Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Martyn Horton, David Ramsden, Douglas Halliday and Alexander Isaac

Ref: 2015-0164 Date: 28 Apr 2015 Coroner: David Ridley Area: Wiltshire & Swindon Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

The Ridgeback vehicle, introduced for operational service, has unspecified "suspension issues" that raise concerns for safety.

Date 28 Apr 2015
56-day deadline 23 Jun 2015 est.
Responses identified 1 of 1
Service Personnel related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The Ridgeback vehicle, introduced for operational service, has unspecified "suspension issues" that raise concerns for safety.
View full coroner's concerns
In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report those concerns to you: _ (I) Suspension issues: During the course of the Inquest heard how Ridgeback had been introduced into UK operational service as part of an urgent operational requirement to provide greater protection to UK service personnel on operation Afghanistan due to the ever increasing threat that had been developing from improvised explosive devices. heard how the original shell vehicle provided by the US manufacturer was modified to UK specifications by UK Government contractors and heard that the resultant additional weight appears to have in particular resulted in an unusually large number of failures to the front spring hanger assembly, mounting bracket as well as leaf spring failures with normal usage. Morgan Advanced Materials have been contracted to remedy the problem and understand that additional information following the involvement of and members of the team of 710 Naval Squadron will be helpful in trying to find a solution_ have been provided with a timetable in respect of which various steps will be covered leading to a solution found and rolled out which will exceed the usual 56 time period to respond to a Regulation 28 Report: As part of my Regulation 28 duty would like to monitor the resolution of the issue relative to the failures in the front suspension area and am sure that the families of the four who died on 23 June 2010, even though that the failure to that particular vehicle (Spring hanger bolt failure) did not cause or contribute to their deaths, would also like to be appraised of developments insofar as sensitive material is not disclosed. am however still concerned that the focus appears to be solely on the front suspension where the vast majority of the failures occurred. would therefore ask for confirmation that given the modifications affected the overall operational load of the vehicle that the whole suspension system is reviewed with a view that ultimately it is fit for purpose having regard to the additional operational load that UK specification vehicles are required to deal with as compared to its American counterparts_ In this respect have suggested quarterly updates as a way forward. For the avoidance of any doubt although the inquest focussed on the Ridgeback, am aware from the same Cougar family that the problem affected Wolfhound and Mastiff as well which of course the UK Government purchased as well (II) Height restrictions. During the course of hearing evidence, heard that there were height restrictions relative to the driver of Ridgeback vehicles as well as the designated Commander of the vehicle. Ordinarily both the driver and Commander sit in the two front seats of the vehicle_ The vehicle involved in this particular incident was a remote weapon system variant Ridgeback and unlike other variants, the right hand seat is occupied by the remote weapon gunner and the Commander is moved to a position sitting at right angles to the driver who of course is occupying the left hand front seat, Depending on operational assessment; am concerned that if there is a height restriction for a driver and Commander that if a gunner is required to occupy the front right hand seat; as is the case in the remote weapon system variant, that a height restriction ought to apply to the gunner as well: In this particular tragic incident found no evidence that the height of Private Alexander Isaac contributed to his inability to escape from the stricken Ridgeback once it had entered the canal as he was able to remove his helmet and body armour and in fact was one of the first bodies to_have_been recovered through the top hatch: Wiltshire & Swindon Coroner's Office, 26 Endless Street; Salisbury; Wiltshire, SP1 1DP Tel 01722 438900 Fax 01722 332223 Alex) being day

(III) Lighting At the end of the day a Commander of a vehicle has overall control and a driver is required to use his Or her skill and judgement relative to road conditions and the vehicle capabilities to drive at an appropriate speed taking into account speed limits When responding to an emergency such as in the QRF (Quick Reaction Force) role as is the case when UK civilian emergency response vehicles are responding to a legitimate emergency, speed limits may not ordinarily be adhered to and very much take the view that it should be a matter of military judgement taken by those who have situational awareness at the time The evidence heard was that operationally drivers could realistically only see using white light approximately 10-15 metres in front of the vehicle. There was an issue with the Ridgeback involved in this incident in that for some reason the main head lights had a lower specification bulb fitted 75/70 watts as opposed to the specified 100/80 watt bulb: The Ridgeback is also fitted with 70 watt lamps and set of 70 watt additional lights which were moved following the incident to the outside of the bar armour. The main lights however still lie behind the bar armour and that must impede their effectiveness would like you to review the effectiveness of Ridgeback lighting and arguably as it is part of the Cougar fleet; the lighting of the Mastiff and Wolfhound also as they are similar vehicles with the addition of an additional axle, as regards operational effectiveness especially if such vehicles are intended to be used in a QRF role or when operational requirements dictate a need to travel at speed: An operational limit of only 10-15 metres in front of the vehicle is in my view restrictive and significantly restricts the safe speed of the vehicle allowing for reaction and stoppage time. (retired) attempted as part of the LAIT investigation to carry out tests on Salisbury Plain, although do have some concerns in relation to the accuracy and usefulness of the data obtained from those tests_ (IV) Tyre pressures: The Ridgeback in question following recovery was found to have under inflated rear tyres some 13% less than the recommended PSI which believe is 110. During the course of the evidence heard that the REME maintenance crew at MOB Price did not have equipment to inflate tyres to that pressure and the on board compressor again did not have the necessary capability t0 inflate tyres over and above 100 PSI: was told that if the required tyre pressure was to be achieved that the only equipment available was at Camp Bastion and of course the vehicles were not regularly, when on operational service in Afghanistan, travelling to Camp Bastion. would ask that you review this concern: Tyre pressures are important. Both under inflated and over inflated tyres can materially affect the handling of the vehicles and if there is a specification for a certain tyre pressure then those operating or maintaining the vehicle ought to have the ability to ensure the correct tyre pressure is achievable. Again this potentially is applicable across the Cougar family fleet AESP Torque references. During the course of the evidence heard that the maintenance of _the Ridgeback vehicle was governed by AESP documentation. was told by Craftsman Ithat regularly at MOB Price during Herrick 12 whilst maintaining these vehicles that he was unaware of the correct torque settings in relation to the front spring hanger assembly bolts and would ensure in the circumstances that the bolts, to quote him, were "fucking tight" There were however torque settings but those settings appear to have been contained in the repair section of the AESP documentation in Section 5 as opposed to the maintenance section in Section 6. fully accepted the evidence heard that the AESP documentation is voluminous but am concerned and believe that it would be of assistance to REME personnel and those responsible for the maintenance of the vehicles that consideration be given to ensuring mention of a cross reference pointing in Section 6 at the relevant section to where the torque settings can be found in Section 5 rather than repeating the verbatim the torque settings again: would ask that you give consideration to this SO as to ensure correction maintenance procedures are carried out. (VI) Ridgeback emergency lighting_ was pleased to hear that the luminescent tape that was introduced following this incident is in the process of being replaced by an emergency lighting system called VELS_ believe that the additional work and installation of this system has only just started to be rolled out and would be grateful for a timetable as regards its completion and also given the similarity between Ridgeback, Wolfhound and Mastiff as to whether or not it will include the other members of the Cougar family (VII) Component failure awareness. It was clear in 2010 that failures associated with the front suspension and spring hanger assembly in the Cougar fleet were starting to develop and following an incident involving a Ridgeback vehicle_in Bovington in 2012,Qinetiq_were _instructed Tel 01722 438900 Fax 01722 332223 fog to analyse these failures_ During the course of the evidence heard from those that were maintaining these vehicles back in 2010 that the bolts on the front spring hanger assembly were in need of regular tightening and the vehicle was subject to 21 inspection checks_ The joint opinion of bothl and members of the team at 1710 Naval Squadron was that it should not be necessary 10 repeatedly have to tighten the bolts relative to a component such as the spring hanger assembly. The need for the retightening of bolts was in their view indicative of a component issue and would ask that you review from learning point as regards raising the awareness of Craftsmen Technicians and not just in relation to Ridgeback or Mastiff but in relation to any component across the services, that if an issue arises requiring regular Or unusually frequent tightening of component bolts that that matter ought to be highlighted as concern warranting proportionate investigation relative to other similar pieces of equipment experiencing the same issue, such a8 was the case here with the Cougar fleet of vehicles. The retightening of bolts on a regular basis was something that was not captured as an issue in itself:

Responses

1 respondent
Ministry of Defence Central Government
28 Apr 2015 PDF
Action Planned

The Ministry of Defence is conducting a review of the vehicle suspension system, including data analysis and investigation into alternative bolts. They are also addressing the Vehicle Emergency Lighting System (VELS) modification, aiming for completion by the end of 2016. (AI summary)

View full response
RECEIVED MINISTRY OF DEFENCE JUL 2015 FLOOR 5 ZONE B MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SWIA 2HB Ministry Telephone: 020 7218 9000 (Switchboard) of Defence PENNY MORDAUNT MP MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES DIMSU/4/7/1 2S June 2015 LU Nv Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 28 April 2015 following the inquest into the deaths of Private Douglas Halliday, Private Alexander Isaac, Lance Corporal David Ramsden and Colour Sergeant Martyn Horton. The Ministry of Defence takes its relationship with HM Coroners extremely seriously and we fully recognise how important it is that we Iearn all possible lessons to ensure that deaths in similar circumstances in the future are prevented Your Regulation 28 Report raised seven concerns that will address in turn: As you identify in your report several of these concerns will be addressed over a period outside the usual 56 Regulation 28 report timeframe; the Defence Inquest Unit will provide you with quarterly updates to allow you to monitor the resolution of the issues The first update will be provided by 25 September 2015 Suspension Issues In response to your concerns we are conducting a review of the whole vehicle suspension system with consideration also being given to the rest of the Cougar fleet of vehicles (Mastiff and Wolfhound)_ This includes: A review of all available data including that recently provided by 1710 Naval Air Squadron (the Structural Materials Investigation team) in order to work out the best maintenance schedule_ We aim to complete this and release a safety notice with findings by 30 June 2015 2 Morgan Advanced Materials has been asked to complete an investigation into alternative bolts by 31 July 2015. Should the investigation prove that alternative bolts are required then we will commence a programme of fleet modifications to replace all bolts across the Cougar fleet of vehicles and review the associated maintenance routine by 31 August 2015 3_ An analysis of the entire spring hanger arrangement (front and rear) to identify potential improvements_ This will consist of an initial feasibility review of options_ followed by the design, prototyping and testing of proposed modifications or upgrades to ensure that the issues identified have been successfully addressed: We aim to complete this by 30 September 2015 and will then make those improvements across the Cougar fleet of vehicles (and review the associated maintenance regimes) by 31 January 2016. A full vehicle review of the Ridgback vehicle to determine the most effective suspension system and options for implementation. This is a more complex piece of work with a direct read-across from Ridgback to Mastiff and Wolfhound and will involve extensive physical prototyping and trialling before design and testing of the safety and operational Mr David Ridley HM Senior Coroner for Wiltshire & Swindon Wiltshire & Swindon Coroner's Court 26 Endless Street Salisbury Wiltshire SP1 1DP (LA ) day

requirements for operating the vehicle: We will aim to complete the review by 31 October 2016 and make recommendations to Army HQ. The dates stated at 2 and 3 above have both slipped by one month compared to those stated at the inquest: This is following extensive work to cross-reference the activity that we are taking in response to your concerns, with work already underway under contract with Morgan Advanced Materials This will help us to avoid overlap or clashing work programmes. Height Restrictions Following the conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army Capability Directorate for Combat has amended the height policy for vehicle crewmen across the range of in-service platforms to maximise safety for those operating the vehicles The new policy emphasises the chain of command's responsibility to select and train personnel able to safely and effectively carry out the tasks required of them: Commanders on operations are still able to re-impose specific height restrictions on crew members should operational circumstances or the enemy threat require it In response to your concerns the Army Capability Directorate for Combat will further review the wording of current policy on height restrictions for Ridgback and will ensure this is based on seating position, rather than the individual's role as part of the crew: The clarified policy is expected to be issued by 31 July 2015. Lighting In response to your concerns, Morgan Advanced Materials will provide an upgraded; legislatively compliant lighting system across the Cougar fleet of vehicles Establishing what this means, and checking compliance with the Road Vehicle Lighting Regulations 1989, will be different for each vehicle_ As well as checking legislative compliance we will conduct a subjective assessment of the performance of the lights in comparison with the old system from the position of the crewmen_ The final design review is planned for July 2015 The production of circa 750 modification kits of a bespoke design will take 5 months after the final design review has formally signed-off the modification; therefore modification kits are expected by 30 November 2015 and implementation will be complete by 31 December 2016. Tyre Pressures As your report identified, there is presently no on-board means (either in terms of vehicle capabilities or by the use of carried tools) to inflate the tyres to the required pressure: The requirement to check and adjust where necessary, tyre pressures is a daily task defined in the relevant Army Equipment Support Publication (AESP): The MOD is currently investigating means to provide the capability of inflating tyres to 110 PSI from systems contained or carried on the vehicle; this work is being conducted in parallel with work to provide a similar capability for the Jackal and Coyote fleets, consisting of circa 700 vehicles: We expect to have identified options to provide this capability by 30 September 2015. In the interim, we have confirmed that sufficient capability exists within the Army Light Aid Detachment' to ensure the tyres on deployed vehicles can be maintained to the required pressure without having to return to main operating base. A unit of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers embedded within deployed unit and charged with the provision of immediate equipment support:

AESP Torque References We are reviewing documentation to check for cross-referencing as you recommend. This review will encompass all of the publications for the 21 different in-service Cougar-based vehicle variants_ The AESPs for the Cougar-based vehicle fleets are subject to a major update release every six months The next is due 31 August 2015; the review work is due to be completed ahead of this date and any major findings will be issued in a Safety Notice prior to the formal publication. Emergency Lighting The Vehicle Emergency Lighting System (VELS) modification is on-going: The VELS kits were originally released to the Army and other users in June 2013; as at 02 June 2015 the percentage of the Cougar fleet that has been modified is as follows, with the percentage of the active fleet (vehicles actually used by the Army and not in storage) shown in brackets: Ridgback 74% (85%) , Mastiff 72% 77%) , Wolfhound 49% (61 Based on the time taken to modifications to date, the Army are expected to complete modifications on the active foepleyea by 30 June 2016 and will not be able to use active fleet vehicles after this date unless VELS is fitted, with the whole of the fleet expected to be completed no later than the end of 2016_ also wanted to provide you with the reassurance that the Roll Over Drills and Egress Trainer (RODET is fitted with VELS as part of the Cougar fleet modifications. As at 02 June 2015 40% of the RODETs have been modified, with the rest of the fleet due to be modified by late 2016_ Component Failure Awareness A review of current training in respect of component failure awareness has been completed: This has resulted in direction to include additional lessons to reinforce the reasons and timeframe for raising fault reports, and the importance of experienced tradespersons diagnosing and reporting equipment failure to effective equipment support hope this letter provides the reassurance and information that you were seeking and am content for you to copy it to other Interested Persons and the Chief Coroner PENNY MORDAUNT MP The active fleet is the vehicles that have been issued to field units _ being %) . being

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 5 July 2010 opened the Inquests into the deaths of Colour Sergeant Martyn HORTON, Lance Corporal David RAMSDEN, Private Douglas HALLIDAY and Private Alexander ISAAC following the repatriation of their bodies into the United Kingdom from Afghanistan resumed the Inquest on Monday 10 November 2014 but regrettably had to adjourn proceedings on 14 November 2014 as a result of potential evidence from an expert witness necessitating, in my view, the need to recognise additional interested persons. The proceedings finally resumed on Monday 21 April 2015 and concluded all four Inquests on 24 April 2015. As a conclusion recorded a combined short form conclusion that of road traffic collision, combined with narrativve conclusion. recorded in relation to the cause of death that all four had died as a result of drowning when their vehicle became submerged following a road traffic collision that occurred on the Bandi Baq Road, South of Gereshk, shortly after 2200 hours o 23 June 2010 in Helmand Provence, Southern Afghanistan.
Circumstances of the death
have set out below the narrative conclusion that recorded that sets out the circumstances of death: Road Traffic Collision whilst on Active Service Afghanistan combined with Narrative Conclusion as follows: Shortly after 2200 on 23 June 2010 the front left hand side of the Remote Weapons System variant Ridgeback that Martyn, and Alex were travelling in and that David was driving, collided with the front right hand side of an Afghan National Police ANP") Ranger vehicle that had been parked on Bridge Harry with the front end of the vehicle protruding onto the Bandi Baq Road, South of Gereshk, Helmand Province, Afghanistan: As a result of the collision the Ridgeback veered to the left off the Bandi Baq Road and entered and overturned in the Narhr-e-Bughra Canal that ran parallel to the road, Water quickly filled the Ridgeback and Martyn, David, and Alex were unable to escape and consequently drowned inside the vehicle. The following matters contributed to the collision: The speed the_Ridgeback_was_travelling_(more_than 3Omph but less than or equal to Tel 01722 438900 Fax 01722 332223 Doug Doug

40mph) at the time of the collision; b) The inconspicuous presence of the unlit and darkly coloured ANP patrol vehicle when set against the dark background in the locality of the collision. The following matters more likely than not impeded the ability to escape from the submerged vehicle thereby contributing to the drowning: The incident occurred at night and in the dark; The water was cold and murky; e) The force of the impact when the Ridgeback hit the water causing a blunt impact head injury resulting in momentary grogginesslunconsciousness (will appear in respect of Martyn, David and and; The wearing of essential body armour.
Action should be taken
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths believe you have the power to take such action:

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Report details

Reference
2015-0164
Date of report
28 April 2015
Coroner
David Ridley
Coroner area
Wiltshire & Swindon

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 23 Jun 2015 (estimated).

Sent to

Ministry of Defence

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