Recommendations & Conclusions
32 items
1
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, the power to negotiate and enter into international agreements is a prerogative power; as such, the power still sits notionally with the sovereign, but in practice is exercised exclusively by the executive (i.e Ministers of the Crown). Prerogative powers are legitimately exercised by Ministers owing …
Government response. The government partially agreed that Parliament has an essential role in treaty scrutiny and accountability, but explicitly rejected the notion that the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is insufficient or requires changes.
2
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
While we believe that the prerogative should continue to be the source of the power for the Government to negotiate and enter into international agreements, it is clear that the manner and way in which that prerogative power is exercised needs to be more clearly and widely understood. The current …
Government response. The government partially agrees with the Committee's recognition of the Royal Prerogative and Parliament's scrutiny role, but explicitly states it does not accept that the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is insufficient.
3
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The UK is a dualist state, meaning that, in order for obligations entered into through treaties to have effect in UK law, domestic implementation is required. This is an important feature of the UK’s constitutional system, ensuring that any changes to domestic law needed to implement treaties must be considered …
Government response. The government partially agreed on Parliament's dual role in treaty scrutiny and implementing legislation, but asserted that the existing framework is appropriate and provides sufficient flexibility, implicitly rejecting the need for changes to Parliament's scope to influence treaty terms.
4
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Accepted
We found the arguments that implementing legislation provides an appropriate opportunity for scrutinising and considering treaties in their entirety to be wholly unconvincing. As such, the current arrangements do not deliver a constitutionally sufficient level of scrutiny; nor do they provide an opportunity for Parliament to approve important policies which …
Government response. The Government disagrees that the Cabinet Manual needs updating, stating it already provides appropriate guidance on the distinction between scrutinizing treaties and implementing legislation. It maintains the existing framework for treaty scrutiny is appropriate and highlights existing parliamentary options for …
5
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Over the last century, there have been significant quantitative and qualitative changes to the nature of international agreements; they now reach into people’s everyday lives in the UK and around the world. They seek not only to deal with relations between states, but increasingly to address problems which one state …
Government response. The government partially agreed there has been growth in multilateral treaty making, but rejected the assertion that treaties have fundamentally changed or become more akin to domestic legislation, maintaining that the UK's dualist system ensures treaties remain distinct.
6
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Parliament is not sufficiently engaged with international agreements. The UK’s parliamentary democracy operates on the basis of the dual constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. As such it must be understood that scrutiny of international agreements is a core constitutional function of the UK Parliament.
Government response. The government partially agreed that treaty scrutiny is a core constitutional function of Parliament but explicitly rejected the Committee's overarching position that parliamentary engagement with international agreements is insufficient.
7
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Currently, there is no requirement for Parliament to approve treaties. We find this situation untenable. Parliament’s approval must be sought when the Government seeks to bind or change in any material way the UK’s obligations under international law. We therefore recommend that, as a matter of constitutional principle, all treaties …
Government response. The government rejected the recommendation for explicit House of Commons approval of all treaties, stating that Part 2 of the CRaG Act strikes the appropriate balance and that further powers would fundamentally undermine the Royal Prerogative of treaty making.
8
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The UK Government carries out negotiations and enters into treaties for the whole of the UK. However, under the UK’s devolution arrangements, day to day responsibility for areas of domestic policy which could be impacted by treaties often lies with the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In …
Government response. The government partially agreed that devolved governments have a strong interest in international policy making, but rejected the recommendation to update the Concordat on International Relations, arguing that newer structures from the 2022 Review of Intergovernmental Relations and existing engagement …
9
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
While many of the principles in the Concordat on International Relations appear to us to continue to be the right ones, the Concordat itself clearly needs to be updated, and the cooperation that it facilitates must take place in earnest. We recommend that the Concordat on International Relations be replaced …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation to update or replace the Concordat on International Relations, stating that its principles remain valid and that new intergovernmental relations structures (IGRR) published in January 2022 provide updated engagement frameworks. It describes existing close working …
10
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
It is clear from the evidence we received that the arrangements set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are unsatisfactory in a modern democratic society. We identified three main areas of concern. First, the legislation provides a passive role for Parliament which need only be notified of …
Government response. The Government rejects the committee's conclusion, stating it does not accept that Parliament requires further powers to scrutinise treaty-making. It argues that Part 2 of CRaG strikes the appropriate balance, aligns with other dualist states, and maintains the Royal Prerogative, …
11
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The explicit, active approval of the House of Commons should be a requirement for all treaties (legally binding international agreements) to be allowed to proceed to ratification or for it to be otherwise indicated that the UK gives consent to be bound by an international instrument. This means that the …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation for explicit House of Commons approval for all treaties, arguing that Part 2 of CRaG already strikes an appropriate balance and that giving Parliament binding votes would undermine the Royal Prerogative and treaty-making flexibility. It …
12
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
To achieve this end, we recommend that the mechanisms contained in Sections 20 to 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are amended to implement the following arrangements in line with this principle of active approval: The legislation should set out that a Minister of the Crown is …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation to amend CRaG and introduce a parliamentary sifting committee for treaties. It reiterates that Part 2 of CRaG already provides appropriate scrutiny, defends the Royal Prerogative, and states that Parliament currently has sufficient mechanisms without …
13
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
The exact criteria on which this decision should be made will be for the sifting committee to determine and to set out. The purpose of this longer scrutiny period would be to allow for the relevant parliamentary committees and other interested stakeholders, including but not limited to devolved legislatures and …
Government response. The government rejected the recommendation for a longer parliamentary scrutiny period and explicit approval of all treaties, including those entering into force on signature, arguing that the existing 21-sitting-day period under CRaG Part 2 is sufficient and provides necessary flexibility.
14
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
If the Government does not wish to accept the longer period of scrutiny set out by the sifting committee, a Minister of the Crown must make a statement to the House setting out the reasons why they believe the period is not appropriate and schedule a vote in the House …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation for ministers to justify overriding a sifting committee's extended scrutiny period, stating that CRaG Part 2 already provides an appropriate balance and no legislative changes are needed. It considers the existing 21-day scrutiny period sufficient …
15
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We recognise that, while rare, there may be circumstances where a treaty needs to enter into force as a matter of urgency. To account for such circumstances, the amended legislation should set out the criteria under which the Government should be able to bypass the sifting committee and proceed straight …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation for amended legislation to set out criteria for urgent treaty ratification bypassing a sifting committee, stating that Part 2 of CRaG provides the appropriate balance and no legislative changes are required. It argues the existing …
16
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Accepted
We recommend that the existing requirement to provide an explanatory memorandum along with the treaty in Section 24 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 is retained.
Government response. The government accepts the recommendation and commits to continuing to provide an explanatory memorandum alongside treaties for parliamentary scrutiny under CRaG, and will keep this under review to ensure necessary detail is provided.
17
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Deferred
We believe that adequate time should be available for both Houses to conduct meaningful scrutiny of treaties. However, it is a matter for the House of Lords how it chooses to arrange its business, both in its committees and chamber. We would, however, hope that a practice might develop whereby …
Government response. The government deflects responsibility, stating it is for the House of Commons to consider establishing a sifting committee for treaties, and draws attention to comparable setups in Australia and New Zealand.
18
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Accepted
The negotiation and conclusion of treaties is a reserved matter. As such, devolved legislatures do not currently have a formal role in the scrutiny of treaties. However, many treaties, in particular following the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, may cover subject matters that touch on areas of devolved competence. …
Government response. The Government partially agrees, acknowledging devolved governments' interest in international policy and impact of treaties on their competence. It states that UK Government departments already engage with devolved governments through established means, including updated intergovernmental relations structures and engagement before/after …
19
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
There is clearly potential for significant changes to be made following the conclusion of a treaty, and for those changes - for various reasons - not to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the current arrangements. All treaties, including any subsequent amendments or decisions of bodies made under those treaties …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation, stating it does not agree that all treaties, including amendments or decisions made under them, should be subject to explicit parliamentary approval before entering into force.
20
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
While non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs) do not place legal obligations on the UK, they can impose ‘political obligations’ that can guide government action and even result in financial obligations being placed on the UK. The UK is an internationally trusted nation; when it makes a political commitment, this should be …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation to establish a central repository for non-legally binding instruments, deeming it impractical and unnecessary. However, it commits to updating its published guidance to encourage consistency and transparency in departmental approaches to managing NLBIs.
21
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
There was considerable concern expressed to us that adequate records of NLBIs were not being kept and that there is insufficient public access to those NLBIs which have been reached. We received calls for a central repository of all NLBIs to be established. We were encouraged by the Government’s assurance …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation to establish a central, public repository for all non-legally binding instruments, citing impracticality, lack of value, resource implications, and the need for flexibility and confidentiality. It states that individual departments are responsible for managing and …
22
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
It is clear that NLBIs are already a significant part of how states manage relations between one another and make policy decisions internationally. Arrangements therefore need to be put in place for Parliament to be informed of new NLBIs and, if necessary, to scrutinise them. We would not expect routine …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation for new arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of non-legally binding instruments, stating it does not agree new votes or processes are needed as existing parliamentary procedures are sufficient for scrutiny when appropriate.
23
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We further believe that if a request is made by a parliamentary committee or the Leader of the Official Opposition for a debate and vote on an NLBI, the Government should make time for this on the floor of the House. This practice should be set out in guidance to …
Government response. The Government rejects the recommendation to make time for parliamentary debates and votes on non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs). It argues against routine scrutiny for NLBIs, asserting that existing parliamentary procedures allow for debates on matters of public importance and committees …
24
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We recognise that, on occasion, there may be good reasons why the Government has to reach NLBIs in secret, for instance in relation to matters of defence or national security. This does not diminish the Government’s accountability to Parliament for placing obligations on the UK. As such, we recommend that …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation for new parliamentary scrutiny arrangements for non-legally binding instruments, stating that existing procedures are sufficient and it must retain its ability to enter such agreements in the national interest.
25
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Accepted
We stress the importance of the UK Government consistently informing devolved governments when it reaches an NLBI that has implications for devolved competence, and for this to be indicated in the central repository recommended in paragraph 94 above. Furthermore, we would expect devolved governments to keep a record of all …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it already engages with devolved governments in line with the Concordat on International Relations and the Review of Intergovernmental Relations, and does not believe the Concordat needs updating. It agrees that devolved legislatures should determine …
26
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
To carry out its constitutional function effectively in regard to the scrutiny of international agreements, it is not enough for Parliament to be involved only at the end of the process. A new approach to conceptualising international negotiations and international agreements needs to be developed in the UK whereby Parliament …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation for Parliament to be involved throughout the lifecycle of international agreements, asserting that existing parliamentary mechanisms are sufficient and that mandates for treaties should not be subject to parliamentary approval.
27
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
Given our recommendation that all treaties need to be subject to a parliamentary process for the UK to indicate consent to be bound, it would be in a Government’s best interest to consult and update Parliament regularly. We recommend that a working practices agreement is reached between the Government and …
Government response. The government rejects the recommendation for a new working agreement and parliamentary approval of negotiating mandates, citing that existing parliamentary mechanisms are sufficient and Parliament has previously rejected such amendments in the Trade Act 2021.
28
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Deferred
The current arrangements in Parliament for the scrutiny of international agreements are not commensurate with their constitutional importance. The House of Lords has taken steps to address this constitutional lacuna with the establishment of the International Agreements Committee. By contrast, the scrutiny arrangements in the House of Commons are currently …
Government response. The government partially agrees on the principle of parliamentary accountability for treaties but rejects recommendations for parliamentary approval of treaties and largely deflects the specific recommendations for new scrutiny mechanisms to Parliament itself.
29
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Deferred
Effective scrutiny of international agreements requires both policy expertise and expertise in international agreements and law. We recommend that a review is carried out to consider whether and what additional resource is required to support effective scrutiny of international agreements in the House of Commons.
Government response. The government partially agrees but deflects the recommendation for a review of parliamentary resources, stating that how Parliament chooses to scrutinise treaties and whether to introduce new functions is a matter for Parliament itself.
30
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Accepted
How the devolved legislatures choose to carry out effective scrutiny of relevant aspects is a matter for them to determine. However, we believe that their scrutiny of international agreements which involve areas of devolved competence is important. 66 Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century As set out …
Government response. The government partially agrees, reiterating its existing engagement with devolved governments through established means like the Concordat and IGRR. It also agrees that how devolved legislatures choose to scrutinise relevant aspects of agreements is for them to determine.
31
Recommendation
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We are encouraged by the evidence we received on the regular and effective discussion and consultation between both the Ministry of Justice and Crown Dependencies and the FCDO and the Overseas Territories with regard to treaties that could be extended to them. We call on the Government to ensure that …
Government response. The government partially agrees on the importance of consultation, stating it will continue to consult Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on treaty extensions. However, it explicitly rejects the recommendation to notify new committees about these discussions or entrustment letters, stating …
32
Conclusion
Second Report - Parliamentary Scrutiny …
Rejected
We are satisfied that the existing conventions are strong enough to ensure that a treaty will not be extended to the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories without their consent. This consent should also be communicated to Parliament at the point where the Government seeks to extend territorial applicability to include …
Government response. The government partially agrees, stating it will continue its existing practice of consulting Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on treaty matters. However, it rejects the need for new arrangements, including communicating their consent to Parliament or establishing a new convention …