MASTS Documentation and Training Clarity
Anthony Grainger Inquiry · The Anthony Grainger Inquiry Report into the Death of Anthony Grainger · Issued 11 July 2019 · Addressed to: National Police Chiefs Council
Source — verbatim from the inquiry
●Inquiry recommendation
All documents and training relating to Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) should: clearly differentiate between MASTS as an operational method of supporting surveillance (and delivering a standard range of tactical options), and the additional tactical options of 'intervention' and 'interception' that MASTS trained authorised firearms officers (AFOs) can deliver; make clear that a MASTS deployment authorisation should not be taken to imply that 'intervention' or 'interception' are preauthorised or preferred tactical outcomes; note that decisive action by MASTS officers is a high-risk option and explain what factors lead to higher risks (for example, the presence of a subject inside a stationary vehicle); and make clear that the reasons for any strategic or tactical command decision in a firearms operation (including any decision to authorise such an operation) must be recorded at the time the decision is made unless it is impracticable to do so, in which case such reasons, together with a full explanation for not recording them at the time, must be recorded as soon as possible.
Anthony Grainger Inquiry, The Anthony Grainger Inquiry Report into the Death of Anthony Grainger · 11 Jul 2019 Source PDF →
Response — verbatim from government
●National Police Chiefs Council
28. This recommendation is complex and has required a review of Authorised Professional Practice (APP), the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) and associated policy and doctrine. NPCC have decided to take responsibility, given the important national implications and dependencies. 29. The College of Policing and NPCC's review of the relevant Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) module of the NPFTC and the guidance therein specifically addresses some of the above recommendations, but certain aspects require further work. The NPFTC was amended in 2015 to clarify that MASTS should be understood as an operational platform from which a number of options can be delivered rather than as a tactic. The outcome of decisive armed intervention (using firearms to challenge a subject) should not be taken as inevitable or pre-authorised. 30. These actions will ensure that there is a greater differentiation, and recognition of the higher risks, between the deployment of MASTS as support to surveillance and as an additional tactic of decisive armed intervention and interception. The provisional target is to complete work by 31 July 2020.
National Police Chiefs Council · 21 May 2020 Written response →
Evidence trail — what's actually happened since
No published activity has been recorded against this recommendation yet.
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