Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Forty-Third Report - COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1
Public Accounts Committee
HC 930
Published 12 February 2021
Conclusions (31)
2
Conclusion
Despite BEIS’s confidence, concerns remain over the vaccine supply chain. Under the Government’s ambitious plans, everyone who wants a vaccination should be able to have one by Autumn 2021. This will depend on continuing vaccine supply. Whilst BEIS asserts that the UK has access to more doses than it likely …
3
Conclusion
BEIS has worked quickly to secure access to vaccines but could have been more transparent about how decisions have been made. Transparency is essential to maintain public confidence and ensure taxpayers’ money is being well spent. BEIS has managed significant uncertainty and worked at pace to purchase vaccines, but it …
4
Conclusion
DHSC, NHSE&I and PHE will continue to face significant challenges in making sure they can get the vaccine to the right people at the right time. Each vaccine will require different plans for deploying because each has different characteristics. Getting the vaccine to the right place to allow it to …
5
Conclusion
There is a risk that NHSE&I and DHSC’s plans for the vaccine programme will not meet public expectations. NHSE&I recognises that its goal to vaccinate the first four priority groups by 15 February is a huge task which it appears to be on track to deliver. As no-one can be …
6
Conclusion
Public confidence in the vaccine programme is crucial to its success yet some members of the public and health professionals were confused by the messaging about when and how people can access a vaccine. The number of people who choose to have the vaccine will ultimately be determined by public …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the Department of Health and Social Care (the Department), NHS England and NHS Improvement (NHSE&I), Public Health England (PHE) and the former Chair of the …
7
Conclusion
BEIS created a Vaccines Taskforce (the Taskforce) in April 2020 to support the research and development of potential vaccines, select which vaccines to purchase, secure the UK’s 7 Committee of Public Accounts, CPVID-19: Supply of Ventilators, HC 685, 25 November 2020 8 Q 33, C&AG’s Report, para 20–21, 3.8–3.10 9 …
8
Conclusion
The Chair of the Taskforce took up the unpaid post in May 2020. The Chair was appointed by, and reported directly to, the Prime Minister until the term expired at the end of 2020.17 We asked the former Chair about criticisms of their appointment and their potential political connection. The …
9
Conclusion
Our report on Government’s procurement and supply of personal protective equipment during the pandemic found that a failure to be transparent had opened up Government to accusations of poor value for money, conflicts of interest and preferential treatment of some suppliers, and risked undermining public trust in government procurement and …
10
Conclusion
We asked what premium the UK had paid for its access to the vaccines and their development at speed. BEIS asserted that the UK had not paid any premiums for access to the vaccines, as at the time the contracts were signed it was not possible to know what the …
11
Conclusion
In response to our questions about whether the UK now had access to enough doses of vaccine or would need to go back to buy more from other suppliers, the former Chair of the Taskforce told us that the “we have more doses than we are likely to need, if …
12
Conclusion
On 11 January 2021, the Secretary of State of Health and Social Care stated that “the supply of the vaccine is currently the rate limiting step”.34 NHSE&I recognised that ensuring everyone who wants a vaccination can have one by Autumn 2021 will depend on continuing vaccine supply.35 Given this, we …
13
Conclusion
Manufacturing the vaccines is the responsibility of pharmaceutical companies. In order to ensure that vaccines can be provided quickly to the UK and reduce the risks to its supply of the vaccine, BEIS calculated that it needed to invest £519 million to provide manufacturing capacity for producing the vaccines within …
14
Conclusion
Government plans to have offered a first vaccine dose to everyone in the top four priority groups identified by the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation by 15 February. This includes: all residents in a care home for older adults and their carers; all those 80 years of age and …
15
Conclusion
We asked NHSE&I whether the timetable for the roll-out of the vaccine was realistic, and how fast it could reach those groups on the priority list. NHSE&I told us that over the first three weeks of the programme, it had administered around 1.1 million doses across the country. and that …
16
Conclusion
NHSE&I is planning its deployment of vaccines in the face of high levels of uncertainty because information about the COVID-19 vaccines is still changing. It needs to keep its plans under review to ensure it can respond to the latest information about which vaccines have been approved, which groups in …
17
Conclusion
Decisions about who will be vaccinated were taken by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, as is the case with all vaccination programmes, based on advice from the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation.47 The Joint Committee identified nine priority groups for the first phase of vaccinations …
18
Conclusion
We asked what progress had been made in identifying who would be prioritised in the next phase of the vaccine programme and whether those in key services, for example education, transport and those working in supermarkets, would be given priority. NHSE&I told us that, while these were decisions for Ministers …
19
Conclusion
Each potential vaccine will require different plans for deploying it to the public because each vaccine has different characteristics. This includes the temperature vaccines need to be stored at, their shelf-life once open, and any preparatory work needed before they are administered.53 The Pfizer Inc and BioNTech SE vaccine, for …
20
Conclusion
In September 2020, NHSE&I estimated that it could need up to 46,000 additional staff to deliver the COVID-19 vaccination programme, including 26,000 vaccinators and 20,000 administrative staff. It planned to fill these posts through a combination of existing primary care staff and targeted local recruitment campaigns.57 At the time of …
21
Conclusion
The NHSE&I concluded that it was not possible to deliver both the COVID-19 and seasonal flu vaccinations solely through existing arrangements such as GP practices and community pharmacies. In response, it developed three new delivery models to take account of different groups and different regional needs. Each region must choose …
22
Conclusion
We were concerned that this approach risked creating a ‘stop-start’ system where the logistics for vaccinations people were in place, but would be difficult to get up and running again if the roll-out was paused while other areas caught up. NHSE&I confirmed 55 Qq 63–65 56 Q 67 57 C&AG’s …
23
Conclusion
In its written evidence to us, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics noted that COVID-19 had a disproportionate impact on groups who already had unmet health needs, such as poorer and BAME communities, those living in care and those with learning disabilities. It explained that it was important that plans for …
24
Conclusion
NHSE&I recognised that its goal of vaccinating the top four priority groups by mid- February was a huge task.67 We noted that it would be essential for Departments to be clear in the language they used to describe progress with the vaccine programme to avoid over-promising and under-delivering. We asked …
25
Conclusion
When it was first rolled-out, the vaccine programme included a three-week break between people receiving their first and second doses. In December 2020, the Government announced that the second dose of the vaccine would be administered 12 weeks after the first dose.73 We asked why this decision had been made …
26
Conclusion
In 2019–20 the long-established seasonal flu vaccination programme had a take-up rate of 72% among those aged 65 years and older, and up to 45% for those aged 64 years or younger. NHSE&I explained that it was using the flu vaccine as an indicator for expected take-up of the COVID-19 …
27
Conclusion
PHE recognised that people trust their local GP, local faith groups and community groups so public health organisations and local government will have an important role to play to encourage people to take-up the vaccine. Flu vaccination programmes have also shown the importance of convenience and location to the take-up …
28
Conclusion
The number of people who choose to have the vaccine will ultimately be determined by public trust in the vaccines.78 Our previous reports have shown the importance of clear and consistent communication and that a lack of information during the pandemic, or repeatedly changing and updating guidance, can be confusing …
29
Conclusion
Research commissioned by PHE showed that about two-thirds of the population were very likely to take-up the vaccine, around 10% were unlikely, and the rest were uncertain. For those who were uncertain or unlikely to have the vaccine, efficacy and safety were the key issues. We asked witnesses what were …
30
Conclusion
We were concerned by reports of confusion among health professionals and the public about what to expect from the vaccine programme and when. We asked NHSE&I how it was ensuring clear lines of communication so that people had access to accurate information quickly and easily.82 NHSE&I explained that its messaging …
31
Conclusion
NHSE&I explained that it would give people “more than one channel and more than one chance” to come forward for a vaccine. It expected to have to go back to people who did not come forward after being contacted to understand why they had not responded and give them another …