Defence in the High North

As the Northern Sea Route becomes more accessible, Russia may seek to turn its control of the route into a de facto monopoly. A transit by a UK state-owned vessel through international waters could help uphold freedom of navigation rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but this action would need to be carefully assessed against the operational and escalatory risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 16)

The government should prepare options for a UK state-owned vessel to transit the Northern Sea Route in support of international freedom of navigation rights, including an assessment of the legal basis, operational risks and potential Russian response. (Recommendation, Paragraph 17) High North policy challenges

UK leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force and NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk offers an opportunity to address any apparent overlap between these groups to ensure resources are effectively deployed to enhance deterrence and maximise warfighting capability. Although the Joint Expeditionary Force was originally intended to operate across the spectrum of conflict, it currently offers a quick response force to counter threats below the NATO Article 5 threshold, in the expectation that NATO would deter any escalation to warfighting. However, with less certainty around US commitment to collective NATO defence, the Joint Expeditionary Force’s more minimal capabilities could be seen as less of a deterrent, leaving it potentially exposed if an incident threatens to escalate. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

Within a year of assuming leadership of NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk, the government should reassess the added value the JEF brings to European security. Either it believes the JEF provides distinct value alongside NATO and should therefore strengthen and align the two more closely, or it does not, and should focus its finite resources on NATO. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) 44

If the government believes that the JEF provides a valuable additional capability alongside NATO structures, and Canada is admitted into the JEF, then focusing more on the High North may well be the most effective use of resources. With Sweden and Finland having joined NATO, eight of the nine countries around the Baltic Sea are now members of the Alliance, offering significant capabilities of their own in that region. (Conclusion, Paragraph 50)

The government should consider whether the JEF focuses on the High North, concentrating finite resources on maximising its ability to operate more frequently in the harsh climate there while undertaking the demanding anti-submarine mission, rather than operating as often in the Baltic as previously. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)

The United Kingdom has committed to acquiring a sub-strategic nuclear capability to enhance deterrence, although how this aligns with the security of the High North is less clear. To ensure the capability is effective it will probably be necessary for the RAF to occasionally rehearse forward deploying the nuclear-capable F-35A aircraft to the High North. Recipient countries will, therefore, need to be fully aligned and supportive of Britain’s extended deterrence strategy. Uniquely, the UK already declares its existing nuclear forces to NATO, but despite consuming over a fifth of the defence budget the MOD does not maximise the political and economic value of this considerable financial and military commitment. (Conclusion, Paragraph 59)

Alongside its response to this report the Ministry of Defence should provide the Defence Committee with a classified briefing on how the Department intends to enhance nuclear deterrence through the acquisition of its new sub-strategic capability, including any discussions with regional allies on enhancing extended deterrence in the High North, including through the forward deployment of the capability. Furthermore, given the enormous financial burden of operating the deterrent, the MOD should remind Allies more frequently of the unique nuclear capability the UK declares to NATO in the defence of Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60) Royal Navy readiness for High North operations

Measured against its own military requirements, the Ministry of Defence has a serious anti-submarine warfare gap. Towed array sonar-equipped frigates are central to detecting and tracking hostile submarines in the High North, the North Atlantic and UK waters, including around the UK’s nuclear deterrent bases. Reducing the fleet to five such vessels against a requirement for eight weakens the UK’s ability to respond to the Russian 45 submarine and underwater sabotage threat and raises questions about whether the transition from the Type 23 to the Type 26 frigate capability has been properly managed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 73)

Given the critical role of anti-submarine operations in the High North, the government should ensure no further towed array-equipped Type 23 Frigates leave service until they are replaced on a one-for-one basis by the new Type 26 vessels. (Recommendation, Paragraph 74)

The Royal Marines’ Arctic expertise is a significant national strength, but it cannot compensate for shortfalls in the naval platforms needed to deploy, protect and sustain operations in the region. The UK’s ability to deter and respond to threats in the High North depends not only on future programmes, but also on the readiness of the Royal Navy’s existing ships, submarines and specialist forces. Russian submarine and seabed warfare capabilities based in the High North pose direct risks to the North Atlantic, UK waters and the nuclear deterrent. Evidence of low availability among destroyers, frigates and attack submarines therefore raises serious questions about whether the UK can meet its High North commitments before new capabilities enter service. (Conclusion, Paragraph 82)

When responding to this report the government should provide the Defence Committee with a plan setting out how the Ministry of Defence will improve the availability of the Royal Navy’s frigates, destroyers and attack submarines before 2030. This update might be presented at a classified level, but the Committee will expect a version to be subsequently publicly available. (Recommendation, Paragraph 83)

The UK has allowed its under-ice submarine capability to lapse at a time when the High North has become strategically more important. Without a credible under-ice capability, the UK is less able to contest Russian freedom of action in the High North and risks being forced into a more defensive posture. Russia can then use the ice to conceal and protect its own submarines, while threatening NATO sea lanes, UK critical infrastructure and the nuclear deterrent. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

Alongside its response to this report the government should brief the Defence Committee on progress it is making to re-establish as rapidly as possible an under-ice capability for at least some of the Astute Class submarines so they can operate effectively in the High North and regularly exercise there to maintain that capability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89) 46 High North capability investment in the longer-term

To offer as credible a deterrent as possible to dissuade Russian aggression in the High North, NATO needs effective military capabilities. Evidence suggests there would be critical military gaps if the United States were not involved in countering such aggression. Given the uncertainty around the latter’s commitment during any future crisis, the UK can play a significant role within NATO by helping identify these capability gaps, and then ensuring these deficiencies are addressed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 100)

Alongside its response to this report the Ministry of Defence should provide the Committee with a classified assessment of the capability gaps that would arise in a 2030 High North conflict scenario in which the UK and regional allies had to operate without US support. This assessment should identify the most serious gaps in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, satellite data, anti-submarine warfare, command and control, deep strike, air and missile defence, cyber resilience, logistics and munitions; assess their operational impact; and set out which gaps can be mitigated by 2030 through UK, bilateral, European or NATO action. (Recommendation, Paragraph 101)

We are not yet persuaded that the £1.3 billion allocated to the Hybrid Navy programme will be sufficient to develop, procure and integrate its five planned classes of maritime platform: four uncrewed classes and the crewed Common Combat Vessel. The government should set out in its response to this report the basis on which it judges the current funding allocation to be adequate. (Recommendation, Paragraph 108)

Uncrewed systems could help the Royal Navy generate the mass and persistence needed for sustained operations in the High North, the North Atlantic and around critical undersea infrastructure. They could be especially valuable for surveillance, anti-submarine sensing and seabed protection, where crewed platforms are scarce and expensive. However, the High North is an exceptionally demanding environment for autonomous systems. Cold, ice, long ranges, degraded communications, poor satellite geometry and electronic interference could all reduce their effectiveness. We are concerned that the MOD’s Hybrid Navy concept must not become a substitute for crewed capability before uncrewed systems have been proven in the specific conditions of the High North. (Conclusion, Paragraph 113)

Within a year the government should set out how it will robustly test and validate the Hybrid Navy’s principal uncrewed systems in High North conditions before they are relied upon for Atlantic Bastion or other operational tasks. This should include cold-weather performance, 47 endurance, communications resilience, resistance to jamming and spoofing, protection against capture or reverse engineering, and integration with crewed ships, submarines and allied forces. (Recommendation, Paragraph 114)

Defence exports can strengthen the UK’s position in the High North when they help closely aligned allies field capabilities that are interoperable with the Royal Navy and are suited to northern operations. The Norway Type 26 agreement is a clear example: if delivered well, it could expand NATO’s ASW capacity on the northern flank and deepen UK-Norwegian operational and industrial integration. However, export success must not come at the expense of the Royal Navy’s own Type 26 frigate delivery timelines. The government must ensure that naval exports expand industrial capacity and allied capability, rather than competing with UK requirements for scarce ships, systems and skilled labour. (Conclusion, Paragraph 122)

In its response to this report the government should set out how major naval export programmes, including the Norway Type 26 agreement and any future uncrewed maritime systems, will support High North deterrence while protecting Royal Navy capabilities. This should include an assessment of their effect on UK delivery timelines, industrial capacity, shared training, sustainment, interoperability and the availability of critical anti-submarine warfare and uncrewed capabilities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 123) Conclusion

The MOD has recognised that the gradual opening of the High North in recent years has made the defence and security of the region a high priority. Failure to deter Russia in the region, particularly from underwater threats, puts at particular risk sub-sea data cables and energy pipes in adjacent UK waters during peacetime. Failure to counter Russia in the High North during hostilities would also threaten the UK population and entire military and civilian critical national infrastructure, including the nuclear deterrent and Atlantic resupply routes from the US. (Conclusion, Paragraph 124)

Government is already investing in the Hybrid Navy and Atlantic Bastion concepts to deter and, if necessary, defeat those threats in the High North. However, Royal Navy equipment readiness and platform numbers in particular are currently far worse than the government’s stated requirements. With 2030 identified as a key date by which to be ready to deter or defeat any Russian threat, dramatic progress is required before the end of the decade to improve the availability and capabilities of the UK’s Armed Forces for operations in the High North. (Conclusion, Paragraph 125) 48