Recommendations & Conclusions
30 items
2
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological advances that 5G will bring. The Government’s ambitions for the …
Government response. The Government’s primary aims for 5G are for the UK to become a global leader in the technology by reducing barriers to 5G deployment and realising the full benefits of 5G as quickly as possible. Security is paramount and networks …
Ministry of Defence
3
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough. Even with the inclusion of Huawei the market was “sub-optimal” and the Government’s decision to remove Huawei completely from 5G by 2027 poses a risk that could potentially result in an even less diverse market, …
Government response. The Government agrees that the UK vendor market is not diverse enough, as highlighted in the Telecoms Supply Chain Review. The Review outlines the need for further diversification in the supply market for access network equipment, in order to reduce …
Ministry of Defence
4
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of the UK’s 5G network in Parliament and across the country from late 2019 and through 2020 with a focus on the presence in our network of high-risk vendors, particularly Huawei. A significant Government announcement took …
Government response. As the Committee notes, the Government has followed an approach that takes into account our specific national circumstances and the full range of risks. The Government made its advice on high risk vendors after considering all the technical, economic and …
Ministry of Defence
5
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some attacks aim to steal individual data and state secrets whilst …
Government response. Hostile actors must understand that irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace will carry cost. The UK and our allies will continue to expose those that aim to do us and our institutions harm. No longer can they act with impunity in the …
Ministry of Defence
6
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the international stage and works to find a deterrent to counter them. There is currently a lack of global rules regulating international cyber-attacks and the Government should work with allies to formulate a system to provide …
Government response. The Government is committed to promoting stability in cyberspace based on the application of existing international law, voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence building measures supported by coordinated and targeted capacity- building programmes. The UK works with the …
Ministry of Defence
7
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified. The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has consistently reported on its low-quality products and concerning approach to software development, which has resulted in increased risk to UK operators and networks. The presence of Huawei in the UK’s …
Government response. The UK has unique insight into Huawei’s presence in our networks and the Government has been quick to respond to the changing risk environment for network security. Because of the work of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) and …
Ministry of Defence
8
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The establishment of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has resulted in the UK leading the world in understanding Huawei’s equipment. Despite the planned withdrawal of Huawei from our 5G networks, the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre should continue to operate to assess Huawei equipment in other areas of our …
Government response. The HCSEC is integral to the UK’s Huawei security mitigation strategy and it provides the UK a unique insight into the workings of Huawei equipment and software. The government requires that HCSEC continues to be maintained at an appropriate level …
Ministry of Defence
9
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations with Government, we are confident that GCHQ and the NCSC …
Government response. The Government appreciates the recognition of the excellent job that Government Communications HQ (GCHQ) and the NCSC do to manage risk in the UK telecoms network. We have always been clear-eyed about the risk posed by Huawei. Since Huawei first …
Ministry of Defence
10
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having a greater number of vendors involved in 5G network provision, despite the designation as high-risk, as this improves overall network resilience should a single vendor fail.
Government response. The Government agrees that the UK market will benefit from a greater number of vendors. We have developed the 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, published on 30 November, to diversify the supply chain. We are talking to a range of …
Ministry of Defence
11
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in the UK’s 5G networks was, according to the Government, significant but manageable through monitoring and regulation. The situation changed when Huawei was deprived of reliable chip manufacturing capabilities. Following these sanctions, as discussed in the …
Government response. The Government welcomes the Committee’s conclusions and recognition of the Government’s response to the changed context. The Government’s position as set out in January related to high risk vendors generally; however, the US sanctions in May applied only to Huawei. …
Ministry of Defence
12
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive defence and national security sites. The Defence Secretary has informed us that no Huawei 5G equipment is present on the defence estate and that sensitive communications are safe from compromise. The Government should ensure that …
Government response. The Government agrees with the Committee that Huawei should continue to be distanced from sensitive networks. High risk vendors are not—and never will be—in our most sensitive networks. The decision was made in January 2020 that high risk vendors, including …
Ministry of Defence
13
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share sensitive information with partners. We have been told that Huawei is not present in our sensitive networks and that, due to encryption standards, even if adversaries were able to record information as it passes through …
Government response. The UK’s most sensitive information and capabilities are protected independently of any public networks and their security does not rely on any public network. Our advice on high risk vendors in January and on Huawei in July do not affect …
Ministry of Defence
14
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such as the United States. The UK’s closest allies, including the United States and Australia, originally embarked on a policy at odds to that of the UK. This had the potential to damage the UK’s close …
Government response. The Five Eyes relationship is robust. The nature of the partnership is such that whilst we share the most important, fundamental principles, there are areas where, from time to time, our approaches differ. These differences encourage a diversity within the …
Ministry of Defence
15
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the presence of Huawei in our networks has generated disagreement between the two Governments, given the contrasting conclusions of technical experts on either side of the Atlantic.
Government response. The UK has a special and enduring relationship with the US on security, as well as a vast range of wider issues. That relationship goes beyond any single issue and is deeply rooted in our shared history, interests and values. …
Ministry of Defence
16
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from sanctions; however the Government should have considered the potential damage to key alliances enough of a risk to begin to remove Huawei from the UK’s 5G network before the US sanctions were imposed.
Government response. Each approach will depend on national circumstances, and the particular risks as they are manifested in each country. It is important that we work closely with allies in this critical area and share experiences and approaches, with the aim of …
Ministry of Defence
17
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, despite its statements to the contrary. This is evidenced by its ownership model and the subsidies it has received. Additionally, Huawei’s apparent willingness to support China’s intelligence agencies and the 2017 National Intelligence …
Government response. The UK has always been open to a range of vendors in our telecommunications network. We welcome Chinese investment, but will take the necessary measures to protect our national security—as we have done for our 5G infrastructure. Since Huawei first …
Ministry of Defence
18
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and the Chinese Communist Party apparatus. It is important that the West does not succumb to ill-informed anti-China hysteria and recognises the mutual benefits of Chinese involvement in our economy. The UK, and allies, should ensure …
Government response. to satisfy our robust legal, regulatory and national security requirements. The new regime introduced under the National Security Investment Bill will be an important addition to existing tools and align more closely with those administered by our Five Eyes allies.
Ministry of Defence
19
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of Huawei in its 5G infrastructure through both covert and overt threats. More recently, following the Government’s announcement for the long-term withdrawal of Huawei from its 5G network, China has threatened to withdraw from the UK’s …
Government response. The UK and China have a constructive and positive relationship and are clear and direct where we disagree. We welcome Chinese investment, but will take the necessary measures to protect our national security – as we have done for our …
Ministry of Defence
20
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge implications for the UK’s economy. If threats by the Chinese state to withdraw from the UK’s critical industries continue and worsen, the Government should carefully consider China’s future presence in critical sectors of the economy. …
Government response. The UK wants a mature, positive relationship with China, based on mutual respect and trust. There is considerable scope for constructive engagement and cooperation. But as we strive for that positive relationship, we will not sacrifice either our values or …
Ministry of Defence
21
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique, with China dominating the industry. In order to combat this dominance, we support the principle of proposals for forming a D10 alliance of democracies to provide alternatives to Chinese technology: however, it is not yet …
Government response. The Government agrees that it is vital that we work with our allies on matters relating to network security. That is why we will continue to work closely together to tackle common security challenges, sharing our approaches and experiences with …
Ministry of Defence
22
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide alternatives to Chinese technology. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance of the most complete kind. For security reasons beyond the …
Government response. The UK is currently a member of a number of different small groups, both informal and formal, which serve a variety of purposes. Those groups have always evolved and will continue to do so. We believe that liberal democracies and …
Ministry of Defence
23
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Global standards are key to 5G and future telecommunications networks. China has been very active in the standard setting bodies whilst the UK and allies have stood back. This is not satisfactory. The UK should take a leadership role in shaping global standards to ensure that the future of mobile …
Government response. Standards are a crucial part of the Government’s work to diversify the supply chain. of stakeholder needs, and support diversification, innovation and open interfaces. This will include assessing how we can best support UK industry to embed them in standards …
Ministry of Defence
24
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has faced pressure to remove Huawei more quickly than by 2027. The evidence we have received would suggest that a quicker timescale could result in signal blackouts, delay the 5G rollout significantly and cost both operators and the economy greatly. For the time being we consider the plan …
Government response. The Government recognises that there may be pressures to remove Huawei from 5G networks before 2027; however, we have provided this advice after taking into account our specific national circumstances and how the risks from these sanctions are manifested in …
Ministry of Defence
25
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for a coherent long-term strategy for the UK’s technical and technological ambitions. It is not clear to us that the Government has a cohesive strategy in this area. The Government should learn lessons from debates around …
Government response. We duly note the recommendation to articulate a long-term plan, which aligns with the PM’s ambition for the UK to be a ‘Great Science Power’. On 1 July, the Government published its ambitious Research and Development Roadmap to ensure the …
Ministry of Defence
26
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Despite being a longer timeframe than some have called for, the Government’s most recent restrictions on the use of Huawei in 5G networks will delay the 5G rollout and economically damage the UK and mobile network operators. The UK Government should take necessary steps to minimise the delay and economic …
Government response. The Telecommunications (Security) Bill makes clear that providers are responsible for the security of their own networks and services. As such, we expect the cost of ensuring adequate security to be met by individual providers. We remain committed to working …
Ministry of Defence
27
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory. Whilst this reflects a wider consolidated ecosystem of global 5G vendors action must now be taken to ensure that 5G is in a more secure position in the years to come.
Government response. The Government agrees that the UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory, and we recognise that there is a need to work at pace to make early progress on diversification. The Government announced in the National Infrastructure Strategy that …
Ministry of Defence
28
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the UK, for example Samsung or NEC and also encourage the development of industrial capacity in the UK. This will not only improve market diversity but make our networks more resilient and lessen the potential security …
Government response. The Government is having regular discussions with companies across the industry, both mobile operators, and suppliers such as NEC, Samsung and others, to find solutions that work for them. We recently announced our intention to provide NEC with £1.6 million …
Ministry of Defence
29
Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one in which operators no longer have to consider which vendor to source from. It will also improve network security in a number of other ways. Whilst it may not provide an immediate solution as the …
Government response. The Government agrees that OpenRAN is an important part of the future diversification of telecoms networks alongside other technologies that support open and interoperable networks. Our diversification strategy is based around three key strands; i) supporting incumbent suppliers, ii) attracting …
Ministry of Defence
30
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory. The Telecoms Security Bill is required to bring regulations up to date and allow Government to compel operators to act in the interests of security. The current situation has led to commercial concerns trumping those of national security. The …
Government response. The Government’s most important duty is national security. The Government fully supports the statement that commercial decisions cannot be placed above security, that is one of the reasons that the Telecommunications (Security) Bill has been introduced to parliament. The Bill …
Ministry of Defence
31
Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The House was promised a Telecoms Security Bill before the summer recess. This did not happen. There must be no further delay. The Government should introduce the Telecoms Security Bill before 31 December
Government response. The Telecommunications (Security) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 24 November 2020.
Ministry of Defence