Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Recommendation 14
14
Rejected
Paragraph: 67
Government must follow specific procedure to override sifting committee scrutiny recommendations.
Conclusion
If the Government does not wish to accept the longer period of scrutiny set out by the sifting committee, a Minister of the Crown must make a statement to the House setting out the reasons why they believe the period is not appropriate and schedule a vote in the House of Commons to override the recommendation of the sifting committee. If that vote approves the Government’s motion to override the sifting committee’s recommendation, the Government can then schedule a debate and vote to approve the ratification of the treaty no less than 21-sitting days after the override vote.
Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the recommendation for ministers to justify overriding a sifting committee's extended scrutiny period, stating that CRaG Part 2 already provides an appropriate balance and no legislative changes are needed. It considers the existing 21-day scrutiny period sufficient in most cases and views the proposed process as inefficient.
Paragraph Reference:
67
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government
Rejected
Disagree. As set out above, the Government’s view is that Part 2 of CRaG strikes the appropriate balance for scrutiny of the treaty-making power and so no legislative changes are required. Consequently, the Government rejects the significant extension to the scrutiny process that the Committee’s recommendations would entail. Furthermore, the possibility of requiring two debates related to ratification of the same treaty would not be an efficient use of parliamentary time. In relation to the duration of the scrutiny period, the Government believes that 21 joint sitting days, which in parliamentary terms is likely to be a minimum of five weeks (often somewhat longer), is sufficient for Parliament to scrutinise a treaty in most cases. CRaG provides a mechanism for the Government to extend the 21 sitting day period, which allows for flexibility should it be required. Parliament has rarely debated treaties or called for an extension to the 21 sitting day period. The Government is committed, through engagement and information sharing, to aid the scrutiny process further. This includes regular discussions between officials, in certain cases the Government sharing a signed treaty text with a relevant Select Committee and/ or the House of Lords International Agreements Committee (IAC) in advance of laying formally under CRaG to help that committee in managing its scrutiny workload, or as we have done for the Australian and New Zealand FTAs, sharing with Parliament while independent scrutiny activity is conducted. It is also updating its guidance on treaty processes to ensure consistent practice across Government. The Government believes there remains a need for the possibility to override the scrutiny process in exceptional circumstances. As foreseen under section 22 of CRaG, the default Government Response 7 procedure of parliamentary scrutiny under section 20 does not apply if a Minister is of the opinion that, exceptionally, the treaty should be ratified without those procedures having been met. If a Minister is of this opinion, they must lay a statement before Parliament, upholding their duty of accountability to Parliament for their treaty actions. Just as the Government does not accept that treaties entering into force upon ratification should be subject to explicit approval of Parliament, so too it rejects that such approval apply to those treaties that enter into force upon signature alone. There has always been a subset of treaties that the Government has been able to enter into without prior parliamentary scrutiny. This provides Government with the flexibility to act with some agility, where necessary, and to respond promptly to situations of urgency, but only where the UK is already able to comply domestically with its treaty obligations. All such treaties are formally drawn to Parliament’s attention when they are laid for information as command papers and Parliament may hold the Government to account for its actions in the usual ways.