Select committee: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Conclusion 3
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
Published 15 Sep 2020
Paragraph 19
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 All items in this report Report on parliament.uk ↗ Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗
Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Act has clearly also altered the default expectation with regards to the timing of elections. The expectation is now that, where the Government has a working majority, a Parliament will normally last a full five-year term. Given that there are mechanisms for an early election included in the Act, the length of a Parliament is never truly a fixed term and, in this regard, the Act was misnamed. While changes may need to be made to the current arrangements, the Committee can see no good reason for altering the default expectation that parliaments should run their full term and elections will occur at scheduled times, thereby providing certainty for those administering elections and for the public who vote in them. The only exceptions should be in circumstances where an early general election is the only means of resolving political deadlock, or if the House of Commons expresses no confidence in the Government.
From: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (HC 167), paragraph 19, 15 September 2020
Government response
The government responded to the whole report on 9 December 2020 (deadline 15 November 2020).
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.The government says it is repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act through a draft Bill that revives the prerogative powers over dissolution, and it disagrees with several of the Committee's conclusions, including on the Commons setting election dates.
- On the prerogative, it recognises "a debate" about whether it can be revived without legislation, and the draft Bill makes express provision to revive it. The government agrees that its exercise should not be "abrogated to the Courts", and the draft Bill contains an ouster clause.
- It states that it "does not accept" that the power to set the precise date of the election should be given to the House of Commons or be subject to parliamentary approval.
- It "does not agree" that a residual dissolution power gives the incumbent government an electoral advantage, and it "does not share" the Committee's assessment that the Act is compatible with the confidence principle.
- On review and scrutiny, a Joint Committee has been set up, and the government says it "shall of course carefully consider" its conclusions on confidence votes. On prorogation, it says the issue is "separate" from the Act and the draft Bill is narrowly focused on dissolution.