Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Joshua Hoole

Ref: 2019-0458 Date: 1 Nov 2019 Coroner: Louise Hunt Area: Birmingham and Solihull Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

A persistent failure to learn from previous heat-related deaths is evident, with commanders lacking awareness and training on critical heat illness guidance (JSP539), which itself is complex and lacks clear protocols for individual risk and new fitness tests.

Date 1 Nov 2019
56-day deadline 27 Dec 2019
Responses identified 1 of 1
Service Personnel related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
A persistent failure to learn from previous heat-related deaths is evident, with commanders lacking awareness and training on critical heat illness guidance (JSP539), which itself is complex and lacks clear protocols for individual risk and new fitness tests.
View full coroner's concerns
General
1. In 2013 three Soldiers died from the effects of the heat whilst on a training exercise in the Brecon Beacons. Their inquests concluded on 26/06/15 and a report to prevent future deaths was sent to the Secretary of state for defence on 20/07/15 (copy attached). Within that report were the following concerns:
• Commanding officers were unaware of the JSP539 and there was no clear system in place either to disseminate information or to check those commanding had the requisite knowledge.
• Commanding officers had not been trained on completing risk assessments.
• The system for reporting heat illness cases was disjointed and cases were not reported giving incorrect data.
• There was no system in place to ensure WBGT readings were taken before training exercises.

Despite a response confirming these issues would be rectified (copy attached) This report to prevent future deaths raises concerns about the same and additional issues. There is a serious concern that lessons have not been learnt from past tragedies and there appears to be a failure to address serious safety concerns on the part of the MOD.

JSP539
2. I heard evidence at the inquest that Commanders were unaware of the provision of JSP539 and how they should apply to an annual fitness test (AFT). Several said they have not been trained on the publication and those that had seen it confirmed they did not understand the full effects of it and had not been trained on it.
3. Evidence at the inquest confirmed that the version of JSP539 in place at the time was difficult to read and understand. The latest version remains long and complex and difficult to understand. There should be consideration to providing commanders with shortened advice on the key messages from the publication – an aide memoire or fact sheets for example – to allow them to understand at a glance the messages being given.
4. The current JSP539 states at annex A page 2A that the activity should be “paused” if there is a suspected case of heat illness. MATT 2 states the activity should be stopped. The publications need to be consistent with each other and the guide should be clearer.
5. The current JSP539 has several annex “A’s” which could be confusing if commanders reference the wrong annex.
6. Individual risk factors were an important part of understanding how a soldier would react to a situation and how best to mitigate any associated risk. At present there is no clear system in place to ensure those conducting activities have the necessary information about an individual to enable them to carry out an appropriate risk assessment.
7. The current JSP539 does not set out explicitly that it is the role of the medic on an activity to pass on medical information.
8. The AFT is being phased out and new tests have been introduced namely GCC (Ground Close Combat) and RFT (Role Fitness Test). The current JSP539 does not provide guidance for the acceptable work rates for these activities yet the activities have already been introduced. JSP539 is therefore inconsistent with the new MATT2.
9. The two cases of heat illness in the AFT were not formally reported in accordance with JSP539. There needs to be a robust system in place to ensure cases are properly referred and recorded.

MATT2
10. At pages 1.1, 1.3 it fails to refer to JSP539 as a relevant publication.
11. At pages 2.7/2.8 it does not mention the need to use a WBGT
12. Currently MATT2 states the medic on a fitness test is to be MATT3 trained. Given that these medics only receive basic training as per MATT3 consideration needs to be given to have a better qualified medic who can properly identify the signs and symptoms of

HI. The Inquest was told by those who were MATT3 or team medic trained did not feel confident to diagnose HI and deferred to the CMT.
13. MATT2 states that commanders should use a generic risk assessment as a starting point to risk assess a particular activity however there is no generic risk assessment within

MATT2. Fitness tests are usually run over pre-set courses so it would be sensible to have generic risk assessments for each venue with clear instructions that they need to be tailored to the day and time of the activity and the prevailing environmental factors.

Training
14. Witnesses at the inquest stated they were unaware of publications and had not received adequate training on those publications they were aware of. There needs to be a clear system of training for key tasks and updated publications. There needs to be measures in place to ensure all commanders are provided with the necessary information and a mechanism for annual updates and monitoring of awareness and training.

WBGT
15. It was established by the Coroner’s appointed expert that the WBGT at Dering Lines was in the wrong place on the 19/07/16 leading to an incorrect reading. A RPFD was raised regarding this however the inquest heard that the steps said to have taken place in the response (copy attached) have not been done. WBGT’s do not have stickers and the YouTube video does not specify that the WBGT should be in sunlight. In addition the WBGT update does not specify it should be in sunlight.
16. Each venue with a WBGT needs to have a clear policy for its placement depending on the time of year and day.
17. The YouTube video does not play on MOD laptops.
18. No further training has been provided for gym staff.

Risk Assessments
19. The senior commanders at the inquest confirmed they had not received training on the production of risk assessments for the activities they were conducting. There needs to be a robust approach to training and management of risk assessments ensuring those who are required to complete them have the necessary skills and training.

Responses

1 respondent
Ministry of Defence Central Government
27 Jan 2020 PDF
Action Taken

The Ministry of Defence has taken corrective action following concerns raised regarding the death of Corporal Joshua Hoole, including improved awareness of Joint Service Publication 539, updating the User Guide video for WBGT monitors, and providing refresher training for staff delivering Physical Training, whilst robust plans are in place to deliver remaining requirements. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Senior Coroner,

Thank you for your letter of 1 November 2019 in which you enclose a copy of your Regulation 28 Report following the Inquest into the death of Corporal Joshua Hoole.

My department greatly values coronial oversight and the opportunity to improve safety. The Ministry of Defence is committed to being a learning organisation and to supporting service personnel and their families, especially so where, tragically, a death occurs. We acknowledge, however, that your report raises a serious concern that lessons have not been learnt from past tragedies. In your report you raise 19 matters of concern, under six headings, and I will address these in the paragraphs below. I have highlighted where corrective action has been completed, and I have been given assurance that where there is still more to do, robust plans are in place to deliver what is required.

General

1. Failure to learn lessons following the 2013 death of 3 soldiers whilst on a training exercise in the Brecon Beacons.

Having recently spent time with the families of the three soldiers who died in Brecon in 2013, the Commander Field Army has been rigorous in addressing the failure to learn lessons from this tragic event. Awareness of Joint Service Publication 539 - Heat Illness and Cold Injury: Prevention and Management (JSP 539), by commanders has improved since 2013 and since Cpl Hoole’s death, but we continue to do more. All Commanding Officers (COs) are briefed on JSP 539 during pre- employment training and, to further raise its profile, actions are being taken to reinforce the importance of its content (See para 1a). A significant amount of work has recently been completed to address the training shortfall in the matter of risk assessments. Following a comprehensive Training Needs Analysis in October 2019, a plan is now in place to meet the immediate needs and to build safety risk management training into career training for all soldiers and officers (See para 1(b)). Reporting of incidents has been simplified, and a clear guide for commanders will accompany the launch of the new procedures in April 2020 (See para 1(c)). The mandatory requirement to take Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) readings, in accordance with JSP539 (where there is an elevated risk of heat illness) before physical testing and loaded march training has now been included in policy, as has the need for it to inform a risk assessment (See para 1(d)). Below are more detailed answers to each of your listed concerns under this heading.

a. Commanding officers were unaware of the JSP539 and there was no clear system in place either to disseminate information or to check those commanding had the requisite knowledge.

All COs attend a Commanding Officers’ Designate Course as part of their pre- employment training. The importance of heat illness and the content of JSP 539 is included on this course. JSP 539, the Commanders’ Guide to Heat Illness and Cold Injury, and the Heat Illness and Cold Injury Field Guide are all accessible on MODNet, the Army Knowledge Exchange and Defence Connect, which is accessed through the Defence Gateway. To improve awareness further, work has been initiated to explore the utility of a CO’s electronic handbook which will seek to signpost COs to relevant policy documents.

Army Briefing Notes are produced and promulgated each time new policy is disseminated. To assure dissemination of policy, the Audit and Inspection regime includes annual inspections to check units are using the most up-to-date policy. The question set for the annual Physical Development audit is being amended to specifically include the key heat prevention publications of JSP 539, Army Command Standing Order 3216 - Management of Safety and Environmental Protection (ACSO
3216), and AGAI Volume 1 Chapter 7 - Physical Training (AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7). Director General Defence Medical Services (DG DMS) is completing the re-writing of JSP
539. The plan is to separate policy on how to prevent heat illness (JSP 375 - Management of Health and Safety in Defence) and how to treat it (JSP 539) and this will be complete by December 2020; I have included more detail in the JSP section below (see para 3).

In February 2020, the Commander Field Army will use his annual conference to brief all COs on heat illness and JSP 539. He will also write to his Commanding Officers once JSP 539 has been revised to emphasise the importance of management of heat illness and other safety related issues.

b. Commanding officers had not been trained on completing risk assessments.

You highlighted your concerns regarding Risk Assessments following the deaths in Brecon and this shortfall was readily apparent in the circumstances surrounding Cpl Hoole’s death. The Army has now addressed this matter and commissioned a comprehensive Training Needs Analysis. The report on Safety Risk Management was published in October 2019 and training for the Army will be rolled out in 3 phases:

a. Phase 1: Risk Assessment Training. A Train the Trainer course has been developed by the Army Safety Centre and pilot courses have already been delivered to qualify Army Force Protection Advisors to deliver risk assessment training. A mass training event will take place at Tidworth Garrison Theatre on 29 January 2020. The event will train up to 120 Army personnel on how to deliver risk assessment training. Under the direction of the Deputy Chief Safety (Army) the trainers will then deliver distributed training across the Army with the aim of training the majority of the target audience (planning and training staff, COs, directing staff, activity directors) by the end of March 2020. The trainers will continue to provide a rolling programme of risk assessment training throughout 2020 to catch those unavailable for the initial tranche.

b. Phase 2: Surge Safety Risk Management Training. The delivery of surge training is a recommendation from the Training Needs Analysis report. The means of delivery and the timeline to deliver are being scoped and a proposed delivery schedule will be completed by the end of February 2020.

c. Phase 3: Steady State Training. The steady state will see Safety Risk Management Training embedded into career courses to deliver the right training at the right point in a soldier’s and officer’s career with each course building on the last. It is anticipated that it could take up to 2 years to fully integrate the training into career courses. The surge training will remain in place until the steady state solution has been implemented.

c. The system for reporting heat illness cases was disjointed and cases were not reported giving incorrect data.

The disjointed reporting system identified in your PFDR following the Brecon Inquest was highlighted as an unresolved issue by the Army Inspector in his Thematic Review of the Army’s Application of Heat Illness Policy (November 2018). In 2019, a major reform of Health, Safety and Environment Protection (HSEP) policy and governance in the MOD resulted in the creation of the Defence Safety and Environment Committee (DSEC), chaired by the MOD's Permanent Secretary. More recently, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS) raised the matter to the DSEC Working Group directing that the MOD conduct a detailed review of the Management Information to improve the way it reports and records all incidents including those involving heat illness; this work is ongoing and will be updated at the next DSEC (23 March 2020). DCGS remains closely engaged with this work with the MOD’s Director of Health, Safety and Environment Protection and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

The MOD is therefore focussed on improving both how and what data is reported and recorded, which will lead to better collation and interpretation, improved trend analysis, and better Management Information that can be presented to the DSEC for Departmental policy setting.

Within the Army, and in consultation with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force as users of the existing Incident Notification System (INS) there has been progress on improving the coordination of reporting. A common (tri-service) suite of reporting and investigation forms has been developed, and the rollout of these new forms will be accompanied by a Commander’s Guide to Reporting and Investigations; both will be issued by 1 April 2020. Future work is now focussed on designing an app-based reporting mechanism utilising the Defence Gateway portal, which will permit personnel to report using smart phones/tablets etc. A timescale for this future work is not yet confirmed.

d. There was no system in place to ensure WBGT readings were taken before training exercises.

Good progress has been made by the Army with the use of WBGT monitors. A Defence Information Notice (2019DIN06-022) was published in September 2019, clarifying the use of WBGT monitors and providing clearer guidance on how to site the WBGT correctly, how to take readings before the start of an activity, and how these should inform the risk assessment. Both Military Annual Training Test 2 (MATT
2) guidance and Army General Administrative Instruction Volume 1 Chapter 7 (AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7) have been amended to include specific direction that the WBGT readings must form part of the Risk Assessment process. A revised version of MATT 2 was published on 18 December 2019 and AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7 released in January 2020. The Institute of Naval Medicine’s Thermal Burden Project is due to deliver its findings by 31 January 2020. This will generate new evidence-based tables to assist Commanders in making safe decisions for work processes of up to four hours’ duration, where WGBT is used to define a maximum safe work/rest duration.

JSP 539

2. I heard evidence at the inquest that Commanders were unaware of the provision of JSP539 and how they should apply to an annual fitness test (AFT). Several said they have not been trained on the publication and those that had seen it confirmed they did not understand the full effects of it and had not been trained on it.

It is the instructions contained in MATT 2 and AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7 that provide commanders on the ground with the necessary information and guidance on how to safely conduct an AFT. JSP 539 is the top level, overarching, publication and MATT 2 and AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7 are complementary single service policy documents that provide additional information to commanders. MATT 2 and AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7 make specific references to direction and guidance contained in JSP 539. In order to increase awareness of JSP 539, the Army is conducting a review of the Unit Fitness Training Officer course (training) and the Physical Development Audit (assurance) to ensure that both include an increased focus on JSP 539 and WBGT Monitor readings. This review will be complete by 30 March 2020. The training chapter in a new ACSO on Heat Illness Prevention contains the requirement to conduct education and briefings at all events where there is a risk of heat illness. It is on final circulation before scheduled publication on 31 January 2020.

3. Evidence at the inquest confirmed that the version of JSP539 in place at the time was difficult to read and understand. The latest version remains long and complex and difficult to understand. There should be consideration to providing commanders with shortened advice on the key messages from the publication – an aide memoire or fact sheets for example – to allow them to understand at a glance the messages being given.

A Field Guide was produced in October 2019 entitled ‘Heat Illness and Cold Injury’. This provides commanders with a short reference guide to assist in the understanding of climatic injuries. A comprehensive review of JSP 539 has been completed and the Joint Medical Group (JMG) discussed the document at the Heat Illness Working Group on 18 July 2019. Members of the JMG agreed that the JSP was long and not the easiest to read. The decision was taken to disaggregate the document. Advice and guidance on the prevention of heat injury will be removed and inserted as a new chapter in JSP 375 - Management of Health and Safety in Defence, whilst the more clinically focussed medical care required for heat and cold injuries will remain in JSP 539. This work will be completed by 31 December 2020. The publication of the Institute of Naval Medicine’s Thermal Burden Project will further inform the next iteration of JSP 539 and the new chapter in JSP 375.

4. The current JSP539 states at Annex A page 2A that the activity should be “paused” if there is a suspected case of heat illness. MATT 2 states the activity should be stopped. The publications need to be consistent with each other and the guide should be clearer.

There is, in fact, no inconsistency. JSP 539 covers a much broader range of activities, including military operations, where it might not be necessary or appropriate to stop activity, and where a pause would be appropriate in the event of a heat illness incident. To cease all activity in an operational context would likely pose a much greater threat to service personnel. In the case of a physical training activity, such as an AFT, there is no similar operational imperative and so, at the first indication of a heat illness incident, the activity is to be ‘terminated’ as directed in MATT 2. In the training context, as stated above, it is MATT 2 that should be followed by those in charge.

5. The current JSP539 has several annex “A’s” which could be confusing if commanders reference the wrong annex.

The disaggregation of JSP 539, and the creation of a separate chapter in JSP 375 will provide the opportunity to remove any confusion over the labelling of annexes in JSP 539.

6. Individual risk factors were an important part of understanding how a soldier would react to a situation and how best to mitigate any associated risk. At present there is no clear system in place to ensure those conducting activities have the necessary information about an individual to enable them to carry out an appropriate risk assessment.

JSP 539 includes guidance on the individual factors to be considered in relation to heat. The new ACSO 3222 Army Heat illness Prevention, will provide additional direction specific to Army requirements. This will include a check list of individual factors for use by commanders prior to the activity, and specific reference to heat illness risk assessments (Annex C to ACSO 3222).

7. The current JSP 539 does not set out explicitly that it is the role of the medic on an activity to pass on medical information.

The recently updated MATT 2 and AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7 now include direction that medics are to communicate medical details of incidents to the Officer in Charge of physical training events. JSP 539 will also include this explicit instruction in its new amended iteration.

8. The AFT is being phased out and new tests have been introduced namely GCC (Ground Close Combat) and RFT (Role Fitness Test). The current JSP 539 does not provide guidance for the acceptable work rates for these activities yet the activities have already been introduced. JSP539 is therefore inconsistent with the new MATT2.

Army Briefing Note (ABN) 076/19 gives interim direction and guidance with regards to GCC and RFT testing thresholds until JSP 539 is subsequently updated. The conclusion of the Institute of Naval Medicine’s Thermal Burden Project will permit further detailed guidance and work rates to be established for a range of activities in a range of different dress states. This will include specific guidance for the GCC and RFT.

9. The two cases of heat illness in the AFT were not formally reported in accordance with JSP539. There needs to be a robust system in place to ensure cases are properly referred and recorded.

See response at para 1(c).

Military Annual Training Test 2

The MATT 2 guidance has been re-issued to include your helpful suggested amendments. The Physical Development Audit will include a new question set from January 2020 that will assure the correct application of the guidance in MATT 2 and will confirm that risk assessments for these activities are being produced to the right standard. Below are more specific answers to your concerns.

10. MATT 2 pages 1.1-1.3 fail to refer to JSP539 as a relevant publication. MATT 2 Policy has been amended to provide specific reference to JSP 539.

11. At pages 2.7/2.8 it does not mention the need to use a WBGT. MATT 2 has been amended and now directs that WBGT readings are to be taken and recorded as part of the Risk Assessment process prior to all testing in accordance with JSP539 (where there is an elevated risk of heat illness).

12. Currently MATT2 states the medic on a fitness test is to be MATT3 trained. Given that these medics only receive basic training as per MATT3, consideration needs to be given to have a better qualified medic who can properly identify the signs and symptoms of Heat Illness. The Inquest was told by those who were MATT3 or team medic trained did not feel confident to diagnose Heat Illness and deferred to the Combat Medical Technician (CMT).

The views of the Defence Consultant Advisor on Pre-Hospital Care (DCA PHEC) were sought on the current provision of MATT 3 trained First Aid NCOs to support AFTs.The DCA PHEC considers this to be sufficient but did stress that heat illness – recognising the symptoms and being able to treat any casualties – must be given sufficient focus during annual MATT 3 training of those personnel. I hope that this deals with your concern, albeit by a different route. He reiterated that MATT 2 must make clear that any physical activity is to be terminated once a heat illness casualty is suspected or identified.

13. MATT 2 states that commanders should use a generic risk assessment as a starting point to risk assess a particular activity. However, there is no generic risk assessment within MATT 2. Fitness tests are usually run over pre-set courses so it would be sensible to have generic risk assessments for each venue with clear instructions that they need to be tailored to the day and time of the activity and the prevailing environmental factors.

MATT 2 and AGAI Vol 1 Ch 7 have been amended to give clear direction that units are to produce generic risk assessments for all physical testing and assessment activity. Generic Risk Assessments will be used as part of the forward planning of the activity. However, on the day of the activity, the Risk Assessment must be reviewed and amended as appropriate to the specific site and conditions.

The Physical Development audit question set will be amended by 30 March 2020 to include a specific check on generic risk assessments, and units will be monitored for compliance.

Training

14. Witnesses at the inquest stated they were unaware of publications and had not received adequate training on those publications they were aware of. There needs to be a clear system of training for key tasks and updated publications. There needs to be measures in place to ensure all commanders are provided with the necessary information and a mechanism for annual updates and monitoring of awareness and training.

Headquarters Royal Army Physical Training Corps, as the Training Requirements Authority is conducting a review of the content of the Unit Fitness Training Officer course. This review will ensure that all relevant publications are included in the

course and that all attendees receive the required level of training. This review will be complete by 30 March 2020. In addition, the Physical Development Audit Self- Assessment has been updated to include specific detail on JSP 539 and

WBGT Monitors and their readings. The Training Chapter in the new ACSO on Heat Illness Prevention contains the direction to conduct briefings and education at all events where there is a risk of heat illness.

In addition, I have directed the Minister for Defence Personnel and Veterans to review the current education provided to Training Officers to ensure that they are qualified with the correct knowledge, skills and experience to carry out their responsibilities. This review will be initiated soonest and the Defence Inquest Unit will update you on the progress in due course.

Wet Bulb Globe Temperature Monitor

An Aide Memoire has been produced for use of the QT34 WBGT monitor and instruction labels ensuring the correct siting of the monitor have been distributed. This was completed in October 2019. In support, on 7 October 2019, the Physical Development audit was updated to include the requirement to assure that the labels are affixed and the aide memoire is held with every monitor. The audit also now assures correct siting of the monitors. The QT34 YouTube user guide has been edited to include direction on placing the monitor in direct sunlight and is now available on MODNet giving easy access to all Defence users. The routine and continual professional development courses for Army Physical Training Instructors includes a briefing on updated policy and guidance. Attendance on these courses is required to ensure currency and competency and is recorded in Physical Training Instructors’ individual training log books. Below are more specific answers to your concerns:

15. It was established by the Coroner’s appointed expert that the WBGT at Dering Lines was in the wrong place on the 19/07/16 leading to an incorrect reading. A PFDR was raised at the time to address this, however the inquest heard that the steps said to have taken place in the response have not been done. Not all WBGTs have warning/instruction stickers attached, and the YouTube instructional video does not specify that the WBGT should be in sunlight. In addition, the WBGT update does not specify it should be in sunlight. and

16. Each venue with a WBGT needs to have a clear policy for its placement depending on the time of year and day.

On 11 October 2019, a Safety Notice Via Email (Ref 00658) was distributed to all Safety points of contact across Defence directing that any QT34 WBGT monitors being used outdoors must not be shaded in any way from sunlight. Stickers must be placed to this effect on every monitor and all must ensure that an up to date QT34 User Aide Memoire published in September 2019 was to be kept with every monitor.

Prior to 30 October 2019, a label and updated Aide Memoire was posted out for every registered QT34 by the Operational Infrastructure (OI) Delivery Team. On 7 November 2019, the Physical Development Audit was updated to include a check that labels were affixed to, and Aide Memoires held with, every QT34, and that units reviewed the siting of the monitor. Direction has also been included within the new ACSO 3216 - Heat Illness Prevention to be published on 31 January 2020.

The Operational Infrastructure Delivery Team has updated all Army Equipment Support Publications (AESPs) and technical documentation to reflect this direction. Additionally, an article highlighting the changes has been written for publishing in the next edition of KiT magazine in March 2020. (Published quarterly KiT Magazine is produced on behalf of Director Land Equipment and provides updates on management of equipment and vehicles).
17. The YouTube video does not play on MOD laptops.

The User Guide video has now been edited to include direction that when used for taking outside WBGT readings, monitors are to be placed in direct sunlight. The new video does now play on MODNet and an access link has been widely circulated. It can be accessed through Defence Connect, Defence Net and the Army Knowledge Exchange (AKX).

18. No further training has been provided for gym staff.

Refresher training for staff delivering Physical Training is provided by the Army School of Physical Training and it is directed within the Annual Deficit Training (ADT) Directive. The ADT Directive mandates Continual Professional Development activities through courses and distance learning; these are recorded and assured through Regional Command Physical Development PD branches.

Physical Training Instructors (PTIs) now complete a personal PTI Log book of their training and delivery, which contains detail of the additional training they have completed and the refresher training they have received as a result of any changes to current policy.

Risk Assessment

19. The senior commanders at the inquest confirmed they had not received training on the production of risk assessments for the activities they were conducting. There needs to be a robust approach to training and management of risk assessments ensuring those who are required to complete them have the necessary skills and training.

I refer you to my response to concern para 1b above.

I would like to thank you for clearly identifying serious failings – some of them very serious – at the end of the very thorough inquest which you conducted into the death of Corporal Joshua Hoole. I acknowledge those failings and I regret them very much. The safety of service personnel is at the heart of what the Ministry of Defence does, and I am determined to ensure that lessons are learned from the tragic death of Cpl Hoole on 19 July 2016.

THE RT HON BEN WALLACE MP

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 26/10/2018 I commenced an investigation into the death of Joshua John Hoole. The investigation concluded at the end of an inquest on 25th October 2019. The conclusion of the inquest was Josh had an unpredictable susceptibility to sudden cardiac death from a previously unknown cardiac arrhythmia. The trigger for his collapse was a combination of the very high cardiovascular workload incurred during the AFT which includes exercise and heat stress coupled with his inherent drive to succeed pushing forward just before his collapse causing an adrenaline rush. The AFT should not have gone ahead as the WBGT was above the acceptable limit at 06.45 and was inevitably going to be above the WBGT limit throughout the AFT. Josh would not have died when he did had the AFT not gone ahead as the triggers for his death would not have occurred. The WBGT was not known to those in charge of the AFT because they were not familiar with the relevant guidance and they did not check the WBGT or request a reading. In any event the incorrect placement of the WBGT by the gym staff meant that even if a reading had been requested it would have been inaccurate and lower than the true WBGT. There was a failure to train those in command of the AFT properly on guidelines to apply to an AFT and when they should and should not go out. Those in command of the AFT were unaware of the applicable guidelines through a combination of lack of training and a lack of individual awareness. The applicable guidelines were lengthy and confusing and difficult to interpret and the key document relating to heat illness, JSP539 failed to address specifically the acceptable WBGT levels for an AFT. The lack of awareness of heat illness and the provisions within JSP539 and MATT2 was a very serious failure. Lack of training and the structure of the RTT meant they did not receive and were unaware of essential updates. Lack of training and awareness on risk assessments meant the risk assessments were not fit for purpose however the risk assessment in place did specify that a WBGT reading should be undertaken and it was a very serious failure not to follow this. During the AFT 2 students dropped out with heat illness and ought to have been treated as suspected heat casualties. There was inadequate assessment, understanding and communication of the reasons for these drops outs which meant that those in command of the AFT were unable to reassess the situation and stop the AFT as required by JSP539 and MATT2. Had the AFT been stopped at either of the times these students dropped out then Josh would not have died when he did.
Circumstances of the death
Joshua Hoole was undertaking a pre course in preparation for a promotional Platoon Sargeant’s Battle Course (PSBC). The course was run by the Rifles Training Team (RTT). The RTT was a team put together to provide centralised training for infantry soldiers from the various Rifles Battalions to help prepare them for promotional courses. It was not formally resourced, did not sit formally in the army structure and had inadequate IT support. This affected the information available to the RTT. Josh arrived at Chepstow Barracks on Sunday 17/07/16 and the course started on Monday 18/07/16. On the Monday there was an introduction briefing from the RTT and some classroom teaching. The students were due to do an annual fitness test (AFT) on Tuesday 19/07/16 starting at 11am on a route starting from Dering Lines Barracks in Brecon. It had been reported on the news that the 19/07/19 was to be the hottest day of the year and the RTT were aware of this. The RTT contacted the gym at Dering Lines and were told to bring forward the AFT to 07.00. The directing staff (DS) assisting with the AFT had a briefing on the Monday lunchtime but the medic was not present and they did not adequately discuss how, when and what information would be communicated during the AFT. Josh slept overnight in a porta cabin. Whilst some other students said they did not sleep well due to a combination of poor facilities and a weapons stag (watch) there is no evidence Josh had a poor night’s sleep.

The students woke early on 19/07/16 at around 04.00 and had breakfast and then travelled to Dering Lines Barracks in Brecon arriving at around 06.30. There was a warm up undertaken by the Physical

Training Instructor (PTI) and a motivational brief from the Officer Commanding (OC) of the RTT. It was unclear who was in charge of the AFT with the PTI and OC both thinking the other was in charge even though MATT 2 specifies the PTI as being in charge. The formal brief in MATT2 (the publication setting out what is required for an AFT) was not given. The DS staff were not further briefed. They had all done many AFT’s and there were assumptions made that staff knew what to do and what information to communicate. There was no specific brief about the temperature or the risk of heat illness. The standards applicable to the AFT stated that it should not go ahead if the Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) was above 20. The WBGT was not checked by the RTT. The members of the RTT were unfamiliar with the relevant standards in MATT2 and JSP539 as they had not been adequately trained and did not check themselves what was required and they did not understand the importance of undertaking a WBGT before the AFT despite it being clearly stated in the risk assessment. In any event the gym at Dering lines set up the WBGT outside the gym that morning at 07.00 in the wrong position which produced an incorrect WBGT reading of 17.1. The AFT stepped off at 07.00 and was an 8mile 25kg loaded march with 4 pre-arranged water stops lasting 1-2 minutes each. The AFT course involves a 2 mile uphill section between about the 2.5 and 4.5 mile points and during this uphill section several students dropped out of the AFT.

At 07.57 one student collapsed into the hedge by the side of the road and was found to have a tympanic temperature of 40 and to be confused in that he did not recognise his friend and had signs and symptoms of heat illness as specified in the relevant publication JSP539 applicable to climatic injuries. JSP539 specified that a case of suspected heat illness indicated there was a risk to others and the activity should be stopped and a dynamic risk assessment undertaken. The information regarding this soldier was not communicated to those commanding the AFT and no dynamic risk assessment was undertaken. The AFT was followed by a safety vehicle (SV) which should stay in contact with the AFT. The SV dropped behind up the hill whilst collecting several drop outs and spent 20mins dealing with the soldier who dropped out at 07.57. At the top of the hill at the third water stop 3 other students dropped out and one complained to a member of the DS of feeling dizzy. It was not appreciated by the DS that dizziness was a sign and symptom of heat illness in the recognised publication JSP539 and this information was not passed onto the staff running the AFT.

At the 6 mile point a soldier collapsed at the 4th water stop with clear signs of heat illness. He was sweating profusely, disorientated and confused and was very unwell. This soldier had previously had an ankle injury and due to his confusion he may have touched his ankle at this time. The DS present with him failed to appreciate he was in fact suffering from heat illness and incorrectly communicated his problem to one of the senior DS as being an ankle injury. This was not recognised by DS present. When the SV arrived at 08.34 there was no handover from the DS to the medic who immediately recognised this soldier as having heat illness. Arrangements were made to take him back to Dering lines straight away, leaving some other drop outs at water stop 4 as there was insufficient room on the SV. Neither the medics view that the soldier had heat illness nor the information that he was being evacuated to the medical centre were communicated to those commanding the AFT.

On arrival back at Dering lines the (SV) came across Josh who had collapsed at 08.52 on the road near the Petrol oil and lubricant point. Josh had been towards the front of the AFT throughout however another student had noted Josh had abnormal breathing, panting like a dog, following the uphill phase at water stop 3. At the final water stop Josh was noted to be irritable by another soldier who had asked him to help with his water bottle. This was out of character for Josh. As the soldiers came into Dering Lines Josh was noted to drop back behind the main group and then try to push himself forwards before complaining of cramp and then collapsing. DS staff were with him immediately and tried to remove his day sack and clothing. As the SV was just entering the camp the medic jumped out to treat Josh. The medic started CPR and requested an AED which was obtained from the SV and was put onto Josh at 08.58 (1-2min after SV dropped of the AED). The AED never indicated a need to shock. Two further medics arrived from the medical centre at Dering Lines and assisted. The paramedics arrived at 09.04 and the air ambulance arrived at 09.23 but despite all efforts Josh was declared deceased at 09.39..

Following a forensic post mortem and based on medical evidence the medical cause of death was determined to be:

1a. Sudden arrhythmogenic cardiac death of unknown aetiology associated with high cardiovascular workload due to exercise and heat stress and adrenaline burst from individual drive.
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Report details

Reference
2019-0458
Date of report
1 November 2019
Coroner
Louise Hunt
Coroner area
Birmingham and Solihull

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
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Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 27 Dec 2019.

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