Recommendations & Conclusions
12 items
4
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of the UK’s 5G network in Parliament and across the country from late 2019 and through 2020 with a focus on the presence in our network of high-risk vendors, particularly Huawei. A significant Government announcement took …
Read more
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of the UK’s 5G network in Parliament and across the country from late 2019 and through 2020 with a focus on the presence in our network of high-risk vendors, particularly Huawei. A significant Government announcement took place in January with restrictions placed on high-risk vendors followed by stricter rules announced in July, with Huawei to be removed from the UK’s 5G network by 2027. The UK Government has had to balance technical considerations with wider geopolitical considerations when formulating its 5G policy.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the committee's observation that it has balanced technical and geopolitical considerations when formulating its 5G policy, stating its approach was evidence-based and informed by comprehensive security assessments.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
7
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified. The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has consistently reported on its low-quality products and concerning approach to software development, which has resulted in increased risk to UK operators and networks. The presence of Huawei in the UK’s …
Read more
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified. The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has consistently reported on its low-quality products and concerning approach to software development, which has resulted in increased risk to UK operators and networks. The presence of Huawei in the UK’s 5G networks therefore poses a significant security risk to individuals and to our Government. Whilst Huawei is a market leading company, we do not believe it to be higher in quality or more functional than its rivals, Nokia and Ericsson.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the committee's findings on Huawei's risks, stating that its unique insight and technical analysis have informed its risk mitigation position. It adds that it will continue working with alternative vendors like Nokia and Ericsson.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
9
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations with Government, we are confident that GCHQ and the NCSC …
Read more
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations with Government, we are confident that GCHQ and the NCSC are able to appropriately manage any increased risk posed by the presence of Huawei or other high-risk vendors in the UK’s 5G.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the committee's confidence in GCHQ and NCSC, stating it appreciates the recognition and has carefully risk-managed Huawei's presence since 2003 through robust oversight mechanisms like HCSEC.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
11
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in the UK’s 5G networks was, according to the Government, significant but manageable through monitoring and regulation. The situation changed when Huawei was deprived of reliable chip manufacturing capabilities. Following these sanctions, as discussed in the …
Read more
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in the UK’s 5G networks was, according to the Government, significant but manageable through monitoring and regulation. The situation changed when Huawei was deprived of reliable chip manufacturing capabilities. Following these sanctions, as discussed in the Government’s July announcement, it became much more difficult to 76 The Security of 5G guarantee and measure the quality of Huawei products. In principle, the Government has made the correct technical decision to ban the purchase and presence of Huawei products in the future.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the committee’s conclusions and recognition of its response to the changed context, confirming that US sanctions altered the risk associated with Huawei's presence, making an updated government position necessary.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
13
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share sensitive information with partners. We have been told that Huawei is not present in our sensitive networks and that, due to encryption standards, even if adversaries were able to record information as it passes through …
Read more
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share sensitive information with partners. We have been told that Huawei is not present in our sensitive networks and that, due to encryption standards, even if adversaries were able to record information as it passes through systems, they would not be able to decipher it.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government confirms that the UK's most sensitive information is protected independently of public networks, and GCHQ has categorically confirmed that high-risk vendor decisions do not affect intelligence sharing. It also notes that equipment from high-risk vendors is banned near particularly sensitive sites.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
14
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such as the United States. The UK’s closest allies, including the United States and Australia, originally embarked on a policy at odds to that of the UK. This had the potential to damage the UK’s close …
Read more
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such as the United States. The UK’s closest allies, including the United States and Australia, originally embarked on a policy at odds to that of the UK. This had the potential to damage the UK’s close intelligence, security and defence relationship with them, although reassurances have been given by Ministers that this was not the case.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government reaffirms the robustness of the Five Eyes relationship and its ongoing cooperation with allies, stating that while approaches may differ, the partnership is strong. It indicates that decisive action was taken based on UK circumstances and expert analysis.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
15
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the presence of Huawei in our networks has generated disagreement between the two Governments, given the contrasting conclusions of technical experts on either side of the Atlantic.
Read more
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the presence of Huawei in our networks has generated disagreement between the two Governments, given the contrasting conclusions of technical experts on either side of the Atlantic.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government emphasizes the special and enduring relationship with the US, stating it has been in close touch on telecoms security and continues to work closely to increase global standards and promote diversification.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
16
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from sanctions; however the Government should have considered the potential damage to key alliances enough of a risk to begin to remove Huawei from the UK’s 5G network before the US sanctions were imposed.
Read more
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from sanctions; however the Government should have considered the potential damage to key alliances enough of a risk to begin to remove Huawei from the UK’s 5G network before the US sanctions were imposed.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of working closely with allies and sharing experiences to raise cyber security standards, stating it is already doing so and will continue to engage. It does not explicitly address the recommendation to have considered alliance damage earlier.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
17
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, despite its statements to the contrary. This is evidenced by its ownership model and the subsidies it has received. Additionally, Huawei’s apparent willingness to support China’s intelligence agencies and the 2017 National Intelligence …
Read more
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, despite its statements to the contrary. This is evidenced by its ownership model and the subsidies it has received. Additionally, Huawei’s apparent willingness to support China’s intelligence agencies and the 2017 National Intelligence Law are further cause for concern. Having a company so closely tied to a state and political organisation sometimes at odds with UK interests should be a point of concern and the decision to remove Huawei from our networks is further supported by these links. (Paragraph 103) 77 The Security of 5G
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need to protect national security while remaining open to investment, stating that risks associated with Huawei have been carefully managed through detailed formal oversight by HCSEC since 2010.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
18
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and the Chinese Communist Party apparatus. It is important that the West does not succumb to ill-informed anti-China hysteria and recognises the mutual benefits of Chinese involvement in our economy. The UK, and allies, should ensure …
Read more
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and the Chinese Communist Party apparatus. It is important that the West does not succumb to ill-informed anti-China hysteria and recognises the mutual benefits of Chinese involvement in our economy. The UK, and allies, should ensure that decisions taken around the involvement of Chinese companies are taken in an evidence-based manner, and only when risk is demonstrable should decisions around removal be made. The UK, and allies, should ensure that decisions taken around the involvement of Chinese companies are taken in an evidence-based manner, and only when risk is demonstrable should decisions around removal be made.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government states that decisions are made to satisfy robust legal, regulatory, and national security requirements, highlighting the new National Security Investment Bill as an important addition to existing tools for ensuring evidence-based risk assessment.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
21
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique, with China dominating the industry. In order to combat this dominance, we support the principle of proposals for forming a D10 alliance of democracies to provide alternatives to Chinese technology: however, it is not yet …
Read more
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique, with China dominating the industry. In order to combat this dominance, we support the principle of proposals for forming a D10 alliance of democracies to provide alternatives to Chinese technology: however, it is not yet clear what the purpose of this alliance is. Following consultation with allies, the Government should set out exactly what the role of this alliance would be and seek to make progress as quickly as possible on formulating joint 5G policy. The Government should explore opportunities for joint network security standard setting across Five Eyes and perhaps more widely, through a D10 or NATO. Following consultation with allies, the Government should set out exactly what the role of this alliance would be and seek to make progress as quickly as possible on formulating joint 5G policy. The Government should explore opportunities for joint network security standard setting across Five Eyes and perhaps more widely, through a D10 or NATO. It should also develop a programme to create necessary industrial capacity. (Paragraph 120) 78 The Security of 5G
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of working with allies on network security and industrial capacity, stating it will continue to work closely and internationally to address challenges and forge consensus on standards. However, it does not commit to specifically setting out the role of …
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence
22
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Acknowledged
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide alternatives to Chinese technology. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance of the most complete kind. For security reasons beyond the …
Read more
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide alternatives to Chinese technology. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance of the most complete kind. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance of the most complete kind.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of liberal democracies working together and states it will consider how to best advance this through current or new groupings, without committing to a specific D10 alliance.
Read full response →
Ministry of Defence