The Anthony Grainger Inquiry

A national policing body should manage a national register of recommendations relating to armed policing, and the response to such recommendations, arising from Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) reports, prevention of future death reports made in the course of inquests, and statutory inquiries concerning fatal police shootings.

In a June 2020 parliamentary answer, Minister of State Kit Malthouse stated that the National Armed Policing lead would hold the register of recommendations on behalf of the National Police Chiefs' Council, managed through an organisational learning board that includes the College of Policing (Kit Malthouse, Jun 2020). The Home Office previously reported in May 2020 that a structured organisational learning process incorporating lessons from statutory inquiries, inquests, and conduct reports had been introduced, with the portfolio responsible for continuing to embed and monitor it (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020).

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (“HMICFRS”) should conduct a thematic inspection or inspections concerning: (i) the selection and training of officers authorised to use weapons requiring special authorisation (paragraph 2.3.1(b) of the Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons); (ii) the selection and training of officers authorised to command incidents involving the use of weapons requiring special authorisation (paragraph 2.3.1(b) of the Code); (iii) the selection and training of officers authorised to provide tactical advice relating to the use of weapons requiring special authorisation (paragraph 2.3.1(b) of the Code); (iv) compliance with the Code and/or the Armed Policing module of Authorised Professional Practice (“APP”) relating to the police use of firearms (paragraph 2.3.1(c) of the Code); and (v) compliance with the Code and/or APP concerning the procurement and use of special munitions.

The Inquiry asked for thematic inspections into armed policing command, training, and munitions procurement. In August 2022, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) reported reviewing force processes for acquiring new weapon systems and specialist munitions (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Aug 2022). In October 2021, the inspectorate reported checking whether officers commanding armed operations were properly trained and competent (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Oct 2021). The Home Office stated in May 2020 that the inspectorate considered its PEEL process the most effective and sustainable way to inspect armed policing and respond to the recommendation (Home Office response, May 2020).

The Secretary of State for the Home Department should ensure that the new Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons contains an express prohibition on the use of a new weapon system by the police service until the approval process set out in the Code of Practice has been completed and the new system has been approved by the Secretary of State.

The Inquiry asked that police be barred from deploying unapproved new weapon systems. In May 2020, the Home Office stated that it accepted the recommendation, having approved and published a revised statutory Code of Practice for Armed Policing and Less Lethal Weapons (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The department explained that the code requires its approval before police forces in England and Wales can use any new less lethal weapon systems, certain specialist munitions, or significant modifications (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). In January 2020, Priti Patel informed the House of Commons that the revised code addressed the recommendation by requiring ministerial approval for all such weapons (Priti Patel, Jan 2020). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of May 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020).

The North West Armed Policing Standard Operating Procedure on Weapons and Ammunition should be amended so that it only permits the use of new specialist munitions that have been approved in accordance with the Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons.

The Inquiry recommended amending armed policing procedures to restrict specialist munitions to approved weapons. The Home Office stated in May 2020 that Greater Manchester Police had revised its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to require approval from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC), and the department (Home Office response, May 2020). The department added in May 2020 that the force was updating the procedure following publication of the new Code of Practice for Armed Policing and Less Lethal Weapons (Home Office, May 2020). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of May 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020).

Greater Manchester Police (“GMP”) should design and promulgate a written policy that specifically relates to the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence for the purposes of planned armed deployments within the meaning of the Armed Policing module of Authorised Professional Practice (“APP”). While it will be for GMP to determine the specific content of such a policy (having regard, in particular, to regional co-operation arrangements), it must address: the use of intelligence in threat and risk assessments for planned armed deployments; where responsibility lies for the creation of threat and risk assessments for planned armed deployments; where responsibility and processes lie for the assurance of threat and risk assessments for planned armed deployments; the use of intelligence in briefings and presentations to authorised firearms officers (“AFOs”) in planned armed deployments; where responsibility and processes lie for the assurance of briefings and presentations of threat and risk assessments to AFOs in planned armed deployments; and where responsibility lies for training officers in the use of intelligence in threat and risk assessments for planned armed deployments and in the creation, assurance and presentation to AFOs of such assessments.

In May 2020, the Home Office reported that the National Police Chiefs' Council had agreed to lead a national review of Authorised Professional Practice, training, and policy alongside Greater Manchester Police and the College of Policing (Home Office response, May 2020). The department stated that a trial of an electronic logging system for command decisions was under way, with a provisional target to complete the work by 31 July 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of May 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020).

All documents and training relating to Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) should: clearly differentiate between MASTS as an operational method of supporting surveillance (and delivering a standard range of tactical options), and the additional tactical options of 'intervention' and 'interception' that MASTS trained authorised firearms officers (AFOs) can deliver; make clear that a MASTS deployment authorisation should not be taken to imply that 'intervention' or 'interception' are preauthorised or preferred tactical outcomes; note that decisive action by MASTS officers is a high-risk option and explain what factors lead to higher risks (for example, the presence of a subject inside a stationary vehicle); and make clear that the reasons for any strategic or tactical command decision in a firearms operation (including any decision to authorise such an operation) must be recorded at the time the decision is made unless it is impracticable to do so, in which case such reasons, together with a full explanation for not recording them at the time, must be recorded as soon as possible.

In June 2020, Kit Malthouse, Minister of State, stated that implementing the recommendation was complex and required reviewing national armed policing policy and training, leading the National Police Chiefs' Council to take the lead with input from the College of Policing and Greater Manchester Police (Kit Malthouse, Jun 2020). Relaying the addressee's position in May 2020, the Home Office explained that a joint review of training guidance addressed parts of the recommendation, though "certain aspects require further work" against a provisional completion target of 31 July 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020).

The National Police Chiefs’ Council (“NPCC”) should, in the formulation of policy, take into account that, when establishing the facts, discharging investigative obligations and ensuring openness and transparency following the discharge of a firearm by a police officer in the course of a pre-planned firearms operation, there are significant advantages in having: recordings of the communications of firearms commanders and authorised firearms officers (“AFOs”); and video recordings from the body-worn video cameras of AFOs and police vehicles involved in decisive action.

The Inquiry asked police leaders to record communications and video during pre-planned firearms operations. In May 2020, the Home Office stated that body-worn video (BWV) was required for Armed Response Vehicle officers and that the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) had issued guidance encouraging BWV use at decisive action (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The department added that research into a vehicle-based option and BWV for covert roles was underway with a provisional target of July 2020, but the sources do not mention recording officer communications (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of May 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020).

The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) should consider whether to recommend equipping unmarked vehicles used in Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) interventions with apparatus designed to identify to subjects that those conducting such interventions are police officers - specifically (i) the illumination of previously concealed blue lights on unmarked police vehicles; and/or (ii) integral loudspeaker systems that could be used to broadcast information or instructions outside such a vehicle.

In May 2020, the Home Office reported that the National Police Chiefs' Council considered the recommendation complete, explaining that national standards require forces conducting surveillance interventions to have three covert vehicles equipped with covert blue lights and two-tones (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The department added that while the Council did not intend to mandate vehicle public address systems, national guidance and a late 2019 circular require forces to assess the implications of fitting them (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The record holds no update since the department's response of May 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020).

The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the College of Policing should jointly decide, in the light of independent expert advice, whether there should be a maximum period of time during which authorised firearms officers (AFOs) are permitted to remain on continuous duty and, if so, should ensure that this maximum period is specified in national guidance.

The Home Office reported in May 2020 that the National Police Chiefs' Council and the College of Policing intended to seek independent expert advice to review the necessity and practicality of introducing duty time limits for authorised firearms officers before issuing national guidance (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The department noted in May 2020 that an interim circular had been issued to forces regarding officer fatigue and fitness monitoring, with the review provisionally targeted for completion by 31 July 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020). The record holds no update since the department's response of May 2020 (Home Office response, May 2020; Home Office, May 2020).