Public Inquiry

The ICL Inquiry

Status: Completed Chair: Lord Gill Established: Apr 2009 Report: Jul 2009 Commissioned by: Scottish Government

Inquiry into the Stockline Plastics factory explosion in Glasgow on 11 May 2004 which killed 9 workers. Found that corroded LPG pipework caused the explosion. Described as "short, sharp and hard-hitting" - completed in 13 months at £1.9m cost.

Response breakdown

7 recommendations total
71%
14%
14%
5 (71%)Accepted
1 (14%)Accepted in Part
1 (14%)Not Accepted

Evidence & impact

AI-generated · 26 Mar 2026
The ICL Inquiry was established in April 2009 following an explosion at ICL Plastics Ltd in Glasgow that killed nine people and injured 33. Lord Gill's inquiry examined the causes of the explosion and made recommendations to prevent similar incidents. The inquiry published its final report in December 2016, making seven recommendations focused on improving LPG safety.

The government's response, published in Command Paper 7849, accepted five recommendations fully, one in principle, and rejected one. The key recommendation for replacing buried metallic LPG service pipes was accepted, with HSE tasked to implement a nationwide programme targeting up to 40,000 premises. Higher-risk premises were scheduled for completion by end 2013, with all industrial and commercial premises by 2015.

The government rejected the recommendation for mandatory independent audits of all workplace risk assessments, citing 78% stakeholder opposition and stating that other proposed measures for LPG installations made independent audit unnecessary. The recommendation for an accredited registration scheme for LPG suppliers was accepted in principle, with 70% stakeholder support, though the government sought further consultation on implementation options.

According to HSE confirmation dated December 2015, all buried metallic LPG service pipe replacements were completed by the 2015 deadline. The same update indicates completion status for all seven recommendations, though specific details of implementation for recommendations beyond the pipe replacement programme are not provided in the available evidence.

Other documented actions include HSE's development of web-based guidance for LPG users, establishment of regular communication channels between HSE and industry bodies, and HSE-funded research into polyethylene piping safety. The evidence suggests a focus on improving guidance, compliance and enforcement within the existing legislative framework rather than introducing new legislation.

Reports & milestones

Reports

Timeline

18 Dec 2008 Inquiry Announced
27 Apr 2009 Inquiry Establish…
17 Dec 2016 Final Report Publ…

Recommendations

7 shown
Code Recommendation Addressed to Response
ICL-1
An urgent programme of replacement of buried metallic LPG pipework with polyethylene piping should be implemented.
Health and Safety Executive Accepted View →
ICL-2
A new safety regime should be put in place governing the installation, maintenance, monitoring and replacement of all LPG systems.
Health and Safety Executive Accepted View →
ICL-3
A new scheme should be introduced requiring all LPG suppliers to be registered and accredited.
Health and Safety Executive Accepted in Part View →
ICL-4
The current risk assessment system should be improved by the addition of an independent audit process.
Health and Safety Executive Not Accepted View →
ICL-5
Research into the safety of polyethylene piping should be conducted to ensure long-term reliability.
Health and Safety Executive Accepted View →
ICL-6
There should be prompt and effective communication between all interested parties of all technical developments in matters of LPG safety.
Health and Safety Executive Accepted View →
ICL-7
Awareness of legal responsibilities should be raised among LPG suppliers and consumers.
Health and Safety Executive Accepted View →

Parliamentary activity

1 mention since Dec 2025
1 question
02 Dec 2025 Written Question ICL Inquiry
Simon Hoare (Conservative)
View all 1 mention →