5th Report - UK-EU agritrade: making an SPS agreement work

The Government must urgently clarify whether on-farm animal welfare and labelling will be included in negotiations with the EU of an SPS agreement so it can properly develop any future legislative changes, prepare industry for reforms and so those changes can be properly scrutinised. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)

The Government and EU should establish the scope of the SPS negotiations as a priority and publish this information on an interim basis, prior to the conclusion of negotiations, to enable effective consultation and scrutiny. (Recommendation, Paragraph 16)

The Government must not allow UK farmers and food producers to be undercut by cheaper imports produced to lower welfare standards, in line with its repeated commitments to not lower food standards and uphold high animal welfare standards in trade agreements. This risk is heightened by the proposals to raise on-farm welfare standards set out in the Animal Welfare Strategy, which will affect producers regardless of whether on-farm welfare ultimately falls within the scope of the SPS negotiations. A Swiss- style animal welfare carve out exemption for the UK would preserve the UK’s ability to maintain and enhance domestic animal welfare standards within a common SPS area. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

The UK Government should seek specific exemptions from dynamic alignment with the EU on animal welfare standards. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)

The Government must prevent UK food producers from being undercut by EU imports produced to lower animal welfare standards within a future common SPS area. In its response to this report, the Government should set out the practical measures it will take to protect producers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

Legislative divergence between the UK and EU has occurred given the EU no longer considers GB-specific scientific evidence, such as climatic conditions relevant to mycotoxin formation or the agronomic need for certain plant 34 protection products (PPPs). As such, full adoption of EU rules in this area would risk embedding regulatory decisions that are inappropriate for GB production systems. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

The Government should ensure in negotiations that GB will only adopt new EU regulations on PPPs and mycotoxin limits where GB climate, growing conditions and scientific data have been fully considered in their development. It should seek assurances, as a core requirement of any SPS framework, that GB scientific evidence, including agronomic and climatic data, will be incorporated into all new science based decisions affecting UK agriculture. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

The EU’s forthcoming new genomic technology (NGT) framework could take several years to be finalised, and waiting for alignment between the EU and UK on precision breeding would undermine England’s first-mover advantage and stall the development and release of PBOs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 33)

The Government should continue implementing England’s Precision Breeding Act, actively progress regulatory procedures to bring precision bred plants to market, and seek a targeted exemption for precision breeding in negotiations with the EU on the SPS agreement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34) Implementation timeline

It is essential that sectors are given sufficient time to adapt to regulatory changes introduced by an SPS agreement. This ensures compliance without causing unnecessary disruption and reflects timeframes afforded to EU member states. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39)

The Government should secure an implementation period of at least 24 months for sectors to make necessary adjustments resulting from the SPS agreement. Once a common SPS area is established all legislative changes adopted under dynamic alignment must include a mechanism to manage transitions similar to that afforded to EU Member states. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40)

Frequent border policy changes over recent years have created disruption, uncertainty and financial pressure for port health and local authorities. Stakeholders are clear that another shift in border regimes will only be manageable if timelines are realistic, communicated early, and not subject to repeated revisions or delays. (Conclusion, Paragraph 41) 35

The Government should provide a clear, realistic transition timetable for moving to a common SPS area, published with key milestones at least 12–24 months in advance. This must not be subject to repeated changes, and implementation plans should be developed with businesses, industry, port health and local authorities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

The Government and EU leadership broadly support reaching an SPS agreement, and it is currently feasible that the June 2027 ambition can be met. However, the Government must consider what will happen if negotiations take longer or ultimately fail, ensuring that day-to-day functions such as biosecurity, border operations, and regulatory oversight continue uninterrupted. While some degree of regulatory inertia is inevitable, it must be kept to a minimum. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

The Government should set out, in response to this report, its contingency plans for the SPS negotiations, recognising that an SPS agreement is not guaranteed. These should set out how core functions such as biosecurity, border operations, and regulatory oversight will continue if negotiations take longer or fail, and how reprioritisation of resources will be managed to avoid undermining critical work. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) UK-wide approach

The Committee did not receive a clear or satisfactory explanation of how the Government intends to address UK internal market issues created by the England only Precision Breeding Act. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)

In response to this report, the Government should provide the Committee with a clear, time bound strategy for addressing market barriers to trade within the UK, including structured engagement with devolved governments and options for mutual recognition, common frameworks or targeted legislative changes to ensure that supply chains can function effectively. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)

SPS negotiations have significant implications for the devolved administrations. While the UK Government leads negotiations, it must take account of the specific needs and priorities of each nation, including regional conditions. Internal market challenges, such as those arising from England’s precision breeding legislation, could be mitigated by a UK–EU SPS agreement, provided alignment and carve-outs are carefully managed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 54)

The Government should ensure that the devolved administrations have a formal consultative position in the negotiations, and outline, in response to this report, the meetings and other mechanisms for this. The Government should also consider the UK-EU SPS agreement as an opportunity to 36 strengthen the UK internal market and hold discussions with counterparts in the devolved administrations on the best way to do so. (Recommendation, Paragraph 55)

We will continue to monitor access to veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland and scrutinise the effectiveness of both the Veterinary Medicines Internal Market Scheme and the Veterinary Medicines Health Situations Scheme. (Conclusion, Paragraph 59)

The Government should actively pursue a Veterinary Medicines Agreement with the EU in tandem with the SPS agreement to facilitate smoother trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. In its response to this report, the Government should set out its priorities and timeline for such an agreement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60) Biosecurity at the border

The UK’s Border Target Operating Model (BTOM) provides a risk-based framework for managing biosecurity threats at the UK border. Our scrutiny and Government action has contributed to tangible improvements in responsiveness, as demonstrated by the swift and effective action taken following the detection of African Swine Fever in Spain, contrasting with the delays experienced during the earlier Foot and Mouth outbreak in Germany. These developments underscore the importance of retaining BTOM’s risk- based principles as the basis for action and ensuring systems and resources remain in place to deliver rapid, proportionate responses to emerging threats. (Conclusion, Paragraph 64)

Maintaining Great Britain’s biosecurity is vital. Britain’s geography provides natural protection from many plant and animal health threats. Any future SPS agreement will require adjustments to existing border controls, but it remains essential that GB retains the ability to apply robust, evidence- based measures to prevent the introduction of diseases from Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 67)

The Government must ensure that Great Britain is able to maintain risk- based controls to protect against serious plant and animal disease threats. This includes the continuation of robust import controls on plants that can host the bacterial disease caused by Xylella species and subspecies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 68)

Both the EU and the UK are exposed to biosecurity risks from illegal meat imports. Although future access to EU data systems and intelligence within a common SPS area could support British border enforcement efforts, there is nothing within an SPS agreement to actively prevent or deter criminal activity linked to the trade of illegal meat. (Conclusion, Paragraph 72) 37

Defra must not wait until SPS negotiations are concluded before developing a strategy to reduce demand for illegally imported animal products. We reiterate the recommendation made in our previous report on this topic that the Government, by June 2026, should begin work with the FSA, FSS and local authorities to develop a strategy to tackle the domestic demand for imported illegal meat. This strategy should include engagement with Eastern European and other at-risk communities in Great Britain to raise awareness of animal disease risks and the importance of control measures. (Recommendation, Paragraph 73)

We welcome the Minister’s commitment to reestablish the cross-ministerial working group on borders, recognising the importance of coordinated oversight of biosecurity risks and border operations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)

In its response to this report, the Government should provide details on how many times the group has met since September 2025 and share minutes of its discussions. Defra should expand the ministerial working group to include an additional operational group comprising of frontline agencies operating at the border, such as the Chief Veterinary Officer, the Animal and Plant Health Agency, Food Standards Scotland and the Food Standards Agency. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75)

Relying on the goodwill of EU travel operators to communicate personal import rules is not an acceptable approach. Defra has acknowledged that its current survey methods make it difficult to assess public awareness of personal import restrictions, and it has subsequently revised down its own estimates after we raised concerns about the methodology used in its quarterly attitude tracker. Nevertheless, even the updated figure of 81% traveller awareness—reduced from the original figure of over 90%— still appears high and does not align with the Committee’s experience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 77)

Regardless of SPS negotiation timings, the Government must not delay the implementation of the requirement for EU transport operators to draw travellers’ attention to UK rules on personal imports of products of animal origin beyond 31 January 2027. (Recommendation, Paragraph 78)

Given the reliance on public awareness for compliance with rules for personal imports from the EU, the Government should ensure its measure of this is as reliable as possible. In response to this report the Government should provide us with its revised methodology and survey plan for measuring public awareness of personal import rules, to ensure the approach is transparent, robust, and is capable of providing more accurate assessments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 79) 38 Border Infrastructure

A common UK-EU SPS area is expected to reduce administrative burdens, costs, and resource pressures at the Short Straits. However, adopting EU-style “third country” controls on Rest of World imports risks increasing checks, costs, and delays, particularly in sectors reliant on non EU suppliers, such as fruit. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

Following an SPS agreement with the EU, the Government should set out an assessment of the agreement on Rest of World (RoW) supply chains. This should include identifying opportunities to redeploy existing infrastructure and staff and maintaining a proportionate risk based approach wherever possible. The Government should provide affected RoW border facilities and traders with a minimum of 12 months to implement the required changes before they come into force. (Recommendation, Paragraph 85)

Local authorities and businesses have invested heavily, at the Government’s instruction, in border infrastructure that may become redundant under a new SPS regime. A lack of clarity from HM Treasury regarding compensation has had a negative impact on relationships between local authorities and Government. (Conclusion, Paragraph 87)

The Government should set out how it will learn lessons from the implementation of the Border Target Operating Model (BTOM), including the handling of costs for unused or under used border infrastructure. It should publish its position on compensation for local authorities and businesses and state how it will ensure future border policy changes avoid generating unnecessary or stranded investments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 88)

We expect that, together with Bastion Point, Sevington BCP will need to be repurposed following the anticipated reduction in border checks for EU goods once a common SPS area is established. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

In addition to the cost-benefit analysis of repurposing Bastion Point BCP already committed to us, the Government should also provide its plans, with an associated cost analysis, for Sevington BCP following the establishment of a common SPS area, no later than three months after negotiations with the EU are completed. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92) Resourcing and oversight

There is uncertainty regarding the Government’s resource capacity to deliver the extensive regulatory changes required to establish a common SPS area with the EU by the ambitious June 2027 deadline. This work is a substantial legislative and operational undertaking, which must be achieved while simultaneously fulfilling commitments under major policy 39 plans and strategies. Without clear prioritisation, resourcing plans, and a transparent roadmap, there is a considerable risk of delays, regulatory inertia, or compromised policy and outcomes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 95)

The Government should find, allocate and disclose budgets and plans for increasing staffing, expertise, and funding to support its work on the SPS agreement and ensure timely delivery alongside other policy commitments. HM Treasury must increase the FSA’s flat budget settlement to reflect the additional operational demands being placed on the agency. The UK Government should also have discussions with the Scottish Government to ensure additional funds are allocated to Food Standards Scotland so it can meet the extra resource requirements associated with SPS implementation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 96)

We believe that our remit and responsibilities make this Committee the most appropriate body for scrutiny of SPS policy. We are therefore disappointed that the Minister for the Constitution and European Union Relations refused to appear before us. We echo the House of Lords recommendation that: “The Government should set out how it envisages that a scrutiny system for dynamic alignment would work and how it plans to ensure that Parliament can play a full scrutiny role in this new area of activity.” (Conclusion, Paragraph 101)

The Government should publish detailed plans for parliamentary scrutiny of the SPS agreement and any future EU legislation that would be assimilated into GB law once within a common SPS area. (Recommendation, Paragraph 102)

While the Government has been vocal in advocating for an SPS deal and highlighting its benefits for farmers, traders, and the wider UK economy, the realities and implications of dynamic alignment have not been well explained to the public. There is a need for fuller debate on both the benefits and challenges of this system, including its long term implications for sovereignty and democratic processes. (Conclusion, Paragraph 105)

The Government should set out in its response to this report how it intends to communicate the realities of dynamic alignment—not only to affected businesses, farmers, producers, and industry stakeholders, but also to the wider public—explaining the benefits and challenges and how this approach interacts with the UK’s democratic processes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 106) 40