Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Ida Lock

Ref: 2025-0155 Date: 21 Mar 2025 Coroner: James Adeley Area: Lancashire & Blackburn with Darwen Responses identified: 4 / 4 View PDF

The Trust suffers from a deep-seated lack of candour, transparency, and deficient clinical governance, resulting in a failure to learn from past incidents, unreliable data, and inadequate reporting of serious harms.

Date 21 Mar 2025
56-day deadline 16 May 2025 est.
Responses identified 4 of 4
Child Death (from 2015) Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The Trust suffers from a deep-seated lack of candour, transparency, and deficient clinical governance, resulting in a failure to learn from past incidents, unreliable data, and inadequate reporting of serious harms.
View full coroner's concerns
I have considered all the documents, evidence and information that the Trust has provided as to current systems and ways of working and yet I am still not satisfied that the Trust has addressed the significant concerns I have.

Tel: (01772) 536536 A: Culture of Candour [Trust, ICB and DHSC]
1. I am concerned that there is not a culture of candour within University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Trust) and the impact that this has on safety, learning and implementing required changes to prevent deaths. Urgent action is required by the Trust to meaningfully embed the Dury of Candour
2. 's evidence to the inquest was that a deep-seated and endemic culture within the Trust leads to denial and a failure to learn. ’s Investigation report was published in 2015, the Trust is ten years on and still issues and themes identified in 2015 were very much in issue in 2019 and still exist at the Trust as identified by Ida’s inquest.
3. The Trust's approach to the inquest has been one of a lack of transparency and openness, failure to provide relevant information and a failure to identify with candour the defective clinical governance processes that have operated at the Trust from 2019 to present day.
4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via STEIS and the Trust's internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust's Patient Safety Summits .The matter was reported to the Coroner a year after Ida's death by the family after the Trust took no action to do so, despite being on notice of failures in treatment from the HSIB report Ida’s harm was at no point categorised by the Trust as a harm event that caused “death”.
5. Trust figures to the Board provided in 2025 stated that there were no complaints over 6 months old when the Trust at the time of the inquest have not responded to and ’s 1 June 2020 complaint., Together

Tel: (01772) 536536

with the Trust's failure to categorise Ida's death as only "Moderate Harm" (see point 4 above) cause me also to have concern about the reliability of Trust's data.

B: Clinical Governance and Maternity Governance [Trust, ICB and DHSC]
6. I consider the clinical governance arrangements at the Trust require urgent review to ensure the appropriate personnel are in place, with the necessary training and skills to deliver robust clinical governance to ensure patient safety in maternity care.
7. As a result of the Trust's deficient processes, the Trust did not undertake any examination of its own clinical governance processes, which were a principle area of concern and which was identified to the Trust five months before the inquest commenced. The Trust's clinical governance arrangements were extracted piecemeal during the course of the inquest. The deficiencies included lack of version control and audit of documents, untrained staff, chaotic clinical governance arrangements, defensive attitudes and inappropriate self-congratulation. The clinicians' reports to the inquest only answered the questions they were asked rather than trying to assist with a holistic view of the evidence, did not provide relevant information until it was extracted from the witness in testimony, that resulted in rolling disclosure of documents and additional witness evidence. This approach caused additional distress to the family who had to sit through an extended court hearing to address these issues
8. is now Head of Compliance and Assurance at the Trust but that there has been no investigation into her role in respect of reneging on the Trust's acceptance of the HSIB report at senior management level and with the family as was indicated by her approval of the July 2021 position statement. Similarly, is now Head of Midwifery at the Trust and there has been no investigation in respect of her disputing the HSIB findings and submission of challenge to the HSIB report in Ida’s case.

Tel: (01772) 536536
9. All investigations conducted by the Trust to date in respect of Ida’s death have been unskilled, superficial, brief, failed to identify issues and left the family without answers and were all features identified by the 2015 Kirkup Report. In view of the continuing culture at the Trust, this cause a significant concern that issues of safety and safeguarding are not properly considered, transparently engaged with and then addressed formally in respect of a child fatality and serious injury by the Trust.
10. The Trust's clinical governance capability has been the subject of repeated and often severe criticism in the Flynn Review 2009, Fielding Report 2010, Central Manchester Hospital Report 2011, Price Waterhouse Cooper 2012 and Kirkup Report 2015. in his evidence to the inquest said that the Trust focus on process, which means that you can comply with the process requirements and still produce an inadequate investigation, rather than focussing on outcome, which measures the quality of the investigation and the patient experience. noted that the Trusts culture impeded transparent and open investigation. I am told that the Trust now uses the PSIRF model and is to appoint 3 whole time equivalent Response Leads by 30 September 2025. However, I remain concerned that the Trust has not fully engaged with the duty of candour such that I am not satisfied that the work on PSIRF to date has truly addressed the issues in respect of Trust’s investigations. C: Mandatory Training, expired training and remedial training [Trust and ICB]
11. The Band 5 midwife supporting in Labour had not undertaken her required mandatory training and this fact had not been provided and was only revealed at the inquest as part of the evidence of the Head of Midwifery in March 2025. I was also concerned to learn that in 2025 non-completion of mandatory training was still an issue as had not completed her mandatory training.

Tel: (01772) 536536
12. It concerns me that the Trust do not have robust systems in place to ensure that any midwife who has not completed her mandatory training is subject to immediate action to ensure that all mandatory training is completed and is in date.
13. There was no remedial training was put in place for either the midwives involved in Ida's delivery and resuscitation or for the paediatric SHO after Ida’s death. This raises a significant concern that the Trust do not operate a system of remedial training when this inquest has identified remedial training was required for , , and . D: Grading of harm for incident reporting: Babies who have sustained hypoxic brain injury and undergo cooling [Trust, ICB, DHSC, NHSE, ]
14. The Trust graded Ida’s level of harm as “moderate”, even after her death. This grading should have been adjusted to "severe" by the Trust before Ida was transferred to Royal Preston Hospital as the consultant paediatrician identified that she had sustained a severe hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy due to fetal bradycardia.
15. The 2024 NHSE Learn from patient safety events (LFPSE) guidance that replaced the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) confirms that the recording and analysis of patient safety events that occur in healthcare support the NHS to improve learning from patient safety events to help make care safer. There is a significant risk that if reporting is graded on harm alone, clinical care that resulted in hypoxic brain damage during delivery and which was prevented by therapeutic cooling, will not adequately identify the problems that caused the harm during the delivery.
16. confirmed that nationally there is inconsistency in categorisation of harm for babies who sustain a hypoxic injury due to fetal bradycardia in labour and who require cooling and clarification guidance would assist prevent further

Tel: (01772) 536536 maternity deaths and ensure full and proper investigation of hypoxic injuries sustained in labour. E: Funding for MSNI [DHSC and , NHSE and ICB]
17. But for the HSIB investigation report into Ida’s death admitted that Ida’s death due to failures by the Trust would never have come to light or resulted in an inquest.
18. The MSNI is now hosted by the CQC with funding secured for the next two years but no certainty as to ongoing funding after this date. These independent investigations by specialist skilled investigators into the most serious of events is an essential safeguard to the lives of mothers and unborn children.
19. Without an assurance that funding will continue beyond 2027 I am concerned that significant harm events to mothers and babies and deaths such as Ida's will go unrecorded and lessons that should be learned to prevent future maternal and baby deaths will go unnoticed, and there will be a risk of future maternity deaths.

Responses

4 respondents
DHSC and NHSE
21 Mar 2025 PDF
Action Planned

NHS England discusses reports to prevent future deaths in a working group and escalates risks nationally through committees, referencing the Three year delivery plan for maternity and neonatal services and the Maternity and Neonatal Safety Improvement Programme. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Coroner, Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Ida Jean Lock who died on 16 November 2019

Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 21 March 2025 concerning the death of Ida Jean Lock on 16 November 2019. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deep condolences to Ida’s parents and family. NHS England are keen to assure the family and the Coroner that the concerns raised about Ida’s and Sarah’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.

I am grateful for the further time granted to respond to your Report, and I apologise for any anguish this delay may have caused to Ida’s parents and wider family. I realise that responses to Coroners’ Reports can form part of the important process of family coming to terms with what has happened, and I appreciate this will have been an incredibly difficult time for them.

Your Report concludes that “Ida was a normal child whose death was caused by a lack of oxygen during her delivery that occurred due to the gross failure of the three midwives attending her to provide basic medical care to deliver Ida urgently when it was apparent she was in distress and contributed to by the lead midwife‘s wholly incompetent failure to provide basic neonatal resuscitation for Ida during the first 3 1/2 minutes of her life that further contributed to Ida's brain damage from which she died on 16 November 2019 at the Royal Preston Hospital neonatal intensive care unit.” In your Report you listed several concerns about Ida’s death, and listed the organisations you expected to respond to each concern: A. Culture of Candour (Trust, ICB, DHSC) B. Clinical Governance and Maternity Governance (Trust, ICB and DHSC) C. Mandatory Training, expired training and remedial training (Trust and ICB) D. Grading of harm for incident reporting: Babies who have sustained hypoxic brain injury and undergo cooling (Trust, ICB, DHSC, NHSE, Mr Streeting) Co-National Medical Director NHS England Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG

12 June 2025

E. Funding for Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations (MNSI) (DHSC and Mr Streeting, NHSE and ICB)

My response therefore focuses on concern D and E. I note that you have also addressed this report to University Hospitals Morecombe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (UHMBT) and NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (LSC ICB). These organisations will address specifics as to the changes being implemented as a result of the Report. NHS England’s response to you is also made on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), and I understand that they will not therefore be issuing a separate response to the Coroner. With DHSC input, I have also addressed in this response some of your concerns regarding A and B.

Grading of Harm

You concluded that in terms of grading of harm, the Trust graded Ida’s level of harm as ‘moderate’, even after Ida’s death, and this grading should have been adjusted to ‘severe’ as the consultant paediatrician at the time identified Ida had a severe hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy when transferred to Royal Preston Hospital. You also reference the 2024 Learn from Patient Safety Events (LFPSE) guidance which replaced the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) and the significant risk that if reporting is graded on harm alone, clinical care that resulted in hypoxic brain damage during delivery, and which was prevented by therapeutic cooling, would not adequately identify the problems that caused the harm during the delivery. Finally, you also mention that evidence was given of inconsistency nationally in the application of categorisation of harm for babies who sustain hypoxic injury due to fetal bradycardia, particularly where cooling has occurred. You confirm that clarification would assist in the prevention of further maternity deaths and ensure full and proper investigations are carried out.

At the time of Ida’s birth in 2019, the older patient safety systems of NRLS and the Serious Incident Framework (SIF) were in place in the majority of Trusts across England. LFPSE’s full implementation to Trusts occurred in 2024 shortly after the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) which was introduced on a transitional basis across NHS Trusts between August 2022 and Autumn 2023. The application of PSIRF principles is mandatory for all health services contracted under the NHS Standard Contract. The new system and framework represent a significant shift in the way the NHS responds to patient safety incidents and marks a shift towards more compassionate, learning-focused approach, which is a key part of The NHS Patient Safety Strategy.

The introduction of LFPSE sought to move away from a focus on purely categorical fields and provide greater opportunity for organisations to review the content of narrative description in their patient safety reporting and explore all aspects of care that may contributed to harm. Whilst harm grading is present as an important indicator by the reporter, strong governance processes within a Trust should provide multiple

points at which this grading can be challenged and changed by others outside of the department.

To support the new system and framework, NHS England has published guidance on recording patient safety events and levels of harm (updated in October 2024) - NHS England » Policy guidance on recording patient safety events and levels of harm. For example, severe physical harm is defined as when at least one of the following apply:
• permanent harm/permanent alteration of the physiology
• needed immediate life-saving clinical intervention
• is likely to have reduced the patient’s life expectancy
• needed or is likely to need additional inpatient care of more than 2 weeks and/or more than 6 months of further treatment
• has, or is likely to have, exacerbated or hastened permanent or long term (greater than 6 months) disability, of their existing health conditions
• has limited or is likely to limit the patient’s independence for 6 months or more.

If we were to apply the new guidance and new framework from 2024 to the information reported at the time of Ida’s birth in 2019, as she required resuscitation immediately after birth, this should have been categorised as ‘severe harm’ as she required “immediate life-saving clinical intervention”. I therefore confirm that under the new framework and reporting system, Ida’s grading of harm would be recorded as ‘severe’.

As you will be aware, national maternity investigations were established in 2018 as part of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB). From October 2023, this is now the Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations (MNSI) programme hosted by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The criteria for an MNSI investigation in early neonatal deaths of term babies (within the first week of life), of any cause, includes: -

• Severe brain injury: diagnosed as occurring in the first 7 days of life, when the baby— (i) was therapeutically cooled (active cooling only), or (ii) has been diagnosed with moderate to severe encephalopathy, consisting of altered state of consciousness (lethargy, stupor or coma) and at least one of the following: (aa) hypotonia; (bb) abnormal reflexes including oculomotor or pupillary abnormalities; (cc) absent or weak suck; (dd) clinical seizures) This means that if similar circumstances to what happened with Ida occurred today, an independent investigation by MNSI should be triggered separate to any local Trust patient safety investigation or assessment. This will be further supported by the roll-out of the new Maternity Outcomes Signal System (MOSS). This system will use Trust Electronic Patient Records to show term stillbirths, neonatal deaths up to 28 days from birth and term Hypoxic Ischaemic Encephalopathy (HIE) at grade 2/3 for all maternity providers, to be used as a signalling system for Trusts when there are clusters or an increased number of

incidents. MOSS is currently in the pilot phase, but is due to be launched in November / December 2025.

Funding for Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations (MNSI) You concluded that MSNI is currently hosted by CQC with funding secured for the next two years and without assurance that funding will continue beyond 2027, you were concerned that significant harm events to mothers and babies and deaths such as Ida’s will go unrecorded and lessons that should be learned to prevent future maternal and baby deaths would go unnoticed, and there will be a risk of future maternity deaths. NHS England acknowledges the importance of, and rigour required, when undertaking these investigations and the specialist skills of the investigators. As you may be aware, the Prime Minister recently announced his intention for the abolishment of NHS England, and a transfer of many of our functions into the DHSC. It is expected that this process will be completed within a two-year timeframe. The DHSC have engaged with us on the concerns raised in your Report and have advised us to share the following with you: ‘The Government is committed to ensuring that all women and babies receive safe, personalised and compassionate care. A key part of this is ensuring we have a strong and robust approach to investigations which ensures both the appropriate level of scrutiny into individual cases and that learning is fed back into the system to prevent future harm to mothers and babies. The work of organisations such as the Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations Programme (MNSI) is therefore critical. The MNSI programme forms part of a wider maternity investigatory landscape, with maternal and perinatal deaths also being investigated by Perinatal Mortality Reviews (supported by the Perinatal Mortality Review Tool (PMRT)) and the MBRRACE-UK Programme. MNSI was initially established for a time-limited period, with a review planned to identify opportunities for improvement and assess whether the programme’s existing investigatory scope is fit for purpose. To support this review, the DHSC has commissioned an evaluation of the PMRT and MNSI programmes via the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR). The evaluation is exploring whether MNSI investigations and PMRT reviews have resulted in system-level quality improvements in maternity care and improved outcomes for parents and families. Further detail on the evaluation can be found at Maternity Investigations and Review Tools process evaluation (MATREP) - NIHR Funding and Awards. The Department will also take into account other feedback, for example from families and from this and other PFD reports.’ Duty of Candour Whilst you have not asked NHS England to address this matter of concern in your Report, you have indicated that a response from DHSC is welcome. DHSC have commissioned a response from NHS England, who confirm:

As you will be aware, the statutory duty of candour organisationally places a direct obligation upon NHS Trusts and all other health and social care providers registered with the CQC to be open and honest with patients, service users and their families, when a notifiable patient safety incident occurs. The Government supports the review on the duty it inherited from previous administration and will consider the findings, published on 26 November 2024. The Government will consider these findings alongside findings from the ongoing NHS manager regulation consultation as it continues to develop policy on candour in healthcare. The Department’s aim is to ensure the NHS can better meet the objectives of the statutory duty of candour and work with patients as partners to support a culture of learning and continuous improvement. Maternity Governance

Whilst you have not asked NHS England to address these matters of concern in your Report, you have indicated that a response would be welcome from DHSC. As this response is to incorporate DHSC’s response to your Report as well, I would also like to provide some assurances to the Coroner regarding maternity governance following engagement with and input from my regional clinical quality colleagues in the North West.

At Trust level

The Trust has been receiving support from the National Maternity Safety Support Programme (MSSP) and has been part of the MSSP programme following a Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspection of maternity services in 2021.

In regard to the Trust improvements of maternity services, the MSSP completed a full diagnostic assessment, which identified several areas for improvement including governance, maternity strategy and vision and leadership. Having delivered required improvements, the Trust entered a sustainability phase of the MSSP (which aims to ensure improvements can be sustained) in October 2023. A reset and review meeting was held in May 2025 and it was agreed that assurance visits were required to test the sustainability and ensure that changes have been embedded. These assurance visits are planned for July 2025, and exiting of the programme will be based on the findings of these site visits. With regard to next steps, once the Trust exits the MSSP they will enter enhanced oversight and gain support from LSC ICB’s Local Maternity and Neonatal Systems (LMNS) (subject to change based on the current ICB restructure). The details of the level of support and oversight is currently in development.

Internally, the Trust have also undertaken a review of maternity governance, which has included the following:
• An organisation reconfiguration in July 2024. Maternity, neonatal and gynaecology services have moved to the Surgical Care Group, to strengthen support mechanisms.

• The Director of Midwifery continues to have a direct line to the Chief Nurse and will continue to report to the Board.
• A number of recent leadership changes within maternity have taken place and they now have a substantive leadership team.
• The maternity governance architecture has been further strengthened by the establishment of a Maternity/Neonatal Improvement Group to monitor the MSSP improvement plan. The reporting structure ensures the Trust’s board receive regular reports and contact with the Director of Midwifery.
• Embedding a culture of openness and humility evidenced through the improvement in their National Education and Training Survey results for both midwifery and obstetrics and engagement with the national maternity score survey.
• All elements of the improvement journey and exit criteria will be further tested in all maternity settings via a MSSP quality visit which is planned over three days in July 2025.

At Regional/National Level

NHS England North West (NW), has developed a Management of Patient Safety Incidents Standard Operating Procedure (April 2024), which ensures escalation of the maternity incidents of serious concern to the NW Regional Maternity Team. The ICB are responsible for escalating concerns, which are shared directly with the regional maternity team. The regional maternity team receive, monitor, and share escalation through the regional governance architecture. By extreme exception (s), the significant concerns are escalated to the National Chief Midwifery Officer and the National Obstetric Lead within NHS England.

In addition, the region has Perinatal Surveillance Group in place, which is attended by multi-stakeholder group such as the LMNS and external arm’s length bodies, which enables to provides a timely identification and escalation of concerns and subsequent action(s).

Regional escalation of maternity risks and concerns to the NHS England national team takes place through the maternity-specific Quality and Performance Committee, and into the National Executive Quality Group. Any Trust requiring additional support, such as UHMBT, can access a Recovery Support Programme meeting where improvement and challenges are discussed, and further support requirements are agreed. In March 2023, NHS England also published its Three year delivery plan for maternity and neonatal services, setting out how we would make care for babies, women and their familiar safer, more personalised and more equitable. An update on the first year of the plan was published in May 2024. The plan is supported by the work of the Maternity and Neonatal Safety Improvement Programme which aims to reduce the rates of maternal and neonatal deaths, stillbirths and brain injuries that occur during or soon after birth by 50% by 2025.

I would also like to provide further assurances on national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Ida, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.

Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB Integrated Care Board
14 May 2025 PDF
Action Taken

NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB outlines measures in place to monitor compliance, including the reporting and escalation process and also that the North-West Regional Chief Midwife is developing Maternity Guidance and Principles with the aim to ensure there is a consistent approach in the identification and reporting of incidents. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Dr Adeley

Regulation 28: Report To Prevent Future Deaths – Ida Jean Lock Conclusion of inquest 21 March 2025

Thank you for your letter dated 21 March 2025 sent following the conclusion of the inquest touching the death of Ida Jean Lock.

I know that you will share my response with Ida’s parents, and I first want to express my deep condolences to them along with a sincere apology for the added distress they have suffered as a result of the failure in clinical governance processes within University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay Trust.

NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (ICB) are keen to assure the family and the coroner that the concerns raised about the care and clinical governance processes have been listened to, carefully reflected on and appropriately actioned.

Through the Regulation 28 report you have raised a number of matters of concern relating to the care that Ida and her mother received and clinical governance processes/practices in University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay Trust. This letter is in response to these issues, and I will respond to each matter raised separately.

A: Culture of Candour

1. There is not a culture of candour within University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Trust) and the impact that this has on safety, learning and implementing required changes to prevent deaths. Urgent action is required by the Trust to meaningfully embed the Dury of Candour. Being open and transparent with our population when something has gone wrong within healthcare is a priority nationally, regionally and locally. Measures are in place to monitor compliance with Duty of Candour through the NHS Standard Contract however Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (LSC ICB) also receive updates from the Trust around compliance with Duty of Candour through the Trusts Integrated Performance Report and attendance at their internal Quality Assurance Committee.

Your ref:

Our ref:

Please contact:

Email:

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

The ICB has identified that the Trust is currently showing common cause variation with the lower compliance attributed to staffing capacity. The capacity issue is being addressed through divisional reconfiguration and additional capacity was identified which came into effect on 1 April
2025. An audit has been undertaken and there is an associated action plan in order to improve compliance to ensure every patient/family is served Duty of Candour in a timely and compassionate manner. The ICB are committed to ensuring that compliance improves and will monitor the effectiveness of the action plan through continued mechanisms including attendance at the Trust Quality Assurance Committee providing external challenge and scrutiny.

2. 's evidence to the inquest was that a deep-seated and endemic culture within the Trust leads to denial and a failure to learn. Following the Care Quality Commissions (CQC) Inspection of Maternity Services in 2021, the service was entered onto the national Maternity Safety Support Programme (MSSP). A full diagnostic assessment was undertaken by the Maternity Improvement Advisor (MIA) allocated to the service which identified several areas for focussed improvement work, including governance, culture and leadership. An associated improvement and sustainability plan has been developed, and the oversight and assurance are led by the national MSSP team. The LSC ICB Local Maternity and Neonatal System (LMNS) are integral to the oversight and assurance work reporting internally within the ICB on progress against this work and are committed to ensuring that the Trust are building a culture to ensure learning from all patient safety events and near misses.

In addition, the quadrumvirate completed the Perinatal Culture and Leadership Programme in 2023/2024; this was a national mandated training programme focused on improving the quality and safety of maternity and neonatal care. Following on from this the SCORE culture survey was undertaken with the development of an associated action plan. The service identified five themes and are progressing these via a phased approach. There is 6- monthly reporting to the LMNS on the progress against this action plan including any identified challenges. It is acknowledged that since the original survey there has been a change in the perinatal quadrumvirate, however the current quadrumvirate have been offered support via the Health Innovation Agency to access further training.

As an organisation the trust has worked with the National Recovery Support Programme (RSP) on the Well Led domain and engaged in various programmes of work to improve culture and learning including:

⦁ Improvements to the Freedom To Speak Up (FTSU) service ⦁ 'Leadership For All' development programme ⦁ Stroke service improvements ⦁ Restorative, Just and Learning Culture implementation ⦁ Organisational development work in Maternity Services ⦁ Refresh of organisational strategy and priorities ⦁ Executive leadership development programme ⦁ Service improvement programmes ⦁ Review of medical staffing ⦁ Embedding kindness project in 2022/23 which informed the Patient Experience strategy.

Improvements were monitored through a System Wide Improvement Board leading to movement from a national System Oversight Framework (SOF) 4 position to SOF 3 and there is continued oversight through the System Improvement Assurance Group (IAG).

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

Additionally, the ICB are sighted on the improvements being made to embed the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) which is focused on learning and compassionate engagement. We do however acknowledge that progress with PSIRF has been limited which in turn delays learning and improvements. In order to address this the ICB are aware that additional capacity has now been sought to ensure that investigations into patient safety events are conducted in a timely manner, and this is currently being closely monitored with appropriate challenge provided to the Trust at both internal Trust and external assurance meetings. Within the wider organisation the Trust attend and actively participate in the ICS Shared Learning Forum and Patient Safety Specialist meetings. The ICB will ensure that actions taken from these discussions are implemented.

3. The Trust's approach to the inquest has been one of a lack of transparency and openness, failure to provide relevant information and a failure to identify with candour the defective clinical governance processes that have operated at the Trust from 2019 to present day. The LMNS, (the maternity arm of the Integrated Care Board) has established and embedded a governance and reporting structure for all local maternity services. This includes a bi-monthly Quality Assurance Panel and Patient Safety Learning Group (see attached Terms of Reference). UHMBT maternity service are fully engaged and provide regular reporting on maternity and neonatal outcomes and patient safety incidents in order to maximise learning across the Integrated Care System (ICS).

The ICS Maternity Patient Safety Learning Group is a dedicated forum to share learning from incidents across the system which UHMBT actively participate via their reporting and dedicated case discussions. In addition, the LMNS is a member of UHMBT Maternity &Neonatal Improvement Group, at this meeting a review of evidence is undertaken against the improvement actions in line with MSSP Plan. Also, the LMNS is invited and attends the UHMBT quarterly quality review with MNSI where a review of completed investigations with a focus on the identified learning and improvement actions is discussed.

The ICB is sorry that the family and coroner experienced a lack of transparency and openness throughout; this is not the expectation of LSC ICB where we are working hard to implement and embed a culture of incident reporting to highlight opportunities for patient safety/experience to be improved. Particular attention will be focused with the Trust in ensuring assurance can be evidenced going forward.

4. The Trust did not disclose that they had failed to notify the external bodies namely the CQC and the then CCG [ICB] via StEIS and the Trust's internal Serious Incidents Reporting Investigation panel, none of which was noted by the Trust's Patient Safety Summits. In line with contractual and regulatory requirements LSC ICB expects all providers to report all patient safety events onto the Learning From Patient Safety Events (LFPSE) platform (this has replaced the National Reporting Learning System – NRLS). Where appropriate and in line with Trust local and national priorities, patient safety events must also be reported onto StEIS where the ICB is then notified. The ICB is very concerned to note from your findings that the Trust failed to fulfil these contractual and regulatory requirements. Since the inception of the ICB there has been a detailed oversight in the reporting of patient safety events from the Trust against expected reporting, with challenge where there has been unexpected variation. The ICB will continue to seek assurance from the Trust through the contractual route and by the ongoing scrutiny of patient safety events.

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

Please be re-assured that specifically for maternity services, as part of the LMNS Patient Safety Learning Group, UHMBT Maternity service provide a two monthly report on all patient safety incidents. This includes any incidents that have met the national and local priorities of the trust PSIRF plan, MNSI investigations, and all other incidents that have had a maternity patient safety review.

It is understood by LSC ICB that Mersey Internal Audit Authority (MIAA) as external auditors are scheduled to undertake an audit on the Trust’s PSIRF progress in 2025/26; the ICB will seek a copy of the audit outcome and monitor the implementation of any resulting action plan.

5. Trust figures to the Board provided in 2025 stated that there were no complaints over 6 months old when the Trust at the time of the inquest have not responded to and ’s 1 June 2020 complaint with the Trust's failure to categorise Ida's death as only "Moderate Harm" (see point 4 above) cause me also to have concern about the reliability of Trust's data. The ICB acknowledges the concerns of the coroner in respect of reliability of data. In order to be re-assured on the validity of data either supplied to the ICB or in the public domain, triangulation of hard and soft information is undertaken. This also includes the use of a Soft Intelligence System across Lancashire and South Cumbria; issues can be raised that allow for consideration of further interrogation or collation/theme/trending to build a wider view of a service or provider. This system plus all the other information held gives an ability to validate information/data provided and where necessary provide external scrunty and challenge through formal contract meetings and Quality Review meetings.

A clinical audit report is presented to the Trust’s Quality Assurance Committee on a quarterly basis which includes audits on documentation. Where audit standards are not being met there are mechanisms in place to track actions and re-audit. The Trust also report on clinical data quality as part of their annual quality account and perform well for data accuracy against peers. The ICB will continue to use this way of working paying particular attention in the ongoing need for triangulation of all data sources.

B. Clinical Governance and Maternity Governance

6. The clinical governance arrangements at the Trust require urgent review to ensure the appropriate personnel are in place, with the necessary training and skills to deliver robust clinical governance to ensure patient safety in maternity care.

As previously described the maternity service is on and remain under the remit of the national MSSP programme. Since being on the programme, a full review of governance has been completed by MIAA with an associated improvement plan developed. A focussed project to develop and implement a Maternity Quality Governance and Accountability Framework was completed in April 2023; the aim of the framework is to ensure that the roles and responsibilities of staff are clearly defined within the outlined risk and incident management process. The ICB does acknowledge that because of the divisional re-configuration within the Trust particular attention will need to be paid by the LMNS to ensure that clinical governance for maternity services is not negatively impacted.

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

7. The Trust did not undertake any examination of its own clinical governance processes, which were a principal area of concern, and which was identified to the Trust five months before the inquest commenced. The deficiencies included lack of version control and audit of documents, untrained staff, chaotic clinical governance arrangements, defensive attitudes and inappropriate self-congratulation.

The ICB is deeply saddened that the family of Ida were unnecessarily exposed to an extended court hearing as result of poor clinical governance within the Trust; we were very concerned to read the findings from the inquest and do not support poor governance practices. We are aware that there has been staffing vacancies/absences within the clinical governance team which we would partly attribute to the deficiencies identified. The ICB are assured that key governance posts have been recruited to and staff commenced in post (albeit interim in some cases). The ICB will continue to monitor the impact of this recruitment to assure itself that clinical governance practices are improved, embedded and sustained. Additionally, the ICB will attend internal Trust key committee meetings and ensure scrutiny is afforded and challenge given where these practices are seen.

Specific to maternity the Trust now has an Independent Senior Advocate whose role is to ensure that the voices of women and families are listened to, heard and acted upon by the maternity services. In UHMBT the Advocate provides a report to Trust Quality and Assurance Committee which the ICB attend. Particular focus on the effectiveness of the Advocate role will continue by the LMNS ensuring there is independent challenge and scrutiny.

8. Specific concerns relating to individual members of staff

As these concerns are relating to individual staff members the ICB believes that UHMBT are best placed to respond to the coroner concerns.

9. All investigations conducted by the Trust to date in respect of Ida’s death have been unskilled, superficial, brief, failed to identify issues and left the family without answers and were all features identified by the 2015 Kirkup Report. In view of the continuing culture at the Trust, this cause a significant concern that issues of safety and safeguarding are not properly considered, transparently engaged with and then addressed formally in respect of a child fatality and serious injury by the Trust. As stated earlier in this response the ICB acknowledges that the Trusts journey in implementing and embedding PSIRF, the frameworks principles and the training of investigators in line with national expectations is not as advanced as initially planned or expected. This includes the clear need for compassionate engagement that is timely, open and transparent when care goes wrong. We are re-assured by the Trust that there is a plan in place to address these gaps and will actively and robustly monitor the progress to fully meet the PSIRF expectations using both quantitative and qualitative intelligence sources.

Additional scrutiny is now provided by the ICB through attendance at internal Trust safety panel meetings where learning response reports are shared and discussed as to whether they meet the criteria as outlined in the national framework. Constructive challenge is consistently delivered by the ICB in a supportive manner in order to assure ourselves that the investigation and report are of good quality with particular focus on family/patient engagement and involvement in the process.

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

In addition, the LMNS have implemented a system wide Patient Safety Learning Group, in which the UHMBT Maternity service provide a two monthly report on all patient safety incidents (as described earlier in this response).

The ICB can confirm that in line with the National Maternity Incentive Scheme the LMNS also undertake quarterly quality assurance visits to review evidence against each of 10 safety actions.

10. The Trust now uses the PSIRF model and is to appoint 3 whole time equivalent Response Leads by 30 September 2025. However, I remain concerned that the Trust has not fully engaged with the duty of candour such that I am not satisfied that the work on PSIRF to date has truly addressed the issues in respect of Trust’s investigations. The Trust implemented PSIRF in line with national guidelines and within the required timescale however the ICB is aware that further progression of this agenda has been delayed due to lack of suitably trained investigators. The ICB is required to assure itself on the quality of the investigation and the quality of the report; this is done through attendance at the Trust internal Learning Response Group where evidence is available of supportive challenge when ICB concerns are raised. Particular attention is focused on the transparency of the investigation/report and the engagement with the patient/family. The Trust recognise that further work is needed to ensure that investigators are trained to use and apply the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) framework methodology in their investigations (or a suitable alternative such as the Yorkshire Contributing Factors Framework). We are pleased that the Trust now utilise Patient Safety Partners who are able to offer an independent view on patient safety matters, challenging where necessary and are also aware that is providing specific training for staff on compassionate engagement following a patient safety event.

The ICB will continue to scrutinise all patient safety reports, provide supportive challenge to ensure the principles of a positive patient safety culture and the PSIRF are fully embedded and sustained with the Trust.

C. Mandatory Training, expired training and remedial training

11, 12 and 13. The Trust do not have robust systems in place to ensure that any midwife who has not completed her mandatory training is subject to immediate action to ensure that all mandatory training is completed and is in date. There was no remedial training put in place for either the midwives involved in Ida's delivery and resuscitation or for the paediatric SHO after Ida’s death. This raises a significant concern that the Trust do not operate a system of remedial training when this inquest has identified remedial training was required.

It is acknowledged that whilst the LMNS has oversight and assurance of training in line with Training Needs Analysis (Maternity Incentive scheme safety action 8), this does not include mandatory training. The Director of Midwifery at UHMBT has provided reassurance to the LMNS that further actions are underway to ensure there is monthly reporting on mandatory maternity training with deep dives to understand those staff not compliant and immediate action taken to remedy this position. As an LMNS we will seek assurance through the monthly reporting process that all staff are compliant and where this is not the case the rationale and actions being taken to ensure patient safety.

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

D: Grading of harm for incident reporting: Babies who have sustained hypoxic brain injury and undergo cooling

14. The Trust graded Ida’s level of harm as “moderate”, even after her death. This

grading should have been adjusted to "severe" by the Trust before Ida was

transferred to Royal Preston Hospital as the consultant paediatrician identified that

she had sustained a severe hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy due to foetal

bradycardia.

15. There is a significant risk that if reporting is graded on harm alone, clinical care that

resulted in hypoxic brain damage during delivery and which was prevented by

therapeutic cooling, will not adequately identify the problems that caused the harm

during the delivery.

16. confirmed that nationally there is inconsistency in categorisation of harm for

babies who sustain a hypoxic injury due to foetal bradycardia in labour and who

require cooling and clarification guidance would assist prevent further maternity

deaths and ensure full and proper investigation of hypoxic injuries sustained in

labour.

As an ICB and LMNS we are aware that the ongoing challenges in the grading of harm, directives from the PSIRF and how this aligns to CQC is a recognised issue both nationally and regionally

The North-West Regional Chief Midwife is developing Maternity Guidance and Principles with the aim to ensure there is a consistent approach in the identification and reporting of incidents. The ICB are supportive of this work and are actively engaged with the regional work to reduce this known risk.

E. Funding for MSNI

17. But for the HSIB investigation report into Ida’s death admitted that Ida’s death due to failures by the Trust would never have come to light or resulted in an inquest.

18. The MSNI is now hosted by the CQC with funding secured for the next two years but no certainty as to ongoing funding after this date. These independent investigations by specialist skilled investigators into the most serious of events is an essential safeguard to the lives of mothers and unborn children.

19. Without an assurance that funding will continue beyond 2027 I am concerned that significant harm events to mothers and babies and deaths such as Ida's will go unrecorded and lessons that should be learned to prevent future maternal and baby deaths will go unnoticed, and there will be a risk of future maternity deaths.

LSC ICB fully support and acknowledge the important role that MSNI play in undertaking truly independent maternity investigations and the value that these investigations have. The funding for this service is led nationally and therefore the ICB are unable to offer any assurances on this matter.

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

I am grateful to you for highlighting your concerns to me and I hope that by this letter, I have addressed your concerns, but should you require any further clarification or information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust NHS / Health Body
16 May 2025 PDF
Action Taken

The Trust has reviewed practices, policies, and procedures, implemented mandatory training on candour, revised investigation processes, increased bereavement support, and implemented measures for consultant oversight. They also have enhanced incident review and executive oversight processes, including learning response leads. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Dr Adeley Re Ida Jean Lock (Deceased) Thank you for your Prevention of Future Death Report dated 21 March 2025. Firstly, we would like to express our deepest condolences to the parents and family of Ida. We want to apologise for the lapses in care that resulted in her tragic death and the further harm we then caused by how we handled the investigation. We recognise the distress this has caused Ida’s loved ones and are truly sorry for this. We have accepted your findings and reviewed our practices, policies and procedures in light of these, so that we can identify where further changes need to be made. We are committed to learning from this tragic event and the issues identified during the inquest. For ease, our responses to your matters of concern follow under the headings used in your report. A: Culture of Candour Following Ida’s death, the Trust did not follow its own policies. We should have met with Ida’s parents at the start of the investigation process. We should have awaited the outcome of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) investigation. The internal investigation relied on flawed and unconventional Root Cause Analysis (RCA) methodology with a narrow scope. This resulted in a failure to identify and address the acts and omissions in care that contributed to Ida’s death in the conclusions reached. Once the HSIB report was available, the Trust should have accepted the findings in the report unreservedly and considered why the conclusions differed from those of the internal investigation. We acknowledge with deep regret that the tragic death of Ida and the manner in which we investigated the case, demonstrated the serious systemic failures that were present within our Trust. It is clear that culture contributed to defensiveness, and a failure to engage in

Westmorland General Hospital Burton Road

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Tel: 01539 732288

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meaningful learning from adverse events. This impeded our ability to take timely and appropriate action to prevent harm and failed those we were entrusted to care for. Specifically, we recognise the unacceptable failure to notify key external bodies—namely the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and the then Clinical Commissioning Group (now the Integrated Care Board (ICB) via the Strategic Executive Information System (StEIS). This omission not only breached statutory reporting duties but also deprived the wider health system of critical information necessary for oversight and learning. To reinforce a culture of candour within the Trust - where openness, honesty, and learning are embedded at all levels - we have implemented a range of measures that go beyond compliance and aim to change behaviours, mindsets, and systems. In addition, we continue to monitor the impact of these changes through ward to board governance arrangements. The changes we have made are detailed below. By embedding these measures, the Trust is taking deliberate and sustained action to move beyond a culture of defensiveness, towards one of honesty, accountability, and continuous learning. These steps are critical in restoring public confidence, supporting staff wellbeing, and, most importantly, ensuring safer care for our patients. The Duty of Candour process is now embedded across the organisation. The maternity service has consistently demonstrated that all women and their families receive duty of candour within 10 working days of an incident occurring. This is monitored via the Quality Governance Assurance Framework. There is a standardised formal duty of candour letter, and communication is regular, with a single point of contact for families to raise any questions or concerns. The completion of Duty of Candour responses across the wider Trust is monitored via the Quality Governance Assurance Framework and reported on at the Quality Assurance Committee. There has been a pilot project, where families have also been informed about the role of the Maternity and Neonatal Senior Independent Advocate (MNSIA), an external point of contact who provides support and assists with advocacy. The application of this was monitored via the Quality Governance Assurance Framework. This is a national pilot programme that has recently closed and we await information around its continuation. There was never any intention by the Trust to be lacking in transparency and openness in its approach to the inquest. However, it is recognised that issues were identified at the inquest, which had not been identified by the Trust’s own investigations, at which point it became evident that further information was relevant. Every effort was made to locate and share this information as swiftly as possible, as soon as its relevance was identified. Actions taken prior to the inquest: Strengthening Freedom to Speak Up (FTSU)
• Enhanced visibility and support: The FTSU Guardians and FTSU Champions are now more visible and accessible across clinical and non-clinical areas, providing staff with safe, confidential pathways to raise concerns.

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• Leadership responsiveness: Senior leaders regularly engage with FTSU data and themes to identify systemic issues and ensure swift action is taken.
• The FTSU team reports to the Board of Directors.
• Psychological safety training: Dedicated training has been introduced to help leaders and teams foster environments where staff feel safe to raise concerns without fear of blame or reprisal. Daily Triage and Cross-Care Group Reviews
• Multi-disciplinary daily triage meetings have been established to review new concerns, incidents, and patient feedback in real time. This ensures timely recognition of risk, early escalation, and coordinated responses.
• These reviews involve cross-care group participation, breaking down silos and promoting shared learning, transparency, and consistency in how patient safety concerns are addressed.
• The daily structure enables tracking of themes and emerging trends, helping to identify issues early and prevent escalation. Implementation of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF)
• The Trust is actively implementing PSIRF, which marks a fundamental shift in how we respond to patient safety incidents.
• Focus on learning, not blame: PSIRF prioritises understanding 'what' and 'how' over 'who', reducing defensiveness and enabling open dialogue.
• Flexible, proportionate responses: The framework allows for different types of learning responses (e.g. thematic reviews, case note reviews, patient safety incident investigations), depending on the nature and impact of the incident.
• Co-produced investigations: We are involving patients, families, and staff in shaping the terms of reference and contributing to learning outcomes.
• Training and capacity building: Staff involved in incident responses are being trained under PSIRF principles to ensure quality, compassion, and consistency in approach. Cultural Leadership and Accountability
• Executive and board-level commitment to candour is now more visible, with regular walkarounds, open forums, and leadership-led safety conversations.
• Leadership performance reviews include assessment of behaviours that support psychological safety, candour, and learning.
• Quarterly culture reviews track staff perceptions and feedback, with action plans developed in collaboration with teams. Promoting a Culture of Transparency and Accountability Regular mortality reviews and triangulation meetings reinforce the message that every patient outcome matters, and that the organisation is committed to learning, not blame. When embedded in organisational culture, these forums:
• Foster trust among staff, patients, and families
• Support the principles of the Duty of Candour
• Promote reflective practice and continuous professional development.
• Contribute to better governance oversight and regulatory compliance.

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Enhancing Clinical Governance and Risk Management By ensuring that lessons learned from mortality reviews are discussed alongside other sources of intelligence, triangulation meetings play a central role in:
• Informing board-level decision-making
• Shaping training, staffing, and resourcing priorities
• Anticipating risk and preventing future harm In 2022, a structured process was implemented to monitor and track complaints within maternity services. This includes weekly meetings between the Patient Experience Team and maternity service representatives to ensure timely review and action. Service user feedback is collected from multiple sources, including:
• Formal complaints
• Concerns raised with the Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS)
• Issues identified by the Maternity and Neonatal Voices Partnership (MNVP) lead
• Findings from the Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations (MNSI) programme
• Concerns highlighted through the incident management process All complaints, concerns, and feedback are logged into a central tracking system and monitored through to resolution. To ensure quality and compassion in our communication, all complaint responses are reviewed by the quadrumvirate leadership team before being sent. We also offer families the opportunity to meet with us to discuss their concerns in more detail, should they wish to do so. The Trust’s Being Open policy, introduced in September 2019, underpins our approach to transparency. It reflects our ethical responsibility and duty of candour, requiring healthcare professionals and managers to inform patients and families when care has resulted in harm. In 2023, we undertook extensive cultural diagnosis work with Maternity teams to understand the state of the culture and how best to address the issues identified. In 2024, a three phased cultural action plan commenced, overseen by the Chair of Culture, Inclusion and Organisational Development and the Head of Midwifery. Phase one delivered actions against several themes including:
1. Leadership and Governance
2. Well-being
3. Respect and Civility
4. Psychological safety
5. Leadership Development Increasing leadership visibility and access to leadership colleagues was central to the improvements, with a focus on improving two-way communication with colleagues and setting standards. A lead Professional Midwifery Advocate (PMA) has been appointed with the objective of expanding formal and structured support and education. A number of colleagues have attended training aimed at increasing cultural understanding and

Westmorland General Hospital Burton Road

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communication skills between team members. Increased visibility of the FTSU team and processes and engagement in PSIRF training has also been central to the cultural plan. Phase one of the plan is complete.

Actions taken after the inquest: Immediate changes were made to the Being Open policy following evidence given at the inquest. An audit was completed that looked at all complaints that had been converted to incidents to ensure the correct processes had been followed and that the individuals concerned had received appropriate responses. We acknowledged that poor handover of maternity events and concerns to level 3 centres would impact on their decisions around reporting to the CQC and the Coroner and so have enhanced our engagement with these centres. A response to and ’s 1 June 2020 complaint was sent on 24 April
2025.

What we are going to do next: Await the outcome of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) review of the statutory duty of candour for health and social care providers in England. This review aims to assess how the duty is being implemented, monitored, and enforced, and to determine if the policy and its design are appropriate. Once the review is published, we will develop an action plan to address any identified gaps in our processes. Phase two of the Maternity cultural action plan is commencing with increased focus on teamwork, communication and creating psychologically safe teams. Organisationally, a key area of focus is to 'create the culture and conditions for success'. This includes creating a sense of belonging and psychological safety in teams so that they are able to speak up when things are not right. Key enablers for delivering this cultural shift are our FTSU service and strategy and our newly implemented People Strategy which sets out the People Strategy deal - outlining what we expect of colleagues and what they can expect of the Trust. The Deal is aligned to NHS People Promise elements, including 'we each have a voice that counts' and 'we are compassionate and inclusive'. Additionally, it sets out our expectations of teams and a two-way dialogue on flexibility, best practice and strengthening team dynamics, with the aim of creating a productive and high performing team environment focused upon patient experience and care.

As part of the 2025/26 internal audit programme, the Board has asked our internal auditors to complete a review of the implementation of the changes proposed following receipt of the PFD in quarter 4.

B: Clinical Governance and Maternity Governance We fully acknowledge the failings in our clinical governance arrangements that have been identified, including poor version control, absence of document audit trails, disorganised governance structures and an inappropriate tone of self-congratulation in the face of serious incidents. The Trust accepts that it did not undertake a robust examination of its own clinical governance processes in relation to Ida’s death. This is a source of deep regret.

Westmorland General Hospital Burton Road

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Tel: 01539 732288

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We recognise the validity of ’s observation at the inquest - that a narrow focus on process over outcomes led to investigations that may have met procedural requirements yet failed to deliver real learning or improve the experience of patients and families. This approach was wholly inadequate and does not reflect the standard of care and transparency that patients deserve. We are committed to ongoing external oversight and transparent engagement with patients, families, and regulators to ensure changes are sustained and effective. We apologise to those affected by our failings and reaffirm our determination to ensure that the lessons learned lead to lasting change. Actions taken prior to the inquest: In 2021, the Trust recognised that there were complex challenges in the organisation that required additional capacity and capabilities. Due to ongoing challenges, the Trust asked to be entered into the national Recovery Support Programme (RSP) in 2021. As part of the RSP, the Trust has been working with NHS England’s Maternity Safety Support Programme (MSSP) since August 2021 and programme leaders have recognised the organisation for improving the maternity service. They have acknowledged and confirmed the measures taken to embed maternity care that is, and feels, safe and effective for women and their families. We progressed to the sustainability phase of the programme in 2024 and await a further assurance visit in the next few months. The Trust engaged the services of the internal auditors (MIAA) in 2024 to assess the effectiveness of governance processes in the implementation and reporting of the MSSP programme. The auditors concluded that there was a substantial level of assurance that the programme was well implemented, with a good system of internal control designed to meet the system objectives, and that controls were generally being applied consistently. There were two recommendations, one relating to action sign off (medium risk) and one relating to a single point of accountability being identified for actions (low risk); both recommendations were implemented immediately and have been signed off by the internal auditors as complete. We have undertaken a comprehensive reform of our Trust-wide clinical governance framework. This includes:
• Strengthening document control and audit mechanisms
• Mandatory training for all staff involved in incident investigation and governance
• Restructuring governance oversight to ensure clarity, accountability, and timeliness
• Shifting the organisational focus from process compliance to outcome-driven learning and meaningful improvement
• Embedding a culture of openness, humility, and family-centred care across all services

Westmorland General Hospital Burton Road

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Staff The role induction process for colleagues was not consistent and there was a significant lack of support, direction, correction and education from senior leaders at the time. Concerns around the incident review were not shared with the appropriate colleagues in the organisation. At the inquest, colleagues openly declared that there were several errors of judgement and that they wholly regretted how they had managed the incident. They also apologised to the family. When responding to the HSIB report, a lack of understanding led to the recording of disputes from the clinicians involved in ’s and Ida’s care as well as the factual accuracy comments. This response was sent to HSIB without internal challenge and included the disputes. The response was submitted to HSIB with the approval of the Governance Business Partner and the knowledge of the Head of Midwifery. In view of the inexperience of colleagues in these matters, it would have been a reasonable expectation for them to have received careful guidance, support and correction in this situation. We acknowledge the need for further learning and more robust support and mentorship to support development of colleagues moving into leadership roles. Actions taken immediately after the inquest: Our Director of Midwifery has taken HR advice and concluded that given: 
• The time elapsed from the event 
• The disclosures and insights given at the inquest 
• That the key senior leadership members no longer work for the Trust 

there is nothing further that would be gained from an investigation. The Trust has therefore opted to follow a restorative justice pathway that is bespoke to the individuals. Such pathways may include:
• A skills analysis against the role descriptions
• Individual learning and development plans
• Requirement to provide a reflective statement including key learning points from the matters concerned with ’s and ’s care following Ida’s death
• An emotional and psychological support plan
• Ongoing support through a professional coach

What we are going to do next: Our Director of Midwifery has developed a skills analysis framework, which will be undertaken with all existing midwives who hold senior positions and with all newly-appointed senior midwives. This skills analysis will be referred to at the annual performance appraisal and will inform the continuous learning and development plan for each individual.

Westmorland General Hospital Burton Road

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INTERIM CHAIR:

Tel: 01539 732288

CHIEF EXECUTIVE:

The Board has asked the internal auditors to:
• review the embeddedness of the Kirkup recommendations or their successor practices.
• provide assurance that the governance arrangements in the three divisions are operating in line with the Trust’s Quality Governance Accountability and Performance Accountability Frameworks.
• evaluate the operating effectiveness of controls and level of consistency in place for the management, recording, monitoring and reporting of Serious incidents following the adoption of PSIRF. C: Mandatory Training, expired training and remedial training During the course of the inquest, it became clear that the midwife providing primary care to had not completed every element of her mandatory education. Some elements of the K2 fetal monitoring package had been completed, but not the full package. K2 is an interactive online, e-learning package which offers modules in fetal monitoring and maternity crisis management. All fetal monitoring modules required completion for the staff member to be fully compliant with the K2 training. K2 is no longer in use by the organisation and has been replaced by a fetal monitoring study day, which includes a competency assessment. It also emerged that the senior midwife was, at the time of the inquest, not compliant with the requirement to undertake annual neonatal resuscitation. On hearing this information, the Director of Midwifery immediately issued a direction for this to be rectified within 24 hours. The senior midwife successfully completed her mandatory education the next day. Each year, the Trust must achieve 10 safety standards in order to be eligible for a 10% rebate of contributions to the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). Safety action 8 requires Trusts to have a minimum 90% attendance for three elements of training and education:
• Fetal monitoring training 
• Multiprofessional maternity emergencies training (PROMPT) 
• Neonatal life support training 

The Trust has consistently demonstrated 90% compliance for all three areas.  Previously mandatory education has been considered a personal professional responsibility. However, the fetal monitoring guideline published in 2023 states that any clinician who is not compliant with fetal monitoring will have restrictions placed on their practice until relevant training is completed. Actions taken prior to the inquest: The Director of Midwifery commenced a body of work before the inquest concluded which has involved: 
• A weekly compliance report 

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Tel: 01539 732288

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• Personal contact with all clinicians not compliant to remind them of their obligations and agree a plan 
• Provision of a plan and timeframe for all clinicians whose compliance had lapsed 
• Work with the obstetric education lead to include obstetric medical compliance as well as midwifery compliance  
• A requirement for mandatory education to be included in individual annual performance appraisals  
• An analysis of mandatory education compliance is now reported to the Board for oversight at the highest level

What we are going to do next: Map all critical training requirements for clinical areas and ensure compliance across the Trust. Where there are areas of concern, provide training and development to improve skills, knowledge and behaviours. D: Grading of harm for incident reporting: Babies who have sustained hypoxic brain injury and undergo cooling We acknowledge that the grading of harm of the incident should have been reviewed and updated to severe once the severity of the hypoxic injury was known. As part of our refreshed Governance processes, we introduced a daily triage of incidents (see also p3). This is attended by members of the Divisional leadership teams, Corporate Clinical Governance team and Chief Nursing Officer team. This daily triage is accountable to the Executive Review Group (ERG). The function of the daily triage is to triangulate events captured through a variety of routes (i.e. incidents, complaints etc.) and agree the most appropriate learning response based on the Trust’s Patient Safety Incident Response Plan (PSIRP) which includes the potential for learning, improvement and systemic risk.  Any incident that is graded as moderate harm or above triggers the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) incident management response - this ensures that a comprehensive independent investigation is undertaken. The Trust has also introduced local maternity PSIRF priorities, since there is a lack of national guidance about the response when an incident falls outside the national reporting structure for MNSI and Perinatal Mortality Review Tool (PMRT). We have triangulated data from complaints, moderate and serious harm incidents to develop our local priorities. Neonatal seizures not meeting cooling criteria is one of those priorities. Any incident that meets the local priorities criteria is escalated for executive oversight of the incident management process. The ERG is chaired by the Chief Medical Officer or Chief Nursing Officer. The group is convened twice weekly to oversee all incidents reviewed by the Divisions that have been validated as causing moderate or above harm. In addition to this, the group may review other incidents that trigger organisational concern. The group also reviews all complaints and claims received in the previous week. This process enables executive oversight of any immediate issues which need addressing. The group has the power to investigate any

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clinical or non-clinical activity within its terms of reference. It is authorised to seek any information it requires from any employee and all employees are directed to co-operate with any request made by the ERG. What we are going to do next: We are in the process of employing three full-time Learning Response Leads who will conduct investigations and provide oversight of the PSIRF process. Embed enhanced quality assurance of Patient Safety Incident Investigations through a structured process involving members of the Chief Nursing Officer and Corporate Clinical Governance teams. E: Funding for MSNI Concern not addressed to the Trust. We hope this information is of reassurance but should you require anything further, please do not hesitate to contact us.
NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB Integrated Care Board
29 Jul 2025 PDF
Noted

NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB clarifies the independence and current availability of its Maternity and Neonatal Independent Senior Advocate role, noting it's under national evaluation and currently unable to accept new referrals. (AI summary)

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Dear Dr Adeley

Regulation 28: Report To Prevent Future Deaths – Ida Jean Lock Conclusion of inquest 21 March 2025

Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (LSC ICB) provided a formal response in relation the Regulation 28: Report To Prevent Future Deaths for Ida Jean Lock on 14 May 2025.

Since providing this response we have been made aware that our narrative to the concern raised regarding University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay Trusts (UHMBT) lack of examination of its own clinical governance processes could be strengthened by accurately reflecting the true independence of the LSC ICB Maternity and Neonatal Independent Senior Advocate and also the current position of this service.

I apologise for the lack of true clarity in our response to this independent role and availability of the service but believe it is vitally important to ensure that the ICB correctly reflects that the Maternity and Neonatal Independent Senior Advocate is truly independent of UHMBT in order to maintain the relationships with existing families who are utilising the Maternity and Neonatal Independent Senior Advisory service rather than potentially casting doubt. It is also essential that expectations on the availability of this service are accurately reflected by the ICB – again I apologise that this was not made clear in our initial response to you in May 2025.

The narrative in the ICB response under section 7 page 5 stated:

‘Specific to maternity the Trust now has an Independent Senior Advocate, whose role is to ensure that the voices of women and families are listened to, heard and acted upon by the maternity services. In UHMBT the Advocate provides a report to Trust Quality and Assurance Committee which the ICB attend. Particular focus on the effectiveness of the Advocate role will continue by the LMNS ensuring there is independent challenge and scrutiny’.

Whilst it is appreciated that this is an unusual situation, I write in order to understand if the revised narrative below, which makes explicitly clear the independence of the Maternity and Neonatal Independent Senior Advocate and current availability of the service could be accepted and published alongside the ICB initial response for the benefit of our population:

Your ref: 6293705 Our ref: AK/CM/SL

Please contact:

Email:

Chair – Chief executive (interim) –

‘The ICB has a Maternity and Neonatal Independent Senior Advocate, whose role is to ensure that the voice of women and families are listened to, heard and acted upon by maternity and neonatal services. To note this pilot service is currently under national evaluation by NHS England pending a future decision around the role at a national level. Within Lancashire and South Cumbria currently the service is unable to accept new referrals. Due to this families being supported by the service receive an individualised plan and relevant signposting, including to other local advocacy organisations.

In UHMBT the advocate reports to the Trust Quality and Assurance Committee which the ICB attend. Particular focus on the effectiveness of the advocate role will continue by the LMNS ensuring that there is independent challenge and scrutiny’.

I would be grateful for your consideration of this matter and should any clarification or information be required please do not hesitate to contact me.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
The investigation into Ida Jean Lock was opened on 24 November 2020 The inquest into Ida Jean Lock was opened on 27 May 2021 The inquest was concluded on 21 March 2025 following 19 days of evidence.
Circumstances of the death
, who was pregnant with her daughter, Ida, attended Royal Lancaster Infirmary Labour Ward, operated by University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, on 8 November 2019 when she should have been offered induction of labour to provider additional monitoring during delivery. re-attended the Labour Ward on 9 November 2019 when due to a report of reduced foetal movements, she should have received obstetric care and additional monitoring during delivery. During the course of the labour on 9 November 2019 there were multiple missed opportunities for enhanced care and obstetric input including a failure to act on bloodstained liquor, a rising foetal

Tel: (01772) 536536 heart rate before 10 am, failing to act on clinical signs that made it inadvisable for to enter the birthing pool, failure to act on a significant slowing of the baby's heart at 10:15 am, a lack of urgency both in asking to leave the pool and on obtaining CTG monitoring equipment, failing to summon obstetric help at an appropriate time, the midwives becoming task focused on obtaining a foetal heart rate and deriving reassurance from unreliable heart rate readings that lead to avoidable delay. The obstetric delivery of Ida was of high quality but, due to the delay involving obstetricians, Ida was born pale in colour with a low heart rate and severe hypoxic ischaemic brain damage. The initial resuscitation for 3 ½ minutes led by the Labour Ward Coordinator was wholly ineffectual and Ida's condition at the time of arrival of the paediatric registrar was consistent with ineffective ventilation where chest rise could not be seen, the heart rate was less than 60 bpm and she was grey in colour. The paediatric registrar took over the resuscitation, Ida responded quickly to ventilation and from this point onwards the resuscitation was of high quality. The conclusion of the inquest is as follows: On 9 November 2019 , who was pregnant with Ida, attended the Royal Lancaster Infirmary Labour Ward in early labour. Ida was a normal child whose death was caused by a lack of oxygen during her delivery that occurred due to the gross failure of the three midwives attending her to provide basic medical care to deliver Ida urgently when it was apparent she was in distress and contributed to by the lead midwife‘s wholly incompetent failure to provide basic neonatal resuscitation for Ida during the first 3 1/2 minutes of her life that further contributed to Ida's brain damage from which she died on 16 November 2019 at the Royal Preston Hospital neonatal intensive care unit. The inquest was one in which Article 2 was fully engaged as a result of the Trust's clinical governance arrangements, inadequate investigations, a lack of transparency and openness, a failure to respond to a detailed complaint letter, a

Tel: (01772) 536536

failure to comply with the Duty of Candour, disputing the findings of the Secretary of State for Health's independent review panel (HSIB now MNSI), failing to notify external monitoring bodies and failing to comply with internal protocols.

The Trust's lack of compliance with clinical governance requirements in the investigation into Ida's death had significant similarities with the criticisms made in 2015 of the Trust as set out in The Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation, otherwise known as the Kirkup Report. , who gave evidence at the inquest, expressed the view that there was a deep seated and endemic culture of defensiveness in respect of maternity incidents at the Trust. also said that the investigation showed elements of failing to identify significant care issues, brevity, defensiveness and was conducted by unskilled investigators.

During the course of the Investigation NHS Resolutions, an arm's length body of the Department of Health and Social Care obtain independent reports to disagree with the independent body established by the Secretary of State for Health to investigate maternal and baby adverse and unexpected incidents.

The detailed review of the evidence heard at the inquest is set out in a 60-page summing up dealing with the clinical care and clinical governance issues.
Copies sent to
1. and2. The Care Quality Commission3. Midwives: a. and bHead of Compliance and Assurance6. MSNIMaternity and Newborn Safety Investigations7. NHS Resolution

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Report details

Reference
2025-0155
Date of report
21 March 2025
Coroner
James Adeley
Coroner area
Lancashire & Blackburn with Darwen

Responses identified

Responses identified 4 of 4
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 16 May 2025 (estimated).

Sent to

Department of Health and Social Care
NHS England
NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board
University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust

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