisions made under them, are considered by the sifting committee. That committee can recommend, within 21-sitting days following notification by the Government, that the amendment is either: i of such a nature as to not require a debate and vote; or ii is, in its view, of such a nature that it should be subject to the process set out in paragraphs 65–67 above. In a situation where the sifting committee has does not make a recommendation within the 21-day sitting period, it will be considered as if that committee had recommended that the measure is of such a nature as to not require a debate and vote. (Paragraph 76) Non-Legally Binding Instruments (NLBIs)
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating it does not agree that all treaties, including amendments or decisions made under them, should be subject to explicit parliamentary approval before entering into force.
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20
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
While non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs) do not place legal obligations on the UK, they can impose ‘political obligations’ that can guide government action and even result in financial obligations being placed on the UK. The UK is an internationally trusted nation; when it makes a political commitment, this should be …
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While non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs) do not place legal obligations on the UK, they can impose ‘political obligations’ that can guide government action and even result in financial obligations being placed on the UK. The UK is an internationally trusted nation; when it makes a political commitment, this should be viewed as essentially equivalent to making a legally binding obligation. We do however recognise that NLBIs can range from the very mundane to the very significant.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to establish a central repository for non-legally binding instruments, deeming it impractical and unnecessary. However, it commits to updating its published guidance to encourage consistency and transparency in departmental approaches to managing NLBIs.
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21
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
There was considerable concern expressed to us that adequate records of NLBIs were not being kept and that there is insufficient public access to those NLBIs which have been reached. We received calls for a central repository of all NLBIs to be established. We were encouraged by the Government’s assurance …
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There was considerable concern expressed to us that adequate records of NLBIs were not being kept and that there is insufficient public access to those NLBIs which have been reached. We received calls for a central repository of all NLBIs to be established. We were encouraged by the Government’s assurance that individual departments do 64 Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century indeed keep records of the NLBIs that are reached. However, we were not convinced by the argument that establishing and maintaining a single repository for non- legally binding instruments would be overly burdensome. We therefore recommend the establishment of a central repository for all non-legally binding instruments, to be coordinated by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and made public on GOV.UK, and call for Parliament be notified of all new or updated documents added to that repository by way of a Written Ministerial Statement.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation to establish a central, public repository for all non-legally binding instruments, citing impracticality, lack of value, resource implications, and the need for flexibility and confidentiality. It states that individual departments are responsible for managing and publishing such instruments as appropriate, …
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22
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
It is clear that NLBIs are already a significant part of how states manage relations between one another and make policy decisions internationally. Arrangements therefore need to be put in place for Parliament to be informed of new NLBIs and, if necessary, to scrutinise them. We would not expect routine …
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It is clear that NLBIs are already a significant part of how states manage relations between one another and make policy decisions internationally. Arrangements therefore need to be put in place for Parliament to be informed of new NLBIs and, if necessary, to scrutinise them. We would not expect routine and regular votes to approve NLBIs, but this does not diminish the obligation on ministers to assure themselves in reaching such agreements that they are acting in accordance with the will of, and with the confidence of, the House of Commons.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation for new arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of non-legally binding instruments, stating it does not agree new votes or processes are needed as existing parliamentary procedures are sufficient for scrutiny when appropriate.
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23
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We further believe that if a request is made by a parliamentary committee or the Leader of the Official Opposition for a debate and vote on an NLBI, the Government should make time for this on the floor of the House. This practice should be set out in guidance to …
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We further believe that if a request is made by a parliamentary committee or the Leader of the Official Opposition for a debate and vote on an NLBI, the Government should make time for this on the floor of the House. This practice should be set out in guidance to ministers and civil servants.
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Government response AI summary
The Government rejects the recommendation to make time for parliamentary debates and votes on non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs). It argues against routine scrutiny for NLBIs, asserting that existing parliamentary procedures allow for debates on matters of public importance and committees can already scrutinise them within …
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24
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We recognise that, on occasion, there may be good reasons why the Government has to reach NLBIs in secret, for instance in relation to matters of defence or national security. This does not diminish the Government’s accountability to Parliament for placing obligations on the UK. As such, we recommend that …
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We recognise that, on occasion, there may be good reasons why the Government has to reach NLBIs in secret, for instance in relation to matters of defence or national security. This does not diminish the Government’s accountability to Parliament for placing obligations on the UK. As such, we recommend that when such an agreement is reached, arrangements are made to brief the appropriate House of Commons committee(s) in confidence, to facilitate a degree of scrutiny to take place, and provide the opportunity to express any concerns to the Government.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation for new parliamentary scrutiny arrangements for non-legally binding instruments, stating that existing procedures are sufficient and it must retain its ability to enter such agreements in the national interest.
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26
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
To carry out its constitutional function effectively in regard to the scrutiny of international agreements, it is not enough for Parliament to be involved only at the end of the process. A new approach to conceptualising international negotiations and international agreements needs to be developed in the UK whereby Parliament …
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To carry out its constitutional function effectively in regard to the scrutiny of international agreements, it is not enough for Parliament to be involved only at the end of the process. A new approach to conceptualising international negotiations and international agreements needs to be developed in the UK whereby Parliament is involved throughout the process or ‘lifecycle’ of an international agreement, from early considerations on whether to open negotiations, through the negotiation rounds themselves, and on to indications of consent (for example, by way of a formal vote on whether or not to approve treaty), and then beyond, into implementation and review. (Paragraph 110) Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century 65
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation for Parliament to be involved throughout the lifecycle of international agreements, asserting that existing parliamentary mechanisms are sufficient and that mandates for treaties should not be subject to parliamentary approval.
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27
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Given our recommendation that all treaties need to be subject to a parliamentary process for the UK to indicate consent to be bound, it would be in a Government’s best interest to consult and update Parliament regularly. We recommend that a working practices agreement is reached between the Government and …
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Given our recommendation that all treaties need to be subject to a parliamentary process for the UK to indicate consent to be bound, it would be in a Government’s best interest to consult and update Parliament regularly. We recommend that a working practices agreement is reached between the Government and Parliament which would set out the arrangements for how Parliament will be informed of the progress of negotiations. Such an agreement should also set out that Parliament would normally be consulted on, and may be asked to approve, the setting of negotiating mandates. (Paragraph 111) Parliamentary arrangements for the scrutiny of international agreements
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation for a new working agreement and parliamentary approval of negotiating mandates, citing that existing parliamentary mechanisms are sufficient and Parliament has previously rejected such amendments in the Trade Act 2021.
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31
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We are encouraged by the evidence we received on the regular and effective discussion and consultation between both the Ministry of Justice and Crown Dependencies and the FCDO and the Overseas Territories with regard to treaties that could be extended to them. We call on the Government to ensure that …
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We are encouraged by the evidence we received on the regular and effective discussion and consultation between both the Ministry of Justice and Crown Dependencies and the FCDO and the Overseas Territories with regard to treaties that could be extended to them. We call on the Government to ensure that it notifies the new sifting committee - as well as Justice Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee where appropriate - when it is in discussion with Crown Dependencies or Overseas Territories on the potential extension of treaties to them when negotiating an agreement on their behalf, or when it has provided a letter of entrustment.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees on the importance of consultation, stating it will continue to consult Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on treaty extensions. However, it explicitly rejects the recommendation to notify new committees about these discussions or entrustment letters, stating no new arrangements are required.
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32
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We are satisfied that the existing conventions are strong enough to ensure that a treaty will not be extended to the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories without their consent. This consent should also be communicated to Parliament at the point where the Government seeks to extend territorial applicability to include …
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We are satisfied that the existing conventions are strong enough to ensure that a treaty will not be extended to the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories without their consent. This consent should also be communicated to Parliament at the point where the Government seeks to extend territorial applicability to include one or more jurisdictions. The changes to require the Government to seek Parliament’s approval for all treaties will mean that treaties which include, or are to be extended to, Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, would require the approval of the House of Commons. A convention should be established between Parliament and the Government whereby the House of Commons would not be called upon to approve a treaty or extension of a treaty solely relating to a Crown Dependency or an Overseas Territory when the relevant jurisdictions had not yet expressed their approval. (Paragraph 143) Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century 67
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Government response AI summary
The government partially agrees, stating it will continue its existing practice of consulting Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on treaty matters. However, it rejects the need for new arrangements, including communicating their consent to Parliament or establishing a new convention for parliamentary approval processes.
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