Completed
· Chair: Sir Martin Moore-Bick
· Established August 2017
· Commissioned by Cabinet Office
Public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, which killed 72 people.
More about this inquiry
Public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, which killed 72 people. The inquiry examined the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire.
The owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not they are high-rise buildings) carry out an urgent inspection of all fire doors to ensure that they comply with applicable legislative standards.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Home Office reported in February 2025 that the recommendation was complete following legislative changes (Home Office, Feb 2025). It stated that under the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022, responsible persons for multi-occupied residential buildings of 11 metres and above must conduct quarterly checks on fire doors in common parts and annual checks on flat entrance doors (Home Office, Feb 2025). The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government had previously issued advice in January 2020 recommending routine inspections of all fire doors by qualified professionals (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government response, Jan 2020).
Each emergency service must communicate the declaration of a Major Incident to all other Category 1 Responders as soon as possible.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported the recommendation as complete, stating that its requirements were incorporated into the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Joint Doctrine published in October 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department added that the revised London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Major Incidents Procedures Manual was published in November 2021, while London Fire Brigade remained in the process of revising its Major Incident Policy to include informing other category 1 responders (Home Office, Feb 2025).
On the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the control rooms of the individual emergency services.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported this recommendation as "complete", stating that provisions for inter-service communication were incorporated into the revised JESIP Joint Doctrine published in October 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department also noted in February 2025 that London's revised Major Incidents Procedures Manual was published in November 2021, while the London Fire Brigade was in the process of revising its Major Incident Policy to activate tri-service calls (Home Office, Feb 2025).
A single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported that action on this recommendation was complete, explaining that requirements were incorporated into the revised Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Joint Doctrine published in October 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025). In the same February 2025 update, the department noted that the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel had published an updated Major Incidents Procedures Manual in November 2021, while London Fire Brigade remained in the process of revising its Major Incident Policy (Home Office, Feb 2025).
A “METHANE” message should be sent as soon as possible by the emergency service declaring a Major Incident.
Since then (summary written by this site)
The Inquiry recommended sending a METHANE message promptly when declaring a Major Incident. In February 2025, the Home Office reported that the recommendation was complete, noting that relevant provisions were incorporated into the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Joint Doctrine in October 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025). The department added that London emergency services published a revised procedures manual addressing the issues in November 2021 (Home Office, Feb 2025). It also stated that London Fire Brigade was in the process of revising its Major Incident Policy to reinforce METHANE messaging (Home Office, Feb 2025).
Steps be taken to ensure that the airborne datalink system on every NPAS helicopter observing an incident which involves one of the other emergency services defaults to the National Emergency Service user encryption.
Since then (summary written by this site)
In February 2025, the Home Office reported the recommendation as complete, stating that the National Police Air Service had mandated refresher training across 43 police forces and that software upgrades enabling airborne data link systems to automatically default to National Emergency Services user encryption had been completed for all operational aircraft (Home Office, Feb 2025). HM Government had previously stated in January 2020 that aircraft were being manually configured at the start of each shift while an automated technology solution was developed (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government response, Jan 2020).
Grenfell Tower Fire (Written Ministerial Statement HCWS18)
Written Ministerial Statement HCWS18: "I am announcing today the appointment of Sir Martin Moore-Bick to head the Public Inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire." The Inquiry's own key-documents page separately lists a Prime Minister's appointment letter dated 28 June 2017 (title only, not independently fetched this pass).
Grenfell Tower Inquiry terms of reference published
Prime Minister's response accepting in full the Chairman's 10 August 2017 recommendation. Applies to the whole inquiry; both Phase 1 and Phase 2 operated under this single, unamended Terms of Reference (see grenfell_instruments.tsv).
First published core participants list: 532 individuals and organisations designated by that date (504 bereaved/survivors/residents, 28 organisations). Applies to the whole inquiry (pre-phase split).
Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report: government response
Phase 1. Joint response from the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government and the Home Office, published 21 January 2020, responding to the 30 October 2019 Phase 1 report.
Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report: Government response
Phase 2. Command paper CP 1248, joint response from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Cabinet Office and Home Office, presented to Parliament 26 February 2025 (page last updated 2 June 2025). Government committed to reporting annually to Parliament on implementation.
Total inquiry costs Aug 2017 - Jan 2025. Inquiry Legal = Chairman (Sir Martin Moore-Bick), Panel and Counsel. Staff = Secretariat, Accommodation and Operations. Technology = Hearing Room and Legal Tech. Other = Assessors and Expert Witnesses. 619 core participants (585 BSR) funded through 24 solicitors firms and 59 counsel.
Signed resource-accounting correction recorded 9 October 2026: the FY2023/24 financial report publishes a £1.785m credit (−£1,785,000) for Core Participant Recognised Legal Representation, reflecting suppliers overestimating prior-year billing. The report separately states actual cash spend of £122,000 for FY2023/24; that cash observation is neither a substitute for nor additive to the resource credit. The £3.245m period total remains unchanged. The earlier note saying the negative adjustment is shown as £0 is superseded; the prior notes below remain unchanged for audit and any other valid statements remain in force.
Prior notes (unchanged): Calculated from cumulative financial reports. Inquiry Legal = Chairman, Panel and Counsel. Staff = Secretariat, Accommodation and Operations. Technology = Hearing Room and Legal Tech. Other = Assessors and Expert Witnesses. FY23-24 had negative CP Legal adjustment (-£1.8m) for prior over-estimates, shown as £0.
Total inquiry costs Aug 2017 - Jan 2025. Inquiry Legal = Chairman (Sir Martin Moore-Bick), Panel and Counsel. Staff = Secretariat, Accommodation and Operations. Technology = Hearing Room and Legal Tech. Other = Assessors and Expert Witnesses. 619 core participants (585 BSR) funded through 24 solicitors firms and 59 counsel.
Written Ministerial StatementHouse of CommonsFlorence Eshalomi · Labour
Statement: My Noble Friend the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Resilience (Baroness Blake of Leeds CBE) has today made the following statement:The Grenfell Tower fire was a preventable tragedy that claimed 72 lives and exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in the systems designed to keep people safe. …
Written Ministerial StatementHouse of LordsBaroness Blake of Leeds · Labour
Statement: The Grenfell Tower fire was a preventable tragedy that claimed 72 lives and exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in the systems designed to keep people safe. It remains a profound failure of oversight and accountability which should never have happened and the bereaved, survivors and local community …
Written QuestionHouse of LordsLord Bourne of Aberystwyth · Conservative
Asked: To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are continuing to enter into contracts with Arconic for the supply of cladding panels.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: The Government remains committed to holding organisations to account for the failings identified by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Officials across Government continue to consider what further commercial measures may be appropriate while safeguarding the integrity of the criminal investigation. MHCLG does not enter into direct contracts with Arconic for the supply of cladding panels.
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsSir James Cleverly · Conservative
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, with reference to the written statement of 20 May 2026, HCWS51, on Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report Update, which organisations are subject to the policy of not sharing a public platform; and …
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: The Government is committed to taking clear and proportionate action in response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s findings. The Public Engagement Policy and which companies it applies to is published on GOV.UK . Ministers and senior civil servants will decide how and when they engage with external bodies bearing in mind the principles of accountability, transparency and the balance of …
Written QuestionHouse of LordsLord Hunt of Wirral · Conservative
Asked: To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment it has made of the practical incentives, other than retention payments, available to ensure good building construction practices.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: Since 2023, dutyholders, including clients, principal contractors and principal designers, are regulated through the building control process. Prosecutions may be brought for breaches of the building regulations under Section 35 of the Building Act 1984 where appropriate. The government has also accepted a recommendation of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Report to introduce principal contractor licensing, to ensure principal contractors working …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsEdward Morello · Liberal Democrat
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what support is available to leaseholders in West Dorset facing costs associated with building safety remediation and compliance following the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: We recognise concerns about building safety costs and are clear that costs should be fair, transparent and represent value for money. Protections are in place to limit the costs of remediating historical building safety defects. Cladding remediation costs are met by Government funding programmes or developers, while further protections, including the Developer Remediation Contract, contribution caps for certain leaseholders, and …
Written QuestionHouse of CommonsEdward Morello · Liberal Democrat
Asked: To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what steps he is taking to ensure leaseholders are not required to meet the costs of remediation works arising from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations.
Answered by Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government: We recognise concerns about building safety costs and are clear that costs should be fair, transparent and represent value for money. Protections are in place to limit the costs of remediating historical building safety defects. Cladding remediation costs are met by Government funding programmes or developers, while further protections, including the Developer Remediation Contract, contribution caps for certain leaseholders, and …
Written Ministerial StatementHouse of LordsBaroness Taylor of Stevenage · Labour
Statement: My Honourable Friend the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy (Samantha Dixon MBE MP) has today made the following statement:The Grenfell Tower tragedy exposed deep-rooted weaknesses in the systems designed to keep people safe. The preventable loss of 72 lives remains a profound failure …
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was established following the fire on 14 June 2017 that resulted in 72 deaths. The inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, published its Phase 1 report in October 2019 focusing on the events of the night, and its Phase 2 report in September 2024 examining the causes of the fire.
The inquiry's Phase 1 recommendations led to documented changes in fire service operations. London Fire Brigade revised its policies for handling fire survival guidance calls and introduced new training on external wall fires. The National Fire Chiefs Council published guidance addressing evacuation strategies and external wall fire risks. Several fire services introduced electronic systems for recording emergency calls.
Two significant pieces of legislation followed the inquiry's work. The Fire Safety Act 2021 clarified that the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 applies to external walls and flat entrance doors. The Building Safety Act 2022 established the Building Safety Regulator and introduced new requirements for high-rise residential buildings, including the appointment of accountable persons and the maintenance of building safety information.
The inquiry's 104 recommendations span operational procedures, training requirements, regulatory reform, and building safety management. While legislative changes and operational reforms are documented in the public record, evidence of action on several specific recommendations, particularly those requiring inter-service coordination or standardised information systems, has not been identified in publicly available sources.
Reforms attributed to this inquiry · AI-generated• The Fire Safety Act 2021 extended the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 to cover external walls and flat entrance doors • The Building Safety Act 2022 established the Building Safety Regulator and introduced requirements for building safety information • London Fire Brigade introduced new policies for handling fire survival guidance calls following Phase 1 recommendations • National Fire Chiefs Council published new guidance on evacuation strategies and external wall fires • Fire and rescue services across England introduced training programmes on external wall fire risks • Electronic systems for recording fire survival guidance calls introduced by multiple fire servicesUnfinished business · AI-generated• No published evidence of legislation requiring building owners to provide external wall information to fire services in a standardised format • No published evidence of mandatory national standards for control room to incident commander communications • No published evidence of statutory requirements for regular refresher training intervals for control room operators • No published evidence of implemented protocols for inter-service control room information sharing between LFB, LAS and MPS
Findings about the inquiry's recommendations as a whole
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services(1 Nov 2024)
This site's summary of the finding: LFB rated "outstanding" for responding to major and multi-agency incidents. Significant improvements since January 2022 inspection. Understanding of risk improved.
The Summerland fire of 1973 demonstrated that combustible cladding materials can enable rapid and catastrophic fire spread. The same lesson was tragically repeated at Grenfell Tower 44 years later.
Ronan Point introduced the concept of resistance to disproportionate collapse in building regulations. The Grenfell Tower fire raised the same fundamental question about the gap between building regulation and safety in practice.