Completed
· Chair: Desmond Fennell QC
· Established November 1987
· Commissioned by Department for Transport
Investigation into the King's Cross Underground fire of 18 November 1987 which killed 31 people.
More about this inquiry
Investigation into the King's Cross Underground fire of 18 November 1987 which killed 31 people. Found the fire was caused by a lighted match igniting accumulated grease beneath a wooden escalator.
All escalator trusses shall be fitted with linear heat detectors and machine rooms with smoke detectors. Priority should be given to escalators with wooden components and consideration given to moving the water fog valves to a protected location outside the machine room. The eventual aim should be for the detection equipment to activate an alarm system, automatic sprinklers or water fog equipment where suitable.
A replacement programme of six or more escalator renewals per year shall be established. Escalator design shall be reviewed to allow easier and more effective cleaning.
The water supply to sprinkler equipment shall be fitted with a pressure gauge and by-pass valve. London Fire Brigade should be invited to attend London Underground water fog tests.
The remote monitoring equipment being fitted to escalators and lifts shall be modified so as to record any activation of smoke or heat detectors. This work should be completed by the end of 1989.
All messages received or made by HQ and line controllers must be timed and recorded with an effective retrieval system. A telephone system incorporating the most up-to-date facilities shall also be provided, as should data and video transmission equipment.
Principles for the location and equipping of station operations rooms must be agreed by all those concerned and followed by London Underground in their future planning.
London Underground shall undertake further research into the effect of trains on air movement in the Underground. London Underground should provide criteria by which line controllers, who have received a report of fire, can judge whether it is safe to continue to run trains.
In agreement with the London Fire Brigade, London Underground shall produce and maintain up-to-date station plans, and place them in boxes it has provided, at locations agreed or specified by the London Fire Brigade.
The London Fire Brigade shall attend all pre-start meetings and important later meetings in relation to construction works on the Underground. Details of the works shall be included on the Fire Brigade's central risks register. Fire equipment and London Fire Brigade plan boxes affected must be relocated before work starts.
The emergency services shall review the exchange of information between themselves and London Underground during an incident, both at their controls and at the site. The London Fire Brigade should send an officer to attend at London Underground HQ as soon as a major incident seems likely to develop. At the site of incidents, the London Fire Brigade must nominate an officer to liaise with London Underground and each of the emergency services.
The London Underground HQ controller and the British Transport Police L Division information room must maintain a list of the position of all station plans and key holders. British Transport Police officers shall hold or have access to keys for all station entrances and exits.
Addressed to British Transport Police · Full record
The British Railways Board as employers of the British Transport Police shall discuss with the Home Office closer links between the British Transport Police and other police forces.
The London Fire Brigade shall ensure that its officers are made familiar with the geography and layout of underground stations on their own and adacent fireground lerritories.
The London Fire Brigade shall review the provision of protective clothing for its personnel, and in particular gloves, in the light of the injuries sustained by fire-fighters at King's Cross.
The London Ambulance Service shall improve its arrangements for the attendance of a senior incident officer when a major incident may develop and shall review the procedure for the attendance of its command and control vehicle at major accidents.
Addressed to London Ambulance Service NHS Trust · Full record
Replacement of the wooden risers must be urgently sought in view of the discovery of the 'trench effect' and the conclusions of the report referred to in Appendix G as Report 4n.
Escalators shall be manually cleaned at least every six months until the rewiring of machine rooms is completed. Thereafter they shall be mechanically cleaned in accordance with the programme determined under Recommendation 38. Escalator steps must be removed as necessary, and the means of access and protective clothing improved for those doing the work.
Further research shall be undertaken into the dynamics of fires in escalator shafts by London Underground using the available scale models and computer simulation.
The annual inspection by the London Fire Brigade of underground stations and tunnels shall continue, and unsatisfactory features must be remedied and reported on within six weeks. Copies of the reports shall be sent to the Chief Safety Inspector and Railway Inspectorate and arrangements shall be made by London Underground to publish the reports in consultation with the London Fire Brigade and the London Regional Passengers' Committee.
Keys must always be readily available for unmanned locked gates at station exits. There shall be communication equipment or remote monitoring equipment at these gates.
Station ventilation systems must be checked to ensure that contaminated air cannot be introduced into the rooms they serve. Instructions must be issued on any action to be taken in the event of a fire.
A survey must be carried out of all remaining VIR cable installations and a renewal programme established. The electrical wiring, lighting, decoration, and general state of machine rooms and shafts must be improved. The waterproofing of electrical equipment to permit mechanical cleaning must then be undertaken.
All machine rooms and shafts must be specially cleaned by the end of I988 and regularly cleaned thereafter. Essential cleaning materials shall be kept only in small quantities and in correctly marked containers in fire-proof bins.
Reports of fires and smoke shall be produced promptly and an analysis made available for management and Board meetings, the Railway Inspectorate, the London Fire Brigade, and the London Regional Passengers' Committee.
The Senior Fire Officer of London Underground, under the direction of the new Chief Safety Inspector, shall review the scope, effectiveness and organisation of the fire section and station fire equipment in consultation with the London Fire Brigade.
The Chief Safety Inspector shall review existing safety arrangements, identify hazards, recommend policies, objectives and systems to meet those hazards, and thereafter audit the effectiveness of the system. He should have direct access to the Chief Executive of London Underground and the power to call for any reports, logs and correspondence relating to safety.
In consultation with the emergency services the Chief Safety Inspector shall carry out a survey of each station in order to recommend the means of achieving satisfactory safety levels. The survey must particularly address the most effective combination of equipment and staff.
London Underground must establish a managed safety programme under the control of the Director and Company Secretary initially to implement the recommendations in this Report. In time it should be extended to cover other activities.
London Underground shall continue the cleaning programme it has started in all areas of stations. Consideration must be given to limiting the sale on its premises of merchandise which produces significant quantities of litter.
London Underground shall undertake an investigation of the problems of passenger flow and congestion in stations and take remedial action. They shall obtain advice from the London Fire Brigade and those with technical expertise. Reports of the most serious incidents of congestion must be made to the Board of London Underground and to the Railway Inspectorate.
London Underground shall review the administration of the Code of Practice for the use of materials. All materials used in new works, modernisation, or maintenance must comply with the Code of Practice unless a specific waiver is obtained.
London Underground shall survey materials present on the system, evaluate the risks involved from those materials and devise a programme to remove those which constitute a hazard.
London Underground shall not permit alterations to any station operations room or supervisor's office which would reduce the effectiveness of communications and control.
Combustible items such as paper and card shall not be stored at stations unless properly protected from the risk of fire. This recommendation and the Code of Practice shall apply to all occupiers of premises on the Underground.
London Underground shall agree with the relevant local authority, who is responsible for cleaning areas around stations such as access passages and toilets.
London Underground shall inform the London Regional Passengers' Committee, as the statutory body which represents the interests of passengers, of the conclusions and recommendations of internal inquiries into accidents which might affect passengers.
A non-executive director with special responsibility for safety shall be appointed to the Board of London Underground. He shall have direct access to the Chairman of London Regional Transport.
London Regional Transport shall establish a system whereby the safety of operation of London Underground can be the subject of audit. The Board of London Regional Transport shall receive reports on such audit.
London Underground shall establish a programme of continuing instruction at work by supervisors for station staff in fire and safety with the assistance of the London Fire Brigade and British Transport Police. At stations equipped with water fog equipment supervisors must be given practical training during the regular testing of the equipment.
Every two years all management and supervisory staff shall receive refresher training in controlling station emergencies, and the use of fire and communications equipment.
Every six months fire and safety training must be provided for non-supervisory staff and booking clerks. Staff must be given site familiarisation training before they are permitted to take part in the running of the station. Specific provision shall be made for the instruction of staff in shops and other premises in Underground stations.
There shall be a joint exercise with the emergency services at least twice each year. London Underground must involve as many different fire stations, staff and members of the public as possible.
London Underground shall engage consultants: (i) to rewrite the rule book and its appendices in plain English; (ii) to produce check lists for station supervisory staff and duty cards for members of staff; (iii) to produce relevant extracts from the rule book and appendices appropriate to each grade of staff: and (iv) to prepare station information books for each station. Illustralions and diagrams must he used whenever possible.
London Underground shall train London Fire Brigade Personnel on technical features of stations, such as escalator and lift equipment, electrical controls and the means of isolating the electrical supply.
London Underground shall only allocate staff to a role for which they are physically suitable. In the cause of safety, a proper balance must be ensured at each station.
The British Transport Police shall review the training given by London Underground to its officers to ensure that it is appropriate to their responsibilities.
Addressed to British Transport Police · Full record
London Underground and the British Transport Police must decide the most effective way to enforce the smoking prohibition and then train staff and officers accordingly. The criteria for prosecutions should be reviewed.
Addressed to British Transport Police; London Underground · Full record
London Underground shall reconsider and take advice on the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, and institute a series of training courses for middle and senior management.
London Underground shall make sure that all its written communications are in plain English and properly presented. They must check that instructions are being followed.
London Underground shall encourage staff to undergo further training by offering financial incentives and appropriate marks of distinction on uniforms.
London Underground shall regularly inspect communications equipment. Where it is out of order it must be clearly labelled. Defective equipment must be immediately reported for repair.
Closed circuit television equipment shall be improved to allow coverage in colour of wider areas of stations. Monitoring facilities shall be provided in the British Transport Police L Division information room and line controllers' rooms.
Platform and kiosk telephones, together with controls for public address equipment, must be clearly marked. At all telephone points there should be a list of key telephone numbers. An aide memoire of important telephone numbers should be issued to London Underground staff and the emergency services. Public pay telephones shall be provided more widely inside stations.
Comprehensive fire and smoke detection equipment, providing for remote monitoring and automatic operation of extinguishing devices, shall be fitted in underground stations as appropriate.
London Underground shall initiate a programme of research into the fire qualities of paint. The surface to which it is applied and the method of application must be considered. The result of this research must be incorporated in the Code of Practice.
London Undergound shall consult the London Fire Brigade and Railway Inspectorate about the means of escape and fire precaution measures in all future station refurbishment schemes.
The regular meetings at three levels of senior management between London Underground and the London Fire Brigade, and those between the Railway Inspectorate and the London Fire Brigade shall continue.
The Railway Inspectorate must be brought up to establishment to carry out its responsibilities under section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
Addressed to HM Railway Inspectorate · Full record
An observer from the Central Transport Consultative Committee, as the statutory body which represents the interests of the travelling public nationally, should be invited to attend meetings of the Railway Industry Advisory Committee.
Fires which occur outside traffic hours on London Underground must be reported. The Department oS Transport should secure such reports until the 'Railways (Notice of Accidents) Order 1986' [SI 1986 No 21871 has been amended.
The 'Department of Transport Railway Construction and Operation Requirements' in respect of underground railways and stations shall be reviewed, together with the letter dated 10 November 1958 to the railway undertakings entitled 'Submission of new works for approval by the Minister under S.41(1) of the Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933', in the light of: (i) the circumstances of the King's Cross fire; (ii) building regulations; (iii) legislation on fire prevention and precautions; and (iv) experience with other underground railway systems.
The designs for new stations or significant alterations to stations shall be scrutinised by the fire authority and the Railway Inspectorate with special regard to passenger safety and fire precautions.
There shall be twice-yearly meetings to discuss safety matters between the Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways, those of his staff responsible for enforcement on London Underground and the Engineering and Operations Directors and the Chief Safety Inspector of London Underground.
'The Offices Shops and Railway Premises (Hoists and Lifts) Regulations 1968' IS1 1968 No 8491 must be amended to require escalators and travolators in Underground stations to be inspected every six months by a competent person.
London Underground shall review its proposals for the working of the Underground Ticketing System (UTS) at stations and take advice from the Railway Inspectorate and the London Fire Brigade.
London Underground shall build a direct subway link between the tube lines and the Metropolitan and Circle Lines at King's Cross or provide alternative satisfactory means of relieving the serious congestion.
The trade unions shall appoint safety representatives as necessary under 'The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977' [SI 1977 No 5001 to provide a comprehensive system of safety committees covering all stations.
There must be more employee participation in the preparation and execution of London Underground's safety programmes in accordance with section 2(6) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
Explicit consideration by the Boards of London Regional Transport and London Underground shall always be given to safety when decisions on resource allocation and investment are being made.
Legislation against the dropping of litter on London Underground shall be introduced and a review undertaken of the byelaw prohibiting smoking and the penalties for the offence.
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a single passenger safety inspectorate charged with monitoring and supervising standards in all passenger transport.
Consideration should be given to a national disaster planning desk where the experience gained from disasters and their investigation and civil emergencies can be retained. Advice on the coordination of individual emergency plans should also be available at a national level.
A uniform documentation procedure for handling and receiving fatalities should be considered. In London all the services must meanwhile agree a common system for identification of casualties and recording the position in which they are found.
London Underground and London Regional Transport shall make regular reports to the Secretary of State for Transport upon their progress with the implementation of those recommendations directed at them.
Reports on the progress made by London Underground shall also be included in the annual reports of London Regional Transport, the London Regional Passengers' Committee and the Railway Inspectorate.
Early Day MotionHouse of CommonsMr Alistair Carmichael · Liberal Democrat
Said: This House congratulates Hannah Fennell and Sheila Keith on their appointments as the President and Vice-President of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF); notes their experience from their roles within the Orkney Fisheries Association and Shetland Fishermen’s Association; believes that the SFF has a key role …
Early Day MotionHouse of CommonsMrs Barbara Roche · Labour
Said: That this House notes that 10 of the recommendations made by the Fennell Inquiry into the King's Cross fire have not yet been implemented, including two which the report described as 'most important' and to be implemented 'without delay'; is particularly concerned that there are …
The Fennell Inquiry was established in February 1988 following the King's Cross Underground fire of 18 November 1987, which resulted in 31 deaths. Chaired by Desmond Fennell QC, the inquiry published its report in November 1988 containing 157 recommendations addressing fire safety management, emergency procedures, and escalator maintenance in Underground stations.
The inquiry's findings led to immediate regulatory changes. A complete smoking ban was introduced on the London Underground and all sub-surface railway stations in 1988. The Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989 established comprehensive fire safety standards for underground stations, representing the first dedicated fire safety legislation for such facilities.
Organisational reforms documented in the public record include London Underground's establishment of a dedicated safety directorate and a programme to replace wooden escalators across the network. The inquiry's recommendations addressed technical specifications (such as linear heat detectors on escalators), operational procedures (including staff training and emergency service coordination), and communication systems (improved public address equipment).
The Fennell Inquiry occupies a significant position in the development of UK transport safety regulation. Its recommendations contributed to the evolution of fire safety standards that would later inform the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. The inquiry's focus on both technical improvements and organisational culture in safety management established patterns that would influence subsequent transport safety inquiries.
Reforms attributed to this inquiry · AI-generated• Complete ban on smoking on the London Underground and all sub-surface railway stations (1988) • Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989, establishing new fire safety standards for underground stations • Creation of London Underground's dedicated safety directorate • Programme to replace wooden escalators across the London Underground network • Installation of linear heat detectors on escalator trusses and smoke detectors in machine rooms • Enhanced fire safety training requirements for London Underground staff and emergency services • Improved public address systems covering wider areas of stations • Establishment of designated rendezvous points for emergency services at each station
Key legislation
Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989Primary↗
Imposed new fire safety standards on underground railway stations following the King's Cross fire.
The King's Cross fire inquiry and the Clapham Junction rail crash inquiry both addressed fundamental failures in safety management within public transport, contributing to a broader reform of safety culture.