Recommendations & Conclusions
6 items
4
Conclusion
51st Report - The UK’s F-35 stealth fig…
Acknowledged
Accommodation at RAF Marham is substandard, exacerbating issues with recruitment and retention. Despite the urgent need to address this, upgrades will not be completed under current plans until 2034. RAF Marham has been the main F-35 operating base since 2013, with at least 1,500 people working there on the F-35, …
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Accommodation at RAF Marham is substandard, exacerbating issues with recruitment and retention. Despite the urgent need to address this, upgrades will not be completed under current plans until 2034. RAF Marham has been the main F-35 operating base since 2013, with at least 1,500 people working there on the F-35, many of whom also live in accommodation at the base. The Department accepts that accommodation at RAF Marham is not good enough and that these failings create a risk that people leave the service earlier than they otherwise would. The Department 3 has committed to removing all the worst grades of accommodation, which includes most of the accommodation at RAF Marham, from its sites. But it does not expect to complete this work at RAF Marham until 2034, albeit with some personnel expected to move into the first new block by the end of 2025. The Department claims that earlier investment was not possible because of the need for savings, and that upgrading accommodation at RAF Lossiemouth has been the higher priority. The 2034 date for relatively simple service accommodation construction is very complacent and should be given greater priority. recommendation The Department should urgently look to prioritise investment to bring forward completion of improvements to RAF Marham accommodation on a much earlier timescale than 2034. It should write to the Committee within 6 months as to how it intends to do this.
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed to prioritize improvements to RAF Marham accommodation and committed to reassessing the current timescale against departmental priorities, writing to the Committee by May 2026 to advise if the completion date can be brought forward.
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HM Treasury
5
Conclusion
51st Report - The UK’s F-35 stealth fig…
Acknowledged
The Department has taken a narrow and short-term approach to management and costs and has failed to realistically appraise the programme’s whole-life cost. The Department acknowledges that it reduced the pace of aircraft deliveries to make short-term financial savings at multiple points in the programme, notably in 2010. In 2021 …
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The Department has taken a narrow and short-term approach to management and costs and has failed to realistically appraise the programme’s whole-life cost. The Department acknowledges that it reduced the pace of aircraft deliveries to make short-term financial savings at multiple points in the programme, notably in 2010. In 2021 the Department decided to pause building a sovereign facility for assuring that aircraft retained their stealth capabilities, which is required for its freedom of action policy. The Department similarly delayed providing 809 Naval Air Squadron’s infrastructure by 6 years, increasing costs by almost £100 million. It did so despite knowing it would cost more money in the long-term and create a gap in capability. The Department also failed for many years to significantly update its public whole-life cost, which hardly increased from its 2013 estimate of £18.425 billion covering the first 48 aircraft to the then out of service date of 2048. In response to the 2025 National Audit Office report the MoD published a whole-life cost of almost £57 billion for all 138 aircraft to the new out of service date of 2069. But this still does not include non-equipment costs such as personnel, fuel and infrastructure which are included in the NAO estimate of £71 billion. recommendation The Department should: a. set out in its upcoming Defence Investment Plan the expected long-term impact on costs and capability of any short-term savings measures, on both the F-35 and other major programmes, and b. build on its recent whole-life cost analysis by including all relevant non-equipment costs to give a more complete through-life cost forecast of the programme. 4
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed to include all non-equipment costs in whole-life cost forecasts, stating it already develops such models but accepts there is an opportunity to go further and will strengthen its approach as part of Defence Reform.
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HM Treasury
1
Conclusion
51st Report - The UK’s F-35 stealth fig…
Acknowledged
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department) on its oversight and management of the UK’s F-35 fighter programme.1
Government response AI summary
The government agreed with the committee's implicit recommendation on oversight, stating it will continue to strengthen its approach to defining and approving capability entry-into-service criteria and declaring service entry for new capabilities as part of Defence Reform.
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HM Treasury
10
Conclusion
51st Report - The UK’s F-35 stealth fig…
Acknowledged
The Department also told us that the 2025 CSG deployment, required for FOC declaration, had impacted availability before the deployment and would impact availability for some weeks after the deployment, because of the need for additional maintenance.16 The National Audit Office’s report noted that the impact of the deployment on …
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The Department also told us that the 2025 CSG deployment, required for FOC declaration, had impacted availability before the deployment and would impact availability for some weeks after the deployment, because of the need for additional maintenance.16 The National Audit Office’s report noted that the impact of the deployment on operational readiness might last for several months.17 The flexibility of the training squadron was also impacted by the reduced number of aircraft available in the UK during the deployment.18 In order that FOC actually means what it says careful evaluation is needed in future to avoid premature unsubstantiated announcements. F-35 capability and availability
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Government response AI summary
The department acknowledges the factors affecting aircraft availability and is increasing the number of aircraft engineers, supporting the US-led F-35 Joint Programme Office, and planning further investments in F-35 technical infrastructure.
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HM Treasury
14
Conclusion
51st Report - The UK’s F-35 stealth fig…
Acknowledged
The Department also set out the reasons for poor availability of aircraft. It accepted that shortages of personnel, particularly engineers, impacted aircraft availability, and would continue to do so until they were resolved.30 Furthermore, the Department told us that the Global Support Solution, which supplies spare parts, is being reset …
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The Department also set out the reasons for poor availability of aircraft. It accepted that shortages of personnel, particularly engineers, impacted aircraft availability, and would continue to do so until they were resolved.30 Furthermore, the Department told us that the Global Support Solution, which supplies spare parts, is being reset by the United States so that it 22 Q 120 23 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.22-1.23 24 Qq 85, 104 25 Qq 109, 130 26 Qq 129-130 27 Qq 120-121 28 Q 109 29 Q 113; C&AG’s report, para 2.10 30 Q 104 9 can improve availability.31 The rates at which UK aircraft are unavailable because they are undergoing maintenance or waiting for spare parts are significantly higher than the target set by the global programme.32 31 Q 130 32 C&AG’s Report, para 1.27 10 2 F-35 personnel and accommodation Personnel
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Government response AI summary
The department is increasing the number of aircraft engineers to align with Force readiness requirements, and is supporting the US-led F-35 Joint Programme Office in efforts to reset the Global Support Solution to improve performance and increase spares availability. The department is planning further investments …
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HM Treasury
26
Conclusion
51st Report - The UK’s F-35 stealth fig…
Acknowledged
In 2013 the Department set out a whole-life cost for the F-35 programme of £18.4 billion, although this only covered the first 48 aircraft out of the 138 that the UK has announced it intends to buy. Before the publication of the National Audit Office report in 2025 this figure …
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In 2013 the Department set out a whole-life cost for the F-35 programme of £18.4 billion, although this only covered the first 48 aircraft out of the 138 that the UK has announced it intends to buy. Before the publication of the National Audit Office report in 2025 this figure had only increased to £18.76 billion and had not taken account of the changed out-of-service date from 2048 to 2069.57 The Department has since published a whole-life cost for 138 aircraft out to 2069 of £57 billion. In correspondence provided after our evidence session the Department stated that this figure was based on the A variant for the final 63 aircraft, which is cheaper than the B variant, and that it does not include related costs such as personnel, infrastructure and fuel.58 The National Audit Office calculated that if these related costs were included the whole-life cost would be £71 billion.59
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Government response AI summary
The department will continue to strengthen its approach to whole life cost modelling as part of the work that is being taken forward under Defence Reform. The department already develops whole life cost models that extend beyond equipment costs, for example covering personnel and infrastructure …
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HM Treasury