Recommendations & Conclusions
9 items
1
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act clearly achieved the purpose of removing the discretion of the Prime Minister to call an election at a time of his or her choosing. It removed the ability of the incumbent party of government to time an election to gain an advantage over its opponents. Whatever …
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The Fixed-term Parliaments Act clearly achieved the purpose of removing the discretion of the Prime Minister to call an election at a time of his or her choosing. It removed the ability of the incumbent party of government to time an election to gain an advantage over its opponents. Whatever legislation replaces the FtPA it is important that this fairness is maintained.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's conclusion that future legislation should maintain fairness by removing the Prime Minister's discretion to call an election. It argues such a power does not provide an electoral advantage and plans to return to a system where Parliament is dissolved on …
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2
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
It is clear that the Act has shifted the balance of power from the executive to the legislature. It is less clear if the right balance of power has yet been struck. While there should not be a return to the Executive dominance of election calling, careful consideration needs to …
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It is clear that the Act has shifted the balance of power from the executive to the legislature. It is less clear if the right balance of power has yet been struck. While there should not be a return to the Executive dominance of election calling, careful consideration needs to be given for how the power of early election calling is balanced between the Executive and the Legislature.
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Government response AI summary
The government states its draft Bill will repeal the FTPA and revive the Prime Minister's prerogative powers for dissolution, returning to a system where the PM chooses the election timing. This rejects the committee's call for careful consideration of power balance and avoidance of executive …
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3
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
The Act has clearly also altered the default expectation with regards to the timing of elections. The expectation is now that, where the Government has a working majority, a Parliament will normally last a full five-year term. Given that there are mechanisms for an early election included in the Act, …
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The Act has clearly also altered the default expectation with regards to the timing of elections. The expectation is now that, where the Government has a working majority, a Parliament will normally last a full five-year term. Given that there are mechanisms for an early election included in the Act, the length of a Parliament is never truly a fixed term and, in this regard, the Act was misnamed. While changes may need to be made to the current arrangements, the Committee can see no good reason for altering the default expectation that parliaments should run their full term and elections will occur at scheduled times, thereby providing certainty for those administering elections and for the public who vote in them. The only exceptions should be in circumstances where an early general election is the only means of resolving political deadlock, or if the House of Commons expresses no confidence in the Government.
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Government response AI summary
The government plans to repeal the FTPA and revive the Prime Minister's power to call early elections at their choosing, while retaining a five-year maximum term. This rejects the committee's preferred default expectation that parliaments should normally run their full five-year term, with exceptions only …
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4
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
It is clear that one of the main purposes of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was to provide assurance to the Coalition partners that an early election would not be called. The fact that the Coalition Government was maintained for the full 2010–15 Parliament, makes it evident that the Act …
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It is clear that one of the main purposes of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was to provide assurance to the Coalition partners that an early election would not be called. The fact that the Coalition Government was maintained for the full 2010–15 Parliament, makes it evident that the Act achieved this narrow purpose. Whatever system replaces the Act needs to be able to accommodate the formation of future coalition governments without further changes to the law for dissolving Parliament and calling elections. The Government and review committee in considering what should replace the Fixed-term Parliaments Act must establish a system that will support majority, coalition and minority governments to be formed, and for them to govern for a full term, notwithstanding circumstances in which an early general election is the only means of resolving political deadlock, or if the House of Commons expresses no confidence in the Government. (Paragraph 23) Review committee
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Government response AI summary
The government rejected the specific recommendation to establish a system that explicitly accommodates different government types, instead favouring a return to pre-FTPA flexibility. It notes it awaits the Joint Committee's findings on the system of dissolution.
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7
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
The question of whether or not the dissolution prerogative can be restored is a complex one, which involves fundamental constitutional principles. It clearly was the intention of the Government in 2011 to abolish the prerogative, but the wording of the Act is less conclusive on this point. Some also hold …
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The question of whether or not the dissolution prerogative can be restored is a complex one, which involves fundamental constitutional principles. It clearly was the intention of the Government in 2011 to abolish the prerogative, but the wording of the Act is less conclusive on this point. Some also hold the view that the fact of abolition does not even matter. As all the evidence to this inquiry makes clear, this is a highly contested issue. There are also questions as to what exactly would be revived and for example what the legitimate expectations of the Sovereign as a constitutional backstop would be. This is of particular concern in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision about the prerogative power of Prorogation. It is clear that attempting to revive the prerogative would invite the courts to make the final decision on these issues. These are core political and constitutional questions that neither Parliament nor government should abrogate to the courts. Even if there is a desire to return to the old system for dissolution and calling elections, it would be better setting these arrangements in statute rather than engaging in an unnecessary attempt to revive a prerogative which could have considerable unintended consequences and implications.
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Government response AI summary
The government's draft Bill makes express provision to revive the prerogative powers relating to dissolution, including an ouster clause to make their exercise non-justiciable. This rejects the committee's recommendation to set election arrangements directly in statute rather than attempting to revive the prerogative.
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8
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
While not all members of the Committee would oppose such a move, it is also cognisant that reviving the prerogative would mean taking a power that is set out in statute and regulated by Parliament and handing it back to the Crown. Whether or not adequate consideration was given to …
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While not all members of the Committee would oppose such a move, it is also cognisant that reviving the prerogative would mean taking a power that is set out in statute and regulated by Parliament and handing it back to the Crown. Whether or not adequate consideration was given to the full implications of removing the prerogative in 2011, Parliament now has responsibility for this area of the UK political system. The Government should not simply rely on reviving the prerogative, but look to establish a new, robust system for dissolution and calling of elections in the UK. (Paragraph 51) Early elections: avoiding paralysis and propping up of weak governments
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to establish a new system, instead confirming its draft Bill explicitly revives the prerogative powers for dissolution of Parliament and calling elections as they existed before the FTPA, including an ouster clause for non-justiciability.
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10
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
It is clear that the inability for the House of Commons to set the date combined with an apparent lack of trust in the Prime Minister, contributed to the paralysis last autumn. There was support in our evidence for the view that allowing the Queen to set the date on …
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It is clear that the inability for the House of Commons to set the date combined with an apparent lack of trust in the Prime Minister, contributed to the paralysis last autumn. There was support in our evidence for the view that allowing the Queen to set the date on the advice of a Prime Minister was a deficiency in the drafting of the Act. Given the Government’s stated reasons for seeking to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, it is important that consideration is given to mechanisms providing the House of Commons with the power to set the date of an early general election. The Committee recommends that the review committee consider this issue and the advantages and disadvantages of the power to call an early election and to set the date for that election being held by different institutions or whether the election state should be set in statute with a limited power of delay, as is presently the case in regards to the scheduled election date.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation for a review committee to consider mechanisms for the House of Commons to set the early election date. It states that the date will continue to be set by Royal Proclamation on the advice of the Prime Minister, without parliamentary …
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15
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
Changing the current arrangements to allow the Government to designate a vote a matter of confidence that if lost would trigger a general election—an established practice under the old arrangements—could be a retrograde step. If it were included in any future arrangements, it would clearly empower the Executive (via the …
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Changing the current arrangements to allow the Government to designate a vote a matter of confidence that if lost would trigger a general election—an established practice under the old arrangements—could be a retrograde step. If it were included in any future arrangements, it would clearly empower the Executive (via the Government Whips) and weaken the House of Commons, in particular Government backbenchers. This would be a matter of political judgment and the Committee does not advocate one way or the other at this point. The Committee recommends that proposals to include the ability for the Government to designate 34 The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 a vote of confidence are included in the review committee’s terms of reference, and if this is to be taken forward, it is given proper consideration by the House. (Paragraph 83) Prorogation
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assessment of the FTPA and its caution regarding restoring the government's ability to designate confidence votes. It asserts that restoring the link between confidence and dissolution is 'vital' for an effective democracy, but states it will also carefully consider the …
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16
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Rejected
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the UK’s constitutional arrangements is a fine but constantly-shifting balance of convention, principle and law, that provides clear guidance, but also flexibility. These arrangements, when working successfully, rely as much on self- regulation and collective approbation …
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The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the UK’s constitutional arrangements is a fine but constantly-shifting balance of convention, principle and law, that provides clear guidance, but also flexibility. These arrangements, when working successfully, rely as much on self- regulation and collective approbation as they do on the hard edge of the law. This is not a constitutional system in which the courts are intended be the ultimate arbiter. In areas of prerogative power, the Sovereign remains the constitutional backstop. However, the prorogation case raised questions over the extent to which the Sovereign is now able to perform this role, especially if the convention that the Sovereign should not be drawn into politically-objectionable matters is not adhered to. A range of options of how to prevent this have been suggested to the Committee, including setting out the power of prorogation in statue. The Committee recommends this is included in the review committee’s terms of reference.(Paragraph 94) The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 35
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to include the power of prorogation in statute in the review committee's terms of reference, stating that prorogation is a separate issue from the FTPA and their Bill is narrowly focused on dissolution.
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