Recommendations & Conclusions
30 items
1
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Even in the sorry recent history of the Army’s attempts to procure Armoured Fighting Vehicles, MRAV—now Boxer—stands out as a stark example of how shifting priorities and indecision about requirements lead to increased costs and failure to deliver new capabilities.
Government response. By way of background, the broad and demanding requirement of Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), that included Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV), could not easily be met. In addition, other factors including complex commercial arrangements, significant planning round savings, changing global …
Ministry of Defence
2
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
The Ministry of Defence and the Army embarked on a series of overly-ambitious procurement programmes which were too reliant on the development of nascent technologies in order to deliver viable capabilities; within these programmes; and, there was a reluctance to trade off capability requirements (such as vehicle weight) leading to …
Government response. The Army, DE&S and the MOD have continued to improve Defence acquisition. Many of the 2011 NAO “cost effective delivery of an armoured vehicle capability” observations and recommendations have been implemented in the Army’s delivery approach including trading requirements, pursuing …
Ministry of Defence
3
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Procurement practices and skills were frequently found wanting; in 2011 the NAO concluded that the failure to introduce any new vehicles since 1997 indicated that, “the Department’s standard acquisition processes for armoured vehicles was not working”. Subsequently the Committee of Public Accounts concluded that “there [was] poor accountability for long-term …
Government response. The Department notes the Committee’s comments and acknowledges that defence acquisition has faced challenges in the past, including within its Armoured Fighting Vehicle portfolio. Whilst defence acquisition remains inherently challenging and complex, our approach has evolved significantly over the past …
Ministry of Defence
4
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We are concerned that the Ministry of Defence, and in particular Defence Equipment and Support may not have sufficient technically qualified staff and capacity to manage effectively the multiple armoured vehicle procurement and upgrade programmes that are currently underway. Given both the large amounts of taxpayer’s money at stake and …
Government response. The Department notes the Committee’s comments and recognises the importance of skills and internal capability in future delivery of defence procurement and support. DE&S has undergone a significant transformation programme over recent years, including a focus on people and skills, …
Ministry of Defence
5
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We are astonished that between 1997 and late 2020 (with the exception of a small number of armoured engineering and Viking protected mobility vehicles) the Department had not delivered a single new armoured vehicle from the core procurement programme into operational service with the Army. It is clear that the …
Government response. Whilst modernisation and upgrading of existing, and entry into service of new Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) has taken far longer than originally intended, the Department’s focus on urgently procuring the right kit for its operations in the Middle East cannot …
Ministry of Defence
6
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We note that the Department’s recent experience of upgrading older vehicles with new weapons and turrets has been difficult, resulting in additional costs and delays 54 Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability in delivering the required capability. The Challenger 2 LEP calls for the integration of a …
Government response. CR2 Life Extension Project (LEP) considered a range of comparative off-the shelf alternatives as part of its recent Full Business Case submission. The underpinning logic on the grounds of affordability and meeting our requirements were fully tested by both the …
Ministry of Defence
7
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We do not want to see the Army forced to ensure a lengthy capability gap as a consequence of emergent technical and integration issues. The Department should confirm to us that the UK’s main battle tank capability is currently fit for purpose and will remain so until Challenger 2 LEP …
Government response. CR2 has been in service for over 20 years and requires modernisation to ensure that it can meet its operational requirements which is why the Army initiated the CR2 LEP. The CR2 LEP has recently been approved and the Army …
Ministry of Defence
8
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Despite having spent around 50% of the allocated budget (£800 million), the programme has yet to place a manufacturing contract. The programme has a current in-service date of 2024 (originally planned for 2017) and is some £227 million over budget. After a decade of effort, this abject failure to deliver …
Government response. The Department notes the Committee’s concerns about historical progress on the Warrior Capability Sustainment Project (CSP). The drivers of cost growth and schedule delay related primarily to the technical and engineering challenges around systems integration, including those associated with the …
Ministry of Defence
9
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
The Ministry, which mandated this weapons system, should therefore now be fully transparent about the cost of this new, highly specialised ammunition and its implications for the full life-cycle costs of the vehicle (and indeed for Ajax, which utilises the same weapon system).
Government response. The Department is committed to this weapons system and agrees with the Committee for the need for accountability and transparency on the programme. The higher cost of the 40mm ammunition and weapon system reflects its increased capability against more demanding …
Ministry of Defence
10
Recommendation
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We note the significant delay and expenditure on the continuation of the Warrior CSP and that, after nine years and over £400 million in sunk costs, the Department has still to decide on the placement of a production contract. We would expect the Department to assess carefully the merits of …
Government response. A decision has now been taken as part of the Integrated Review to no longer upgrade Warrior due to some of the issues highlighted by the Committee, but also the Army’s capability requirements to meet current and future threats. The …
Ministry of Defence
11
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
The first vehicles were originally due to be delivered to the British Army in April 2017, however this was delayed. In May 2020 it emerged that the delivery of the first batch of Ajax vehicles was to be delayed further as they were found not to be ready to be …
Government response. The Department notes the Committee’s comments and appreciates their concerns about delays in delivery of this capability to the front line. AJAX represents the first major procurement of an Armoured Fighting Vehicle that is fully digitised with an Electronic Architecture. …
Ministry of Defence
12
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
The Ajax programme, which is now also seriously delayed, is yet another example of chronic mismanagement by the Ministry of Defence and its shaky procurement apparatus. This is particularly worrying, as Ajax is fundamental to the establishment and deployment of the Army’s new Strike Brigades, which are intended to be …
Government response. There is no suggestion that the weapons system has contributed to the delays on AJAX and we remain committed to it. While there are alternatives to the 40mm cannon, they do not meet the lethality requirements and are unable to …
Ministry of Defence
13
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We note that difficulties with the Ajax programme have again arisen in part as a consequence of the Army’s desire to develop a bespoke vehicle capability (albeit one based on an existing but modified ASCOD 2 hull), with a plethora of complex requirements, and the need to integrate a novel …
Government response. originally envisaged as the first next generation modern, digital AFV. As in any complex acquisition there are several risks and challenges that materialise in the demonstration and pre-production phases which the MOD looks to manage and mitigate against thorough analysis …
Ministry of Defence
14
Recommendation
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We recognise that the Army must prioritise its equipment spending to specific areas of capability, but consider it unacceptable that the replacement of the FV430 series may not be in service until the 2030s, meaning that this vehicle will have been in service for some 70 years. We urge the …
Government response. Age is not always an indicator of capability and it should be recognised that the FV430 series (now called Bulldog (BD)) has had a series of upgrades to enhance its mobility, lethality and protection. It has been used successfully on …
Ministry of Defence
15
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We welcome the decision to procure the Boxer armoured vehicle for the British Army, albeit more than ten years later than would have been the case had the UK stayed in the original multi-national consortium. As part of the Integrated Review and associated funding decisions, the Department should seek to …
Government response. The Department agrees with the Committee on the desirability of acceleration of Boxer and whilst there have been financial constraints the MOD is intending to accelerate and enhance the programme, intending to deliver full operational capability by 2030. The Boxer …
Ministry of Defence
16
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We believe that commonality of platforms and modularity of capability such as sensors and weapon systems will be an essential element in maintaining an effective and capable Army. The Department should ensure that future decisions around procuring new vehicles give greater weight to the undoubted benefits offered by both commonality …
Government response. The Department fully supports the aspiration for commonality of platforms and modularity of capability where this is appropriate given the potential implications on cost and performance. This is something we have considered in commissioning sensors for AJAX that can be …
Ministry of Defence
17
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We are alarmed by the revelation to this inquiry that a core aspect of the plans set out in the 2015 SDSR will not be met. In its response to this Report the Ministry of Defence should provide a detailed explanation of the specific shortfalls (equipment, logistic support, personnel et …
Government response. Following SDSR 15 and subsequent planning round decisions, the modernisation programme was placed under increasing pressure, resulting in challenges to fully meet SDSR ambition. The Department has learnt from this and sought to fully resource the propositions within the recent …
Ministry of Defence
18
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
While we welcome the ongoing efforts to modernise the fleet, new vehicles will only trickle into service over the next four years, and it seems unlikely that they will do so in sufficient numbers to make a material difference by 2025. For example, the Ministry of Defence does not expect …
Government response. With the Full Business Case for CR2 LEP now approved and a contract awarded, a joint effort between RBSL and the MOD is investigating ways in which the current delivery timeline can be accelerated. Work is also ongoing on accelerating …
Ministry of Defence
19
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
An “artillery duel” between a modern British and Russian division would now only be likely to end one way—and not necessarily to the British Army’s advantage.
Government response. It is inconceivable that the UK would engage in Divisional artillery duel with Russia. Not only would we be shoulder to shoulder with our NATO allies, the Army in a conflict scenario would rely on a series of effectors to …
Ministry of Defence
20
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We share our witnesses’ concern that, considering recent experience in Ukraine and elsewhere, UK armoured forces may find themselves at a serious disadvantage in terms of artillery capability and air defence when facing a peer adversary. The Ministry of Defence must urgently pursue options to address shortfalls in artillery, air …
Government response. This area is indeed one of Defence’s top priorities. One of the Army’s four prioritised ‘sunrise capabilities,’ the Category ‘A’ Land Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) Programme comprises Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD), including Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS), Medium-Range Air Defence (MRAD), …
Ministry of Defence
21
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
It is alarming that for at least the next several years UK armoured forces may find themselves overmatched by their most challenging peer adversary. During the Cold War, the British Army and its NATO counterparts sought to offset the numerical advantage held by the Warsaw Pact through the superior quality …
Government response. Overmatch is not as simple as quantity versus quantity and the Department has articulated how the Land Component intends to ‘Operate’ and ‘Fight’ in the modern era. The aim is to ‘overmatch’ adversaries across the battlespace in both the physical …
Ministry of Defence
22
Recommendation
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We share Brigadier Barry’s concern about the message that any reductions in the Army’s ability to conduct high-intensity warfighting in defence of NATO may send to both our allies and adversaries. Whatever the specific conclusions that emerge from the Integrated Review, the Army must retain (or perhaps regain) its credibility. …
Government response. The Integrated Review has set the British Army on a course of radical transformation. Under ‘Future Soldier’ we will transform to become an Army that is more agile, more integrated and more expeditionary – ready for the next challenge, not …
Ministry of Defence
23
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
The lack of a credible short-range air defence system for our land forces, especially in light of the rapidly increasing threat from unmanned aerial vehicles, is of particular concern. We have already noted in Chapter 3 that the Army is also overmatched in terms the artillery firepower available to our …
Government response. There is an acknowledged pressing need for Defence to address GBAD. The Land GBAD Programme will deliver both SHORAD/MRAD capabilities from 2026, for which funding profiles are in place. Regarding the threat from Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), in the short …
Ministry of Defence
24
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We share the concerns of our witnesses and our predecessors. It appears that, as part of the Integrated Review, there is a risk that the Army’s current armoured capabilities (albeit in need of modernisation) are at risk of being denuded on the basis of promises of technically advanced ‘jam tomorrow’. …
Government response. Our current AFV fleet remains broadly fit for purpose against the most likely threats but must be modernised to ensure they can deal with future threats. The current modernisation programme is delivering a competitive advantage, intending to create a fleet …
Ministry of Defence
25
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
The Department must ensure that Project Morpheus is adequately resourced with technically qualified staff to facilitate coordination and integration with its current and planned armoured vehicle programmes. Based on the Department’s track record in the Land sector we are concerned that the programmes necessary to deliver the capability described above …
Government response. The LETacCIS programme provides the digital backbone for the deployed force from individual soldier, through the vehicle platforms, right the way to Divisional and Corps HQs. This digital backbone consists of the radio/bearers, user devices, associated infrastructure and applications required …
Ministry of Defence
26
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We support the Ministry of Defence’s initiative to develop a Land Industrial Strategy. The LIS should place the land sector on an equal footing with the Air and Maritime sectors, providing industry with certainty for the coming decades and ensuring the Army has access to the technical and manufacturing base …
Government response. The Department will develop and introduce a Land Industrial Strategy and absolutely sees the benefits of doing so, noting the positive expenditure on the Maritime and Air domains. The new Defence and Security Industrial Strategy acknowledges that the ability to …
Ministry of Defence
27
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We agree that it is important the Ministry of Defence maximises the collaborative opportunities offered by the recent investments in the UK’s armoured vehicles sector. The Department should ensure that it leverages these advantages by making a clear decision about its participation in the Main Ground Combat System. A repeat …
Government response. The Army’s Future Ground Combat System (FGCS) will replace the close combat capability from around 2040; the capability requirements are being informed by the most up to date threat assessments from Defence Intelligence and DSTL. The Future Ground Combat System …
Ministry of Defence
28
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
We trust the creation of and adherence to the proposed Land Industrial Strategy will improve the UK’s competitiveness in this sector. The Ministry of Defence, the British Army and their Industry counterparts must work together to map out the coming decades for the armoured vehicle sector. (Paragraph 107) Conclusion
Government response. The Department welcomes and agrees with the Committee’s recommendation and recognises that successful procurement depends upon a positive and collaborative relationship with industry. The Army’s Armoured Fighting Vehicle modernisation programme, through our commitment to Ajax, Boxer and Challenger 3, has …
Ministry of Defence
29
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
This report reveals a woeful story of bureaucratic procrastination, military indecision, financial mismanagement and general ineptitude, which have continually bedevilled attempts to properly re-equip the British Army over the last two decades. Even on the MoD’s own current plans (but subject to the Integrated Review), we are still some four …
Government response. Whilst there is some truth that there has been a lack of emphasis on the core AFV programme, the Department’s pre-eminent focus on delivering large-scale, urgent operational requirements for the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and its achievement in doing …
Ministry of Defence
30
Conclusion
Fifth report: Obsolescent and outgunned…
Were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary—a euphemism for Russia— in Eastern Europe in the next few years, whilst our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into battle in a combination of obsolescent or even …
Government response. . The Department agrees and acknowledges that the technical advantage of the UK over potential adversaries has diminished over the past two decades. The UK and other allies are now challenged by adversary investment in capabilities designed to counter our …
Ministry of Defence