Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation 8
8
The Chair of the Taskforce took up the unpaid post in May 2020.
Conclusion
The Chair of the Taskforce took up the unpaid post in May 2020. The Chair was appointed by, and reported directly to, the Prime Minister until the term expired at the end of 2020.17 We asked the former Chair about criticisms of their appointment and their potential political connection. The former Chair told us that they had been clear at the outset that they were not a vaccines expert and that their experience was in “taking novel science and turning those into therapeutics”.18 They explained that, in essence, this meant demonstrating that treatments were effective and safe, ensuring they could be manufactured, and in getting the regulatory approvals needed so that they could be administered . They noted that there were other vaccine experts available, and others may have been better qualified, but that their “venture capital skillset and biotech mindset” had been what was needed for the Taskforce.19 We noted that in a pandemic it was not necessarily possible to undertake a full-recruitment process, but asked whether there should have been more discussion about, or others should have been involved in, the appointment of the Chair. The former Chair told us that they were not privy to what process took place. BEIS similarly told us that it was not privy to the process for this specific appointment and that, in non-emergency circumstances, it would still expect to undertake a normal recruitment process.20
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government
Not Addressed
The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Ta rget implementation date: April 2021 BEIS has considered its decision-making processes in relation to investing taxpayers’ money and its appointments process and responded to the Committee in March 2021. The Chair of the Taskforce was appointed for 6 months by a direct ministerial appointment process and was unpaid. The government often appoints industry experts into senior leadership roles as this allows us to access a vast range of skill sets and expertise, which may not always exist within the Civil Service. The government assesses each such appointment on a case-by-case basis; if it is appropriate and there is scope to follow the standard recruitment process, then it does so. As the Committee is aware, a new Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) was recently appointed to the Taskforce, taking over from the previous SRO who has left the civil service. An SRO appointment letter is already in place, confirming the SRO’s accountabilities including to Parliament. As the Committee recognises in its report, it was important for the Taskforce to be able to move quickly to secure vaccines on behalf of the UK population. All decisions regarding government spending were made through the established approval routes. However, to provide enhanced flexibility and agility, a number of process innovations were put in place for approvals relating to the Taskforce’s work. The department has considered these process innovations and believes that they continue to ensure appropriate due diligence, assurance to the Accounting Officer in a delegated funding environment and accountability across the portfolio. The department therefore intends to continue with these improvements to the approvals process in relation to the Taskforce’s work, which range from simple changes such as ensuring the timing of departmental approvals Committee meetings could be flexed at short notice to accommodate developments in the Taskforce’s commercial negotiations, to an increase in the department’s spending and commercial delegations from HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office. A cross-departmental ministerial panel was also set up in agreement with HM Treasury and other departments and brings together Ministers from relevant departments to take the final decisions on major investments made by the programme. The department believes that these process improvements played an important role in enabling robust decision-making at pace while ensuring taxpayer value was protected, and will consider whether these improvements should be replicated in other areas of the department’s work and share experiences and lessons learned with other Whitehall departments. The department will write again to the Committee by the end of April 2021 on its lessons learned for the cross-government emergency response.