Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Recommendation 12
12
Rejected
Amend CRAG Act 2010 to establish a sifting committee for treaty scrutiny periods.
Recommendation
To achieve this end, we recommend that the mechanisms contained in Sections 20 to 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 are amended to implement the following arrangements in line with this principle of active approval: The legislation should set out that a Minister of the Crown is required to send all treaties to a parliamentary sifting committee, the composition of which will be determined by the House. This sifting committee will have 21-sitting days to recommend either: i that the treaty can proceed to the floor of the House of Commons for debate and that a vote to approve the treaty or otherwise should take place no less than 21-sitting days after this recommendation is made (standard scrutiny period); or ii that the treaty is of such a nature that it requires enhanced scrutiny, and that an appropriate period should be set for that enhanced scrutiny (to be determined by the sifting committee) before which the treaty cannot be brought to the floor of the House of Commons for a debate and a vote (extended scrutiny period). In a situation where, following the expiry of the 21-sitting day sifting period, the sifting committee does not make a recommendation in accordance with either points (i) or (ii) above, the Government may bring a treaty forward to the floor of the House of Commons for a vote to approve the treaty or otherwise as soon as parliamentary time allows. (Paragraph 65) 62 Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century
Government Response Summary
The Government rejects the recommendation to amend CRaG and introduce a parliamentary sifting committee for treaties. It reiterates that Part 2 of CRaG already provides appropriate scrutiny, defends the Royal Prerogative, and states that Parliament currently has sufficient mechanisms without further legislative changes.
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government
Rejected
Disagree. The Government does not accept the Committee’s conclusion that Parliament requires further powers to scrutinise the Government’s exercise of Royal Prerogative powers in its treaty making. Part 2 of CRaG strikes the appropriate balance. When scrutinising a treaty subject to CRaG, either House may object to its ratification. Parliamentary approval of treaties is more commonly found in monist States, where treaties automatically become part of domestic law. UK practice is consistent with that of other dualist states such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand – in some respects the Government’s commitments to Parliament go beyond what is provided in other systems. The current practice therefore provides the flexibility, the necessity of which the Committee has recognised, to ensure that Government can continue the important business of doing deals in the national interest while providing a mechanism for Parliament to oppose if the strength of feeling is there. Significantly, the House of Commons has never resolved against ratification using the power it already has under CRaG. To give Parliament binding votes – or vetoes – over treaties would be to fundamentally undermine the Royal Prerogative of treaty making and limit the flexibility needed to negotiate and enter into the deals that will best serve UK interests. As the Committee has noted, the government is accountable to Parliament and holds office by virtue of its ability to command the confidence of the elected House of Commons. The consequence of these principles is not that further legislation is required. Rather, it is that Parliament has the mechanisms to properly scrutinise the Government’s treaty making powers already.