Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Recommendation 16
16
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the...
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the UK’s constitutional arrangements is a fine but constantly-shifting balance of convention, principle and law, that provides clear guidance, but also flexibility. These arrangements, when working successfully, rely as much on self- regulation and collective approbation as they do on the hard edge of the law. This is not a constitutional system in which the courts are intended be the ultimate arbiter. In areas of prerogative power, the Sovereign remains the constitutional backstop. However, the prorogation case raised questions over the extent to which the Sovereign is now able to perform this role, especially if the convention that the Sovereign should not be drawn into politically-objectionable matters is not adhered to. A range of options of how to prevent this have been suggested to the Committee, including setting out the power of prorogation in statue. The Committee recommends this is included in the review committee’s terms of reference.(Paragraph 94) The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 35
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
Sixth Special Report of Session 2019–21 9 As the Supreme Court itself noted, the circumstances of Miller / Cherry were exceptional and unlikely to arise again. The exercise of the prorogation prerogative is an issue separate from the FTPA which is concerned with the calling of elections. The Government’s manifesto made a clear commitment to repeal the FTPA and the draft Bill which the Government has published for pre-legislative scrutiny is intended to deliver on this commitment. The draft Bill is short and narrowly focused on the dissolution of Parliament and the calling of a general election, not the ending of a parliamentary session.