Recommendations & Conclusions
14 items
2
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological advances that 5G will bring. The Government’s ambitions for the …
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We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological advances that 5G will bring. The Government’s ambitions for the rollout of 5G are laudable and cybersecurity policy should take into account the strategic value of the UK maintaining its position as a global market leader in this technology.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the objective for the UK to be a global leader in 5G, stating security is paramount, and highlights ongoing 5G testbeds and trials leveraging UK cybersecurity expertise to achieve secure networks and economic benefits.
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Ministry of Defence
3
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough. Even with the inclusion of Huawei the market was “sub-optimal” and the Government’s decision to remove Huawei completely from 5G by 2027 poses a risk that could potentially result in an even less diverse market, …
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It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough. Even with the inclusion of Huawei the market was “sub-optimal” and the Government’s decision to remove Huawei completely from 5G by 2027 poses a risk that could potentially result in an even less diverse market, which could bring security and resilience concerns of its own.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees the UK vendor market is insufficiently diverse and has published a multifaceted 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy to address this, aiming to maintain network resilience while growing the market and building UK capability.
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Ministry of Defence
5
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some attacks aim to steal individual data and state secrets whilst …
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There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some attacks aim to steal individual data and state secrets whilst others seek to bring down the network in its entirety. (Paragraph 58) 75 The Security of 5G
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the prevalence of malicious cyber-attacks and states its commitment to making hostile actors understand there are consequences, by exposing them, using existing and new tools like sanctions, and coordinating with international partners.
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Ministry of Defence
6
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the international stage and works to find a deterrent to counter them. There is currently a lack of global rules regulating international cyber-attacks and the Government should work with allies to formulate a system to provide …
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It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the international stage and works to find a deterrent to counter them. There is currently a lack of global rules regulating international cyber-attacks and the Government should work with allies to formulate a system to provide accountability for perpetrators. The Government should clarify why it is not deploying a cyberattack capability to deter aggressors.
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Government response AI summary
The government states it is committed to promoting stability in cyberspace through international cooperation with allies. It clarifies that it does employ offensive cyber capabilities as part of its deterrence strategy, delivered by the National Cyber Force, addressing the committee's underlying question.
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Ministry of Defence
10
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having a greater number of vendors involved in 5G network provision, despite the designation as high-risk, as this improves overall network resilience should a single vendor fail.
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Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having a greater number of vendors involved in 5G network provision, despite the designation as high-risk, as this improves overall network resilience should a single vendor fail.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that a greater number of 5G vendors benefits the UK market and has launched a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, including an initial £250 million investment, exploring R&D incentives, and working with international partners to diversify the supply chain.
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Ministry of Defence
12
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive defence and national security sites. The Defence Secretary has informed us that no Huawei 5G equipment is present on the defence estate and that sensitive communications are safe from compromise. The Government should ensure that …
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We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive defence and national security sites. The Defence Secretary has informed us that no Huawei 5G equipment is present on the defence estate and that sensitive communications are safe from compromise. The Government should ensure that Huawei continues to be distanced from sensitive networks until the complete removal of its equipment from 5G by 2027.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees that Huawei should continue to be distanced from sensitive networks, confirming that high-risk vendors are already excluded from critical and sensitive sites, a decision enforced through the Telecommunications (Security) Bill.
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Ministry of Defence
19
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of Huawei in its 5G infrastructure through both covert and overt threats. More recently, following the Government’s announcement for the long-term withdrawal of Huawei from its 5G network, China has threatened to withdraw from the UK’s …
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Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of Huawei in its 5G infrastructure through both covert and overt threats. More recently, following the Government’s announcement for the long-term withdrawal of Huawei from its 5G network, China has threatened to withdraw from the UK’s economy, including in critical infrastructure such as nuclear.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the situation by affirming its balanced approach to China, welcoming investment while reiterating its commitment to protect national security and reject compromising investments, as demonstrated with 5G infrastructure.
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Ministry of Defence
20
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge implications for the UK’s economy. If threats by the Chinese state to withdraw from the UK’s critical industries continue and worsen, the Government should carefully consider China’s future presence in critical sectors of the economy. …
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Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge implications for the UK’s economy. If threats by the Chinese state to withdraw from the UK’s critical industries continue and worsen, the Government should carefully consider China’s future presence in critical sectors of the economy. The Government should make provision in its proposed National Security and Investment Bill to give it the power to intervene and stop investments in critical industries should threats or risks be present.
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Government response AI summary
The government affirms its commitment to protect national security, stating that all critical infrastructure investments are thoroughly scrutinised, and confirms the new National Security and Investment Bill will provide important additional powers to intervene against risks.
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Ministry of Defence
25
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for a coherent long-term strategy for the UK’s technical and technological ambitions. It is not clear to us that the Government has a cohesive strategy in this area. The Government should learn lessons from debates around …
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The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for a coherent long-term strategy for the UK’s technical and technological ambitions. It is not clear to us that the Government has a cohesive strategy in this area. The Government should learn lessons from debates around Huawei and seek to formulate a long-term plan for tech in the UK, this should include, for example, the Government’s plan relating to OneWeb and the UK’s removal from the Galileo satellite system.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the need for a long-term plan, pointing to its published Research and Development Roadmap and commitment to develop more detailed plans, which will complement a refreshed Industrial Strategy and the 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy.
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Ministry of Defence
27
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
The UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory. Whilst this reflects a wider consolidated ecosystem of global 5G vendors action must now be taken to ensure that 5G is in a more secure position in the years to come.
Government response AI summary
The government agrees the vendor market is unsatisfactory and has committed £250 million, published a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, is engaging suppliers and exploring R&D incentives, and appointed a Telecoms Diversification Taskforce to address the issue.
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Ministry of Defence
28
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the UK, for example Samsung or NEC and also encourage the development of industrial capacity in the UK. This will not only improve market diversity but make our networks more resilient and lessen the potential security …
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The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the UK, for example Samsung or NEC and also encourage the development of industrial capacity in the UK. This will not only improve market diversity but make our networks more resilient and lessen the potential security risks by removing Huawei and therefore leaving the UK reliant on Nokia and Ericsson alone.
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Government response AI summary
The government is actively working with mobile network operators and suppliers, providing £1.6 million grant funding to NEC for a NeutrORAN testbed and highlighting SME involvement in 5G Create projects, including trials with Samsung kit.
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Ministry of Defence
29
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one in which operators no longer have to consider which vendor to source from. It will also improve network security in a number of other ways. Whilst it may not provide an immediate solution as the …
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OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one in which operators no longer have to consider which vendor to source from. It will also improve network security in a number of other ways. Whilst it may not provide an immediate solution as the standard is not yet mature, it does present a long-term solution to the current situation. The UK Government and mobile service operators should continue investment in OpenRAN technology and work to make the UK a global leader, not just in technological development, but also in production. The UK Government and mobile service operators should continue investment in OpenRAN technology and work to make the UK a global leader, not just in technological development, but also in production.
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the importance of OpenRAN and states it is already investing in the technology through its diversification strategy, citing commitment to the NEC NeurtORAN trial and industry deployments by Vodafone UK.
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Ministry of Defence
30
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory. The Telecoms Security Bill is required to bring regulations up to date and allow Government to compel operators to act in the interests of security. The current situation has led to commercial concerns trumping those of national security. The …
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The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory. The Telecoms Security Bill is required to bring regulations up to date and allow Government to compel operators to act in the interests of security. The current situation has led to commercial concerns trumping those of national security. The Government should not allow a situation where short-term commercial considerations are placed ahead of those for national security and defence. The Telecoms Security Bill is necessary in order to enhance the Government’s and Government bodies’ regulatory powers and should be published as soon as possible.
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the need for the Telecoms Security Bill, stating it was introduced to Parliament on 24 November 2020, to enhance regulatory powers and ensure national security is prioritised over commercial considerations.
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Ministry of Defence
31
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Accepted
The House was promised a Telecoms Security Bill before the summer recess. This did not happen. There must be no further delay. The Government should introduce the Telecoms Security Bill before 31 December
Government response AI summary
The government states that the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 24 November 2020, fulfilling the recommendation to introduce it before 31 December.
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Ministry of Defence