8
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Acknowledged
Despite having spent around 50% of the allocated budget (£800 million), the programme has yet to place a manufacturing contract. The programme has a current in-service date of 2024 (originally planned for 2017) and is some £227 million over budget. After a decade of effort, this abject failure to deliver …
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Despite having spent around 50% of the allocated budget (£800 million), the programme has yet to place a manufacturing contract. The programme has a current in-service date of 2024 (originally planned for 2017) and is some £227 million over budget. After a decade of effort, this abject failure to deliver against both cost, (with an overrun now totalling over a quarter of a billion pounds of public money) and timescale (ISD seven years late) is clearly totally unacceptable. Nevertheless, it is symptomatic of the extremely weak management of Army equipment programmes, by both DE & S and the Army Board itself, in recent years.
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Government response AI summary
The government notes the committee’s concerns regarding the Warrior CSP's failures, attributing them to technical challenges. It states that the Warrior upgrade has been cancelled as part of the Integrated Review and that a programme of acquisition reform, with new systems for lesson identification and …
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Ministry of Defence
11
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Acknowledged
The first vehicles were originally due to be delivered to the British Army in April 2017, however this was delayed. In May 2020 it emerged that the delivery of the first batch of Ajax vehicles was to be delayed further as they were found not to be ready to be …
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The first vehicles were originally due to be delivered to the British Army in April 2017, however this was delayed. In May 2020 it emerged that the delivery of the first batch of Ajax vehicles was to be delayed further as they were found not to be ready to be accepted into service. It is not exactly clear what caused this delay but, in its evidence to the inquiry GDLSUK stated that delays had occurred in agreeing requirements and challenges with the integration of the 40mm weapon system mandated by the Ministry of Defence - similar to the issue on the Warrior programme.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged concerns about AJAX delivery delays, explaining that technical challenges related to digitisation, system complexity, and 40mm weapon integration are being collaboratively addressed with the Prime Contractor.
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Ministry of Defence
21
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Acknowledged
It is alarming that for at least the next several years UK armoured forces may find themselves overmatched by their most challenging peer adversary. During the Cold War, the British Army and its NATO counterparts sought to offset the numerical advantage held by the Warsaw Pact through the superior quality …
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It is alarming that for at least the next several years UK armoured forces may find themselves overmatched by their most challenging peer adversary. During the Cold War, the British Army and its NATO counterparts sought to offset the numerical advantage held by the Warsaw Pact through the superior quality of its equipment, training, and people. While we do not believe Army personnel have diminished in their capability and motivation, it does appear that our heavy armoured equipment has fallen behind in terms of both quantity and quality. (Paragraph 78) The future of UK armoured capability
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the concept of overmatch but asserts it is not simply quantity versus quantity, outlining its modernization program to ensure the Army can overmatch adversaries across the battlespace and deal with new threats.
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Ministry of Defence