Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
HC 167
Published 15 September 2020
Recommendations
5
Para 34
The Committee welcomes the Government’s commitment not to rush through replacement legislation and to provide...
Recommendation
The Committee welcomes the Government’s commitment not to rush through replacement legislation and to provide adequate time for full scrutiny. We also appreciate the Minister’s commitment to forging cross-party support for whatever replaces the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The first step, …
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8
While not all members of the Committee would oppose such a move, it is also...
Recommendation
While not all members of the Committee would oppose such a move, it is also cognisant that reviving the prerogative would mean taking a power that is set out in statute and regulated by Parliament and handing it back to …
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11
Para 79
The principle that the Government must have, and retain, the confidence of the elected House...
Recommendation
The principle that the Government must have, and retain, the confidence of the elected House of Commons is fundamental to our system of Parliamentary democracy. The Committee fully endorses the findings of our predecessor Committee on the operation of confidence …
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Conclusions (13)
1
Conclusion
Para 17
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act clearly achieved the purpose of removing the discretion of the Prime Minister to call an election at a time of his or her choosing. It removed the ability of the incumbent party of government to time an election to gain an advantage over its opponents. Whatever …
2
Conclusion
Para 18
It is clear that the Act has shifted the balance of power from the executive to the legislature. It is less clear if the right balance of power has yet been struck. While there should not be a return to the Executive dominance of election calling, careful consideration needs to …
3
Conclusion
Para 19
The Act has clearly also altered the default expectation with regards to the timing of elections. The expectation is now that, where the Government has a working majority, a Parliament will normally last a full five-year term. Given that there are mechanisms for an early election included in the Act, …
4
Conclusion
It is clear that one of the main purposes of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was to provide assurance to the Coalition partners that an early election would not be called. The fact that the Coalition Government was maintained for the full 2010–15 Parliament, makes it evident that the Act …
6
Conclusion
The Committee does not recommend a particular composition for the review committee beyond that set out in the Act. But the Committee believes that the review committee should be a Joint Select Committee, subject to parliamentary approval and not an executive-appointed committee. The Joint Committee could require additional provisions to …
7
Conclusion
Para 50
The question of whether or not the dissolution prerogative can be restored is a complex one, which involves fundamental constitutional principles. It clearly was the intention of the Government in 2011 to abolish the prerogative, but the wording of the Act is less conclusive on this point. Some also hold …
9
Conclusion
Para 63
The two-thirds ‘super majority’ required to trigger an early election under the Act can, like any statutory provision, be circumvented by passing an Act of Parliament to set an election date. As was made clear to the Committee the option of such a circumvention was clearly always contemplated as a …
10
Conclusion
Para 69
It is clear that the inability for the House of Commons to set the date combined with an apparent lack of trust in the Prime Minister, contributed to the paralysis last autumn. There was support in our evidence for the view that allowing the Queen to set the date on …
12
Conclusion
Para 80
It is clear that some mix of statue and convention is the best way for this area to be governed, but this requires the actors involved to act in ways which engender trust.
13
Conclusion
Para 81
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act is compatible with the confidence principle and has not divorced confidence from dissolution. If the House of Commons wanted to trigger dissolution by removing confidence from the Government, it has that power under the Act. However, as was seen last year, the Act has created a …
14
Conclusion
Para 82
Providing the House of Commons with the power to set the date of an election could provide one route to avoid unnecessary paralysis at times of deadlock.
15
Conclusion
Changing the current arrangements to allow the Government to designate a vote a matter of confidence that if lost would trigger a general election—an established practice under the old arrangements—could be a retrograde step. If it were included in any future arrangements, it would clearly empower the Executive (via the …
16
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller-Cherry case highlights that at the heart of the UK’s constitutional arrangements is a fine but constantly-shifting balance of convention, principle and law, that provides clear guidance, but also flexibility. These arrangements, when working successfully, rely as much on self- regulation and collective approbation …