Biosecurity and animal welfare

Animal disease threats like foot and mouth disease and African swine fever are a national security issue and must be understood as such across Government. Although it is not possible to prevent all contaminated animal products entering Great Britain, the Government must take all possible steps to reduce the risk of disease incursion through human-mediated routes. Prevention of animal disease outbreaks is particularly important at a time when farmers are under pressure, foot and mouth disease has spread in Europe, and the UK’s biosecurity capability is vulnerable due to increasing outbreaks, veterinary shortages, and the precarious condition of the APHA Weybridge estate. Animal diseases present an acute risk to the mental health and wellbeing of farmers and veterinary professionals, and that of their families and communities. Policymakers must give weight to the mental health implications of animal diseases when designing and communicating policy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 12) Illegal imports in Great Britain

Consumers deserve confidence that the food they are buying is safe and meets high welfare standards, and British farmers should not be undercut by cheap, poor quality animal products. We need to understand more about the nature and scale of illegal imports of animal products, and their destinations in Great Britain. This will help target resources, inform the design of strategies to reduce demand, and evaluate progress. Farmers and the public also deserve greater transparency about the risks we face. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

Defra should commission a risk assessment of the type published by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in 2004 for the import of contaminated meat and meat products into Great Britain and subsequent exposure of livestock. It should model the probable amount of meat and dairy illegally imported per year, the probability that imported meat and dairy are contaminated with virus, the probability that the import of meat and dairy results in infection in GB livestock, and the amount of illegally 35 imported meat and dairy that is sold in GB. Furthermore, the Government should publish quarterly data relating to seizures of illegally imported animal products made at the border and inland, broken down by type. (Recommendation, Paragraph 27)

Defra’s ban on personal imports of most animal products from the EU, introduced in April 2025, is a welcome simplification and strengthening of the rules. However, there is not yet enough public awareness of the restrictions or the reasons for them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 28)

Travel operators should be legally compelled to inform travellers of the rules for personal imports from the EU into GB. Defra must immediately scale up its communications to the public about personal import rules and reach a much broader audience. Communications must explain both the rules and their purpose, such as the specific threats of foot and mouth disease and African swine fever. Defra should also produce a digital tool for travellers to identify what they can bring into the country, like those provided by the United States and Australia. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

Under successive governments, Defra’s approach to personal imports from the EU since 2021 has been unnecessarily lax, too reactive and overly complicated. Temporary personal import rules create confusion for travellers, uncertainty for farmers, and difficulty for enforcement professionals. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

Defra must consult on a permanent personal import policy for the EU by April 2026. It should prioritise safeguarding British farms and should be straightforward enough to be understood by travellers and to be enforced. The current temporary ban on most meat and dairy imports should not be lifted until a permanent policy has been introduced. (Recommendation, Paragraph 29)

Demand for cheap meat and culturally preferred products is fuelling the influx of illegal imports to Great Britain. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)

Defra should work with the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland to design a strategy to reduce demand for illegally imported products. Defra must further consider how to engage with Eastern European communities in Great Britain to raise awareness of animal disease risks and controls. (Recommendation, Paragraph 30) Inter-agency working

The Committee supports the Government’s commitment to “do whatever it takes to protect British farmers from foot and mouth”. The Committee welcomes efforts made so far, but concludes that there is more that Defra 36 could and should be doing to prevent animal diseases like foot and mouth and African swine fever. There is no encompassing strategy to tackle POAO smuggling and structures to facilitate inter-agency working are incomplete. Defra has not presented a convincing plan to address these issues. (Conclusion, Paragraph 42)

By January 2026, Defra should create a strategy for POAO smuggling in collaboration with the National Food Crime Unit (FSA), the Scottish Food Crime and Incidents Unit (FSS), port health authorities, inland local authorities and Border Force. To be effective, this must be a genuine co- design with the enforcement professionals whose expertise is currently being neglected in policy making. The strategy should establish formal information sharing mechanisms between Defra, local authorities, and port health authorities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

There is currently no identifiable or effective ownership of the issue of illegal meat imports. Responsibility is so fragmented across agencies that outdated, inefficient ways of working have been allowed to persist and the scale of the crisis has been able to escalate to an intolerable degree. This is an issue that is in desperate need of focussed, energised leadership and personal accountability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

A taskforce for illegal imports of animal products should be established by November 2025, led by the Minister for Biosecurity, to provide oversight of the strategy’s design and implementation and to drive improvements. The taskforce should at least include the Chief Veterinary Officer; representatives from the Animal and Plant Health Agency, the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland including the National Food Crime Unit and Scottish Food Crime and Incidents Unit, and Border Force; and local government representation such as port health authority leaders, the Association of Port Health Authorities, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and the Local Government Association. The taskforce must have credibility with all stakeholder groups and should spend time with operational teams. The taskforce should report annually and refine the strategic approach to tackling meat smuggling as required. (Recommendation, Paragraph 43)

Local authorities are a key partner in tackling illegal POAO imports but are being overlooked and under supported by Defra. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

Local authorities should be integrated into formal information sharing and intelligence networks. The illegal imports taskforce should review the workforce needs of local authorities in relation to POAO smuggling. The taskforce should consider whether regional expert contacts would be an effective tool to support and connect enforcement teams, and should consider how imported food verification training can be disseminated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44) 37

Border Force is not adequately fulfilling its responsibility to enforce personal import rules relating to animal products; it has too many competing priorities and officers lack understanding of product of animal origin (POAO) rules and seizures. Border Force and port health authorities have shown that they can work well together in teams, but port health authorities are needlessly inhibited by a lack of powers and funding. Britain needs expert teams at the border with a single focus on animal products; these teams could target their operations based on POAO-specific intelligence and begin to address this crisis. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

Port health authorities should be given stop, search and seize powers in relation to animal products and funding for enforcement presence at the border in relation to personal imports for the EU and rest of world. With the introduction of a UK-EU SPS zone and the reduction of border checks on POAO from the EU, there may be appropriately trained, experienced personnel who could be redeployed to personal import enforcement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

There is currently no effective deterrent to meat smuggling and smugglers are operating with impunity as a result. Defra’s proposal to crush vans carrying illegal imports is not a silver bullet for this issue and may be challenging to practically implement at the border. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46)

Defra must deliver a plan to immediately start fining and prosecuting repeat offenders and those who are attempting to smuggle significant amounts of animal products. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) The Port of Dover

Under the previous Government, there was an unacceptable breakdown of trust, communication and cooperation in the relationship between Defra and Dover Port Health Authority (DPHA) to the detriment of national biosecurity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

This Government must lead an effective, mutual restoration of that relationship, which is of strategic importance to the UK’s security and trade. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60)

In the absence of an effective deterrent for meat smuggling and within the context of high rates of non-compliance with import rules, 20% operational coverage for DPHA’s anti-meat smuggling operations is insufficient. Defra’s decision to cease funding for official veterinarians at the Port of Dover is counterintuitive to its ambition of a biosecure border. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61) 38

The Committee has recommended that POAO enforcement powers and funding be transferred to port health authorities; in any interim period, emergency funding should be provided to at least double DPHA’s operational coverage at the border and should allow for the use of official veterinarians who are evidently an asset to its enforcement capability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

The space and facilities at the Port of Dover are not suitable for seizing high volumes of potentially contaminated meat. Defra needs to think creatively about how it can tackle this unprecedented challenge at the Short Straits, rather than being constrained by the boundaries of existing enforcement arrangements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 62)

Defra should work with DPHA to consider how the space available at its Bastion Point site could be repurposed to support with enforcement activities and relieve pressure at the port. Defra should conduct a cost- benefit analysis of repurposing Bastion Point and provide this to the Committee. Additionally, Defra should seek advice on the health, safety and wellbeing of frontline workers at the Port and the risk of disease cross-contamination at the Port. Defra should oversee any necessary improvements and disseminate learnings to other ports. Defra should engage with Border Force and the Port of Dover on renovation of inspection sheds and investment in facilities for the benefit of workers, biosecurity and customers travelling through the port. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62) 39

While assessments of the effectiveness of the Border Target Operating Model (BTOM) in safeguarding UK biosecurity vary, and regardless of whether full or partial implementation would be sufficient in principle, Defra and the relevant authorities have not fulfilled their responsibilities under the BTOM in practice. As such, the question of adequacy of the system is largely academic; without effective delivery, even a well-designed model cannot achieve its intended outcomes. We are reassured by the overall level of compliance within industry, but a robust, risk-based regime is essential to maintaining standards and safeguarding biosecurity. We have real concerns that the inspection rates set out in the BTOM risk assessment are not being met and that Defra has no effective system of oversight for border controls. We are not convinced that a lack of published data on the inspection rates is due to a desire to protect the integrity of the intelligence system. We have concerns that they are not being published to avoid highlighting Defra’s historic noncompliance with its own targets. (Conclusion, Paragraph 9)

It is essential that Defra thoroughly reviews the implementation of the BTOM. Defra should commit to this review in its response to our Report, and the review must be published no later than January 2026. It should set out why and how much variation in inspection rates is occurring between ports of entry, and how often auto clearance mechanisms are being used and the reasons for this. In its response to this Report, the Government should commit to the publication of quarterly inspection rates for all ports of entry, beginning January 2026, and to publishing historic quarterly inspection rates. (Recommendation, Paragraph 9)

Varying inspection rates at different ports of entry has created a system that can be gamed by those seeking to dodge costs or import illegal goods and may even introduce “temptation” for legitimate importers who witness their consignments auto-clear important processes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 10) 25

In the review proposed above, Defra should work with relevant Government departments and non-departmental delivery partners to assess the scale and nature of intentional non-compliance and outline the steps it will take to address this. These lessons should also be applied to any future UK-EU trading arrangements. (Recommendation, Paragraph 10)

There is a critical need for greater transparency and accuracy in the modelling and implementation of SPS controls. A failure to publish risk assessments and data informing inspection rates, limits scrutiny and undermines trust in the system. Addressing these issues through open publication and review of underlying models will support more effective, evidence-based policy and enforcement at the GB border. As such, we welcome the commitment the Minister for Biosecurity made on 6 May to review the type of data Defra will publish. (Conclusion, Paragraph 11)

Defra should, in response to this Report, provide us with the risk-based assessment models and underlying data used to determine SPS inspection rates. Publicly available models will enhance transparency, allow for independent scrutiny, and help rebuild stakeholder confidence in the integrity of border biosecurity measures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 11)

Defra maintains that a “robust” enforcement system is in operation at the Short Straits entry point. Within the context of flawed IT systems, data gaps, routine auto-clearance of goods and strained local authorities, the Committee does not share that confidence. We are particularly concerned that the absence of robust enforcement mechanisms between the Short Straits and Sevington inland BCP has created vulnerabilities that may be exploited for the illegal entry of products of animal origin into Great Britain. The current system, as it stands, risks undermining the very assurances that the BTOM was intended to deliver. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

In an annex included in the response to this Report, Defra should provide us with the August and November 2024 figures relating to the number of lorries that were directed to Sevington Inland BCP for border checks and the number of lorries that present themselves to the BCP for inspection in that same month. This would allow the committee to scrutinise compliance levels without jeopardising the dynamic nature of intelligence-led biosecurity controls. The Government should also outline what specific process it will implement to validate that goods re-exported following inspections at Sevington Inland BCP do in fact leave the UK. This process should include mechanisms for tracking consignments post-inspection and verifying their departure from UK territory, with appropriate documentation and oversight to ensure compliance. Defra should also provide, in its response to this Report, its assessment of the potential merits of creating a legal mechanism to ensure lorries transporting animal and plant products are commercially sealed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 15) 26 Digital Systems

Throughout our inquiry, we heard repeated and serious concerns about the functionality, integration, and reliability of the IT systems underpinning the UK’s border biosecurity regime. As enforcement relies on data, these concerns raise fundamental questions about the Government’s ability to deliver on its commitments under the BTOM. We welcome the Department’s efforts to review how data are recorded and analysed within port health authority and Defra IT systems and how these can be combined to create a reliable and complete data picture. We note that the Department is now working to pre-identify commodity codes for the top five notifiable diseases to enable faster updates in future. We are also encouraged by the improved response to subsequent FMD outbreaks in Slovakia and Hungary, where IPAFFS was updated immediately in line with policy changes, preventing goods from auto-clearing controls. This demonstrates that lessons are being learned but also underscores the need for a more resilient and responsive system from the outset. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

In response to this Report, the Government should confirm that it has produced a list of pre-identified commodity codes for the top five notifiable diseases and provide a copy of this database containing the commodity codes in question to the committee. The Government should also confirm that it has established a digital team that can update IPAFFS ‘24-7, 365’, in line with the statement from the Chief Veterinary Officer. (Recommendation, Paragraph 19)

It is disappointing that it required persistent questioning from the Committee over a period of three months before the Department provided answers to all our questions regarding the initial response to foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreaks in Europe. This reflected cultural and bureaucratic issues within Defra that impeded effective scrutiny and timely adherence to parliamentary processes, ultimately creating barriers to public transparency. We are encouraged by the Minister’s commitment to improve transparency and the handling of correspondence with the Committee. (Conclusion, Paragraph 20)

The Common Understanding with the EU presents a positive and welcome opportunity to bolster UK biosecurity and we praise the Government for its work in this regard. It remains unclear, however, how the Government sees the new arrangements working in practice. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

In response to this Report, the Government should set out its strategic objectives for shared EU–UK digital systems in the context of border biosecurity. Specifically, it should clarify whether IPAFFS will be retired in favour of adopting TRACES NT, or whether a model of integration is preferred. The Government should also outline contingency plans for 27 digital system continuity in the event of a breakdown in any future SPS agreement. Defra should publish a comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of both integrating IPAFFS with TRACES NT, or adopting TRACES NT wholesale, ahead of the establishment of a Common SPS Area. Any new IT systems introduced as part of this transition must undergo rigorous testing prior to deployment and be fully interoperable with existing platforms across both UK and EU jurisdictions, including those used by local authorities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

Until a Common SPS Area is formally established, IPAFFS will remain the UK’s primary digital system for managing border biosecurity. It must therefore be capable of meeting the operational needs of all users and enforcement bodies, including importers, port health authorities, and inland local authorities. The system’s interoperability with EU platforms and local authority systems is essential to ensure effective enforcement and traceability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 24)

In response to this Report, Defra should confirm it is taking steps to provide local authorities with real-time access to IPAFFS to support enforcement and traceability of consignments. Until the UK gains full access to EU systems, IPAFFS should be maintained, updated as needed, and evaluated for potential integration with EU databases to ensure continuity and efficiency during any transitional period. To achieve this, a comprehensive interoperability assessment of existing systems should be conducted across relevant national and local authorities, followed by the establishment of technical standards and data-sharing protocols aligned with EU and local systems. If deemed feasible by the assessments, within the next three months, pilot projects should be launched to test cross-border digital integration with selected local authorities and EU counterparts, helping to identify functionality gaps and inform future improvements. A publicly available roadmap should then be published, setting out clear milestones, timelines, and accountability mechanisms to guide progress toward full digital interoperability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 24) Cost, delays and administrative burden

There is a need to learn from the cost overruns and delays associated with developing new digital systems such as the Single Trade Window. While an SPS deal with the EU may ease administrative burdens, the UK’s global trade requires a fully functioning Single Trade Window to deliver the necessary efficiencies. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27) 28

Future border systems must prioritise ease of use, interoperability, and support for trade growth. In its response to this Report, the Department should provide an analysis of the reasons for the Single Trade Window’s delay. It should also outline the renewed timeline for the implementation of the Window and the costs associated with its development and pausing. (Recommendation, Paragraph 27)

Border control posts recover costs whilst operating as the least-cost, high-efficiency solution for border checks. Industry trust in the Common User Charge has been undermined by a perceived lack of transparency in cost recovery processes and concerns over the widespread use of auto-clearance. Many stakeholders feel they are not receiving value for money. It is vital that future cost recovery mechanisms are developed collaboratively with industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 29)

If the Government continues to operate a BCP within the common SPS area, any cost recovery mechanism must be co-designed with industry and should not disproportionately affect small and medium-sized enterprises. In the interest of transparency, the Government should publish the operational costs of running Sevington Inland BCP. (Recommendation, Paragraph 29)

Industry has expressed dissatisfaction with the current system of SPS checks on plants and plant products conducted at inland Border Control Posts (BCPs), citing concerns around value for money, inspection standards, and biosecurity. While a future SPS agreement with the EU may significantly reduce or remove the need for such checks, improvements to the current system are necessary to rebuild industry trust and ensure continued compliance and biosecurity in the interim. The competing demands for APHA plant inspectors across BCPs and Control Points, restricts the availability of inspections at CPs, industry’s preferred location, at the time consignments arrive. Reintroducing Place of Destination (PoD) inspections for a limited number of consignments could ease pressure on the system and improve inspector availability at CPs without requiring a significant expansion of the workforce. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)

The Government should adopt the Horticultural Trades Association’s proposal for a hybrid inspection model, combining BCP and PoD approaches. Following a short consultation with industry, the Government should designate specific consignments eligible for PoD inspections. Additionally, APHA should share with us its guidance on the biosecurity protocols in place for inspecting multiple consignments at inland BCPs, including measures to prevent cross-contamination. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35) 29 Planning and delivery of future commercial biosecurity arrangements

Future border policy development must include structured, transparent, and iterative consultation with stakeholders from the outset to ensure policies are workable and informed by the sector. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)

During the transition away from the BTOM, the Department should commit to clear timelines for decision-making, a delivery plan, and communicate changes promptly to allow businesses to plan with confidence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40)

Reports that the Government may be seeking to sell and repurpose the inland border control post at Sevington raises concerns about its ongoing commitment to maintaining and improving the facility while it remains operational. This demonstrates an assumption that an SPS agreement will soon remove the need for inland checks. However, given the uncertainty around the timing of any such agreement, and the significant risks associated with an animal or plant disease outbreak, continued investment in infrastructure and operational efficiency is essential to ensure effective border management in the interim. The announcement of the Common Understanding has also created uncertainty for local authorities who were anticipating recouping the costs of their investment into border facilities through charges for their use. (Conclusion, Paragraph 42)

The Government should publicly clarify its intentions regarding the future of Sevington BCP, including whether it plans to sell or repurpose the site. Regardless of any future SPS agreement, Defra should commit to maintaining the facility and improving the efficiency of current border checks to ensure continued resilience and value for money. In its response to this Report, Defra should set out its position on supporting local authorities who stand to lose out financially due to the proposed agreement with the EU. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42) User experience

Implementing the BTOM goes beyond logistics and finance; people are central to a successful, biosecure border. The welfare, dignity, and working conditions of those delivering and using a border system must be integral to its design and operation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44) 30

In its response to this Report, Defra should outline plans to reduce current wait times for hauliers at the border and outline how it intends to ensure that all drivers have 24-hour adequate welfare facilities. Any future border infrastructure and operational planning must explicitly include provisions for adequate driver facilities and realistic scheduling, to mitigate the human impact of delays and disruption. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44) 31

The Government must urgently clarify whether on-farm animal welfare and labelling will be included in negotiations with the EU of an SPS agreement so it can properly develop any future legislative changes, prepare industry for reforms and so those changes can be properly scrutinised. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

The Government and EU should establish the scope of the SPS negotiations as a priority and publish this information on an interim basis, prior to the conclusion of negotiations, to enable effective consultation and scrutiny. (Recommendation, Paragraph 16)

The Government must not allow UK farmers and food producers to be undercut by cheaper imports produced to lower welfare standards, in line with its repeated commitments to not lower food standards and uphold high animal welfare standards in trade agreements. This risk is heightened by the proposals to raise on-farm welfare standards set out in the Animal Welfare Strategy, which will affect producers regardless of whether on-farm welfare ultimately falls within the scope of the SPS negotiations. A Swiss- style animal welfare carve out exemption for the UK would preserve the UK’s ability to maintain and enhance domestic animal welfare standards within a common SPS area. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

The UK Government should seek specific exemptions from dynamic alignment with the EU on animal welfare standards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)

The Government must prevent UK food producers from being undercut by EU imports produced to lower animal welfare standards within a future common SPS area. In its response to this report, the Government should set out the practical measures it will take to protect producers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

Legislative divergence between the UK and EU has occurred given the EU no longer considers GB-specific scientific evidence, such as climatic conditions relevant to mycotoxin formation or the agronomic need for certain plant 34 protection products (PPPs). As such, full adoption of EU rules in this area would risk embedding regulatory decisions that are inappropriate for GB production systems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

The Government should ensure in negotiations that GB will only adopt new EU regulations on PPPs and mycotoxin limits where GB climate, growing conditions and scientific data have been fully considered in their development. It should seek assurances, as a core requirement of any SPS framework, that GB scientific evidence, including agronomic and climatic data, will be incorporated into all new science based decisions affecting UK agriculture. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

The EU’s forthcoming new genomic technology (NGT) framework could take several years to be finalised, and waiting for alignment between the EU and UK on precision breeding would undermine England’s first-mover advantage and stall the development and release of PBOs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 33)

The Government should continue implementing England’s Precision Breeding Act, actively progress regulatory procedures to bring precision bred plants to market, and seek a targeted exemption for precision breeding in negotiations with the EU on the SPS agreement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34) Implementation timeline

It is essential that sectors are given sufficient time to adapt to regulatory changes introduced by an SPS agreement. This ensures compliance without causing unnecessary disruption and reflects timeframes afforded to EU member states. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39)

The Government should secure an implementation period of at least 24 months for sectors to make necessary adjustments resulting from the SPS agreement. Once a common SPS area is established all legislative changes adopted under dynamic alignment must include a mechanism to manage transitions similar to that afforded to EU Member states. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40)

Frequent border policy changes over recent years have created disruption, uncertainty and financial pressure for port health and local authorities. Stakeholders are clear that another shift in border regimes will only be manageable if timelines are realistic, communicated early, and not subject to repeated revisions or delays. (Conclusion, Paragraph 41) 35

The Government should provide a clear, realistic transition timetable for moving to a common SPS area, published with key milestones at least 12–24 months in advance. This must not be subject to repeated changes, and implementation plans should be developed with businesses, industry, port health and local authorities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

The Government and EU leadership broadly support reaching an SPS agreement, and it is currently feasible that the June 2027 ambition can be met. However, the Government must consider what will happen if negotiations take longer or ultimately fail, ensuring that day-to-day functions such as biosecurity, border operations, and regulatory oversight continue uninterrupted. While some degree of regulatory inertia is inevitable, it must be kept to a minimum. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

The Government should set out, in response to this report, its contingency plans for the SPS negotiations, recognising that an SPS agreement is not guaranteed. These should set out how core functions such as biosecurity, border operations, and regulatory oversight will continue if negotiations take longer or fail, and how reprioritisation of resources will be managed to avoid undermining critical work. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) UK-wide approach

The Committee did not receive a clear or satisfactory explanation of how the Government intends to address UK internal market issues created by the England only Precision Breeding Act. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)

In response to this report, the Government should provide the Committee with a clear, time bound strategy for addressing market barriers to trade within the UK, including structured engagement with devolved governments and options for mutual recognition, common frameworks or targeted legislative changes to ensure that supply chains can function effectively. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)

SPS negotiations have significant implications for the devolved administrations. While the UK Government leads negotiations, it must take account of the specific needs and priorities of each nation, including regional conditions. Internal market challenges, such as those arising from England’s precision breeding legislation, could be mitigated by a UK–EU SPS agreement, provided alignment and carve-outs are carefully managed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 54)

The Government should ensure that the devolved administrations have a formal consultative position in the negotiations, and outline, in response to this report, the meetings and other mechanisms for this. The Government should also consider the UK-EU SPS agreement as an opportunity to 36 strengthen the UK internal market and hold discussions with counterparts in the devolved administrations on the best way to do so. (Recommendation, Paragraph 55)

We will continue to monitor access to veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland and scrutinise the effectiveness of both the Veterinary Medicines Internal Market Scheme and the Veterinary Medicines Health Situations Scheme. (Conclusion, Paragraph 59)

The Government should actively pursue a Veterinary Medicines Agreement with the EU in tandem with the SPS agreement to facilitate smoother trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. In its response to this report, the Government should set out its priorities and timeline for such an agreement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60) Biosecurity at the border

The UK’s Border Target Operating Model (BTOM) provides a risk-based framework for managing biosecurity threats at the UK border. Our scrutiny and Government action has contributed to tangible improvements in responsiveness, as demonstrated by the swift and effective action taken following the detection of African Swine Fever in Spain, contrasting with the delays experienced during the earlier Foot and Mouth outbreak in Germany. These developments underscore the importance of retaining BTOM’s risk- based principles as the basis for action and ensuring systems and resources remain in place to deliver rapid, proportionate responses to emerging threats. (Conclusion, Paragraph 64)

Maintaining Great Britain’s biosecurity is vital. Britain’s geography provides natural protection from many plant and animal health threats. Any future SPS agreement will require adjustments to existing border controls, but it remains essential that GB retains the ability to apply robust, evidence- based measures to prevent the introduction of diseases from Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 67)

The Government must ensure that Great Britain is able to maintain risk- based controls to protect against serious plant and animal disease threats. This includes the continuation of robust import controls on plants that can host the bacterial disease caused by Xylella species and subspecies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 68)

Both the EU and the UK are exposed to biosecurity risks from illegal meat imports. Although future access to EU data systems and intelligence within a common SPS area could support British border enforcement efforts, there is nothing within an SPS agreement to actively prevent or deter criminal activity linked to the trade of illegal meat. (Conclusion, Paragraph 72) 37

Defra must not wait until SPS negotiations are concluded before developing a strategy to reduce demand for illegally imported animal products. We reiterate the recommendation made in our previous report on this topic that the Government, by June 2026, should begin work with the FSA, FSS and local authorities to develop a strategy to tackle the domestic demand for imported illegal meat. This strategy should include engagement with Eastern European and other at-risk communities in Great Britain to raise awareness of animal disease risks and the importance of control measures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73)

We welcome the Minister’s commitment to reestablish the cross-ministerial working group on borders, recognising the importance of coordinated oversight of biosecurity risks and border operations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)

In its response to this report, the Government should provide details on how many times the group has met since September 2025 and share minutes of its discussions. Defra should expand the ministerial working group to include an additional operational group comprising of frontline agencies operating at the border, such as the Chief Veterinary Officer, the Animal and Plant Health Agency, Food Standards Scotland and the Food Standards Agency. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75)

Relying on the goodwill of EU travel operators to communicate personal import rules is not an acceptable approach. Defra has acknowledged that its current survey methods make it difficult to assess public awareness of personal import restrictions, and it has subsequently revised down its own estimates after we raised concerns about the methodology used in its quarterly attitude tracker. Nevertheless, even the updated figure of 81% traveller awareness—reduced from the original figure of over 90%— still appears high and does not align with the Committee’s experience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 77)

Regardless of SPS negotiation timings, the Government must not delay the implementation of the requirement for EU transport operators to draw travellers’ attention to UK rules on personal imports of products of animal origin beyond 31 January 2027. (Recommendation, Paragraph 78)

Given the reliance on public awareness for compliance with rules for personal imports from the EU, the Government should ensure its measure of this is as reliable as possible. In response to this report the Government should provide us with its revised methodology and survey plan for measuring public awareness of personal import rules, to ensure the approach is transparent, robust, and is capable of providing more accurate assessments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 79) 38 Border Infrastructure

A common UK-EU SPS area is expected to reduce administrative burdens, costs, and resource pressures at the Short Straits. However, adopting EU-style “third country” controls on Rest of World imports risks increasing checks, costs, and delays, particularly in sectors reliant on non EU suppliers, such as fruit. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

Following an SPS agreement with the EU, the Government should set out an assessment of the agreement on Rest of World (RoW) supply chains. This should include identifying opportunities to redeploy existing infrastructure and staff and maintaining a proportionate risk based approach wherever possible. The Government should provide affected RoW border facilities and traders with a minimum of 12 months to implement the required changes before they come into force. (Recommendation, Paragraph 85)

Local authorities and businesses have invested heavily, at the Government’s instruction, in border infrastructure that may become redundant under a new SPS regime. A lack of clarity from HM Treasury regarding compensation has had a negative impact on relationships between local authorities and Government. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87)

The Government should set out how it will learn lessons from the implementation of the Border Target Operating Model (BTOM), including the handling of costs for unused or under used border infrastructure. It should publish its position on compensation for local authorities and businesses and state how it will ensure future border policy changes avoid generating unnecessary or stranded investments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88)

We expect that, together with Bastion Point, Sevington BCP will need to be repurposed following the anticipated reduction in border checks for EU goods once a common SPS area is established. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

In addition to the cost-benefit analysis of repurposing Bastion Point BCP already committed to us, the Government should also provide its plans, with an associated cost analysis, for Sevington BCP following the establishment of a common SPS area, no later than three months after negotiations with the EU are completed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92) Resourcing and oversight

There is uncertainty regarding the Government’s resource capacity to deliver the extensive regulatory changes required to establish a common SPS area with the EU by the ambitious June 2027 deadline. This work is a substantial legislative and operational undertaking, which must be achieved while simultaneously fulfilling commitments under major policy 39 plans and strategies. Without clear prioritisation, resourcing plans, and a transparent roadmap, there is a considerable risk of delays, regulatory inertia, or compromised policy and outcomes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 95)

The Government should find, allocate and disclose budgets and plans for increasing staffing, expertise, and funding to support its work on the SPS agreement and ensure timely delivery alongside other policy commitments. HM Treasury must increase the FSA’s flat budget settlement to reflect the additional operational demands being placed on the agency. The UK Government should also have discussions with the Scottish Government to ensure additional funds are allocated to Food Standards Scotland so it can meet the extra resource requirements associated with SPS implementation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 96)

We believe that our remit and responsibilities make this Committee the most appropriate body for scrutiny of SPS policy. We are therefore disappointed that the Minister for the Constitution and European Union Relations refused to appear before us. We echo the House of Lords recommendation that: “The Government should set out how it envisages that a scrutiny system for dynamic alignment would work and how it plans to ensure that Parliament can play a full scrutiny role in this new area of activity.” (Conclusion, Paragraph 101)

The Government should publish detailed plans for parliamentary scrutiny of the SPS agreement and any future EU legislation that would be assimilated into GB law once within a common SPS area. (Recommendation, Paragraph 102)

While the Government has been vocal in advocating for an SPS deal and highlighting its benefits for farmers, traders, and the wider UK economy, the realities and implications of dynamic alignment have not been well explained to the public. There is a need for fuller debate on both the benefits and challenges of this system, including its long term implications for sovereignty and democratic processes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 105)

The Government should set out in its response to this report how it intends to communicate the realities of dynamic alignment—not only to affected businesses, farmers, producers, and industry stakeholders, but also to the wider public—explaining the benefits and challenges and how this approach interacts with the UK’s democratic processes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 106) 40

Workforce pressures in the veterinary profession are no longer driven primarily by an overall shortage of qualified individuals, but by challenges in retention, distribution and alignment with specific roles. At our evidence session at Harper Adams University, all four senior veterinary representatives on the panel emphasised that veterinary training produces a highly transferable skillset, supporting careers across industry, research, regulation and policy. While presented as a strength, this sits in clear tension with evidence of ongoing recruitment and retention difficulties in clinical practice, raising questions about how far workforce planning is aligned with the profession’s own account of career mobility. (Conclusion, Paragraph 12)

While recruitment has stabilised and the arrival of new entrants through the pipeline has increased, significant and persistent gaps remain in public sector roles, geographically isolated practices and other “deficit areas”. High attrition rates and a “constant churn” in some areas are leading to a loss of expertise and impose ongoing costs on employers. This is not an issue that can be resolved by any single organisation, but one that requires a collective response across the whole sector. To be sustainable, the profession will need to adapt to the expectations of a more modern workforce, including evolving needs and preferences around working conditions, flexibility and career development. (Conclusion, Paragraph 13)

Defra should, within six months, commission a sector-wide review, working in partnership with the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, veterinary schools, and other major employers and representative bodies, including the British Veterinary Association, to build a robust evidence base on the drivers of retention challenges across the profession. This review should: • establish a consistent, data driven understanding of attrition across different sectors, career stages and geographies; • identify the key factors influencing retention, particularly in shortage areas such as public sector roles and rural practice; 23 • set out targeted, evidence-based interventions to improve retention in these sectors such as incentives, support packages, and career pathways; and • include clear metrics and baseline data for monitoring workforce distribution and attrition rates annually, alongside measurable targets for improvement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 14)

The veterinary profession remains reliant on international recruitment to fill critical roles, particularly in public health and official veterinary services. While international vets have made a vital contribution, this “learned dependency” has masked underlying weaknesses in domestic workforce planning and training pipelines. Recent changes to visa thresholds and the phasing out of the mutual recognition for EU veterinary qualifications arrangements risk exacerbating these pressures. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

The Home Office, in collaboration with Defra, should review the Skilled Worker Visa salary thresholds for veterinary roles by early 2027 to ensure they: • reflect realistic earlycareer salary progression in the sector; • do not create barriers to recruiting overseas vets into shortage roles; and • are aligned with wider workforce needs in public health and food safety. This review should include consultation with the RCVS, BVA, and major veterinary employers, and publish its findings. (Recommendation, Paragraph 16) Veterinary training and access to the profession

Veterinary education in the UK is of critical national importance, underpinning animal health and welfare, public health, food safety and biosecurity. UK veterinary schools are internationally revered and play a vital role in delivering a highly skilled workforce. Despite this, the current funding model is not sustainable; the high cost of delivering veterinary training is not matched by available funding. This imbalance has placed veterinary education in a precarious position at a time when wider pressures on the higher education sector are acute. We are concerned that, without intervention, there is a real risk of course contraction or closures, which could have significant societal impacts, including for public health, animal welfare and food security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 25) 24

The government should, within the next Spending Review, undertake a full review of funding for veterinary education and take the recommended steps to ensure that funding levels reflect the true cost of training. This review, jointly undertaken by Defra and the Department for Education should: • assess the gap between costs and funding for domestic students; • set out options to close this gap, including increased teaching grants for high-cost courses; and • ensure the long-term financial sustainability of veterinary schools, recognising their strategic importance to the UK. (Recommendation, Paragraph 26)

While high academic standards in veterinary school admissions are justified, we are concerned that current entry routes may unintentionally exclude applicants who would excel in the profession. It takes more than academic excellence at 18 to be a good vet, and the profession is strengthened by a diversity of skills, experiences and perspectives. Barriers such as limited access to required subjects at school or a lack of opportunities for relevant work experience do not reflect a lack of ability. International examples, particularly from Australia and the United States, show that widening participation can not only improve diversity, but also support better retention outcomes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

Defra and the RCVS should, within 18 months, begin work with veterinary schools to develop and implement sector wide guidance on contextual and flexible admissions. This should: • support consistent use of contextual offers and alternative access routes; • encourage recruitment from rural and underserved areas; and • include annual monitoring of student intake by background and geography, with results published by the RCVS. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

Accreditation for veterinary schools must be adaptable to match the realities of a modern veterinary profession, allowing greater flexibility in training while maintaining high standards, so that graduates are better prepared for the evolving demands of practice. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

In bringing forward reforms to the 1966 Veterinary Surgeons Act, the government should ensure that it sets out how accreditation requirements can be made more flexible and adaptable, allowing greater freedom in curriculum design. (Recommendation, Paragraph 30) 25 CMA reforms to veterinary services for household pets

Rising prices for veterinary services cannot be explained solely by increased operating costs or higher expectations for standards of care. We agree with the CMA that market consolidation has been a major contributing factor to price increases and welcome its investigation and the overall direction of its proposed remedies. We are concerned, however, about the potential unintended consequences of the remedial proposals. In rural and isolated areas, limited provision means that market competition is often not the primary concern. There is a risk that additional regulatory burdens may lead to increased costs rather than improved competition. The proposals may also require independent and mixed practices to adapt or fundamentally change their business models, particularly where small animal services currently support the viability of other services. Care must therefore be taken to ensure that reforms do not inadvertently weaken overall service provision or access to care, particularly in geographically isolated areas as animal welfare must remain paramount. (Conclusion, Paragraph 37)

The government should ensure the CMA’s remedies are fully rural proofed. The government should instruct the CMA, in partnership with the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, to establish a monitoring framework by September 2027 to coincide with the deadline for small practices to implement most of the remedies. This framework should monitor prices, competition, business sustainability and access to services in rural and isolated areas. The CMA should publish a formal review of the impact of its remedies by March 2029, giving small business 18 months to adapt to the new requirements. The review should assess impacts on mixed practices, rural provision, and market outcomes. Where adverse effects are identified, the CMA should implement corrective measures within a further six months to protect service provision and animal welfare. (Recommendation, Paragraph 38) Reform of the Veterinary Surgeons Act

Reform of the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 (VSA) presents an important opportunity to modernise regulation, support a more flexible workforce, and strengthen public confidence. Reform is clearly needed, but it must be carefully designed, with clear definitions of roles and responsibilities and sufficient flexibility to remain fit for purpose as the profession evolves. We therefore welcome Defra’s commitment to engage the sector and consult on priorities for a new VSA. While reform is long overdue and the Act is nearly 60 years old, it is better to take an additional 18 months to two years to 26 deliver a phased, wellplanned approach. The CMA remedies are seen by the government as a “stopgap” ahead of wider VSA reform, but this could risk undermining the longterm legislative change required and pre-empting or complicating more comprehensive reform. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

The development of Competition and Market Authority’s (CMA) remedies and Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 (VSA) reform should be coordinated to ensure alignment, avoid duplication, and minimise unintended consequences. In response to this report, Defra should provide a clear explanation of how the CMA’s interim remedies will interact with longer-term legislative reform. Defra should explain how the reformed VSA will deliver a flexible, future- proof framework that supports workforce development and protects animal welfare. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44)

Defra should set out a clear delivery plan for VSA reform in response to this report, including estimated staff requirements, programme costs, key milestones, and an indicative legislative timetable through to implementation. This plan should also identify how engagement with the sector will be resourced and sustained throughout the reform process. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

In professions such as medicine and law, regulatory functions have been separated from professional bodies, with oversight vested in independent regulators. Self-regulation is increasingly unsuitable for a profession where vet practices and services are coming under the ownership of corporate entities and the management of non-vets. Reform of the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 provides an opportunity to implement an independent regulatory model, while we recognise that such a change would involve tradeoffs and require careful assessment of its costs and impacts. (Conclusion, Paragraph 49)

As part of reform of the Veterinary Surgeons Act, the government should separate the RCVS’s professional leadership role from any regulatory functions within the veterinary profession, creating a new independent body that can oversee the expanded role of a reformed Act. It should draw on models used in other regulated professions to achieve this, taking account of the specific requirements of the veterinary profession. (Recommendation, Paragraph 50) 27