Select committee: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Recommendation 16
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
Published 15 Sep 2020
Paragraph 94
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 All items in this report Report on parliament.uk ↗ Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗
Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the UK’s constitutional arrangements is a fine but constantly-shifting balance of convention, principle and law, that provides clear guidance, but also flexibility. These arrangements, when working successfully, rely as much on self- regulation and collective approbation as they do on the hard edge of the law. This is not a constitutional system in which the courts are intended be the ultimate arbiter. In areas of prerogative power, the Sovereign remains the constitutional backstop. However, the prorogation case raised questions over the extent to which the Sovereign is now able to perform this role, especially if the convention that the Sovereign should not be drawn into politically-objectionable matters is not adhered to. A range of options of how to prevent this have been suggested to the Committee, including setting out the power of prorogation in statue. The Committee recommends this is included in the review committee’s terms of reference.
From: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (HC 167), paragraph 94, 15 September 2020
Government response
The government responded to the whole report on 9 December 2020 (deadline 15 November 2020).
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.The government says it is repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act through a draft Bill that revives the prerogative powers over dissolution, and it disagrees with several of the Committee's conclusions, including on the Commons setting election dates.
- On the prerogative, it recognises "a debate" about whether it can be revived without legislation, and the draft Bill makes express provision to revive it. The government agrees that its exercise should not be "abrogated to the Courts", and the draft Bill contains an ouster clause.
- It states that it "does not accept" that the power to set the precise date of the election should be given to the House of Commons or be subject to parliamentary approval.
- It "does not agree" that a residual dissolution power gives the incumbent government an electoral advantage, and it "does not share" the Committee's assessment that the Act is compatible with the confidence principle.
- On review and scrutiny, a Joint Committee has been set up, and the government says it "shall of course carefully consider" its conclusions on confidence votes. On prorogation, it says the issue is "separate" from the Act and the draft Bill is narrowly focused on dissolution.