Public Inquiry

The ICL Inquiry

Completed · Chair: Lord Gill · Established January 2008 · Commissioned by Scottish Government

Inquiry into the Stockline Plastics factory explosion in Glasgow on 11 May 2004 which killed 9 workers.

More about this inquiry

Inquiry into the Stockline Plastics factory explosion in Glasgow on 11 May 2004 which killed 9 workers. Found that corroded LPG pipework caused the explosion. Described as "short, sharp and hard-hitting" - completed in 13 months at £1.9m cost.

Where it stands

Government response (7 recommendations)

Delivery (the addressees’ latest statements)

  • Health and Safety Executive says partially delivered 3
  • No statement from Health and Safety Executive found in the sources searched 2
  • Health and Safety Executive says in progress 2

Record checked against the sources 6 February 2026. Latest activity 4 August 2016.

Latest on the recommendations

All 7 recommendations

Reports

Reports and timeline

Recent milestones

  • Report published16 July 2009
  • Inquiry set up and chairman formally appointed21 January 2008
  • Inquiry announced1 October 2007
Full timeline

Costs

£1,900,000

Reported cost Costs in detail

Parliament

1

mention in Parliament Parliamentary activity

Recommendations

4 shown (filtered)
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ICL-1: Replace Buried Metallic LPG Pipes

Accepted · Health and Safety Executive says partially delivered

Recommended

An urgent programme of replacement of buried metallic LPG pipework with polyethylene piping should be implemented.

Since then (summary written by this site)

The Inquiry recommended urgently replacing buried metallic liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) pipework with polyethylene. In August 2016, UKLPG and the Health and Safety Executive reported that suppliers had replaced pipework at approximately 4,500 priority 1 sites by 2015, but explained that longer deadlines applied to lower-risk pipes while regulators addressed remaining resistant customers (UKLPG and Health and Safety Executive, Aug 2016). HM Government had agreed in March 2010 that metallic service pipework in industrial and commercial premises should be replaced (Department for Work and Pensions response, Mar 2010). In August 2009, Judith Hackitt CBE, Chair of the executive, had initially planned to complete the replacement programme by the end of 2015 (Judith Hackitt, Aug 2009).

Addressed to Health and Safety Executive · Full record

ICL-5: Polyethylene Piping Research

Accepted · Health and Safety Executive says in progress (4 August 2016; nothing later found)

Recommended

Research into the safety of polyethylene piping should be conducted to ensure long-term reliability.

Since then (summary written by this site)

The Inquiry recommended research into the safety and long-term reliability of polyethylene piping. In August 2016, UKLPG and the Health and Safety Executive reported that a review of literature and consultations with manufacturers had been unable to provide an adequate assessment of pipework lifetime under liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) use (UKLPG and Health and Safety Executive, Aug 2016). It stated that research assessing pipe samples that had carried LPG remained ongoing to inform future replacement and maintenance strategies (UKLPG and Health and Safety Executive, Aug 2016). HM Government had accepted the recommendation in March 2010, agreeing that sufficient knowledge of replacement materials was necessary (Department for Work and Pensions response, Mar 2010).

Addressed to Health and Safety Executive · Full record

ICL-6: LPG Safety Communications

Accepted · Health and Safety Executive says in progress (4 August 2016; nothing later found)

Recommended

There should be prompt and effective communication between all interested parties of all technical developments in matters of LPG safety.

Since then (summary written by this site)

The Inquiry recommended prompt communication among all parties on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) safety. In August 2016, UKLPG and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) reported that formal meetings to monitor pipework replacement continued three to four times a year and that regular monitoring would continue with a lighter touch, but communication of all technical developments to all interested parties is not mentioned in the sources (UKLPG and Health and Safety Executive, Aug 2016). Earlier, in March 2010, HM Government agreed that effective communication was vitally important to ensuring the continuing safety of small bulk installations (Department for Work and Pensions response, Mar 2010).

Addressed to Health and Safety Executive · Full record

ICL-7: Legal Responsibility Awareness

Accepted · Health and Safety Executive says partially delivered

Recommended

Awareness of legal responsibilities should be raised among LPG suppliers and consumers.

Since then (summary written by this site)

The Inquiry recommended raising legal responsibility awareness among liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) suppliers and consumers. In August 2016, UKLPG and the Health and Safety Executive reported that they had delivered a communication programme to advise pipework owners of their responsibilities, noting a survey found 43% of commercial users were aware of their legal obligations (UKLPG and Health and Safety Executive, Aug 2016). The joint report described work directed at consumers, while measures addressing suppliers were not mentioned (UKLPG and Health and Safety Executive, Aug 2016). HM Government (Department for Work and Pensions) had accepted the recommendation in March 2010, stating that the executive would prepare practical advice for users in consultation with UKLPG (Department for Work and Pensions response, Mar 2010).

Addressed to Health and Safety Executive · Full record

Reports and timeline

Timeline

Inquiry announced

Source

Inquiry set up and chairman formally appointed

Source

Report published

Source

Parliamentary activity

1 mention since Dec 2025
1 question

ICL Inquiry

Written Question House of Commons Simon Hoare · Conservative

Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, what the official closing date under section 14 of the Inquiries Act 2005 was for the public inquiry entitled ICL Inquiry.

Answered by Department for Work and Pensions: The independent public inquiry entitled ICL Inquiry, officially closed when its final report was presented to the House of Commons and the Scottish Parliament under Section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005 in July 2009.

View all 1 mention →

Evidence & impact

AI-generated · 26 Mar 2026
The ICL Inquiry was established in April 2009 following an explosion at ICL Plastics Ltd in Glasgow that killed nine people and injured 33. Lord Gill's inquiry examined the causes of the explosion and made recommendations to prevent similar incidents. The inquiry published its final report in December 2016, making seven recommendations focused on improving LPG safety.

The government's response, published in Command Paper 7849, accepted five recommendations fully, one in principle, and rejected one. The key recommendation for replacing buried metallic LPG service pipes was accepted, with HSE tasked to implement a nationwide programme targeting up to 40,000 premises. Higher-risk premises were scheduled for completion by end 2013, with all industrial and commercial premises by 2015.

The government rejected the recommendation for mandatory independent audits of all workplace risk assessments, citing 78% stakeholder opposition and stating that other proposed measures for LPG installations made independent audit unnecessary. The recommendation for an accredited registration scheme for LPG suppliers was accepted in principle, with 70% stakeholder support, though the government sought further consultation on implementation options.

According to HSE confirmation dated December 2015, all buried metallic LPG service pipe replacements were completed by the 2015 deadline. The same update indicates completion status for all seven recommendations, though specific details of implementation for recommendations beyond the pipe replacement programme are not provided in the available evidence.

Other documented actions include HSE's development of web-based guidance for LPG users, establishment of regular communication channels between HSE and industry bodies, and HSE-funded research into polyethylene piping safety. The evidence suggests a focus on improving guidance, compliance and enforcement within the existing legislative framework rather than introducing new legislation.
Reforms attributed to this inquiry · AI-generated- HSE implemented nationwide programme for replacement of buried metallic LPG service pipes at industrial and commercial premises, with completion reported by 2015
- HSE developed web-based guidance for LPG users on meeting statutory obligations
- Strengthened installation record requirements and supplier asset registers for LPG installations
- Enhanced communication channels established between HSE, UKLPG and industry stakeholders through regular meetings and working groups
- HSE funded research into polyethylene piping safety and published guidance for domestic LPG customers

Key facts

Duration: 1 year, 5 months Total reported cost: £1.9m