Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Recommendation 15
15
Changing the current arrangements to allow the Government to designate a vote a matter of...
Conclusion
Changing the current arrangements to allow the Government to designate a vote a matter of confidence that if lost would trigger a general election—an established practice under the old arrangements—could be a retrograde step. If it were included in any future arrangements, it would clearly empower the Executive (via the Government Whips) and weaken the House of Commons, in particular Government backbenchers. This would be a matter of political judgment and the Committee does not advocate one way or the other at this point. The Committee recommends that proposals to include the ability for the Government to designate 34 The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 a vote of confidence are included in the review committee’s terms of reference, and if this is to be taken forward, it is given proper consideration by the House. (Paragraph 83) Prorogation
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
The Government does not share the Committee’s assessment of the effect of the FTPA, which, by codifying motions of confidence in statutory form, did divorce the issue of confidence from dissolution, as demonstrated by the events in the 2017 - 19 Parliament. The overriding principle of our constitution should be that the Government of the day has the confidence of the House of Commons. The FTPA’s codification of confidence motions (and the uncertainty around what happens following the passage of a no confidence vote under the Act) undermines this democratic necessity, hindering the function of representative democracy by making it harder to have necessary elections. in statutory form; flexibility is an essential part of our constitutional system and the codification of confidence motions under the FTPA led to parliamentary paralysis. This is because under the FTPA system, the passage of confidence motions which do not conform to the statutory wording of the Act means that the Government could remain in office even if it was unable to secure its agenda or confidence was withdrawn in de facto, non- statutory terms. When the Act is repealed it will be vital that the link between confidence and dissolution is restored in order that critical votes can be designated as matters of confidence which, if lost, would trigger an early election. The Government shall of course carefully consider the conclusions of the Joint Committee on the operation of confidence votes, both under the FTPA and under the Government’s draft repeal Bill.