Pandemic Decision-Making Framework
COVID-19 Inquiry · Module 2: Core Decision-Making · Issued 20 November 2025 · Addressed to: Cabinet Office
Government responseUK Government: Accepted (Mar 2026)Northern Ireland Executive: Accepted (Mar 2026)Scottish Government: Accepted in part (Mar 2026)Welsh Government: Noted (Mar 2026)
DeliveryNo statement from Cabinet Office found
Recommendation, verbatim from the inquiry
●Inquiry recommendation
The UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4) how decision-making will work in a future pandemic.
This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK government and devolved administrations will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the emergency will be longer-term.
It should include provision for longer-term decision-making structures in the UK government which consist of:
a strategy group to set the overall approach to each stage of the pandemic and take decisions on major interventions (eg entering and exiting lockdown); and
an operational group to take decisions on the implementation of the agreed strategy throughout the pandemic.
The design of these structures should include an outline of decision-making procedures for each group.
The strategy should make express provision for the involvement of the UK Cabinet in the decision-making of the strategy and operational groups.
It should also provide that longer-term decision-making should be conducted primarily by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Cabinets and the Northern Ireland Executive.
Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard.
COVID-19 Inquiry, Module 2: Core Decision-Making · 20 Nov 2025 Source PDF →
Published evidence summary
AI-generated evidence summary
The Inquiry asked governments to set out pandemic decision-making structures in preparedness strategies. In March 2026, the UK Government (Cabinet Office) stated that initial crisis responses would use Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) before transitioning to strategy and operational committees, with the Minister for Women and Equalities representing vulnerable groups (Cabinet Office response, Mar 2026). The Northern Ireland Executive stated in March 2026 that the design of an enduring response structure remained under consideration (Northern Ireland Executive response, Mar 2026). The Scottish Government confirmed in March 2026 that its governance outline established strategic and operational structures, while the Welsh Government stated in March 2026 that decisions on devolved matters must remain with Welsh Ministers from the outset (Welsh Government response, Mar 2026; Scottish Government response, Mar 2026). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of March 2026 (Cabinet Office response, Mar 2026).
Sources
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 7 Oct 2026.
About this summary
Government response
●UK Government · Accepted · 25 Mar 2026
The government’s strategic approach to pandemic preparedness is set out in the DHSC-led Pandemic Preparedness Strategy. This reinforces the commitment to working in partnership across government and with the devolved governments to effectively plan for and respond to pandemics. It outlines the principles and high level approach to further strengthen cross government and four nation collaboration, ensuring a whole-system response. It also recognises that devolved governments are responsible for making their own decisions in line with their devolved responsibilities.
In line with this, and in addition to the Amber Book, the Cabinet Office has collaborated with other UK government departments and the devolved governments to develop risk-specific operational plans for whole-system emergencies, such as pandemics, which define roles, structures, and decision-making processes. This includes a Concept of Operations for responding to a pandemic which sets out the practical arrangements to support decision-making in order to deliver the strategic response to a pandemic including considering cascading impacts beyond immediate health outcomes.
For the initial phase of a crisis, the UK government response would be managed through COBR. Consideration would then be given to transitioning to a taskforce model, with associated committee meetings for ministers and officials, for the enduring response.
The specific Cabinet committee structures supporting the response will be established by the Prime Minister of the day, upon the advice of the Cabinet Secretary. The Amber Book provides a default model recommending two Cabinet committees, focusing on Strategy and Operations, to respond to a future pandemic. Arrangements will be made at the time to ensure a seamless transition between COBR and any new Cabinet committee(s), with departments in the UK government and the devolved governments being engaged.
Operational planning includes the expectation that devolved governments would be invited to participate in pandemic COBR and taskforce meetings as appropriate. Devolved government officials will also be invited to serve as liaison officers within the taskforce, facilitating joined-up strategy and implementation at all levels.
The UK government is actively working to enhance its understanding of vulnerabilities during a pandemic, as set out in recommendation 8. This includes considering how equalities concerns and the impacts of response measures on vulnerable groups including children and young people can be most effectively represented at a ministerial level. The UK government will ensure that the Minister for Women and Equalities is engaged in decision-making in this area, alongside any lead Ministers.
Extract from: UK Government Response to the Covid-19 Inquiry Module 2 Report
●Northern Ireland Executive · Accepted · 18 Mar 2026
Accepted
The Executive accepts Recommendations 10 and 12 and considers them complementary in strengthening strategic and operational governance arrangements here. We recognise the importance of clear, coherent and proportionate decision‑making arrangements to support preparedness for future pandemics and other whole‑system emergencies.
The Covid‑19 pandemic demonstrated the need for governance structures that can adapt as an emergency evolves, including the ability to move from early response arrangements to more sustained strategic and operational oversight.
It is essential that such arrangements here reflect the statutory responsibilities of Ministers, the collective role of the Executive, and established accountability to the Assembly.
Our future preparedness strategies will, therefore, set out how decision-making will operate across the lifecycle of an emergency, including how governance arrangements will transition as the nature, scale and duration of an emergency change. These arrangements must ensure clarity of roles and effective coordination across our departments, while maintaining appropriate alignment with wider scientific, operational and public health considerations.
We have incorporated the pilot of this into the existing Pandemic Resilience Steering Group (formerly the Cross-Departmental Pandemic Resilience Programme Board), jointly chaired by the Department of Health and The Executive Office. This has strengthened whole-system planning and cross-government coordination. The Steering Group is overseeing the development of a Pandemic ‘Concept of Operations’ and is supporting the development of cross-cutting planning assumptions, a cumulative impact assessment, and improved interdepartmental collaboration in preparation for future pandemics.
As outlined further in our response to Recommendations 18 and 19, we recognise the importance of early and consistent engagement by the devolved governments in UK-level coordination arrangements during whole-system emergencies. The Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated that decisions taken at a UK level can have direct and immediate implications here, making NI Ministerial and senior official involvement from the outset essential to ensuring that our legal, operational and regional context is fully reflected.
Through our response to Module 1 of the Covid-19 Inquiry, we have already strengthened our Civil Contingencies governance arrangements via enhanced NICS Board oversight, more structured Ministerial engagement following the meetings of the Civil Contingencies Group (Northern Ireland) (CCG(NI)), and significant senior participation in Exercise Pegasus. Exercise Pegasus provided a valuable opportunity to test strategic and operational decision-making processes and demonstrated the Executive’s ability to operate within tiered emergency governance arrangements.
Broader civil contingencies improvements, including strengthened reporting between CCG(NI) and the NICS Board, the operation of a dynamic risk review cycle, and enhanced learning and development arrangements further support our capacity to operate effectively within complex emergency decision-making environments.
We recognise that our current structures, following an activation of the NI Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA), are unlikely to be suitable beyond an initial 3-4-week period. As such, the Executive agrees that future whole-system emergencies would benefit from a clearly defined enduring response structure, similar to the UK Taskforce Model, to support decision-making. Any such model would need to operate within existing civil contingencies arrangements and be tailored to local governance and operational requirements. The development of this model is being taken forward through the review of the Civil Contingencies Framework and through our strategic risk project which is reviewing catastrophic risks specific to here. The precise composition of this enduring response structure remains under consideration; however, key functions are likely to include dedicated teams for the coordination of cross-government and expert advice, maintenance of a consolidated data and intelligence picture, early identification of cross-cutting risks, and managed progression through the various stages of the emergency management cycle.
The development of these future arrangements will give regard to the constitutional arrangements here, our statutory responsibilities and the Executive’s accountability to the Assembly. Additionally, we will consider how to incorporate decision making requirements arising from the land border, including cross-border health measures, data sharing and operational alignment.
Response document: Executive Response to the Covid-19 Module 2 Report March 2026
●Scottish Government · Accepted in part · 17 Mar 2026
The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle and recognises the importance of taking action to manage future pandemic risks, including ensuring we have clear strategic and operational structures for this. Our strategic and operational structures are set out in our Pandemic Response Governance Outline (ScotOps). Related decision-making structures and processes remain subject to standard requirements for record keeping, under the Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011 and release of information.
During a pandemic, Cabinet continues to be the main decision-making body of the Scottish Government. The Scottish Cabinet is made up of the First Minister and all Cabinet Secretaries, including the Cabinet Secretary with portfolio responsibility for human rights and inequalities. This is currently the Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice.
The Permanent Secretary attends Cabinet meetings as Secretary to the Cabinet. Cabinet is also supported by Cabinet Secretariat who ensure the Scottish Government functions effectively by managing the agenda, minutes, and flow of information for Cabinet meetings and aiding with the coordination and implementation of policy, ensuring Cabinet decisions are translated into action across government.
As part of the Future Pandemic Preparedness programme key enhancements to existing practice on decision-making will include embedding equality roles in governance to ensure equity considerations are integral to decision-making.
Response document: UK Covid-19 Inquiry - Module 2 report: Scottish Government response, page 5
●Welsh Government · Noted · 16 Mar 2026
3.1. The Welsh Government recognises that an effective response to large-scale emergencies affecting all parts of the UK requires close working among all four nations. We agree that decision-making and coordination processes and structures need to be clearly defined and transparent, reflecting that responsibility for decisions in respect of areas devolved to Wales lies with Welsh Ministers. Arrangements for working together on a four-nations basis should be grounded in partnership, trust and mutual respect – never on perceived hierarchy – and should adhere to the principles, structures and approaches set out in the Review of Intergovernmental Relations. Where an incident is impacting, or has the potential to impact Wales, the Welsh Government will activate its crisis management arrangements without delay in a way which is proportionate to the scale and extent of the incident.
3.2. We support continuing the practice of early COBR meetings or four-nation discussions at the start of a UK-wide crisis. We accept that COBR will in many scenarios be the forum where potential decisions are discussed (and where a four-nation consensus on the decisions which need to be taken can hopefully be achieved). However, decisions relating to devolved matters must be taken by the Welsh Government from the outset, and not by COBR. The exercise of devolved responsibilities cannot be delegated to any other body, even in an emergency: the Welsh Government is accountable to the Senedd for the exercise of devolved powers, including in respect of decision-making during any future pandemic or other emergency.
3.3. We also agree in principle that decision-making groups should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups; it will be for the Welsh Government in office after the Senedd elections in May 2026 to determine its Ministerial portfolios.
Response document: UK Covid-19 Inquiry Modules 2, 2A, 2B, 2C Report (Core decision-making and political governance): Welsh Government response
Delivery
No statement on delivery from Cabinet Office has been found in the sources searched. This is separate from the response above.
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