3rd report - Biosecurity at the border: Britain's illegal meat crisis

Animal disease threats like foot and mouth disease and African swine fever are a national security issue and must be understood as such across Government. Although it is not possible to prevent all contaminated animal products entering Great Britain, the Government must take all possible steps to reduce the risk of disease incursion through human-mediated routes. Prevention of animal disease outbreaks is particularly important at a time when farmers are under pressure, foot and mouth disease has spread in Europe, and the UK’s biosecurity capability is vulnerable due to increasing outbreaks, veterinary shortages, and the precarious condition of the APHA Weybridge estate. Animal diseases present an acute risk to the mental health and wellbeing of farmers and veterinary professionals, and that of their families and communities. Policymakers must give weight to the mental health implications of animal diseases when designing and communicating policy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 12) Illegal imports in Great Britain

Consumers deserve confidence that the food they are buying is safe and meets high welfare standards, and British farmers should not be undercut by cheap, poor quality animal products. We need to understand more about the nature and scale of illegal imports of animal products, and their destinations in Great Britain. This will help target resources, inform the design of strategies to reduce demand, and evaluate progress. Farmers and the public also deserve greater transparency about the risks we face. (Conclusion, Paragraph 27)

Defra should commission a risk assessment of the type published by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in 2004 for the import of contaminated meat and meat products into Great Britain and subsequent exposure of livestock. It should model the probable amount of meat and dairy illegally imported per year, the probability that imported meat and dairy are contaminated with virus, the probability that the import of meat and dairy results in infection in GB livestock, and the amount of illegally 35 imported meat and dairy that is sold in GB. Furthermore, the Government should publish quarterly data relating to seizures of illegally imported animal products made at the border and inland, broken down by type. (Recommendation, Paragraph 27)

Defra’s ban on personal imports of most animal products from the EU, introduced in April 2025, is a welcome simplification and strengthening of the rules. However, there is not yet enough public awareness of the restrictions or the reasons for them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 28)

Travel operators should be legally compelled to inform travellers of the rules for personal imports from the EU into GB. Defra must immediately scale up its communications to the public about personal import rules and reach a much broader audience. Communications must explain both the rules and their purpose, such as the specific threats of foot and mouth disease and African swine fever. Defra should also produce a digital tool for travellers to identify what they can bring into the country, like those provided by the United States and Australia. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

Under successive governments, Defra’s approach to personal imports from the EU since 2021 has been unnecessarily lax, too reactive and overly complicated. Temporary personal import rules create confusion for travellers, uncertainty for farmers, and difficulty for enforcement professionals. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

Defra must consult on a permanent personal import policy for the EU by April 2026. It should prioritise safeguarding British farms and should be straightforward enough to be understood by travellers and to be enforced. The current temporary ban on most meat and dairy imports should not be lifted until a permanent policy has been introduced. (Recommendation, Paragraph 29)

Demand for cheap meat and culturally preferred products is fuelling the influx of illegal imports to Great Britain. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)

Defra should work with the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland to design a strategy to reduce demand for illegally imported products. Defra must further consider how to engage with Eastern European communities in Great Britain to raise awareness of animal disease risks and controls. (Recommendation, Paragraph 30) Inter-agency working

The Committee supports the Government’s commitment to “do whatever it takes to protect British farmers from foot and mouth”. The Committee welcomes efforts made so far, but concludes that there is more that Defra 36 could and should be doing to prevent animal diseases like foot and mouth and African swine fever. There is no encompassing strategy to tackle POAO smuggling and structures to facilitate inter-agency working are incomplete. Defra has not presented a convincing plan to address these issues. (Conclusion, Paragraph 42)

By January 2026, Defra should create a strategy for POAO smuggling in collaboration with the National Food Crime Unit (FSA), the Scottish Food Crime and Incidents Unit (FSS), port health authorities, inland local authorities and Border Force. To be effective, this must be a genuine co- design with the enforcement professionals whose expertise is currently being neglected in policy making. The strategy should establish formal information sharing mechanisms between Defra, local authorities, and port health authorities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

There is currently no identifiable or effective ownership of the issue of illegal meat imports. Responsibility is so fragmented across agencies that outdated, inefficient ways of working have been allowed to persist and the scale of the crisis has been able to escalate to an intolerable degree. This is an issue that is in desperate need of focussed, energised leadership and personal accountability. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

A taskforce for illegal imports of animal products should be established by November 2025, led by the Minister for Biosecurity, to provide oversight of the strategy’s design and implementation and to drive improvements. The taskforce should at least include the Chief Veterinary Officer; representatives from the Animal and Plant Health Agency, the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland including the National Food Crime Unit and Scottish Food Crime and Incidents Unit, and Border Force; and local government representation such as port health authority leaders, the Association of Port Health Authorities, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and the Local Government Association. The taskforce must have credibility with all stakeholder groups and should spend time with operational teams. The taskforce should report annually and refine the strategic approach to tackling meat smuggling as required. (Recommendation, Paragraph 43)

Local authorities are a key partner in tackling illegal POAO imports but are being overlooked and under supported by Defra. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

Local authorities should be integrated into formal information sharing and intelligence networks. The illegal imports taskforce should review the workforce needs of local authorities in relation to POAO smuggling. The taskforce should consider whether regional expert contacts would be an effective tool to support and connect enforcement teams, and should consider how imported food verification training can be disseminated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44) 37

Border Force is not adequately fulfilling its responsibility to enforce personal import rules relating to animal products; it has too many competing priorities and officers lack understanding of product of animal origin (POAO) rules and seizures. Border Force and port health authorities have shown that they can work well together in teams, but port health authorities are needlessly inhibited by a lack of powers and funding. Britain needs expert teams at the border with a single focus on animal products; these teams could target their operations based on POAO-specific intelligence and begin to address this crisis. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

Port health authorities should be given stop, search and seize powers in relation to animal products and funding for enforcement presence at the border in relation to personal imports for the EU and rest of world. With the introduction of a UK-EU SPS zone and the reduction of border checks on POAO from the EU, there may be appropriately trained, experienced personnel who could be redeployed to personal import enforcement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45)

There is currently no effective deterrent to meat smuggling and smugglers are operating with impunity as a result. Defra’s proposal to crush vans carrying illegal imports is not a silver bullet for this issue and may be challenging to practically implement at the border. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46)

Defra must deliver a plan to immediately start fining and prosecuting repeat offenders and those who are attempting to smuggle significant amounts of animal products. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) The Port of Dover

Under the previous Government, there was an unacceptable breakdown of trust, communication and cooperation in the relationship between Defra and Dover Port Health Authority (DPHA) to the detriment of national biosecurity. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

This Government must lead an effective, mutual restoration of that relationship, which is of strategic importance to the UK’s security and trade. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60)

In the absence of an effective deterrent for meat smuggling and within the context of high rates of non-compliance with import rules, 20% operational coverage for DPHA’s anti-meat smuggling operations is insufficient. Defra’s decision to cease funding for official veterinarians at the Port of Dover is counterintuitive to its ambition of a biosecure border. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61) 38

The Committee has recommended that POAO enforcement powers and funding be transferred to port health authorities; in any interim period, emergency funding should be provided to at least double DPHA’s operational coverage at the border and should allow for the use of official veterinarians who are evidently an asset to its enforcement capability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

The space and facilities at the Port of Dover are not suitable for seizing high volumes of potentially contaminated meat. Defra needs to think creatively about how it can tackle this unprecedented challenge at the Short Straits, rather than being constrained by the boundaries of existing enforcement arrangements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 62)

Defra should work with DPHA to consider how the space available at its Bastion Point site could be repurposed to support with enforcement activities and relieve pressure at the port. Defra should conduct a cost- benefit analysis of repurposing Bastion Point and provide this to the Committee. Additionally, Defra should seek advice on the health, safety and wellbeing of frontline workers at the Port and the risk of disease cross-contamination at the Port. Defra should oversee any necessary improvements and disseminate learnings to other ports. Defra should engage with Border Force and the Port of Dover on renovation of inspection sheds and investment in facilities for the benefit of workers, biosecurity and customers travelling through the port. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62) 39