Select committee: Defence Committee

Recommendation 20

Second Report - The Security of 5G Published 8 Oct 2020 Paragraph 110 Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Recommendation (the committee's words)
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge implications for the UK’s economy. If threats by the Chinese state to withdraw from the UK’s critical industries continue and worsen, the Government should carefully consider China’s future presence in critical sectors of the economy. The Government should make provision in its proposed National Security and Investment Bill to give it the power to intervene and stop investments in critical industries should threats or risks be present.

From: Defence Committee, Second Report - The Security of 5G (HC 201), paragraph 110, 8 October 2020

Government response

The government responded to the whole report on 16 December 2020 (deadline 8 December 2020).

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The government agrees that the UK vendor market is not diverse enough and points to its diversification strategy and the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, while holding to a 2027 removal date for Huawei.

  • On supply diversity, it agrees the UK market is "far from satisfactory" and cites a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, published on 30 November, with an "initial investment of £250 million".
  • On the committee's call for the Telecoms Security Bill, it states the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 24 November 2020.
  • On removing Huawei faster, it "recognises that there may be pressures" to do so before 2027, but says going "further and faster" would add "considerable further costs and delays".
  • On compensation for operators, it says it expects "the cost of ensuring adequate security to be met by individual providers".

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error