Manchester Arena Inquiry

A clean start should be possible when a student moves from school to college or higher education, such that it would not be appropriate for a general file on significant behavioural problems to follow them at that point. However, there may still be value in passing on a record of any behaviour that is assessed to indicate vulnerability to radicalisation. I recommend that the Department for Education consider whether this is workable and, as with the school record, what nature of incident and level of seriousness should be included in this kind of record.

In a Cabinet Office dashboard update in February 2026, the Department for Education stated that implementation remained in progress, having analysed sector views on Keeping Children Safe in Education guidance, but noted it still needed to discuss detailed proposals with ministers while "awaiting broader steers" on the government's approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

I also recommend that consideration be given to the creation of statutory powers under section 36 that can be used to prevent a material witness to an inquiry putting themselves beyond the reach of the existing powers to compel a witness's attendance. One such power, which would have assisted in the cases of Ismail Abedi and Ahmed Taghdi, would be a short-term restriction on the use of a witness's passport prior to attending to give evidence when required.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that the Ministry of Justice would consider it in light of wider reforms to strengthen the public inquiries system following recommendations from the Statutory Inquiries Committee (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In that February 2026 update, the department added that any legislative changes needed would be "taken forward as part of this broader package" (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK government had previously partially accepted the recommendation in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

In 2021, the Commission for Countering Extremism published a report entitled Operating with Impunity. Hateful Extremism: The Need for a Legal Framework. I recommend that the Home Office consider and respond to this document as a matter of urgency.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the action was complete, noting that a counter-extremism review had concluded and the Commission for Countering Extremism's report helped inform its findings (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated that recommendations from the review were being considered and that the government would continue to work closely with the Commission to determine its approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded in November 2025 that the recommendation was accepted in full (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the Crown Prosecution Service establish a written protocol in relation to its approach to any application from an inquiry Chairman for a section 35 prosecution to be taken over under section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was completed, stating that published Crown Prosecution Service guidance confirms an inquiry chairman can ask the service to take over proceedings under section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had accepted the measure in full in November 2025, when the department first recorded this position (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the Department for Education consider whether schools should include notes of any significant behavioural problems on the Common Transfer File, or some other suitable new form of record which follows a student if they move school. The focus should be on any behaviour that may be indicative of violent extremism, such as physical aggression or misogynistic conduct. This kind of behaviour is consistent with the development of a violent extremist mindset, but is not necessarily an indication of it by any means. Details as to what nature of incident and level of seriousness should be included in such a record will therefore require careful thought by the Department for Education, alongside consultation with relevant stakeholders.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the Department for Education's work on the recommendation remained in progress (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department stated in February 2026 that it had analysed sector responses to a call for evidence on statutory safeguarding guidance to inform its proposed approach (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted in the same February 2026 update that it still needed to take a detailed submission to ministers and was awaiting broader government steers on the guidance (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

I recommend that the Home Office consider introducing a system based on a robust assessment of the risk a prisoner poses for radicalisation of others. This system should allow for proportionate restrictions to be applied to visitors to that person. Controls such as prohibiting vulnerable visitors where justified or ensuring conversations are supervised should be among the options available in the case of a prisoner who poses a particular risk to others.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that work on the recommendation was complete following the rollout of the Enhanced Contact Vetting Scheme in June 2025 (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It noted in that February 2026 update that the scheme limits all terrorist prisoners to 20 social contacts and requires identification checks alongside counter-terrorism police vetting (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The department had previously recorded in November 2025 that the government accepted the recommendation in full, while introducing enhanced monitoring of communications and increased vetting checks for high-risk prisoners (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025; Cabinet Office, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the Home Office give consideration to addressing the difficulties in extradition in relation to an offence under section 35, given that the maximum sentence for such an offence is below the minimum qualifying threshold for extradition.

The Cabinet Office reported in February 2026 that the Ministry of Justice has "no current plans to increase the maximum sentence" for an Inquiries Act offence to bring individuals within scope of extradition, because existing and proposed penalties are proportionate and dual criminality might still prevent extradition (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It stated in February 2026 that wider reforms to the Inquiries Act are under consideration, in light of which the recommendation will be considered and any necessary legislative changes taken forward (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

I recommend that the Ministry of Justice give consideration to amending section 21 of the 2005 Act to include the express provision for requiring a potential witness to participate in an interview.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that this recommendation remains in progress, explaining that it is considering wider reforms to the Inquiries Act 2005 and that the Ministry of Justice will consider the proposal in light of those reforms, with any required legislative changes taken forward as part of a broader package (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). The UK Government had previously registered the recommendation as partially accepted in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the Ministry of Justice, possibly in conjunction with the Law Commission, give consideration to amending section 36 of the 2005 Act to make provision for issuing pre-emptive enforcement proceedings for witnesses in relation to whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that they will not co-operate.

In February 2026, the Cabinet Office reported that the recommendation remained in progress, explaining that the Ministry of Justice would consider it alongside wider reforms to the Inquiries Act 2005 and that any resulting legislative changes remained to be taken forward as part of that broader package (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). Earlier, the government had recorded the recommendation as partially accepted in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).

I recommend that the scheme be codified, and clear policy and guidance be published so that it can be applied consistently across the prison estate.

The Cabinet Office stated in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, noting that the Authorised Communications Controls and Interception Policy Framework was published in September 2022 to provide rules and guidance across prisons and Young Offenders Institutions (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). In the same February 2026 update, it added that HM Prison and Probation Service had established a National Counter Terrorism Communications Centre to monitor authorised phone communications and conduct vetting checks for high-risk prisoners (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026).

I recommend to all educational establishments and the Department for Education that images of school pupils or college students handling firearms, explosives or other weapons that come to the attention of staff be recorded as a potential indicator of violent extremism, unless there is a very clear innocent explanation, so that this can be taken into account in any assessment of vulnerability to radicalisation.

The Cabinet Office stated in February 2026 that the recommendation was complete, reporting that it had analysed sector responses after it "utilised the existing call for evidence" on the Keeping Children Safe in Education statutory guidance to inform its response (Cabinet Office, Feb 2026). It had given the same progress update in November 2025, when it also recorded the status as complete (Cabinet Office, Nov 2025). The UK Government originally accepted the recommendation in full in November 2025 (Cabinet Office response, Nov 2025).