Central Emergency Taskforces

The government has revised its crisis management governance processes. The Amber Book, which was updated and republished in April 2025, sets out the principles for establishing and running a taskforce to oversee the enduring response to a significant and protracted crisis. As a part of routine planning for large-scale risks, operational plans for a pandemic taskforce have been drafted and are included in the Cabinet Office Pandemic Concept of Operations.

The UK government taskforce would be situated within the Cabinet Office in order to support ministerial collective agreement, coordinate and oversee strategy and policy, and coordinate the data and analysis needed to support cross-government decision-making, including equalities-related data. Strong links will be maintained between the taskforce and UK government departmental response functions. As set out in the Amber Book, the Cabinet Secretary is expected to appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the taskforce.

The taskforce would incorporate liaison officers representing the devolved governments and the UK government. This structure is intended to facilitate alignment across the four nations and between all enduring response structures. The recent national pandemic exercise (Exercise Pegasus) tested key elements of a taskforce, and included participation of liaison officers from the devolved governments.

SAGE and its sub-groups would be activated to provide scientific and technical advice, with representation from all four nations.

A number of pre-existing four nations bodies, which provide advice to the government on the management of zoonotic disease, would be integrated into the pandemic response should the pathogen be zoonotic in nature. These bodies support the ‘One Health’ approach adopted by the UK government, which considers the interdependencies of human, animal, plant, and environmental health.

Accepted

The Executive accepts Recommendations 10 and 12 and considers them complementary in strengthening strategic and operational governance arrangements here. We recognise the importance of clear, coherent and proportionate decision‑making arrangements to support preparedness for future pandemics and other whole‑system emergencies.

The Covid‑19 pandemic demonstrated the need for governance structures that can adapt as an emergency evolves, including the ability to move from early response arrangements to more sustained strategic and operational oversight.

It is essential that such arrangements here reflect the statutory responsibilities of Ministers, the collective role of the Executive, and established accountability to the Assembly.

Our future preparedness strategies will, therefore, set out how decision-making will operate across the lifecycle of an emergency, including how governance arrangements will transition as the nature, scale and duration of an emergency change. These arrangements must ensure clarity of roles and effective coordination across our departments, while maintaining appropriate alignment with wider scientific, operational and public health considerations.

We have incorporated the pilot of this into the existing Pandemic Resilience Steering Group (formerly the Cross-Departmental Pandemic Resilience Programme Board), jointly chaired by the Department of Health and The Executive Office. This has strengthened whole-system planning and cross-government coordination. The Steering Group is overseeing the development of a Pandemic ‘Concept of Operations’ and is supporting the development of cross-cutting planning assumptions, a cumulative impact assessment, and improved interdepartmental collaboration in preparation for future pandemics.

As outlined further in our response to Recommendations 18 and 19, we recognise the importance of early and consistent engagement by the devolved governments in UK-level coordination arrangements during whole-system emergencies. The Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated that decisions taken at a UK level can have direct and immediate implications here, making NI Ministerial and senior official involvement from the outset essential to ensuring that our legal, operational and regional context is fully reflected.

Through our response to Module 1 of the Covid-19 Inquiry, we have already strengthened our Civil Contingencies governance arrangements via enhanced NICS Board oversight, more structured Ministerial engagement following the meetings of the Civil Contingencies Group (Northern Ireland) (CCG(NI)), and significant senior participation in Exercise Pegasus. Exercise Pegasus provided a valuable opportunity to test strategic and operational decision-making processes and demonstrated the Executive’s ability to operate within tiered emergency governance arrangements.

Broader civil contingencies improvements, including strengthened reporting between CCG(NI) and the NICS Board, the operation of a dynamic risk review cycle, and enhanced learning and development arrangements further support our capacity to operate effectively within complex emergency decision-making environments.

We recognise that our current structures, following an activation of the NI Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA), are unlikely to be suitable beyond an initial 3-4-week period. As such, the Executive agrees that future whole-system emergencies would benefit from a clearly defined enduring response structure, similar to the UK Taskforce Model, to support decision-making. Any such model would need to operate within existing civil contingencies arrangements and be tailored to local governance and operational requirements. The development of this model is being taken forward through the review of the Civil Contingencies Framework and through our strategic risk project which is reviewing catastrophic risks specific to here. The precise composition of this enduring response structure remains under consideration; however, key functions are likely to include dedicated teams for the coordination of cross-government and expert advice, maintenance of a consolidated data and intelligence picture, early identification of cross-cutting risks, and managed progression through the various stages of the emergency management cycle.

The development of these future arrangements will give regard to the constitutional arrangements here, our statutory responsibilities and the Executive’s accountability to the Assembly. Additionally, we will consider how to incorporate decision making requirements arising from the land border, including cross-border health measures, data sharing and operational alignment.

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle. CIREG also emphasised the need for strengthened data quality and integration. We recognise the importance of having a central body that can coordinate a consistent data picture and provide clear, timely evidence to support decision-making structures. To achieve this, we are formalising the operational approach for such a group within our Pandemic Response Governance Outline.

Related decision-making structures and processes remain subject to standard requirements for record keeping, under the Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011 and release of information.

As part of the Future Pandemic Preparedness programme key enhancements to existing practice relevant to this recommendation will include:

drawing together evidence on the potential impacts associated with some of the key interventions the Scottish Government may choose to introduce in response to a future pandemic. This will examine the evidence related to different vulnerable groups and will form an evidence repository that can be updated rapidly and used to inform future emergency decision-making during a crisis. This will include creating a suite of pre-prepared foundational impact assessments of PHSMs, which will be revisited during a crisis using the latest data and evidence. Work on these impact assessments is now under way as part of the Scottish Government’s reform programme for impact assessments and statutory duties

integrating practical checkpoints into the strategic policy coordination process and consideration of impact so at-risk groups and high-impact populations are systematically considered

leveraging data-driven tools and cross-government collaboration to deliver a proactive, transparent, and adaptable Impact Assessment models and tools to support emergency decision-making

The Scottish Government considers data and analytical input is central to the functioning of any response to future pandemics. An analytical framework for future pandemics has now been developed and ensures we are well-positioned to deliver timely, coordinated, and impactful analysis during a pandemic.

We are reviewing lessons learned from Exercise Pegasus and have updated the analytical framework to clarify in more detail how analysis feeds into relevant documents such as situational reports and Cabinet papers.

3.9. In our response to recommendation 2 of the Module 1 report, we recognised that in the event of a prolonged, whole system emergency, that the lead government department model has limitations and a different model might be required. We also recognise that effective emergency response requires structures for making decisions, but it also requires structures which ensure that decision-makers have the advice they need to make those decisions and then ensure that the decisions taken are implemented.

3.10. We accept recommendation 12, that the response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each nation, which will have responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, the coordination of a single data picture and the facilitation of decision-making processes. The Welsh Government’s Covid-19 Taskforce was an essential component of our internal arrangements during the pandemic, as the Inquiry itself has noted.

3.11. In response to recommendation 2 of the Module 1 report, we established a sub-group, under our Risk & Preparedness Committee, to consider potential models including an enduring taskforce for whole system emergencies. The enduring taskforce will provide a dedicated vehicle for scenarios where the coordination of a prolonged emergency response is required. The objectives of the taskforce are:

• Dedicated resources to coordinate a cross-government response for a whole-system prolonged crisis;

• Dedicated governance structures to enable cross-government decision-making and accountability;

• Enable strategic leadership; and

• Integrate recovery of communities, economy and society within decision making earlier within the response considerations.

3.12. As part of our commitments to continued learning, we included a pilot of the task force during Exercise Pegasus. Information from the exercise will be used to refine the taskforce model, including key roles, escalation and de-escalation processes. The enduring taskforce will be incorporated into the Crisis Management Concept of Operations which will be published in early summer 2026.

No statement on delivery from Cabinet Office has been found in the sources searched. This is separate from the response above.