Recommendations & Conclusions
16 items
1
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act clearly achieved the purpose of removing the discretion of the Prime Minister to call an election at a time of his or her choosing. It removed the ability of the incumbent party of government to time an election to gain an advantage over its opponents. Whatever …
Government response. As a result of the FTPA, Her Majesty does not currently have any residual power to dissolve Parliament. Instead, an early dissolution either requires the support of two-thirds of MPs, or a statutory vote of no confidence. As the Committee …
2
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
It is clear that the Act has shifted the balance of power from the executive to the legislature. It is less clear if the right balance of power has yet been struck. While there should not be a return to the Executive dominance of election calling, careful consideration needs to …
Government response. The Government’s draft Bill, which has been published for pre-legislative scrutiny, will repeal the FTPA and revive the prerogative powers relating to the dissolution of Parliament (and the calling of a new Parliament) that existed before the FTPA. The Bill …
3
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The Act has clearly also altered the default expectation with regards to the timing of elections. The expectation is now that, where the Government has a working majority, a Parliament will normally last a full five-year term. Given that there are mechanisms for an early election included in the Act, …
Government response. As the Committee observes, since 2015 the Act has not had its intended effect. Neither the 2015 Parliament nor the 2017 Parliament lasted for a full-five year term. The fact that 4 Sixth Special Report of Session 2019-21 Parliament had …
4
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
It is clear that one of the main purposes of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was to provide assurance to the Coalition partners that an early election would not be called. The fact that the Coalition Government was maintained for the full 2010–15 Parliament, makes it evident that the Act …
Government response. We note that the 2011 Act was passed by the Coalition Government in order to provide stability to that administration. However, we would question the merits of making such fundamental changes to long-standing constitutional practice for short-term expediency. Since 2015 …
5
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The Committee welcomes the Government’s commitment not to rush through replacement legislation and to provide adequate time for full scrutiny. We also appreciate the Minister’s commitment to forging cross-party support for whatever replaces the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The first step, as the Minister 32 The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 recognised, …
Government response. To fulfil its statutory responsibilities under Section 7 of the FTPA the Government tabled a motion, in the House of Commons on 10 November, to make arrangements for a committee to undertake a review of the FTPA and conduct pre-legislative …
6
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The Committee does not recommend a particular composition for the review committee beyond that set out in the Act. But the Committee believes that the review committee should be a Joint Select Committee, subject to parliamentary approval and not an executive-appointed committee. The Joint Committee could require additional provisions to …
Government response. To fulfil its statutory responsibilities under Section 7 of the FTPA the Government tabled a motion, in the House of Commons on 10 November, to make arrangements for a committee to undertake a review of the FTPA and conduct pre-legislative …
7
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The question of whether or not the dissolution prerogative can be restored is a complex one, which involves fundamental constitutional principles. It clearly was the intention of the Government in 2011 to abolish the prerogative, but the wording of the Act is less conclusive on this point. Some also hold …
Government response. The Government recognises that there is a debate about whether the dissolution prerogative can be revived without specific legislation to do so. To provide for legal, constitutional and political certainty around the process for dissolving Parliament and to remove any …
8
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
While not all members of the Committee would oppose such a move, it is also cognisant that reviving the prerogative would mean taking a power that is set out in statute and regulated by Parliament and handing it back to the Crown. Whether or not adequate consideration was given to …
Government response. The Government recognises that there is a debate about whether the dissolution prerogative can be revived without specific legislation to do so. To provide for legal, constitutional and political certainty around the process for dissolving Parliament and to remove any …
9
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The two-thirds ‘super majority’ required to trigger an early election under the Act can, like any statutory provision, be circumvented by passing an Act of Parliament to set an election date. As was made clear to the Committee the option of such a circumvention was clearly always contemplated as a …
Government response. The FTPA, in providing that a two-thirds majority is required to bring about an early general election, served to hinder the calling of elections, and as the events of 2019 demonstrated, led Parliament to legislate to circumvent this provision in …
10
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
It is clear that the inability for the House of Commons to set the date combined with an apparent lack of trust in the Prime Minister, contributed to the paralysis last autumn. There was support in our evidence for the view that allowing the Queen to set the date on …
Government response. It has long been the position that the date of the election is set by Royal Proclamation on the advice of the Prime Minister. This was reflected in the FTPA and will continue to be the case under the legislation …
11
Recommendation
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The principle that the Government must have, and retain, the confidence of the elected House of Commons is fundamental to our system of Parliamentary democracy. The Committee fully endorses the findings of our predecessor Committee on the operation of confidence since the establishment of the Fixed- term Parliaments Act, and …
Government response. 8 Sixth Special Report of Session 2019-21
12
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
It is clear that some mix of statue and convention is the best way for this area to be governed, but this requires the actors involved to act in ways which engender trust.
Government response. 8 Sixth Special Report of Session 2019-21
13
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act is compatible with the confidence principle and has not divorced confidence from dissolution. If the House of Commons wanted to trigger dissolution by removing confidence from the Government, it has that power under the Act. However, as was seen last year, the Act has created a …
Government response. 8 Sixth Special Report of Session 2019-21
14
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Providing the House of Commons with the power to set the date of an election could provide one route to avoid unnecessary paralysis at times of deadlock.
Government response. 8 Sixth Special Report of Session 2019-21
15
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
Changing the current arrangements to allow the Government to designate a vote a matter of confidence that if lost would trigger a general election—an established practice under the old arrangements—could be a retrograde step. If it were included in any future arrangements, it would clearly empower the Executive (via the …
Government response. The Government does not share the Committee’s assessment of the effect of the FTPA, which, by codifying motions of confidence in statutory form, did divorce the issue of confidence from dissolution, as demonstrated by the events in the 2017 - …
16
Conclusion
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliamen…
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the UK’s constitutional arrangements is a fine but constantly-shifting balance of convention, principle and law, that provides clear guidance, but also flexibility. These arrangements, when working successfully, rely as much on self- regulation and collective approbation …
Government response. Sixth Special Report of Session 2019–21 9 As the Supreme Court itself noted, the circumstances of Miller / Cherry were exceptional and unlikely to arise again. The exercise of the prorogation prerogative is an issue separate from the FTPA which …