Select committee: Defence Committee
Conclusion 9
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Published 8 Oct 2020
Paragraph 72
Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Defence Committee The Security of 5G All items in this report Report on parliament.uk ↗ Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗
Conclusion (the committee's words)
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations with Government, we are confident that GCHQ and the NCSC are able to appropriately manage any increased risk posed by the presence of Huawei or other high-risk vendors in the UK’s 5G.
From: Defence Committee, Second Report - The Security of 5G (HC 201), paragraph 72, 8 October 2020
Government response
The government responded to the whole report on 16 December 2020 (deadline 8 December 2020).
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.The government agrees that the UK vendor market is not diverse enough and points to its diversification strategy and the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, while holding to a 2027 removal date for Huawei.
- On supply diversity, it agrees the UK market is "far from satisfactory" and cites a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, published on 30 November, with an "initial investment of £250 million".
- On the committee's call for the Telecoms Security Bill, it states the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 24 November 2020.
- On removing Huawei faster, it "recognises that there may be pressures" to do so before 2027, but says going "further and faster" would add "considerable further costs and delays".
- On compensation for operators, it says it expects "the cost of ensuring adequate security to be met by individual providers".