Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

[REDACTED]

Ref: 2025-0507 Date: 1 Sep 2025 Coroner: Ian Potter Area: Inner North London Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

There were widespread failures in the quality, accuracy, and auditing of patient observations, including staff distraction during crucial monitoring. Concerns also persist regarding the door-locking system's reliability and staff guidance for its failure.

Date 1 Sep 2025
56-day deadline 27 Jan 2026 est.
Responses identified 1 of 1
Mental Health related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
There were widespread failures in the quality, accuracy, and auditing of patient observations, including staff distraction during crucial monitoring. Concerns also persist regarding the door-locking system's reliability and staff guidance for its failure.
View full coroner's concerns
I acknowledge that the East London NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust) has  made some progress in addressing some areas of concern identified prior to  the inquest, and that is to be commended. However, there remain some  matters of concern that do not appear to have been addressed adequately, or at all, and the evidence also revealed other matters that have not been  identified in the Trust’s improvement plan. 

1)  Patient Observations (generally) I am aware that, prior to  [REDACTED] final admission under the care of the Trust in 2022, other concerns had been raised by a coroner regarding patient observations within the Trust. Those concerns were  first raised in 2021 (following a patient death in 2018). Concerns  included the quality of observations and the falsification of  observations. Despite assurances from the Trust in numerous action  plans since, the evidence in this inquest revealed widespread concerns across two wards at THCMH (Brick Lane Ward and  Rosebank Ward) about observations that were carried out. Such  concerns included: the level of detail in observation records not  meeting the expectations of the Trust’s own policy; the accuracy of  timing’s in some observations was questionable; observations were  often not used as a tool to aid therapeutic engagement with patients;  and some observations were inaccurate or possibly falsified.  

The evidence received and heard during the inquest did not reassure me that this matter has been adequately addressed. Given the  importance of observations in keeping patients safe, I remain  concerned that significant risks remain. 

2)  1:1 or ‘within eyesight’ Observations  The CCTV footage played at inquest showed a member of staff who was allocated to ‘within eyesight’ observations of another patient sat on the back of a chair (with their back facing the patient’s bedroom  door) and engaged on their mobile telephone. That member of staff  initially told the court that they were conducting the ‘within eyesight’  observations correctly and could see the patient in question. This  raises significant concern, not only about the quality of 1:1 observation but also about staff attitudes and approach to observations that are  integral to keeping patients safe (see below at para 7)). 

3)  Auditing of record keeping  The Trust’s evidence regarding auditing nursing / clinical records  provided little, if any, reassurance that the system in place is bringing about a truly measurable or meaningful change.  

4)  The door-locking / ‘fob’ system  This was not working at the time of [REDACTED] death and the jury found this to have been a contributory factor in her death, in that it  allowed her access to other patient’s bedrooms. There was evidence  to suggest that the system is now working as intended, which is  positive. However, the cause for concern is whether there is a sufficient system in place to guide and assist staff in what to do if the  door locking system were to fail again. The evidence was that, at the  material time, staff were aware that this was an issue that put patients  at increased risk; however, there was evidence that staff did not fully appreciate the nature and extent of the increased risk or deploy measures to sufficiently reduce the risk. 

5)  Risk assessment of patients  The Trust accepted that there were issues in the risk assessment of [REDACTED] in that: what documentation there was stated there  were risks but did not fully assess the risks; there was no ‘My Safety Plan’ in place; and ‘Dialog+’ had not completed. At the time, staff said  that they had been trained regarding risk assessment and its  importance. However, when giving evidence at the inquest, numerous members of staff were vague in their understanding of risk  assessment. For example, a senior member of staff said that it was  possible to complete the ‘My Safety Plan’ documentation even if a  patient did not want to engage with the process, whereas other  members of staff were insistent that if a patient doesn’t engage then  the document should not be completed. 

6)  Understanding of risk  Some Trust witnesses who gave evidence appeared to lack an  appreciable understanding of what could constitute serious risks to  patients. In some instances, this seemed to go beyond possible  training issues and raised potential questions about suitability for being in a caring role. 

7)  Attitudinal concerns  There was a recurrent theme in the evidence provided by nursing and  support staff that certain clinical tasks (including, but not limited to, the  completion of risk assessment documentation) could simply be left for  the next shift to complete. The net result of this was that such tasks  were not completed, allowing the risks associated with non-completion to be perpetuated.  

The court was told that all shifts (on Rosebank Ward in particular)  were busy and staff often did not have time to complete the tasks  allocated to them. However, CCTV footage showed, for example, a  member of staff (allocated to complete observations and not on a  designated break at the material times) checking their mobile  telephone and sitting in the lounge reading the newspaper instead of undertaking their clinical role.  

8)  Effective clinical oversight at THCMH  There was clear evidence at the inquest that, following an extended  bank holiday weekend period, there was a lack of consultant cover on Rosebank Ward and the male PICU ward, which led to one consultant attempting to cover both wards. This, in itself, is not the concern for  the purposes of this report, but it puts the matter into some context.  The consultant that was providing the cover to both wards gave evidence at the inquest, as did other senior nursing staff. The  consultant’s own evidence raised questions about their own professional judgment in providing that cover to the wards and  assessing the risks. The evidence of a senior nurse was that specific  concerns had previously been raised about the consultant in question,  including that consultant not being a “very responsive consultant” and  there having been “a pattern” with this consultant not reviewing  patients in a timely manner. The court was told that those concerns  had previously been raised with the Trust’s Clinical Director and  Associate Clinical Director and, despite this, no discernible change had been noted. The Trust’s response to this during the inquest was to say that the consultant in question no longer works for the Trust and  therefore the risk has been addressed.  In my opinion, this is a  misunderstanding of the risk. I consider that the risk is that senior  nursing staff raised a serious issue with very senior (director level)  clinicians about a pattern of issues creating risk to patients (some  relating to other patient deaths and / or other serious untoward  incidents) and little, if any, evidence was provided about how the Trust  dealt with this serious issue from a clinical governance and oversight  point of view. As such, the concern remains.

Responses

1 respondent
East London NHS Foundation Trust NHS / Health Body
1 Sep 2025 PDF
Action Taken

East London NHS Foundation Trust has already made progress improving patient observations, observation practices, record keeping, risk assessments, understanding of risk, and clinical oversight, with interventions like new observation policy, therapeutic engagement improvements, enhanced auditing, and strengthened handover procedures. (AI summary)

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Dear Sir RE: REGULATION 28 REPORT I am writing to provide a formal response to the concerns set out in the Regulation 28 report that you issued on 1 September 2025 following the inquest touching the death of The Trust gratefully notes your observations that it has already made progress in some areas, and that you commend its work in doing so. You noted various continuing concerns as follows: Concern 1 – Patient Observations Concern 2 – 1:1 or ‘eyesight’ Observations Concern 3 – Auditing of Record-Keeping Concern 4 – Door-locking/’fob’ System Concern 5 – Risk Assessment of Patients Concern 6 – Understanding of Risk Concern 7 – Attitudinal Concerns Concern 8 – Effective Clinical Oversight at Tower Hamlets Centre for Mental Health I have addressed these in turn below. Please note that in respect of Concerns 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 the Trust entirely acknowledges the reasons for your concerns and has considered them extremely

Private & Confidential


HMC Ian Potter


27 October 2025 Office of the Chief Medical Officer Trust Headquarters Robert Dolan House 5th Floor 9 Alie Street London E1 8DE

seriously. The Trust has done a considerable amount of work since very sad death in June 2022 and as such is reassured that no further action is required. Patient Observations You heard evidence about the significant amount of work that the Trust has done in relation to this issue over the past years and as such I do not intend to duplicate it here. Readers of this response who did not attend the inquest can find further details in the Trust’s response to the Regulation 28 report issued in relation to . I would like to draw your attention to an article published in the International Journal for Quality in Healthcare shortly after inquest took place, where the results of some of the Trust’s interventions to improve observation practices have been quantified. Observation completion and therapeutic engagement were shown to have improved following the introduction of zonal observations, a board relay, and life skills activities led by recovery workers. Sustained improvements were seen in all 10 measures used in this work, as evidenced by shifts in statistical process control charts. General observation completion increased by 1.2% (to 99.57%), and intermittent observation completion rose by 1.9% (to 98.25%). Incidents of physical violence were reduced by 23%, verbal aggression by 38% and racial aggression by 60%. Restrictive practice use also reduced, with restraint reduced by 16%, prone restraint by 35%, seclusion by 38%, and rapid tranquillisation by 26%. Staff sickness also decreased by 16%. was nursed on intermittent observations and you have noted that they were often not being used as a tool to aid therapeutic engagement. The Trust shares your concern about whether these observations are realistically providing opportunities for therapeutic engagement, and has been exploring how the use of intermittent observations can be reduced while strengthening safer, more compassionate forms of care. Instead of relying so much on scheduled checks, the focus will be on creating ward environments where relational, therapeutic engagement is the default. It is important to note that other ‘types’ of observation such as hourly observations and 1:1 observation will still take place as clinically indicated. The Trust’s work on this project is comprised of two phases: Phase 1 (April – October 2025): Ten inpatient wards will test new approaches to reducing intermittent observations with hands-on support from local Improvement Advisors, QI coaches, and sponsors. Real-time data will be gathered to guide decision-making and monitor impact. Phase 2 (November 2025 onwards): The most effective ideas will be refined and tested in new conditions to build confidence in their effectiveness. Once a strong degree of belief is established, these changes will be spread across all ELFT inpatient wards using a structured approach to scale.

1:1 or ‘eyesight’ Observations The member of staff in question has had their knowledge refreshed about the expectations of the Trust’s observations policy and the Trust’s mobile phone policy. The latter was updated in 2024 to include material on staff use of mobile phones, making it clear that they are not allowed in clinical areas unless there is an exceptional reason agreed with a local manager. There has been shared learning with all staff across the unit on the use of mobile phones whilst on duty, in 2024. Auditing of Record-Keeping The Trust is moving towards using CCTV to objectively audit whether observations have been made as recorded. This is anticipated to commence in January 2026 to allow for staff training to download and access CCTV footage. Door-locking/’fob’ System The ward environment – including the locking systems / fobs – has been added as an agenda item onto Ward Safety Huddles. A representative of the Trust Estates team normally attends these huddles and any issues with the system can be escalated directly to them. In the event of failure, staff are briefed to proactively close doors themselves and to encourage patients to close their own doors. I understand that there has been an occasion since death when a malfunction has been successfully rectified in the space of a single day, indicating that the revised system is working effectively. Risk Assessment of Patients There is a rolling programme of monthly Dialog+, my safety plan and risk assessment training for staff, with each member of staff completing this as a one-off. In terms of the Trust’s expectations regarding whether staff should commence the My Safety Plan and Dialog+ documents in the absence of patient engagement, staff are expected to complete the Dialog+ and My Safety Plan within 72hours of admission; where patients are not able to engage in this process staff will revisit and obtain their input. Staff are also encouraged to obtain collateral information from family, friends and carers. There are weekly case note audits to look at the quality of dialog+ including patients’ views, which provides opportunities for clarity of processes and expectations related to this documentation to be reinforced.

Understanding of Risk Although you have – very properly – not specified which staff you are referring to, the Trust believes it knows who you mean. I do, very respectfully, want to emphasise that human error can always occur in a high-pressure situation, and an isolated occurrence of human error does not in and of itself mean someone is unsuited to a caring role. The Trust has carefully considered this and reviewed matters with staff as necessary. Attitudinal Concerns All qualified nursing staff are undergoing brief initial training around the role of the nurse in charge which includes allocation of outstanding tasks (assessments, care plans etc) and monitoring the completion of these. A longer electronic training package is being developed. This has already been completed in Tower Hamlets. A standardised handover template has been introduced which facilitates the identification of outstanding nursing and medical tasks to be allocated. The lead nurse and matrons are attending nursing handovers to monitor and embed this practice. The daily unit huddle meeting in the Tower Hamlets Center for Mental Health requires ward managers to feedback on each new admission and the completion of their initial assessments and care planning. This is monitored until it is reported that all tasks have been completed. There is a record kept of this. Effective Clinical Oversight of Medical Staff at Tower Hamlets Centre for Mental Health Concerns about the conduct or capability of medical staff are managed following the East London NHS Foundation Trust ‘Maintaining High Professional Standards in the Modern NHS’ (MHPS) policy, in line with the nationally agreed MHPS framework. It ensures all concerns are addressed fairly, transparently, and with patient safety as the priority. Misconduct matters are handled locally through the Trust’s Disciplinary Policy, with additional procedures for doctors under MHPS. The course of action depends on whether concerns are deemed serious or non-serious: non-serious concerns may be managed informally or through local resolution, while serious concerns trigger formal procedures as outlined in the MHPS and relevant disciplinary policies. These processes are implemented when necessary after considered review by medical managers and colleagues from Human Resources. External advice is routinely sought from Practitioner Performance Advice within NHS Resolution. Both before and subsequent to this incident occurring,

there have been occasions when formal measures have been put in place regarding the performance of medical staff in the Trust, demonstrating the seriousness with which the Trust take this issue.
 Conclusion I hope this response provides sufficient reassurances to you and to the family of about the learning that has taken place at the Trust since her sad death. I would like to offer my sincere and heart-felt condolences to her family at this difficult time.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 9 June 2022, an investigation was commenced into the death of [REDACTED], aged 23 years at the time of her death. The investigation concluded at the end of an inquest heard by me (and a jury) between 28 July 2025 and 15 August 2025. 

The inquest concluded with a short-form conclusion of misadventure. The medical cause of death was:  1a hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury 1b cardiac arrest  1c suspension by ligature
Circumstances of the death
The following is a summary of the jury’s findings: [REDACTED] was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and was admitted to Brick Lane Ward at the Tower Hamlets Centre for Mental Health (THCMH) on 2 June 2022. Following an escalation in her presentation she was transferred to Rosebank Ward (a psychiatric intensive care unit) at  THCMH on 5 June 2022. 

Following an incident that culminated in [REDACTED] mobile telephone being confiscated on the evening of 6 June 2022, [REDACTED] agitation increased. On the morning of 7 June 2022, [REDACTED] made numerous efforts to secure the return of her mobile telephone, to no avail. 

At 10:38 on 7 June 2022, [REDACTED] entered [REDACTED] (room 7). At 10:40 on 7 June 2022, [REDACTED] she was found unresponsive by staff in room 7 at 11:14. [REDACTED] did not intend to take her own life. 

She was subsequently conveyed to the Royal London Hospital, where her death was verified at 17:06 on 7 June 2022. 

The jury found that numerous factors probably contributed to  [REDACTED] death:  The automatic door locking or ‘fob’ system was not working; [REDACTED]   was not permitted access to items that could be used as a ligature, and the fact that the ‘fob’ system was not working [REDACTED]   Staff were aware of the increased risks of the ‘fob’ system not working, but there was ‘not a widespread practice of closing doors to prevent or  reduce the risk’;  The standard of observations being carried out at the time showed that observations were often not meeting the expectations of the Trust’s  own policy. 

They found a number of additional matters possibly contributed to the death.

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Report details

Reference
2025-0507
Date of report
1 September 2025
Coroner
Ian Potter
Coroner area
Inner North London

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 27 Jan 2026 (estimated).

Sent to

East London NHS Foundation Trust

Part of a series

4 reports
2018-0405 All responses identified
2023-0234 All responses identified
2026-0178 0 responses identified

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