Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Thomas Huntley

Ref: 2023-0461 Date: 14 May 2023 Coroner: Robert Simpson Area: Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

Prison staff failed to comply with mandatory ACCT procedures and lacked understanding of risk factors, indicating poor training and audit quality. Inadequate information sharing between healthcare and prison systems also posed significant risks.

Date 14 May 2023
56-day deadline 17 Jan 2024 est.
Responses identified 1 of 1
State Custody related deaths Suicide (from 2015)

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Prison staff failed to comply with mandatory ACCT procedures and lacked understanding of risk factors, indicating poor training and audit quality. Inadequate information sharing between healthcare and prison systems also posed significant risks.
View full coroner's concerns
ACCT documents In evidence at the inquest ACCT assessors and case managers accepted that they had not complied with various mandatory actions required under PSI 64/2011: Managing Prisoner Safety in Custody. They were not able to identify in evidence the risk factors it was mandatory to consider for persons at risk of suicide or self-harm. They had not recorded triggers in the relevant section of the ACCT nor recorded all risk factors in the Caremap section. One ACCT case manager stated that they did not know whether it was necessary to record a trigger if action had been taken to mitigate it. They also stated they categorised risk based on ‘remaining’ risk after action had been taken despite having not recorded the trigger. This leads me to have 2 concerns: The first regards the provision and quality of ACCT training and refresher training given this evidence was given some 2 years after the death of Mr Huntley and well after the disruptions brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic. I also heard evidence that despite an ACCT being a ‘whole prison’ document (which can and should be opened by any member of staff) training was not mandatory for non-security staff. In 2019 there was no joint training for prison and heathcare staff on the use of ACCT documents. I am informed by CNWL that under ACCT v6 (which has been in force since July 2021) joint training is provided for and this is reassuring. However I understand that the frequency of this training is determined in relation to operational capacity at individual establishment level. This is of concern given the evidence from witnesses at this inquest some 20 months after this version came into force. The second relates to the quality and effectiveness of ACCT audits. We heard evidence that ACCT documents are reviewed annually. The case manager mentioned above advised that he had not received any adverse feedback about the quality of his ACCT documents and no issues with them had been identified. Given the inadequate nature of the ACCT document opened on Mr Huntley and apparent lack of understanding about completing the documents the quality of the audits is brought into question. Information sharing. In evidence it was clear that the ACCT document was the only written document used for sharing information between the healthcare staff employed by the NHS trust and the prison security staff. Healthcare staff record and share their information within SystemOne which the prison security staff do not have access to. Prison security staff record information within NOMIS which healthcare staff do not have access to. Evidence from witnesses revealed that these information systems are not necessarily fully reviewed for relevant information prior to attending ACCT meetings. In addition a decision relating to Mr Huntley’s care (i.e. the move to a different cell) was taken by healthcare staff at their own meeting when they did not have the benefit of information available to prison staff. of HMP Winchester informed me that a Safety Intervention Meeting was now carried out weekly, chaired by a Senior Governor and attended by representatives of the prison, physical and mental health care providers and the probation service. This meeting covers each person subject to an ACCT and any relevant information is share via the ACCT case manager, NOMIS and the multi disciplinary team. could not assist me with whether this was a HMP Winchester initiative or had a wide application across the prison estate. My concern is therefore that the current procedures and policies for sharing information are incomplete or not fully complied with. This renders the information on which separate teams make decisions about a prisoner incomplete and increases the risk that important factors are not considered. Cells At HMP Winchester within the area, considered and referred to by most healthcare and prison staff, as the ‘mental health’ cells there are 2 cells which are not equipped in a way to reduce the amount of available ligature points. It was clear from the evidence of the healthcare staff at the MDT meeting on the 28/05/2020 that they did not consider the contents of the cell when deciding to move Mr Huntley to the ‘mental health cells’ simply due to the fact he was on an ACCT. I heard evidence that the policy of CNWL has now changed and that a cell move risk assessment must now be carried out and that there is now a revised ligature audit process. HMP Winchester informed me that there is now an annual ligature audit carried out in conjunction with the new healthcare provider at that establishment. In addition I was informed that all telephone points in the ‘mental health cells’ at HMP Winchester have now been removed and placed outside the cells. These are welcome developments. However at inquest those representing the HMPPS could not inform me whether all telephone points within cells designed for use by those at risk of self harm across the prison estate had been removed. Nor was any evidence available as to what consideration had been given to reducing the risk of the telephone points by design of the points themselves or the manner of their installation. Those representing were invited to provide this information after the hearing but have not done so. I am concerned that telephone points which provide a ligature point may remain within cells which prison and health care staff consider to be suitable for use by those at risk of self harm. The final area of concern is the lack of certified Safer Cells at HMP Winchester. The inquest heard evidence that these had either never existed at HMP Winchester or had not done so for many years. The evidence from prison governors was that, generally speaking within the prison estate, they were not used or proved too hard to maintain to the certified standard. However certified Safer Cells are still referred to in PSI 64/2011 as a means of managing risk from ligatures. It was heard in evidence that HMP Winchester experience high levels of self-harm and suicide and yet it did not appear that consideration had been given recently to introducing these. Those representing the HMPSS at the were invited to provide information about the status and use of safer certified cells across the prison estate. No such information has been forthcoming. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you (and/or your organisation) have the power to take such action.

Responses

1 respondent
HM Prison and Probation Service Central Government
22 Aug 2023 PDF
Action Taken

HMP Winchester delivers monthly ACCT v6 and SASH training, reviews staff training needs, reinforces ACCT procedures, facilitates multi-disciplinary discussions, and reviews the use of SIM forms. A review of ligature-resistant cells is also underway nationally. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Simpson,

Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 7 June 2023 following the inquest into the death of Thomas Huntley at HMP Winchester which concluded on the 3 April 2023. This report was received on the 27 June 2023 and I am grateful to you for agreeing the 56 day for the response from the date of receipt.

I know that you will share a copy of this response with Mr Huntley’s family, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority.

You have expressed concerns around the Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) procedures and training, information sharing and safer cells at HMP Winchester. I will respond to each concern in the order that they were raised.

It is essential that ACCT Version 6 (v6) procedures are understood and undertaken by all members of staff working within prisons, including healthcare colleagues, and that staff feel confident in recognising an increase in risk and are aware of the need to record all required information within the ACCT document, including any triggers. ACCT v6 and SASH training includes guidance on understanding and assessing the risks and triggers of self-harm, the ACCT process and supporting individuals who self-harm while they are subject to monitoring.

HMP Winchester is currently delivering monthly training and awareness sessions for all staff which incorporates both ACCT v6 and SASH training. The Group Safety Team attend HMP Winchester regularly to assist with this and to deliver further support for staff around ACCT procedures. Staff training requirements have been reviewed and a training plan is currently in place which allows the ongoing training levels to be monitored with the current target for all staff to have received the required training by the end of 2023.

All establishments are required to have an ACCT quality assurance process in place that ensures that quality assurance is carried out at a level and frequency that enables meaningful insight into how effectively support through ACCT is being implemented. At HMP Winchester, quality

assurance checks take place at three main stages. The first takes place within 48 hours from the opening of the ACCT, conducted by the Safety Team, assessing the effectiveness of the immediate steps taken and quality of the documentation. The second check is by the Custodial Manager who checks the ongoing record and the case reviews, ensuring that entries are detailed and meaningful, and whether previously identified actions or identified concerns continue to be taken into account and built on. Following ACCT closure, the Safety Team then review the full ACCT document including the seven day post closure monitoring procedure and the post closure reviews.

Following Mr Huntley’s death, HMP Winchester undertook a review of the quality assurance checks in place to ensure these are being completed appropriately, and which resulted in the implementation of a system for accountability which has robust procedures to follow up any identified concerns and promote effective practice throughout the staff group. All findings of the quality assurance checks are now fed back to the relevant staff to recognise best practice and highlight the need for improvement. The Safety Custodial Manager monitors the feedback and any serious concerns are rectified immediately.

You have also raised concerns around the current procedures and policies for sharing information. Some prisoners supported through ACCT may have particularly challenging needs that mean an escalation path for additional support is required. The Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM) is a multi-disciplinary safety risk management meeting, chaired by the Senior Management Team (SMT), providing support and multi-disciplinary guidance to Case Coordinators and case review teams. This may include reviewing and recommending actions to reduce risk, discussing alternative interventions within a more senior multi-disciplinary forum, and arranging for more senior members of staff to participate in ACCT Case Reviews if necessary. The SIM forms part of the national policy requirement on all prisons, to ensure that any prisoners who present a significant level of risk or complexity can be referred for enhanced support.

While SystmOne, the electronic system used by healthcare staff to record medical information cannot be accessed by operational staff for reasons of medical confidentiality, the appropriate sharing of information is encouraged through a range of methods, for example the morning operational meeting is multi-disciplinary and allows all those working with individuals to provide updates and ensure necessary information is shared. The Daily Briefing sheet and wing observation books are also vital tools to ensure all staff are aware of concerns regarding a prisoner.

The final concern raised relates to ligature points in cells. HMPPS is currently undertaking a review of ligature-resistant cells, which have been designed to eliminate ligature points as far as possible. The review has included the cell build standards and how they are used to support prisoners in crisis. Our aim is to ensure that cells that are fitted with ligature-resistant features are available as an option for staff managing prisoners in crisis, and that they retain those features in full working order and do not deviate from the standard over time. At this point it is too early to say what new rules may be introduced, such as setting the frequency of maintenance, although we do recognise that cells are subject to constant wear and tear and need frequent attention to keep them up to standard.

Thank you again for bringing your concerns to my attention. I trust that this response provides assurance that action is being taken to address these matters.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 02 June 2020 an investigation was commenced into the death of Thomas Victor HUNTLEY (aged 54) who had died in HMP Winchester. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 05 April 2023. The inquest, which was held with a jury, ended with a narrative conclusion. The medical cause of death was 1(a) hanging. The jury concluded, amongst other matters, that: (a) Relevant information about Mr Huntley, namely information from the recall notification and previous ‘Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork’ (ACCT) documents, was not recorded on NOMIS. (b) The risk level recorded in the ACCT document opened on the 23/05/2020 did not reflect a higher level of risk indicated by witness evidence and neither did it align with the guidance on risk levels contained within that document. This caused or contributed to Mr Huntley’s death. (c) There was a failure to record triggers for self-harm behaviour in the ACCT document. There was a failure to record all relevant risks within the ‘Caremap’ section of the ACCT document. These factors contributed to the death of Mr Huntley. (d) The level of observations under the ACCT document opened on the 23/05/2020 were not adequate based on the level of risk Mr Huntley posed to himself. This caused or contributed to his death.
Circumstances of the death
Mr Huntley was recalled to prison on the 23/05/2020. Whilst in the community Mr Huntley had been under the care of Steps to Wellbeing for PTSD and anxiety. He had disclosed daily suicidal thoughts to them with no intent to act upon these thoughts. The recall notification of the 22/5/20 stated that Mr Huntley reported low mood and claimed to want to take his own life but was not brave enough to do so. This information from the recall notice was not recorded in the record keeping system which could be accessed by all prison security staff (NOMIS). Mr Huntley denied thoughts of suicide or self-harm when asked by the police on the 23/02/2020. During the reception process at HMP Winchester he denied thoughts of suicide or self-harm. On the 25/05/2020 Mr Huntley called for help . He later disclosed that this had been a planned act with the intent to end his own life. He had taken steps to avoid being discovered and had only called for help when he awoke . Mr Huntley was subsequently taken to hospital and discharged later the same morning. Having left hospital he collapsed and was admitted to the Healthcare wing of the prison for observations. An ACCT document was opened. This is a way of monitoring persons in custody who are at risk of harm. During previous periods of imprisonment in 2010 and 2016 ACCT documents had been opened for Mr Huntley. These documents were not contained within in core records as should have been the case and still cannot be located. Their existence, and the circumstances of the 2016 ACCT, were recorded on NOMIS. Mr Huntley was initially placed on 30-minute observations when the 2023 ACCT was opened, this was reduced to hourly observations after the first case review on the 25/05/2020 and then to 3 random observations overnight after the second case review on the 27/05/2020. These changes were made following assessment meetings involving Mr Huntley, prison staff and staff from the NHS Trust providing physical and mental health interventions within the prison. Mr Huntley denied further thoughts of self-harm or suicide during these meetings. On the 28/05/2020 Mr Huntley was moved from his original cell in the healthcare wing to cell
13. Cell 13 was located in the area of the healthcare unit primarily used for patients with mental health difficulties. Apart from cells 6 and 13 all of the cells in this area were designed to have reduced ligature points. However in 2019 telephone points had been installed in each of these cells which protruded from the wall. The decision to move Mr Huntley was made at a Multi-disciplinary meeting at which no-one who had met Mr Huntley to assess his mental health was present. On the evening of the 28/05/20 the night duty prison officer completed their rounds at approximately 20.30 and noted that Mr Huntley was sat on the floor of his cell in a partial blind spot. Between 21.00 and 21.30 the nurse on duty knocked on Mr Huntley’s cell door and received a verbal response. At about 23.30 the prison officer attended to complete the first observations required under the ACCT document for Mr Huntley. They saw that Mr Huntley was in the same position as some 3 hours earlier and Mr Huntley did not respond to him. The officer entered the cell with other prison officers at about 23.35 and found Mr Huntley sat motionless

. The prison officers cut the ligature and commenced CPR. An emergency call was put out and further prison officers and both on-duty nurses attended. Those present provided CPR to Mr Huntley until the arrival of paramedics. Sadly despite the efforts of staff and the attending medics Mr Huntley could not be revived and his life was declared extinct.

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Report details

Reference
2023-0461
Date of report
14 May 2023
Coroner
Robert Simpson
Coroner area
Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 17 Jan 2024 (estimated).

Sent to

HM Prison and Probation Service

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