Digital services at the border

The Department has failed to identify, acknowledge and be transparent about problems within the Digital Services at the Border programme. Optimism bias about delivery and a failure to be open and transparent about delays left the Department unable to act on accurate information and exposed it to increased costs due to delays in identifying the need to reset the programme. In 2016 the Department made commitments to Parliament that the Digital Services at the Border programme was on track to deliver in 2017. Only in 2019 did the Department accept that it needed to reduce and narrow the scope of the programme to make it more deliverable. The Department put delays and subsequent reduction in scope of the Digital Services at the Border programme down to EU Exit and changes to classification of security data, but it had failed to make any contingency plans for the UK leaving the EU and the changes to classification were in place before the programme started. Recommendation: The Department should report back to the Committee on: • its mechanisms for oversight and assurance of delivery and how it knows whether they are working; • any costs incurred from deviating from the Department’s delivery plans.

The Department’s failure to deliver the Digital Services at the Border programme by March 2019 was caused by a lack of effective leadership, management and oversight. The Department accepts that the Digital Services at the Border programme did not achieve value for money up to 2019, with none of the three 6 Digital Services at the Border systems being delivered as planned. It failed to respond to or address risks that were flagged to the programme board. There have been three Accounting Officers and four Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) since the Digital Services at the Border programme began. The Department now expects the Digital Services at the Border programme SRO to focus full-time on seeing the programme through to delivery. The Department claims to have streamlined its oversight and reporting and says that in future it will hold its programme leaders more closely to account for programme delivery. Recommendation: The Department should set out specifically what it is doing differently in its approach to the DSAB programme to ensure that it is delivered on time to its revised end March 2022 timetable.

The Department has struggled to deliver the core technical components of the Digital Services at the Border programme. The Department has faced repeated problems with the technical aspects of delivery which means it has continued to depend on existing suppliers and extending contracts, with further cost implications. It struggled for several years to find a workable technical solution for storing secret data following the change of data security classification. The Department was also slow to respond to the consequences of EU exit and changes to intelligence requirements. The Department had to suspend its Border Crossing pilot system in March 2020 because it was not stable enough and was only available to frontline staff included in the pilot for 54% of the days it was in operation. The Department has struggled to retain people with the technical skills it requires but tells us it now has a balance between technical and frontline skills with relevant people better able to manage different aspects of the programme. Recommendation: The Department should set out what it has done to resolve the problems it has had with the technical components of the programme and what it will do if these components are not working as intended to the timescales it has planned.

We see a clear risk that the Department will not be able to deliver the programme by the end of March 2022. The Department started its latest rollout of the Border Crossing system on time, but it has so far reached only 300 frontline users at 7 locations out of an intended 7,000 at 56 locations by June 2021. It still has no proof that systems can cope with passenger volumes that existed prior to COVID-19, let alone the 6% annual growth in the volume of passengers it is allowing for above the 140 million people that arrived in the UK annually prior to COVID-19. The Department also plans to include new mobile technology so that Border Force staff covering small ports and airports not included in the Border Crossing rollout will still benefit from the delivery of the Digital Services at the Border programme. Despite recent modest improvements to its risk ratings and achievement against milestones, the Department’s own rating of scope risk was Red as recently as August

The Department’s ambitions for the border and its delivery of practical improvements for users depend upon it coordinating the implementation of the Digital Services at the Border programme with the delivery of several related projects. The Department’s aim to provide UK Border Force staff with better information to make decisions about people crossing the border and to track goods entering and exiting the UK depends on it delivering all elements of the new systems on time. It is also reliant on the delivery of other interdependent projects such as e-gates and port infrastructure upgrades to meet this aim. The Department has significant interdependencies to manage with the Data Futures programme to realise the original Digital Services at the Border programme’s objective of better tracking goods entering and exiting the UK. Recommendation: The Department should set out progress against planned milestones for related programmes, any impacts on frontline Border Force staff and people using border services, and what it is doing to mitigate these impacts. 8 Digital Services at the Border 1 Multiple failures to deliver a digital border

Based on a report by the Comptroller & Auditor General we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department), including from Border Force, on progress with the Digital Services at the Border (DSAB) programme.1

In a May 2016 Treasury Minute response to this Committee, the Department provided Parliament with assurance over several aspects of DSAB. It committed to delivering Advanced Freight Targeting Capability in 2017 and to rolling out Border Crossing nationally by 2017. It did not meet these commitments and had still not delivered these systems when the programme was eventually reset in 2019.13

The Department noted that this was part of a wider pattern whereby those involved with the programme wanted to present a positive direction for the programme to senior management at a time when the programme was struggling in 2017 and 2018.14 This resulted in a failure to be open and transparent about delays.15 As a result, information about the progress of the programme was not passed up the line as required. This led to the Department not deciding to reset the programme until 2019, which in turn has resulted in additional costs.16

The Department suggested that external factors had hindered the programme, noting that new requirements emerged following the EU Exit referendum results in 7 Q 45; C&AG’s report Progress delivering the Emergency Services Network, Session 2017–19, HC 2140, 10 May 2019, Para 5 8 Q 44 9 Q 66 10 Q 49 11 Q 37 12 Qq 66, 67 13 Qq 37, 38; HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes – Government responses on the Twenty–Seventh to the Thirty–Third reports from the Committee of Public Accounts Session 2015–16, Cm 9270, May 2016 14 Q 81 15 Q 67 16 Q 81 10 Digital Services at the Border

The Department acknowledged that by the time of its reset, the programme had not delivered the value for money that had originally been intended. The Department had delivered none of the three systems that it had intended to deliver on time.19 The programme removed two of these systems from the scope in the reset, moving their capability to other programmes within the Department which will deliver later than the Digital Services at the Border Programme.20

Problems with the programme were compounded by instability among its senior leadership. The programme had four different Senior Responsible Owners (SRO) between 2014 and 2020, with the current SRO being the longest serving after just over 2 years in post.21 The Department has also had three Permanent Secretaries during the life of the programme. The Department has acknowledged that previous SROs had other roles outside the programme, reducing their time and focus on the programme. The Department stated that it has changed this situation so that being the SRO on programmes of this size is a full-time role and has committed to seeking greater continuity in the position, with the expectation that the current SRO should stay in post until programme delivery.22

The Department failed to act on risks that were being flagged. The Committee noted that ongoing issues existed but that the Department did not address them, in part because information was not being communicated effectively by the programme team to the wider Department.23 Since the programme reset the Department claims to have streamlined its oversight of the programme, including closer scrutiny by its digital and data programme staff and with monthly reports from the SRO to the Border Force board.24 Difficulties in delivering technical aspects

The Department has faced repeated technical difficulties in delivering the programme. These difficulties have caused delays which in turn have forced the Department to extend existing contracts for legacy systems, at a cost of £145 million between 2019 and 2022.25 This also meant that frontline Border Force staff needed to continue using existing systems in their work and delayed the delivery of benefits to them.26

Some of the technical difficulties involved responding to the external factors that hindered the programme. For example, the Department created the Future Border and Immigration System (FBIS) programme in response to EU Exit which developed six new interfaces with which the DSAB systems needed to connect. In addition, the Department 19 Qq 36, 90 20 Qq 36, 104–105 21 Qq 65, 66 22 Qq 66, 84 23 Q 81 24 Q 70 25 Q 90 26 Q 31 12 Digital Services at the Border explained that it had attempted to collaborate with other departments on storing secret data before eventually accepting the need to build its own data centre.27 These were the main external factors behind the programmes eventual reset.

The programme suspended an attempted roll-out of the Border Crossing system in March 2020.28 The system had difficulty operating reliably at scale, with stability problems causing it to be available for only 54% of the days that it was supposed to be available, and roll-out limitations meaning that it was only available to 783 users out of a required 7,000.29 The programme started the latest roll-out of Border Crossing at the beginning of December after attempting to fix these difficulties. The latest roll-out has so far been available 98% of the time. While this is an improvement on previous performance, the Department has set a requirement of 99.93% to be met by April 2021.30

The Department acknowledged that it has faced strong competition for people with the scarce technical skills required to deliver the programme, including from other government departments. The Department has now designed framework contracts with outside suppliers so that it is the responsibility of the suppliers to provide the right people with the right skills to support the programme.31 To support its skills base the programme has building the working relationship between the Department’s Digital, Data and Technology team and Border Force. The Department stated that this has improved the balance between the technical experts who understand the necessary system requirements and frontline staff who understand the user perspective. The Department is also attempting to improve civil service skills for the long-term.32 27 Qq 39, 40 28 Q 89 29 Q 59; C&AG’s Report, Digital Services at the Border Figure 12 30 Q 59; C&AG’s Report, Digital Services at the Border para 3.8 31 Q 66 32 Qq 66, 74 Digital Services at the Border 13 3 Delivering the reset programme The risk of late delivery

The latest roll-out of Border Crossing started on time at the beginning of December

The Department has outlined plans to ensure Border Crossing systems are available at crossing points other than the 56 major entry points which will have permanent access to the system. The Department stated that this will involve a mobile capability which will allow Border Force officers to access the Border Crossing system temporarily at other entry points when they determine by a risk-based assessment that this is necessary.36 The Department has yet to fully set out its approach to delivering this mobile capability.

There has been some improvement in the risk ratings applied to the programme. The most recent IPA review rated it as amber, having previously been amber-red following the reset. This was in response to improved governance and leadership in line with recommendations from the IPA and from an internal Department review.37 Despite these modest improvements the programme still rated its own scope risk as red as recently as August 2020 after one aspect of programme delivery slipped on its timeline, although it has since returned to amber.38 Coordination with related projects

For the Department to deliver its planned improvements to border security, it is dependent on the quality of the data input into its information systems. This will include new system inputs from European Union countries after Schengen Information System II (SIS II) uploads and records were removed from UK systems following the end of the transition period.39 These inputs will be replaced by uploads and records from Interpol. With either SIS II or Interpol, the UK is dependent on the speed with which other countries upload information onto these systems.40

The Department’s ambitions for the border as a whole and delivery of practical improvements for users require timely delivery of all elements of the new DSAB systems, 33 Qq 58, 59, 85 34 Qq 85,88, 106 35 Q 88 36 Qq 62, 64 37 Q 54 38 Q 56 39 Q 25 40 Qq 24, 25 14 Digital Services at the Border as well as effective interdependencies with systems from other programmes.41 The Department noted the importance of re-platforming Semaphore to allow that system to continue operating. Some of the technology originally developed for DSAB is also being taken forward by the Data Futures programme. The Department expects the key part of the Data Futures programme associated with the original DSAB scope to deliver in 2022–23.42 The Department also needs to integrate the Border Crossing system with e-gates, in order to check passengers using those gates against the new system, as well as upgrade infrastructure including network connections at ports to enable these systems to operate effectively.43

The Department stated that, if the programme is not delivered on time, its contingency is to extend existing contracts with Warnings Index and Semaphore, including using extension clauses in the existing contracts. The Department is seeking to avoid this for two reasons. Firstly, running those existing systems instead of delivering the programme would cost £130 million over 10 years and necessitate reliance on systems that would be very difficult to sustain during that period as the Warnings Index would be over 35 years old by the end of it.44 Secondly, continuing to use the existing systems delays the benefits of the newer systems, which are more user-friendly for staff operating at the border. For example, Border Crossing shows the age of passengers passing through rather than just their date of birth, removing the need for border staff to calculate the age themselves.45 41 Q 111 42 Qq 103, 105, 106 43 Q 92; C&AG’s Report, Digital Services at the Border Para 3.11 44 Qq 100–102 45 Q 31 Digital Services at the Border 15